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Abstract
Drawing on Foucault and the sociology o f science and technology, this thesis traces the 
curious attempt that has been made over the last century to capture one o f the most elusive 
social acts -  the lie. This endeavour was made possible by the emergence o f the human 
sciences, whose guiding belief was that the subject’s inner life could be made apparent by 
means of physiological measurements and therefore be controlled. My thesis follows the 
development o f the ‘embodiment’ o f the lie within early and recent psychology as a means o f 
detecdng the subject’s guilt. It examines the disconnection o f lie detection from its academic 
origins and its re-positioning within criminal investigation which engenders the development 
o f polygraphy as a separate profession. In this, it elaborates on the special roles played by 
instruments in lie detection practices — the ‘lie detector’ and the ‘polygraph’ -  and analyses 
changing epistemological aims and models o f ‘scientific’ expertise. In accounting for its 
contested status, the latter analysis is connected to an evaluation o f the continuous exclusion 
o f lie detection as scientific evidence from the courts.
The thesis examines the changing functions o f the polygraph examination in systems o f social 
control as their logic moves from reform to increased containment and control: from a 
confessional technique mediating the efficient processing o f a delinquent population from the 
1920s, to a disciplinary technique controlling employee behaviour from the 1930s. In recent 
years it has become a ‘truth facilitator’ in the management and containment o f the monstrous 
individual: the sex offender.
In a broader consideration o f the power/knowledge mechanism of lie detection, the thesis 
applies Foucault’s notion o f grotesque knowledge, arguing that the ensemble o f the lie 
detector/polygraph and psychological expert/interrogator is Ubuesque as it implements an 
absolute power in the ‘diagnosis’ o f  the lie, which is disqualified at the moment o f its 
verification through confession. The thesis demonstrates how Foucauldian analyses and the 
sociology o f science can be fruitfully combined to comprehensively explain both the 
dynamics o f contested expert knowledges and the ways in which psychological techniques 
operate in shaping the subject. Having traced the emergence o f the lie as an object of 
knowledge and intervention, the thesis concludes by providing directions in an historically 
informed sociology o f the lie.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Writing on the liar, Montaigne stated acidly:
‘I f  a lie, like truth, had only one face we could be on better terms, for certainty would be the reverse o f  
what the liar said. But the reverse side o f  truth has a hundred thousand shapes and no defined limits. The 
Pythagoreans make good to be definite and finite; evil they make indefinite and infinite. Only one flight 
leads to the bull’s-eye: a thousand can miss it.’1
In this thesis, I trace the curious attempt that has been made since the end o f the 19th century 
to come to better terms with the ‘lie’ — to reduce its ‘hundred thousand shapes’ and undefined 
limits so that certainty, truth is fashioned precisely as ‘the reverse o f what the liar said.’ As we 
will see, turning the lie into an object that can be known with certainty involved a series o f 
transformations in physiological techniques o f detecting deception at the end o f which the lie 
emerged as a tangible, recordable, discrete, a seemingly objective entity. The emergence of 
early techniques o f detecting deception was set within the interstices o f criminology and 
psychology. On different levels, these disciplines were guided by the idea that human beings 
and forms o f human action could be classified on the basis o f measuring bodily 
characteristics or functions and that these classifications, in turn, should provide a basis for 
social control. In this context techniques o f detecting deception became the basis o f a 
technique o f knowledge production and intervention. For it is not just that the detection o f 
deception afforded a way o f finding out when someone lies. Rather, more significantly, the lie 
itself was constructed in such a way that it became a clue to the criminal suspect’s guilt. The 
lie that was to be detected was the lie o f the criminal and the knowledge to be gained was that 
o f his guilt. The various experiments with lie detection culminated in the development o f the 
polygraph — or as it was later dubbed by the media, the ‘lie detector’ — in America in the mid- 
1920s and in borrowing from its ‘scientific’ designation the formation o f polygraphy as 
separate profession from the 1930s onwards. Having received little interest in the academic 
realm from which it emerged for the first 50 years o f its existence, from the 1970s 
psychologists yet again directed their attention towards polygraphy, turning it into a site of 
scientific contestation and developing new ways o f capturing the lie.
An historical study o f the development o f the history o f lie detection is intriguing at first 
glance — a popular scientific account o f the lie detector could make for fascinating bed-time 
reading — yet one still might wonder why a sociologist would study a technique that has been 
termed both dubious and outmoded in an age in which a host o f natural scientific techniques 
such as DNA-analysis have come to populate criminal investigation. In this introduction, I
1 Montaigne, 1991, p. 35.
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provide a rationale for the study o f the history o f lie detection which locates this thesis at the 
intersection o f the history o f the human sciences and the sociology and history o f science and 
technology.
Firstly, I show how the history o f lie detection provides a contribution to the study o f the 
history o f scientific methods o f criminal investigation within the history of criminology and 
the sociology o f science and technology. Secondly, I demonstrate how the study of 
polygraphy as a technology which intervenes on individuals by taking the body as a basis for 
the construction o f subjective truth, provides a contribution to the study o f how 
psychological techniques operate in current systems o f social control. Thirdly, I illustrate how 
the study o f the different ways in which the lie has been captured in the 20th century provides 
an insight into how psychology has conceived o f the human subject and allows for an analysis 
o f how contested forms o f knowledge take root while others remain locked in the 
psychologist’s laboratory. Fourthly, I show how an analysis o f the ‘lie detector’ and the 
‘polygraph’ provides an insight into how the representations o f science and their practices 
become entangled.
Partly inspired by Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, a number o f studies have emerged in the last 
thirty years that are concerned with the history o f the enmeshment of the nascent human 
sciences — defined broadly to include medicine, sociology, psychiatry, psychology and 
criminology — with the development o f the penal system. As part o f this field o f research, 
scholars have looked at how the figure o f the ‘criminal’ as a certain type o f human being was 
constituted as an object o f knowledge through different knowledge techniques that are 
external to jurisprudence and how these techniques were in turn applied to people classified 
as ‘criminals’ by an emergent group o f experts.2 Given the wealth o f studies which have 
traced the knowledge practices that developed alongside the criminal justice system in 
constituting the ‘criminal’ as an object o f knowledge and intervention, one is surprised to find 
a relative dearth in historical studies o f  how scientific discourses have come to be included in 
the detection o f crime. For the emergence o f the modern criminal justice system since the 
19th century has not only been characterised by the development o f a set o f scientific 
discourses concerning the classification and the treatment o f the offender, but it has equally 
been marked by the elaboration o f scientific techniques which now come under the heading 
o f ‘forensic science.’ These techniques are geared towards reconstructing the criminal act and 
establishing the guilt o f the suspect through the transformation o f ‘clues’ or ‘traces’ into 
‘scientific evidence.’
The lack in the extant literature o f an historical and sociological treatment o f the 
intertwinement o f scientific practices and criminal investigation from the middle o f the 19th
2 Cf. Garland (1985); Leps (1992); Becker and Wetzell (2006); Beime (1993); and Wetzell (2000).
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century onwards is arguably due to the selective fod o f the disciplines that study the 
emergence o f the modern criminal justice system.
According to Claire Valier, the history o f criminology has focused on three interrelated 
themes. Firsdy, it has studied the varying definitions o f criminal behaviour which have 
directed criminology. Secondly, it has concentrated on the development o f criminology as a 
professional discipline from the 1880s onwards.3 Thirdly, elaborating on Foucault’s history o f 
the birth o f the modern prison, the history o f criminology has identified the prison as the 
main institutional context in which modern mechanisms of social control are brought to bear 
on the individual.
A consideration o f the history o f scientific methods of criminal investigation within the 
history o f criminology is fruitful for gaining an understanding o f how knowledge techniques 
operate in terms o f organising the modern system o f social control beyond the confines o f 
the prison, and specifically in relation to apprehending the criminal. Additionally, the study o f 
scientific methods o f criminal investigation provides a more complex picture o f how the 
development o f diverse knowledge techniques are intertwined on the level o f developing 
knowledge o f the criminal as a certain human type as well as ‘taking a hold’ o f the criminal. 
Valier points to the history o f identification as an example o f how certain techniques — 
anthropometry and, to some extent, fingerprinting — became the basis upon which a method 
for identifying criminals was developed. Additionally, anthropometrical measurements came 
to be used by Lombroso as a basis for establishing a classification system of ‘criminal man,’ o f 
defining the criminal as a certain type o f human being. As part o f this study o f the 
intertwinement o f knowledge techniques, it can also be shown how certain techniques might 
be taken up in both realms but might also disappear again. For example, as regards the history 
o f fingerprint identification, fingerprints were taken both as method of identification as well 
as basis for the classification o f mental and criminal pathologies -  categories which 
overlapped. However, the criminological interest in fingerprints soon waned, while 
fingerprint identification became firmly rooted in criminal investigation. As regards the 
history o f lie detection, a similar movement is apparent. The techniques that were used in 
early detection o f deception were used by practitioners in analysing the mental patient and the 
criminal as specific types. As it moved into criminal investigation, the main developer o f the 
final set-up o f the lie detection examination, John Larson — a trained psychiatrist and 
physiologist — still sought to combine the detection o f the subject’s guilt with an analysis o f 
his ‘personality.’ As lie detection developed further, however, the simple interest in 
apprehending the criminal through the establishment o f his guilt on the basis o f his lie took 
precedent. There was no longer an interest in the kind o f individual that the suspect
3 Valier, 1998, p. 89.
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represented. As Valier points out, in criminal investigation the aims are much more 
immediate than in academic criminology.4 That is to say, the underlying causes o f crime which 
might be derived from a certain form o f behaviour and are rooted in a certain human type are 
not o f interest. Rather, the driving interest is simply in the apprehension o f the perpetrator. 
Thus the history o f  lie detection provides a contribution to how techniques o f knowledge 
production move between realms and how they are framed differently according to the aims 
o f the knowledge to be gained at the entry o f the criminal justice system. This also means that 
in moving between realms we might find different ways in which knowledge practices are 
organised, thus making an analysis o f different conceptions o f scientific expertise in these 
realms possible.
Another area o f research where one might expect to find studies o f scientific criminal 
detection is the history o f institutions o f social control. The history o f policing has become a 
si2able field. As the police have become one o f the central agencies that carry out criminal 
investigations using scientific methods o f crime detection, one might surmise that studies o f 
the development o f policing would take the increasing enmeshment o f scientific knowledge 
and the establishment o f criminal guilt as a focus o f study. However, historians o f law 
enforcement agencies have to a large extent focused on the development o f the police as a 
profession (with a view towards implementing reforms on the basis o f historical analyses) or 
on the role o f the police in maintaining public order.5 Moreover, insofar as (following 
Foucault) the history o f the police as one o f the main agents o f modern social control 
activities has been subject to the scrutiny o f historians of the human sciences, the role of 
agents o f social control in implementing a seamless web o f surveillance across the modern 
social body has tended to be highlighted. This varied emphasis has resulted in the exclusion
4 Ibid, p. 93.
5 There have been differences in the directions and quality o f  research across Western countries, most notably 
between studies in police history in Britain, France, and Germany, and the USA. While broader questions 
with regard to the history o f  the police as agency o f  social control have been raised by social historians in 
Britain and France, the study o f  American police history has to some extent remained outside o f  the 
province o f  the history o f  the human sciences and social history until more recently (Conley, 1977). In the 
US, professional histories were written with a view o f  learning lessons from failures o f past 
professionalization in the late 1970s and 1980s as a result o f  the conflict between the police and civil rights 
and student movements which lead to calls for police reform (Richardson, 1980; Deakin, 1988). There are 
some critically informed histories o f  the American police which were written in this period (e.g. Walker 1977, 
1998; Fogelson, 1977; Monkkonen, 1981). Additionally, much historical scholarship has focused on the 
emergence o f  the police in the 19th century and the police reform movement during the Progressive era up 
until WWI, which has crucially shaped the way in which the police became institutionalised in the US and 
which is relevant as regards this thesis (Monkkonen, 1981; Liebman and Polen, 1978). This has also included 
a range o f  studies o f  the development o f  individual police departments most notably N ew  York, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Boston (Richardson, 1977; Lane, 1967; Monkkonen, 1992). More recently, historical scholarship 
has emerged which addresses the role o f  the police in maintaining public order and their placement in the 
larger political order (Weiss, 1999; Robinson, 1994) as well as the police professionalization movement, 
which is related to the institution o f  scientific methods o f  criminal detection (Monkkonen, 1992). However, 
none o f  these studies examine in-depth the way in which scientific methods o f  criminal detection were 
constituted and integrated as knowledge practice as part o f  the development o f  the modem police.
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o f  an analysis o f the role played by the police and forensic experts in apprehending suspects 
and establishing the suspect’s guilt, and the techniques o f knowledge that are used to do so. 
The only attempt at a sustained history o f methods o f criminal detection that surfaces in this 
field is a Ph.D. dissertation written by Dillon in 1977.6
Before the 1970s, the sociology o f science (largely influenced by Merton) centred on the 
analysis o f science as an institution and represented more a sociology o f scient/jlr than a 
sociology o f scientific knowledge. From the 1970s onwards, scholars in the emergent social 
studies o f science started to scrutinise the construction o f scientific knowledge itself. This 
has not only resulted in in-depth studies o f how social practices constitute scientific 
knowledge but - in light o f the omnipresence o f ‘expert discourses’ in modern society - has 
also generated an interest in how scientific expertise is translated, used and shaped in other 
social realms. Given the spread o f the use o f scientific evidence into the legal system 
generally and into the criminal justice process specifically, it therefore makes sense that 
sociologists o f science would take an interest in studying ‘how ideas o f truth and ideas o f 
justice are co-constructed in the context o f legal proceedings.’7 While Jasanoff has provided 
one o f the first studies o f the construction o f scientific and technical evidence in litigation 
and the judicial shaping o f technological developments in areas o f bio-ethical concern, 
relatively few sociological forays have been made into the analysis o f the use o f scientific 
evidence in criminal cases. A special issue o f the journal Social Studies of Science on ‘Contested 
Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice’ edited by Jasanoff and Lynch constitutes one 
o f the rare examples o f an engagement by sociologists o f science with forensic science in 
criminal court proceedings. The contents o f this issue are instructive.8 Firsdy, all but one o f 
the articles presented in this issue centre on the most recent, most powerful and least 
contested form o f scientific evidence: DNA-profiling. Secondly, the articles centre on how 
the credibility o f scientific evidence is negotiated in the courtroom. The articles take the O. 
J. Simpson case as their starting point. As one o f  the most widely publicised and also the 
first fully televised criminal court case, the O. J. Simpson trial provided a wealth o f material 
for an analysis o f  the ‘discursive construction and deconstruction o f scientific credibility.’9 
As is well-known, the DNA-analysis provided by the prosecution was successfully 
challenged by the defence team. Because the trial enjoyed so much publicity and such an 
extensive amount of labour (and expense) was invested in the contestation o f the evidence
6 Dillon (1977).
7 Jasanoff, 1995, p. xiv. There is o f  course a large literature in legal theory and history which discusses the 
criteria for the admission o f  scientific evidence in legal proceedings. Some o f  this literature will be drawn on 
in Chapter 6.
8 Jasanoff and Lynch (1998a). For another collection o f  articles on scientific expertise in legal proceedings, cf. 
Edmond (2004).
9 Lynch and Jasanoff, 1998b, p. 675.
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provided — starting from how it was gathered, transported and examined — the trial material 
allowed the authors to analyse every minor step that might lead to an unravelling o f the 
chain o f translations from the drip o f blood to the presentation o f O. J. Simpson’s D N A  as 
proof o f his guilt in court. Thus the case presented ‘an exceptional window o f opportunity 
to investigate contingencies and uncertainties o f evidence production, as well as the 
discursive contingencies associated with the courtroom ‘exposure’ o f uncertainty.’10 Apart 
from the richness o f the material which the O. J. Simpson case affords, the research 
strategy employed by the authors o f the articles in the Social Studies of Science special issue has 
formed the basis o f much research in the field o f the social studies o f science and 
technology. W hether it be the development o f pasteurization,11 the creation o f the bubble 
chamber,12 or the construction o f the bicycle,13 sociologists o f science and technology have 
examined scientific theories and artefacts, and technological objects which seem the least 
amenable to a sociological analysis in order to show how these objects are actually the result 
o f  a complex process o f construction involving social and material factors. The only article 
that is not concerned with DNA-profiling in the issue edited by Jasanoff and Lynch equally 
follows this strategy. Simon Cole, one o f the few scholars in the social studies o f science to 
have provided a sustained historical analysis o f a particular scientific method o f crime 
detection already mentioned above, namely fingerprinting,14 shows how the infallibility o f 
fingerprint evidence was constructed through the practices and boundary-work o f latent 
fingerprint examiners.15 However, the opposite strategy may be just as useful, as Latour’s 
study o f the failure o f Aramis has shown.16 In this book, Latour shows that the failed 
development o f a public transportation system cannot simply be imputed to technological 
unfeasibility, but instead is the result o f the failure o f social and material actors to be 
brought into alignment to form a durable actor-network.
Rather than showing how the seemingly most advanced or reliable scientific methods o f 
criminal investigation are in fact the result o f a successful process o f ‘blackboxing’, in this 
thesis I study a scientific m ethod o f criminal investigation that has both remained highly 
controversial and generally been excluded from the criminal court. Although polygraph 
examinations continue to be the only type o f evidence to remain generally barred as 
scientific evidence in court decisions, they are widely used in criminal investigation. Thus, 
the polygraph constitutes a case o f what one might call a technique o f knowledge
10 Ibid, p. 684.
11 Latour (1988), Pickering (1995).
12 Pickering (1995).
13 Bijker (1995).
14 Cole (1999; 2001).
15 Cole (1998).
16 Latour (1996).
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production and intervention that — despite its continued failure in the judicial realm — has 
nevertheless setded successfully at the entrance o f  the criminal jusdce system. A sociological 
study o f the history o f lie detection thus affords an opportunity to study how a particular 
definition o f what constitutes science is elaborated by the courts in order to maintain and 
protect the construction o f judicial truth from certain types o f knowledge. Additionally, lie 
detection provides an opening for a sociological investigation into the ‘undergrowth’ o f the 
modern criminal justice system, a system that has become just as infused with practices that 
are geared towards the solution of the question o f guilt by means o f scientific knowledge as 
the criminal courts themselves.
And yet polygraphy does not remain restricted to its use in criminal investigation. From the 
1930s, it became a tool in the screening o f employees in commercial and increasingly in 
government institutions. Here, it served not only in the identification o f the petty thief or the 
uncovering o f the spy. It also became a tool in the surveillance o f the workforce. Additionally, 
as part o f recent developments, polygraph examinations have been used in the monitoring o f 
sex offenders on parole or probation. N ot only has this last use o f the polygraph examination 
been implemented in the US, which marks the ‘birth-place’ o f polygraphy and has remained 
its main geographical locale. In addition, in December 2006, the British Home Office was 
considering the implementation o f a scheme, which had constituted one o f the provisions for 
the 2005 Management of Offenders and Sentencing B illf  which forms part o f the ongoing penal 
reform of the British system. Thus as part o f polygraphy’s changing locales o f intervention, it 
comes to encompass different power mechanisms which it exerts as a knowledge technique 
over the individual. In tracing the different modes o f how this technology operates a 
‘technology o f subjective truth’ and how it becomes reframed as part o f instituting different 
control mechanisms, my thesis therefore extends this history o f lie detection beyond an 
analysis o f how it is instituted as a technique o f scientific criminal investigation. This analysis 
provides a contribution to the sociological study o f the history o f the human sciences — in this 
case more specifically psychology — and how they come to operate within the modern 
systems of social control by intervening on the body.
For the first fifty years since its inception, polygraphy raised little interest in the psychological 
field out o f which it had originally developed. It was only in the later 1970s that psychologists 
turned their attention once again towards lie detection. While some psychologists hailed the 
‘ingenious methods’18 that had been developed by polygraphers in the field, others have 
fiercely contested the scientific validity o f the discrete and objective nature o f the polygraphic
17 House o f  Lords. “Management o f  Offenders Sentencing Bill.” 12/1/2005. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldbiUs/016/2005016.pdf (14/2/2007). Cf. N o. 47-50 
o f Part 5 MisceUaneous Provisions o f  the BiU.
18 Podelsney and Raskin, 1978, p. 344.
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lie as it had emerged as object o f detection in the 1920s. Part o f this contestation has 
engendered the development o f new ways o f capturing the lie. The polygraphic lie had been 
framed in terms o f the expression o f ‘primitive fear’ on the body on the basis o f the focus o f 
early psychology on the study o f the emotions. By contrast, as a result o f a subsequent shift in 
psychology from the study o f the emotions to the study o f cognition, research on the 
detection o f deception has reconfigured the interpretation o f bodily responses as denoting 
‘guilty knowledge/ and have most recently moved the location o f deception from the body to 
the brain. Portrayed (by psychologists) as corresponding to current notions o f science in 
rendering deception in terms o f the ‘probability o f guilt/ these new forms o f capturing the lie 
have nevertheless remained locked within the laboratory. Instead, polygraphy has continued 
to be the main applied technique continuing its spread. An analysis o f this development not 
only allows for the consideration o f how changing conceptions o f capturing the lie have 
become configured around shifts in the way in which psychology has conceived o f the human 
subject in its development. In addition to my argument above that the history o f lie detection 
provides an insight into the reframing o f techniques o f knowledge production in the human 
sciences around the aims o f the knowledge to be gained, it allows for an analysis o f the 
processes by which contested knowledge techniques take root, while others which appear to 
correspond to accepted scientific standards, remain lost to the context o f their intended 
application.
Finally, in the context o f the different measurements that have been enlisted in capturing 
deception, there is, o f course, one instrument which has received the most attention: the ‘lie 
detector’ itself. The idea that there might be a scientific machine which can tell us in a 
straightforward manner whether someone is lying or not has been accompanied by amused 
scepticism as well as a slight uneasiness, which some have exaggerated into dystopic fantasies 
o f totalitarian mind control along the lines o f Orwell’s 1984.
The term ‘lie detector’ was coined in the media in 1921, as part o f the entanglement o f the 
media fascination with mass crime and a police professionalization movement which actively 
enlisted the media in portraying itself as a new ‘scientifically’ oriented police force. Usually, 
the idea o f the ‘lie detector’ has been coupled with its dismissal as merely a popular term for 
the properly scientific technique connected to the ‘polygraph.’ However, the distinction is not 
so straightforward. Rather, the history o f lie detection shows that the distinction between 
these ‘instruments’ is far from clear-cut. The ‘lie detector’ as instrument which could detect 
lies by itself became an important entity to be reckoned with by early lie detection specialists 
potentially undermining their status as experts. I f  the lie detector could detect lies by itself, 
would the expert be needed at all? This thesis examines the historical relationships that were 
built between the lie detector and the polygraph in providing different representations o f who
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or what can detect the lie. Thus rather than accepting the distinction between the popular ‘lie 
detector* and the scientific ‘polygraph* as given, this thesis examines how the distinction 
between these entities was elaborated, an elaboration which entailed varying representations 
o f lie detection. On this basis, it provides an analysis o f how the very idea o f the ‘lie detector* 
came to mediate lie detection practices. Thus, this thesis provides a contribution to the 
sociology o f science and technology in studying how the representations o f scientific artefacts 
come to inform and feed back into knowledge practices.
In the following, I provide an overview of the substantive chapters that follow in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 Methods of Research
In developing a rationale for the historical study o f lie detection, Chapter 2 draws on Foucault 
in setting out to study lie detection as a technique o f knowledge production and intervention 
and provides a discussion o f extant methodologies in the sociological study o f scientific and 
technological artefacts. I provide an introduction to the three most current historiographical 
approaches in the sociology o f science and technology -  The Social Construction of 
Technology [SCOT], Pickering’s Mangle o f Practice, and actor-network theory [ANT]. I 
conclude that none o f these three approaches can be used for studying the history o f lie 
detection. Rather, the thesis takes a multiple perspective on four interrelated aspects which 
play a role in the constitution o f lie detection as a technique o f knowledge production and 
intervention. These four aspects are: ways o f capturing deception, the role o f the instrument, 
lie detection as expertise, and its status as technique o f knowledge production and 
intervention including its contestation. With regard to these four lines o f inquiry, I explain 
how this approach has been shaped by the available historical sources. As regards the general 
positioning o f lie detection as a knowledge practice, I draw on Bloor’s principle o f the 
symmetry of knowledge. In elaborating on this position, I identify Gieryn’s notion o f boundary- 
work as useful tool in explaining how the courts elaborate the exclusion o f lie detection 
evidence and in examining how lie detection experts legitimate the ‘scientificity’ o f their 
practices. As regards the analysis o f the role of the ‘polygraph’ and the ‘lie detector* in the 
history o f lie detection, I draw on sociological scholarship on science popularisation and 
communication.
Chapter 3 The Lie as an Object of Knowledge
Chapter 3 examines how the detection o f deception emerged at the interstices o f psychology 
and criminology between 1904 and 1923, and how it was elaborated on the basis o f the
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construction o f and intervention upon the human subject through physiological 
measurements. It traces two reconfigurations in developing methods o f detecting deception 
whereby the simple ‘lie’ emerged as object o f detection on the subject’s body based on the 
evolutionary distinction between emotion and cognition elaborated in early psychology. I 
describe how this split was materialised in the set-up o f the lie detection examination in terms 
o f an epistemological and normative construction of the body’s internal ‘truthful’ processes 
and the external ‘deceptive’ appearance and speech of the subject. In conceptualising the lie 
as an emotional construct which could be read on the basis o f the body’s physiological script, 
the lie became evaluated on the basis o f the distinction between the ‘normal’ and the 
‘abnormal’ prevalent in the humans sciences. Its reduction into a simple falsification made it 
correspond to the scientific binary o f truth/falsehood which, in turn, could be translated into 
innocence/guilt. The simple lie as a sign on the body’s script carries a special function in the 
establishment o f the guilt o f the subject. Once defined as a psychological condition, the 
subject’s lie not only serves to establish the guilt of the subject on the basis o f the irregular 
responses o f  his body, but also to establish him as immoral. However, while the simple lie had 
emerged as measurable entity, in its early period the detection o f deception was still rooted 
within an analysis o f the criminal’s personality that guided academics. As Chapter 4 shows, 
the institutionalisation o f lie detection as separate method o f scientific investigation was to 
depend on its movement across realms and the development o f the instrument designed for 
lie detection.
Chapter 4 Disentangling the Polygraph, the U e Detector and LJe Detection
This chapter covers the period o f the 1920s and 1930s, as part o f which lie detection 
increasingly moved away from the academic setting and began to constitute itself as a separate 
endeavour - polygraphy. In examining this period, I place a special emphasis on the role 
played by instruments and how they mediated lie detection practices: the emergence o f the ‘lie 
detector’ in the media, and the development o f the ‘polygraph.’ In analysing these two 
entities, I provide an historical narrative o f the development o f the polygraph and draw on 
the discourse analysis o f the emergence o f the lie detector by Geoffrey Bunn. I broadly agree 
with Bunn’s analysis, which identifies a horizontal shift from the analysis o f the criminal to 
the detection o f the lie in this period. However, I argue that he conflates the history o f the lie 
detector and the history o f lie detection, locating the polygraph and the lie detector on the same 
plane. By contrast, I contend that in considering the history o f lie detection as a practice, the 
polygraph and the lie detector need to be evaluated separately. Firstly, the shift in the 
detection o f deception from the analysis o f the criminal to the detection o f the lie is
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connected to the movement o f the detection o f deception away from the academic setting to 
‘scientific’ criminal investigation as it was instituted at police departments as part o f the police 
professionalisation movement. I demonstrate that this move was connected to the 
reformulation of lie detection practice around the more immediate epistemological aims and a 
technical conception o f scientific expertise in criminal investigation. This movement was 
facilitated by the development o f the polygraph. Secondly, as regards the role o f the lie 
detector in lie detection practices, I reframe and extend Bunn’s analysis. I show how the 
notion o f the ‘lie detector’ came to inform lie detection practices despite the denigration o f its 
existence by lie detection specialists.
Chapter 5 U e Detection and Science
While Chapter 4 was concerned with the role o f the instrument in the constitution o f lie 
detection as a practice, Chapter 5 moves towards a consideration o f lie detection as ‘science’ 
by discussing its evaluation as a scientific technique by the courts before opening out to a 
more general discussion o f its status as expertise. While represented as scientific technique o f 
interrogation, it nevertheless remained excluded from the courts on the basis o f the Frye case, 
which set admissibility standards in the US for a large part o f the 20th century. The chapter 
explores this continued rejection o f lie detection as scientific evidence by drawing on analyses 
provided by Ken Alder and Tal Golan. Drawing on the latter, it shows that the rejection o f lie 
detection evidence was due to the threat that it posed to the functioning o f the criminal 
justice system rather than the questionability o f its methods. I provide an analysis o f the 
protective boundary-work that the court engaged in implementing a new rule o f admissibility 
that allowed it to exclude lie detection evidence. Next, I consider the analysis o f Alder. On 
the basis o f a comparison o f the ‘knowledge strategies’ employed by two central figures in the 
development o f lie detection (John Larson and Leonarde Keeler), Alder maintains that the 
rejection o f lie detection evidence was due to the way in which polygraphy — as inspired by 
Keeler — developed as a profession. O n the basis o f an historical narrative o f the different 
routes which Larson and Keeler took and by considering the subsequent professionalization 
o f polygraphy, I qualify Alder’s arguments regarding the judicial exclusion of lie detection 
evidence. With respect to his evaluation o f the history o f lie detection, I show that it is based 
on a normative and hierarchical conception o f science. This results in the portrayal o f 
Larson’s practices as legitimate because knowledge-oriented versus Keeler’s power-oriented 
coercive ones. By contrast, I present an analysis o f Keeler’s and Larson’s differing practices in 
terms o f two distinctive models o f expertise. On this basis I provide a sociological 
explanation o f why Keeler’s model o f lie detection turned out to be the more successful.
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Having shown that the development o f lie detection cannot be framed in terms o f a 
hierarchical opposition between Larson’s ‘knowledge-oriented’ and Keeler’s ‘power-oriented’ 
methods, I argue that a different approach to its evaluation might be necessary. In accounting 
for the fact that lie detection is characterised by the linkage between its aim and only means 
o f verification (i.e., the confession), we need to consider the nature o f the knowledge that lie 
detection represents and the way in which power and knowledge come to intersect in the 
polygraph examination itself.
Chapter 6 U e Detection as Grotesque Knowledge
Chapter 6 provides a broader evaluation o f the lie detection examination as technique o f 
knowledge production and intervention. First, it integrates the analytical threads that have been 
running through the thesis regarding the constitution o f the lie detection examination by 
providing an examination of its power/knowledge mechanism. I draw on Foucault’s category of 
the ‘grotesque’ which he elaborates with regard to the role o f psychiatric expertise as ‘switch- 
point’ between medical knowledge and jurisprudence. This category is characterised through the 
maximisation of effects o f power which is accompanied by its simultaneous disqualification. I 
demonstrate how, analogously to medico-legal knowledge, the lie detection examination operates 
as switch-point between psychological knowledge and criminal interrogation. I elaborate on the 
‘grotesqueness’ o f the ensemble o f the expert/interrogator and the instrument/lie detector in 
instituting the threat o f an absolute power that what is in the subject’s mind will be known by 
modulating the responses o f the body. I show how the combination of psychological knowledge 
with the process of establishing guilt constitutes the lie detection examination as a confessional 
technique, which in exerting its effect is simultaneously disqualified.
Secondly, I discuss the emerging functions o f polygraphy as technique o f knowledge 
production and intervention. I show how the lie detection examination operates as hybrid o f 
an inquisitorial technique and a psychological examination at the entrance o f the criminal 
justice system carrying faint echoes o f torture while replacing the latter’s ‘epistemology of 
pain’ with an ‘epistemology of fear.’ I argue that its anachronistic nature constitutes its very 
modem character by matching the system’s orientation towards the efficient processing o f a 
population o f delinquents in mediating the quick disposing o f criminal cases both within and 
outside court. Drawing on archival material and the analyses o f Alder and Hanson, I elaborate 
on the function that polygraphy comes to take on as moral technology through its use in 
personnel screening. Here, it works as a tool for including or excluding potential employees 
on the basis o f their ‘trustworthiness.’ More significantly, however, it becomes a disciplinary 
tool in controlling employees’ behaviour. Its mode o f operation follows the logic o f
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disciplinary power in making the individual the bearer o f the power reladonship that is 
exerted on him. Overall, lie detection constitutes what Foucault might describe as a tool in 
the political technology of the body, which by constructing the individual’s body in terms o f 
the modern soul, helps to create a ‘productive’ and ‘subjected’ body.
Chapter 7 The Truth Facilitator and the Neuro-Circuitry of Deception
This final substantive chapter o f this thesis extends my analysis o f the lie detection 
examination as technique o f knowledge production and intervention, by reflecting on the 
most recent developments in polygraphy and the detection o f deception. As regards the 
former, I examine how polygraphy assumes a novel function within the reformulation of 
systems o f social control around the management and containment o f ‘risky’ individuals by 
focussing on its employment in the monitoring o f sex offenders and paedophiles. Drawing on 
Rose’s analysis o f  how networks o f inclusion and exclusion mediate the governing o f 
individuals on the basis o f their conduct, I elaborate on how the polygraph examination 
comes to assume the function o f a ‘truth facilitator’ in the pre-emptive control and 
supervision o f the sex offender as a ‘monstrous individual’ who exists beyond the moral 
boundary o f society. I show, how in this process, the polygraph examination comes to 
constantly construct and re-assert his ‘monstrosity.’
Moving from a consideration o f how polygraphy as an applied technique has managed to 
become rooted as a variously employed control mechanism, I consider the re-emergence of an 
academic interest in the detection o f deception. This has involved both the re-integration of 
polygraphy and the development o f new methods o f capturing deception, resulting in the 
movement o f deception from the body to the brain on the basis o f a ‘cognitive’ shift in 
psychology. I provide an analysis o f this shift which initially moves the detection o f deception 
from an ‘epistemology of fear’ to an ‘epistemology o f recognition’ in reframing the detection of 
the lie in terms o f the detection o f ‘guilty knowledge.’ I evaluate the boundary-work done by 
proponents o f the guilty-knowledge test in legitimating their technique as properly scientific 
over and against polygraphy. I elaborate on why the former nevertheless remains trapped within 
the laboratory by contrasting the successful establishment of polygraphy in criminal 
investigation in its early period with the knowledge strategies and institutional placement o f the 
detection o f ‘guilty knowledge.’ In completing my analysis o f the ‘cognitive’ shift in the 
detection of deception, I discuss the most recent developments in using brain measurements in 
‘lighting up’ the simple lie directly in the brain. I raise the question whether this automized 
process o f ‘computing’ the lie finally fulfils the promise o f establishing lie detection as ‘humane’ 
and ‘scientific’ technique, or whether it will bear all the hallmarks o f the grotesque.
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Chapter 2 Methodology
Many scholars who study the intersection of the human sciences and the criminal justice system 
might expect an analysis of the history o f lie detection to draw on the historiography of Michel 
Foucault, whose work has directed much research in this field in the last three decades. In 
substantive terms, this study has indeed been inspired by Foucault’s understanding of the 
relationship between power and knowledge, particularly regarding their intersection within the lie 
detection examination when it is conceived as a technique o f  knowledge production and 
intervention. In methodological terms, however, I take a different historiographical approach to 
that o f Foucault. Broadly speaking, Foucault’s historiography is located on a level which 
encompasses major historical (or ‘epochal5) shifts in structures of knowledge, techniques of 
government, and ways o f constituting ourselves as subjects and objects o f knowledge. The 
history of lie detection is situated in a similar substantive field to that o f Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish, which forms a ‘genealogy o f the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power 
to punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which 
it masks its exorbitant singularity.’19 The lie detection examination is located in the field of 
criminal justice which constitutes part o f the punitive system that Foucault describes.20 Foucault 
explores the punitive system in its entirety and examines how it relates to the creation of the 
‘modem soul’ — expressed in the terms o f ‘psyche, subjectivity, consciousness’ — which is 
constituted as a result of how the modern system of social control institutes a benign ‘political 
technology of the body.’21 This political technology of the body is located in a general ‘political 
economy o f the body,’ in which power mechanisms work on the body both as a ‘productive 
body and a subjected body.’22 The lie detection examination is part o f this construction of the 
modem soul. It institutes a knowledge technique which takes the body as a site for transforming 
its responses into a statement of what goes on in the subject’s mind connected to a moral 
evaluation which becomes the basis for enticing the subject into a confession. At the same time, 
lie detection becomes a moral technology which applies its knowledge mechanisms in order to 
control the productive body in personnel screening. Finally, it becomes a tool for constructing 
and reproducing the sex offender as a ‘monstrous individual’ in monitoring and containing him. 
According to Foucault, the political technology of the body is ‘diffuse, rarely formulated in 
continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up o f bits and pieces; it implements a disparate
19 Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 23.
20 This seems like a rather obvious statement. However, the punitive system which Foucault describes is 
marked by the fact that it is connected to techniques o f  controlling the body which are dispersed across 
society (cf. his arguments on discipline in schools and the military).
21 Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 29-30.
22 Ibid, p. 26.
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set o f tools and methods.’23 Against this particular background, the history o f lie detection is a 
history o f a technique o f knowledge production that might be seen as one of the tools within that 
technology. On a general level, this thesis therefore shares Foucault’s view that the history o f the 
modem system of social control cannot be divorced from the history o f the human sciences. As 
I have already stated in the Introduction, lie detection emerges at the interstices between 
psychology, criminology and law enforcement agencies. Psychology and criminology, especially 
at the beginning o f the 20th century, were disciplines which sought to gain knowledge of the 
‘abnormal’ or the ‘criminal’ within academic institutions. But additionally, this knowledge was 
not divorced from the subjects that it worked on, that is to say, it operated as applied knowledge 
which would help to ‘cure’ society o f its ills with scientific means.
While Foucault’s perspective on the entanglement of the human sciences and the modem 
system of social control has been indispensable in orienting the broader analysis o f this thesis, 
when it comes to the concrete study o f the history o f lie detection it has been necessary to 
utilize methodological tools which account for the specificity o f its development on the basis o f 
which its nature as a ‘technique o f knowledge production and intervention,’ may be captured. I 
use the term technique o f knowledge production and intervention to denote the way in which 
power and knowledge are intimately linked in generating certain effects in a specific context. 
Here, ‘technique’ refers both to the application of that knowledge and to its entwinement with 
social and material processes.
In looking for possible approaches to studying the history o f lie detection as a delimited field, 
I have considered the three main historiographical approaches in the sociology o f science and 
technology, which in recent years have provided in-depth empirical studies o f particular 
scientific facts and technological objects. The first perspective to be examined in this chapter 
is the Social Construction of Technology [SCOT] by Pinch and Bijker.24 The second perspective is 
Andrew Pickering’s Mangle of Practice. Lastly, I will discuss actor-network theory [ANT] and 
more specifically Latour’s view on historical work.
Ibid, p. 26.
Another approach is advocated by Thomas P. Hughes who explains technological change on the level o f  
technological systems. Since I am only concerned with the development o f  one technological/scientific 
technique I have not considered this approach here. Cf. Hughes (1983).
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2.1 SCO T — The Social Construction of Technology
SCOT was inspired by the Empirical Programme o f Relativism (EPOR). This was developed 
by Collins25 in the sociology o f scientific knowledge and carried over into the sociology o f 
technology by Pinch and Bijker. It is a programme that is intended to show that 
‘technological artefacts are culturally constructed and interpreted.’26 SCOT is based on the 
symmetrical view o f knowledge that was originally developed by Bloor. This view argues that 
what currently counts as scientific knowledge is not to be taken as independently valid and 
subject to necessary development but rather the result o f social negotiations. It follows from 
this that there is no easy distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ knowledge.27 Pinch and Bijker 
argue (by analogy with Bloor) that there are no linear trajectories to technological artefacts 
but maintain instead that
‘in SCOT the developmental process o f  a technological artefact is described as an alternation o f  variation 
and selection. This results in a “multidirectional” model, in contrast with the linear models used explicidy 
in many innovation studies and implicidy in much history o f  technology.’28
This multidirectional model is elaborated in a research programme which takes the 
‘interpretive flexibility’ o f technological artefacts as one o f its main starting points. The 
development o f a technological artefact is traced in terms o f the different possible variants 
which may have existed at different junctures in time and to which different social groups 
have accorded different meanings. The analysis seeks to explain how, over time, certain 
variants become excluded at the expense o f others, and how one variant may eventually 
become ‘stabilised.’ The concept o f ‘interpretive flexibility’ is complemented by the notion o f 
‘relevant social group.’ Relevant social groups give different meanings to different variants o f 
technological artefacts. These groups include ‘institutions and organizations (such as the 
military or some specific industrial company), as well as organized or unorganized groups o f 
individuals. The key requirement is that all members o f a certain social group share the same 
set o f meanings, attached to a specific artefact.’29
SCOT proceeds with a detailed description o f the relevant social groups, which may include the 
norms and values o f the group or their economic and political position within the wider social 
context, and focuses on the problems that such groups identify regarding the different variants 
and the solutions they devise in response to such problems. According to this analysis, the 
interpretive flexibility which is present at the beginning o f the development gradually gives way
25 Collins (1981).
26 Pinch and Bijker, 1987/1993, p. 40.
27 Bloor (1976).
28 Ibid, p. 28.
29 Ibid, p. 30.
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to a process whereby one specific variant is stabilised until the meaning of the artefact is 
subjected to ‘closure/ This point o f closure is reached when one particular meaning o f an 
artefact becomes dominant and is no longer contested. Pinch and Bijker acknowledge that there 
might be cases in which stabilization or closure cannot be achieved, i.e. ‘that different social 
groups have radically different interpretations o f one technological artefact/30 
The concepts o f interpretive flexibility and relevant social group are further supplemented by 
Bijker’s notions o f the ‘technological frame’ and ‘inclusion’ in what he considers a 
contribution ‘toward a theory o f invention/31 Each o f the different social groups involved in 
the development o f a technological artefact has its own specific technological frame. This 
frame consists o f ‘a combination o f current theories, tacit knowledge, engineering practice 
(such as design methods and criteria), specialized testing procedures, goals, and handling and 
using practice’32 and works as a kind o f ‘grammar’33 in the constitution o f the meaning given 
to a certain technological artefact by a specific social group. There are two key features to the 
notion o f technological frame which, according to Bijker, are important to a social 
constructivist analysis o f technology. Firstly, the technological frame is defined in a very 
broad way in order to allow for the analysis o f all relevant social groups, i.e. not just 
developers or ‘users’ in the classical sense. Secondly, technological frames are meant to work 
on the level o f interaction between actors rather than referring to individual or institutional 
‘characteristics/34 As I have already stated above, the technological frame works as a grammar 
for the social group, that is to say, it ‘structures the interaction o f members o f a social 
group.’35 However, it can only do so to a certain extent, and this is where the notion o f 
inclusion comes in. Different actors are subject to different degrees o f inclusion within the 
frame. The degree o f inclusion might vary depending on the goals o f an actor, his or her 
expertise and training, or his or her problem-solving strategies.36
Bijker’s notions o f technological frame and inclusion, like the entire SCOT construct itself, are 
intended to provide ‘heuristic device[s] to simplify the description o f the “seamless web” o f 
history.’37 However, while SCOT could be seen as a helpful perspective when it comes to the 
initial identification o f the different social groups that were involved in the development and 
commercialisation o f the polygraph, my own analysis does not proceed on the level o f the 
meanings attributed to this object by different social actors at different stages o f its 
development. Insofar as this thesis covers the development o f the polygraph, it focuses on
30 Ibid, p. 41.
3» Bijker (1987/1993).
32 Ibid, p. 168.
33 Ibid, p. 173.
34 Ibid, p. 172.
35 Ibid, p. 173.
36 Ibid, p. 174.
37 Ibid, p. 185.
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different representations o f the instrument(s) in relation to how lie detection is constituted as a 
practice. This necessitates an examination o f the ways in which the lie detector and the polygraph 
are represented and how these representations come to mediate lie detection practices. 
Moreover, with regard to these instruments, we can speak o f ‘technological development’ only 
in the case o f the polygraph, while the lie detector is not a stable object. For example, the Tie 
detector’ could refer to a whole set o f instruments, most o f which had been developed in the 
19th century. Additionally, in analysing the constitution o f the lie detection examination, I am 
interested in the processes of translation (rather than,per se, processes o f constituting meaning) 
which made the ‘diagnosis’ of the lie possible. This means moving between the examiner, the 
instrument, and the examination subject and analysing the nature of their social and material 
interactions. Thus, my research does not focus on a linear process o f change whereby a certain 
group o f developers or users change the meaning o f a certain variant o f a technological object 
drawing on a specific technological frame. While the notion o f technological frame is intended 
to denote the ‘grammar’ which structures technologists’ interactions, it seems to refer to the 
different resources, goals, and assumptions, with which actors enter into interactions rather 
than referring to the definition o f rules o f the actual interaction setting between human and 
non-humans. Rather than describing the grammar which directs the interactions between 
developers o f technological artefacts, I aim to trace the grammar which constitutes the 
ensemble o f the examiner and the instrument in externalising the subject’s lie in the constitution 
of lie detection as a technology o f knowledge production and intervention.
Moreover, the SCOT programme as a whole is to some extent contradictory. On the one 
hand, Pinch and Bijker seek to provide a ‘social constructivist’ analysis o f technology which 
accounts for the variable nature o f technological artefacts in different social settings. This 
analysis is to be supported by a set o f heuristics such as interpretive flexibility, technological 
frame and inclusion. O n the other hand, Bijker works towards a ‘theory o f invention’ and 
criticises the analyses o f historians o f technology for failing to allow for generalisation.38 Since 
I aim to trace the history o f lie detection as a technique o f knowledge production and 
intervention in its specificity — and only consider the development o f the polygraph as a 
technological object insofar as it comes to mediate lie detection practices — I have not been 
able to apply a SCOT perspective.
2.2 The Mangle of Practice
In contrast to SCOT, which focuses on the development o f technological artefacts, 
Pickering’s approach in The Mangle of Practice focuses explicitly on historical descriptions of
38 Pinch and Bijker, 1987/1993, p. 22.
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how the interactions between human and non-human agents are patterned in scientific 
encounters. This approach might therefore be useful when it comes to an analysis o f  how the 
interactions between social and material actors (the examiner, the subject and the instrument) 
in the lie detection examination were structured and how these changed in the constitution o f 
lie detection practices over time. While Pickering focuses mosdy on scientific experiments, he 
also provides an analysis o f how the ‘mangle’ might be used in documenting technological 
and conceptual change, and even goes so far as to claim that the mangle might be thought o f 
as ‘theory o f everything.’39 In providing a historiographical rationale, he maintains:
‘I seek a real-time understanding of practice. I want to understand the work o f cultural extension in science as it 
happens in time. This is to be contrasted with retrospective approaches that look backward from some terminus 
o f  cultural extension and explain practice in terms o f  the substance o f  that terminus. The exemplary 
instance o f  the latter is what I call “the scientist’s account” (Pickering 1984b), in which accepted scientific 
knowledge functions as an interpretive yardstick in reconstructing the history o f  its own production.40
This ‘real-time understanding o f practice’ is to be achieved within what Pickering calls a 
‘performative view o f science.’ This view is opposed to the traditional ‘representational’ view 
o f science which ‘casts science as, above all, an activity that seeks to represent nature, to 
produce knowledge that maps, mirrors, or corresponds to how the world really is.’41 In 
contrast to this, the ‘performative’ view of science centres on the idea ‘that the world is filled 
not, in the first instance, with facts and observations, but with agency. Thus, science should be 
‘regarded a field o f powers, capacities, and performances, situated in machinic captures o f  
material agency’.42 While granting the material realm an independent form o f agency, 
Pickering nevertheless disagrees with the likes o f Latour or Callon who assign a complete 
symmetry to humans and machines in terms o f their agency (see below). He argues that, while 
there might be important commonalities between human and material agency — most notably, 
their ‘repetitive quality’ and their ‘temporal emergence’43 — there is nonetheless a fundamental 
difference between the two when it comes to human intentionality. Intentionality is defined 
by him as ‘a term I use in an everyday sense to point to the fact that scientific practice is 
typically organized around specific plans and goals. I find that I cannot make sense o f the 
studies that follow without reference to the intentions o f scientists, to their goals and plans, 
though I do not find it necessary to have insights into the intentions o f things.’44 However, 
the goal-directedness o f scientists’ practices should not be seen as unchangeable. Pickering
39 He maintains: ‘I f  we replace my analysis o f  the intentional structure o f  human agency with a less structured 
notion like “drift,” and if  we relax my focus on literal machines, we are left with a schema that might 
describe the evolution o f  any field o f agency or agencies, nonhuman as well as human’ (Pickering, 1995, p. 
247).
40 Pickering, 1995, p. 3, [my italics].
41 Ibid, p. 5.
42 Ibid, p. 7.
43 Ibid, p.16.
44 Ibid, p. 17.
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stresses that human intentionality is configured and reconfigured over time. Scientists’ goals 
are developed on the basis o f the existing scientific culture; they are ‘imaginatively 
transformed versions o f the present.’45 The process o f  devising future states o f science is a 
process o f open-ended ‘modelling’ ‘with no determinate destination.’46 Furthermore the goals 
and plans o f scientists change as they interact with the material world around them.
This interaction between human and material agents should be conceived o f as a ‘dance of 
agency’ which, seen from the human perspective, takes on the form o f a ‘dialectic o f 
resistance and accommodation:’
‘As active, intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new machine. They then adopt a passive 
role, monitoring the performance o f  the machine to see whatever capture o f material agency it might effect. 
Symmetrically, this period o f human passivity is the period in which material agency actively manifests itself. 
Does the machine perform as intended? Has an intended capture o f  agency been effected? Typically the 
answer is no, in which case the response is another reversal o f  roles: human agency is once more active in a 
revision o f modelling vectors, followed by another bout o f  human passivity and material performance, and so 
on. The dance o f agency, seen asymmetrically from the human end, thus takes the form o f  a dialectic of 
resistance and accommodation, where resistance denotes the failure to achieve an intended capture o f  agency in 
practice, and accommodation an active human strategy o f  response to resistance, which can include revisions 
to goals and intentions as well as to the material form o f  the machine in question and to the human frame o f 
gestures and social relations that surround it.’47
Pickering calls this process o f the reconfiguration o f human goals and practices in interacting 
with the active material world in an attempt to capture it the ‘mangle.’ The mangle is a 
‘posthumanist’ analytical framework. That is to say, it shifts the focus o f analysis away from 
human agency by according independence to material agency and stressing the mutual 
dependence o f the material and human aspects o f scientific practice, i.e. the ‘interactive 
stabilization’ of human and material agency.
Pickering uses the term ‘temporal emergence’ to illustrate the fact that, in his view, there is no 
given path for the coming into existence o f a certain type o f scientific object. Rather, the 
emergence o f  such an object is to be understood in terms o f ‘brute chance, happening in 
time.’48 By using notions such as ‘modelling’, the ‘dance o f agency’ and the ‘dialectics of 
resistance and accommodation,’ the analyst can establish a pattern, which makes the 
processes that are being traced comprehensible: ‘The pattern repeats itself endlessly, but the 
substance o f resistance and accommodation continually emerges unpredictably within it.’49 
Pickering provides a perspective on studying the interaction o f human and non-human 
entities in the context o f scientific encounters by contrast to SCOT (which focuses on how 
social actors attribute different meanings to variants o f technological artefacts), and might 
thus be seen as a potentially fruitful approach to tracing the ways in which the lie detection
45 Ibid, p. 19.
46 Ibid, p. 19.
47 Ibid, p. 21-22.
48 Ibid, p. 24.
49 Ibid, p. 24.
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examination is constituted as part o f how the interactions between the examiner and the 
instrument in conjunction with the subject are framed and reframed in its development. 
However, the concepts o f ‘dance o f agency’ and the ‘dialectics o f resistance and 
accommodation,’ cannot be applied in the case o f the history o f the lie detection examination. 
The turn-taking that is implemented in the lie detection examination does not resemble the 
‘dance o f agency’ in which human agency and captures o f material agency follow one another. 
This is due to the different form which experimentation and examinations took in 
psychological techniques. Rather than capturing material agency, their goal was to capture 
human agency by means o f enlisting instruments. This has to be conceptualized as a triadic 
exchange between experimental subject, the instrument, and the experimenter rather than a 
dyadic interaction between human experimenter and machine. In this triadic exchange the 
capturing o f human agency takes on different patterns o f interaction. By contrast to the turn- 
taking o f human and machinic agency in ‘the mangle,’ the interaction o f the instrument and 
the subject is simultaneous and symmetrical, whereby the instrument ‘mirrors’ the internal 
functions o f the subject’s body in time. The interaction between the instrument and the 
experimenter/examiner is representational, whereby the instrument translates the internal 
functionings o f  the body onto a graph, which the examiner/experimenter interprets. The 
interaction between the examiner and the subject is based on an asymmetrical turn-taking 
system, which is directed by the examiner and follows certain specified patterns o f  verbal 
exchange. While this does not undermine Pickering’s analysis, it does limit the scope o f the 
concepts which he develops for the sociological analysis o f science — certainly as regards their 
application to psychological techniques. This is important in light o f his claim that the 
‘mangle’ could count as a theory o f everything and would allow for the analysis o f any field o f 
agency or agencies.
On the other hand, the ‘dance o f agency’ and the ‘dialectics o f resistance and accommodation’ 
also seem to be rather unspecific terms for guiding the analysis o f scientific and technological 
change. In a similar fashion as Pinch and Bijker’s ‘technological frame,’ they are conceptual 
tools which are potentially too broad in scope for my purposes here. In Pickering’s case this is 
problematic as his conceptual tools are bound up with his understanding o f history. His 
historiography is based on a conception o f ‘emergence’ which is based on ‘brute chance, 
happening in time.’ This brute chance is to be made sense o f by means of the dance o f agency 
and the dialectic o f resistance and accommodation. The argument for ‘brute chance’ is 
necessary in Pickering’s model in order to contravene conventional understandings o f science 
which tend to conceptualise scientific developments in terms o f  an intrinsic causality. This 
causality is independent o f the context in which scientific facts are developed. I would argue 
instead that we need to conceive o f history as patterned, and trace those individual patterns
29
without imposing intrinsic laws on its scientific developments or developing tools intended to 
cover all of its myriad ways. This is also why I find my description o f the pattern o f interactions 
that mark the triadic exchange in psychological techniques o f experimentation and examination 
not very useful and have therefore not attempted to extend Pickering’s dyadic model to include 
a triadic model. Actor-network-theory provides the final framework to be discussed as regards 
the sociological study of the history o f science and technology.
2.3 Actor-Network-Theory and Bruno Latour
ANT has caused multiple controversies in the sociology of science and technology in recent 
years: mainly for the way in which it extends Bloor’s principle o f the symmetry o f knowledge 
to humans and non-humans. ANT is based on a semiotic approach to the analysis o f human 
and material interaction,50 in which both humans and non-humans are seen as capable o f 
action and thus considered to be actors; or to use ANT terminology, ‘actants.’ By according 
human and non-human actors equal status, ANT effectively seeks to abolish the distinction 
between the (knowing, acting) subject and object, and move the study o f science from a focus 
on epistemology to the study o f various ontologies. This ‘generalized symmetry,’ as Latour 
calls it, has been criticised by some sociologists o f science and technology who, like Pickering, 
believe that humans differ from non-humans in at least one important respect: their 
intentionality. Other critics, such as Bloor, hold that the distinction between the knowing and 
acting subject and its representations o f an object on the one hand, and the object itself on 
the other, needs to be maintained.51 In ANT, an actant is not a stable entity — actants are 
effects created in and through heterogeneous networks, which consist o f human and non­
human entities. Scientific facts and technological artefacts are the results o f processes that go 
on within and across heterogeneous networks. Insofar as these facts and artefacts are 
successful, we subsequendy ‘black box’ them, i.e. see them merely as objects that ‘work’ 
without wondering about the complexity of what it takes for them to work. ANT opens and 
unpacks these black boxes in an effort to describe the socio-technical imbroglios that are 
necessary to produce them.
Latour’s historical studies o f science and technology follow a similar pattern. Aramis, Or the 
hove of Technology2 is a study o f a technological failure, which aims to show how a 
technological project that was funded for over twenty years never became a reality. This was
50 Cf. Akrich and Latour (1992) for ‘A Summary o f  a Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics o f  Human and 
Nonhuman Assemblies’ or refer to the glossary o f  Latour (1999a).
51 Cf. Bloor (1999a), Latour (1999b), and Bloor (1999b) for an outline o f  the debate on the sociology o f  
scientific knowledge (SSK) and ANT. Cf. also the debate between Collins and Yearley (1992a; 1992b) and 
Callon and Latour (1992).
52 Latour (1996).
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due to the fact that the heterogeneous network that made up Aramis could neither enlist 
enough actants, nor the right actants, to make Aramis durable. Latour’s other major historical 
study, The Taste unction of France53 — parts o f which are also used in his programmatic 
statement on science studies Pandora’s Hope — similarly consists o f an analysis o f the process 
by which a scientific discovery (pasteurization) becomes real. ‘Reality’ is a continuum in 
Latour’s work, which is connected to the notion o f ‘relative existence.’ Scientific facts that we 
hold to be true have not existed ‘always and everywhere,’ waiting to be discovered. N or have 
what we now think are scientific falsehoods ‘never’ existed ‘anywhere.’ Rather, ‘when a 
[scientific] phenomenon “definitely” exists this does not mean that it exists forever, or 
independently o f all practice and discipline, but that it has been entrenched in a cosdy and 
massive institution which has to be monitored and protected with great care.’54 The degree of 
the relative existence o f an entity can be described by the two dimensions o f ‘association’ and 
‘substitution.’ Association denotes the number o f  other entities that an entity is connected to 
or ‘collaborating with.’ The higher the number o f associated (heterogeneous) entities, the 
more ‘real’ is the entity under study. Substitution refers to ‘how many elements in a given 
association have to be modified to allow other new elements to cohere with the project.’55 It 
indicates the stability o f the connections between associated elements within a heterogeneous 
network.56 The description o f the coming into being — or the becoming more or less real — of 
an entity such as lactic acid fermentation in terms o f its associations and substitutions 
constitutes the tracing o f its ‘spatiotemporal envelope.’ This spatiotemporal envelope 
‘remains locally and temporally situated and empirically observable.’57 Moreover, even once 
the ‘reality’ o f an entity such as microbes has been constituted, once it has become an 
institution (a term which Latour opposes to the term substance), it still has to be actively 
maintained — it remains an historical entity:
‘In other words, to account for even a long-lasting victory, one does not have to grant extrahistoricity to
a research program as if  it would suddenly, at some threshold or turning point, need no further upkeep.
What was an event must remain a continuing event. One simply has to go on historidzing and localizing
the network and finding who and what make up its descendants.’58
Latour explains the fact that we speak o f substances as if they had always existed, thus 
according them an ahistorical status, by introducing the notion o f ‘retrofitting.’ He maintains 
that aside from the process o f institutionalisation, there is a second process called 
‘retrofitting,’ in which the event o f making up an entity, e.g. ‘microbes,’ is used to reinterpret
53 Latour (1988).
54 Latour, 1999a, p. 155-156.
55 Ibid, p. 159.
56 Ibid, p. 161.
57 Ibid, p. 166.
58 Ibid, p. 168.
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the past before this entity existed. Retrofitting ‘situates a more recent event as what “lies 
beneath” an older one.’59 This process is possible because o f the two dimensions o f time: the 
linear succession of time which denotes the fact that time ‘always moves forward’60 and the 
sedimentation of time in which time moves backwards. This second dimension o f time is marked 
by the continuous reinterpretation o f a certain moment in time, e.g. the year 1864 when lactic 
acid fermentation did not yet exist. Thus, corresponding to the historical vantage point of 
interpretation there are different interpretations o f ‘the year 1864’ from the perspective o f the 
years 1865,1998, and so on.
Latour discusses the relationship between humans and technology in terms o f mediation. He 
argues that ‘there is nothing that we can define philosophically or sociologically as an object, 
as an artefact or piece o f technology.’61 Rather, there are different forms o f ‘technical 
mediation’ by which both human and non-human agents come to form new actants. The first 
meaning o f technical mediadon concerns the goal ‘displacement’ o f human and non-human 
actants: when human and non-human actants interact their original goals (or functions) are 
displaced to form a new ‘composite’ goal. In this process, all o f the actants involved are 
transformed as well.62 Latour uses the debate on gun regulation as an example in this context. 
It is not guns that turn people into killers, nor is it people that turn guns into dangerous 
weapons. Rather, both the ‘goals’ o f the gun and those o f the person holding it become 
transformed.63 The second meaning o f technical mediation relates to ‘composition,’ which 
denotes the fact that action is constituted by a combined set o f agents — ‘action is simply not 
a property o f humans but of an association of actants, and this is the second meaning o f technical 
mediation.’64 As a result the same symmetry which applies to the ‘fabrication’ o f scientific 
facts also holds in the case o f the ‘use’ o f technical artefacts. The third meaning o f technical 
mediation is to do with ‘the folding o f time and space.’ The number o f actants and the 
composition o f objects and their stability varies in time and space: ranging from different 
actants existing independently side-by-side, to a conglomerate o f actants being integrated ‘into 
a single punctuated whole,’ or a black box. These different stages o f integration are reversible 
and processes o f disintegration are marked by crises, which make the different stages o f 
integration o f objects observable to the student o f science and technology.65 The fourth
59 Ibid, p. 170.
60 Ibid, p. 171.
61 Ibid, p. 190-191.
62 Ibid, p. 178-180.
63 Latour elaborates: T his translation is wholly symmetrical. You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun 
is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object 
because it has entered into a relationship with you. The gun is no longer the gun-in-the-armory or the gun- 
in-the-drawer or the gun-in-the-pocket, but the gun-in-your-hand, aimed at someone who is screaming’ 
(Latour, 1999a, p. 179-180).
64 Latour, 1999a, p. 182.
65 Ibid, p. 183-185.
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aspect o f technical mediation involves the term delegationy on the basis o f which Latour seeks 
to describe the process by which not only the meaning o f an action is changed, but also the 
mode in which it is expressed, e.g. when the enforcement o f the speed law is no longer 
effected by words and signs but is translated into a material form of expression, such as a 
speed bump.66
However, my thesis differs from an ANT perspective in that the aim of my study is not simply 
to describe the coming into existence o f a particular scientific artefact or technological object, 
i.e., the polygraph. While I have examined the development o f the polygraph, I have taken a 
more multi-faceted approach in order to explore how lie detection came to be instituted as a 
technique o f knowledge production and intervention. As a consequence of this, my focus has 
been broader than it would have been had I sought to trace the ways in which human and 
material actors combined in order to constitute ‘polygraphy’ as an actor-network. ANT focuses 
on how a certain historical actor-network is constituted by the different entities enlisted in it 
and describes the nature o f the different entities or actants and the connections that they form. 
In the context o f my study, such an analysis would seek to explain how the different entities 
involved in the history of lie detection (ranging from particular institutions such as the courts, 
police departments or crime laboratories, different actors such as early psychologists, police 
reformers, instrument manufacturers, patent examiners, individual developers and examiners to 
various instruments) are enlisted and transformed in order to constitute polygraphy as a stable 
actor-network — despite its contested nature. In short, the focus would be on tracing the 
different ‘associations’ that were formed among actors, and the ‘substitutions’ o f actors that 
take place along its trajectory. By contrast, my study seeks to frame polygraphy in terms of the 
development o f a particularpractice which institutes certain power effects. In other words, I have sought 
to investigate how polygraphy was instituted as a psychological knowledge practice across 
particular locations, and how it has intervened on the human subject. This means that while the 
‘entities’ that appear in the history o f lie detection are certainly taken into account, they are not 
viewed as a horizontal ‘actor-network’. Rather, I have investigated different aspects of lie 
detection as technique o f knowledge production and intervention. This means: first, tracing 
how different ways of capturing deception emerge out o f psychological discourse; second, 
examining the role o f the instrument in the development o f polygraphy; third, considering 
changing lie detection practices and their status as ‘expertise’; and fourth, analysing the 
placement o f lie detection as a technique o f knowledge production and intervention by also 
taking into account the contested nature o f the lie detection examination.
Although this thesis does not explicitly draw on an ANT perspective, it nevertheless does take 
ANT’s focus on various ‘ontologies’ as a sensitizing device for considering how human and
66 Ibid, p. 185-187.
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material actors are elaborated. For example, in my analysis o f the way in which the notion o f the 
‘lie detector’ comes to mediate lie detection practices, I consider the ontological uncertainty that 
defines the polygraph as instrument in the polygraph examination and how this uncertainty 
constitutes its special function in mediating the subject’s bodily responses during the 
examination. More broadly, while this thesis does not apply the three main historiographical 
approaches that have been elaborated in the sociological study o f the history of science and 
technology, I have integrated methodological principles and considerations elaborated within 
this field that are more closely related to the issues raised in the history o f lie detection. As I 
discuss in the next sections, there are issues that are specific to the history o f lie detection that 
have rendered this more varied (or piecemeal) approach necessary. This includes an account of 
how the available historical sources have mediated my approach to the history o f lie detection.
2.4 U e detection, criminal justice and science
While polygraphy has become widely applied in the field o f criminal investigation by law 
enforcement institutions, and has even been hailed as a ‘scientific technique o f detecting 
deception,’ it has not managed to gain entry to the criminal court as ‘scientific evidence.’ 
Nevertheless it is part o f a broader movement inaugurated in the early 20th century which 
sought to combat crime by means o f ‘scientific crime detection’ — a movement that has 
resulted in the formation o f the ‘forensic sciences.’ In order to understand the variable 
scientific status that is accorded to polygraphy by law enforcement agencies and by the 
criminal justice system, I have traced the way in which the rules governing what counts as 
‘legitimate knowledge’ are constructed in these two realms. By examining the boundaries 
which certain types o f knowledge fail to overcome, insight can be gained into the modus 
operandi o f institutions o f social control and the way in which knowledge is disseminated, 
legitimised, and applied within these institutions. Such an analysis requires that what counts as 
‘science’ is not taken as a given. Rather, the distinction between ‘science’ and ‘pseudo-science’ 
(and polygraphy has been widely associated with the latter) must be conceptualised as a variably 
constructed boundary. The sociology o f science offers the methodological maxim o f the 
‘symmetry o f knowledge’ which, instead o f judging knowledge on the basis o f whether according 
to current standards we believe it to be true or false, traces the ways in which it is elaborated and 
seeks to establish the reasons for its being classified as either ‘true’ or ‘false’. This maxim was 
originally developed by Bloor in his ‘Strong Programme’ for a study o f the sociology of 
science.67 Bloor maintains that scientific knowledge should not be treated as a ‘special’ type of 
knowledge which is somehow independent of its conditions o f production. Rather it is
67 Bloor (1976).
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important to apply the same principles of explanation to what is considered ‘true’ knowledge and 
what is deemed ‘false’ knowledge. The principle o f the symmetry o f knowledge therefore allows 
researchers to analyse the ways in which knowledge is stabilised or destabilised in different 
circumstances. In the context o f my study, the principle also means not taking a position on the 
debate over the ‘scientificity’ or ‘pseudo-scientificity’ o f the lie detection examination.
In order to trace the ways in which science is marked off from pseudo-science, Gieryn has 
employed the notion o f boundary-mrk. More specifically, he uses this concept in 
contradistinction to the term demarcation, which has conventionally been utilised in the 
philosophy of science. Whereas philosophers o f science have sought to identify certain 
properties that are intrinsic to the scientific method in order to ‘demarcate’ science from other 
forms of knowledge, Gieryn and others have shown that science cannot be distinguished from 
pseudo-science or ‘non-science’ — as he more broadly calls it — in a straightforward way.68 
Gieryn’s first elaboration o f the concept o f boundary-work draws on the study o f ideology. 
Boundary-work consists in ‘their [i.e., scientists’] attribution o f selected characteristics to the 
institution of science (i.e. to its practitioners, methods, stock o f knowledge, values and work 
organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual 
activities as “non-science.”’69 Gieryn seeks to expand on the notion o f ‘boundary-work’ in a 
later article which maintains that ‘boundary-work occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or 
challenge the cognitive authority of science — and the credibility prestige, power, and material 
resources that accompany such a privileged position. Pragmatic demarcations o f science from 
non-science are driven by a social interest in claiming, expanding, protecting, monopolizing, 
usurping, denying, or restricting the cognitive authority o f ‘science.’70 Gieryn contends that the 
boundaries of science are not necessarily determined by certain practices but also by the way in 
which the science is represented. He suggests that we might use the analogy o f a topographical 
map and the landscape that it represents, and think of science in terms o f a cultural map which 
— like a topographical map — includes ‘those features o f reality most useful for achieving 
pragmatic ends (legitimating authority to knowledge claims or hiking through wilderness).’71 
The notion o f boundary-work can usefully be applied to aspects o f  my study.72 
First, in terms o f the third strand in this history o f lie detection (i.e., the consideration o f the 
changing lie detection practice and its status as ‘expertise’), the notion o f boundary-work can 
be used to examine a conflict which arises between two central figures in the development of
68 Cf. Laudan, L. (1983) for a history o f  the demarcation o f  science, cf. also the other papers in the same 
collection Laudan, R. (1983); for another early collection o f  articles on this subject cf. Wallis (1979).
69 Gieryn, 1983, p. 782.
70 Gieryn, 1995, p. 405.
71 Ibid, p. 406.
72 For a more comprehensive overview o f  Gieryn’s approach to studying the construction o f  scientific 
boundaries, cf. Gieryn (1999) in which he uses the notion o f  boundary-work in different case studies on 
phrenology, organic farming, cold fusion, etc.
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the lie detection examination regarding the use o f the lie detection examination, John Larson 
and Leonarde Keeler. While the former, holding a Ph.D. in physiology, developed the final 
set-up o f the lie detection examination in the early 1920s, the latter developed and 
commercialised the polygraph itself, thereby making possible the increased spread o f the use 
o f lie detection in criminal investigation. Larson expressly opposed the commercialisation of 
the polygraph and sought to undermine Keeler’s practices as ‘unscientific.’ In doing so, he 
took recourse to Keeler’s lack o f academic credentials and contravention o f the ‘norms of 
scientific practice.’ Understanding this strategy in terms o f boundary-work is certainly helpful, 
as I will later demonstrate in an evaluation of Alder’s historical analysis o f Larson’s and 
Keeler’s different knowledge strategies. Alder opposes the strategies o f both Larson and 
Keeler, but in such a way as to present Larson’s version o f lie detection in a more favourable 
light -  that is to say, as more legitimate — than that o f Keeler. However, by deeming one 
version o f knowledge as more acceptable by virtue o f the fact it appears to correspond more 
closely to pre-conceived standards o f scientific — or more spefically, psychological -  practice, 
Alder simply reiterates an assumed or implicit distinction between ‘false’ and ‘true’ knowledge 
rather than asking how such distinctions are generated by different actors as they contend for 
scientific authority. Moreover, in considering the shift from the ‘epistemology o f fear’ 
implemented in polygraphy to an ‘epistemology o f recognition’ as an academic interest re- 
emerged in the 1970s, I examine the ways in which proponents o f cognitive methods o f 
detecting deception — the so-called guilty-knowledge test — do boundary-work in constructing 
the scientificity o f their approach over and against polygraphy. The notion o f boundary-work 
is important in the examination o f the strategies that proponents o f the ‘guilty-knowledge’ 
test use in setting themselves off from polygraphy for a similar reason provided above. It 
ensures a symmetrical analysis o f knowledge practices rather than according epistemological 
authority to knowledge practices which seemingly correspond to the most recent standards o f 
psychological knowledge framed in terms o f psychological testing and probability.
Second, as regards the fourth strand o f my analysis (i.e., the consideration o f the contested 
nature o f lie detection as evidence), the notion of boundary-work will be applied to a discussion 
o f the status of the lie detection examination in the criminal courts. Instead o f exploring how a 
‘scientific’ institution sets itself off from ‘non-scientific’ institutions, I use the notion of 
boundary-work to analyse how the criminal justice system employs a specific conception of 
science in order to allow into its judging processes certain types o f knowledge as opposed to 
others which threaten to upset the structure o f  its workings. In other words, I will explore how 
the criminal justice system established a boundary between science and non-science in order to 
protect its onm legitimacy. In this way, I extend Gieryn’s notion o f boundary-work to consider 
not only how ‘scientists’ (i.e., lie detection specialists) construct their own boundaries but also,
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more broadly, the way in which institutions — in this case the courts — elaborate understandings 
o f science mthout being producers o f the knowledge which they sanction.73 
In discussing the status o f lie detection evidence and its placement at the entrance o f the 
criminal justice system (and beyond), I have used a combined approach which considers 
secondary as well as archival sources. As regards the use o f  secondary sources, I use the work 
of two historians o f science, Golan and Alder, as two main interlocutors. Golan’s historical 
analysis o f the court case Frye v. United States (which provided the basis for the exclusion of lie 
detection evidence) is taken as a starting-point for gaining an understanding o f how the courts 
constructed a boundary enabling them to legitimise the barring o f lie detection evidence. His 
research is expanded by a consideration o f the complementary boundary-work that was 
undertaken by lie detection examiners in reaction to the rejection o f lie detection evidence. 
Alder, mentioned above, serves as the second interlocutor in extending the discussion o f the 
rejection o f lie detection evidence.
2.5 The lie detector and the polygraph
The consideration o f the second strand o f this thesis (regarding the status o f the instrument 
in the development o f lie detection as technique o f knowledge production and intervention) 
also requires an examination o f the notion o f the ‘lie detector’ in relation to the main 
instrument which comes to be used in lie detection, the ‘polygraph.’ ‘Polygraph’ is 
conventionally thought o f as a scientific term, whereas ‘lie detector’ tends to be considered a 
popular term for the self-same instrument. But careful analysis o f both instruments 
demonstrates that quite different claims have been made on behalf o f these instruments 
regarding their capacity to detect lies. This analysis will draw on a methodological aspect o f 
evaluating knowledge in the sociology o f  science which concerns the ‘diffusion’ o f 
knowledge. Sociologists o f science and technology have been arguing against a view of 
science which depicts the public distribution o f knowledge that is generated by scientists as a 
process o f simplification and possible distortion.74 According to Hilgartner, this ‘dominant 
view o f science popularisation’ is problematic insofar as it presents an ‘idealised notion of
73 I mean this in the narrow sense o f  the actual carrying out o f  studies, interpreting results, developing certain 
practices — as I said in the introduction to this chapter, knowledge does not function independently o f  the 
system in which it is used.
74 Cf. Shinn and Whitley (1985); Cooter and Pumfrey (1994); Hilgartner (1990); Kitzinger (1990); Myers (2003); 
also Lewenstein (1995); a related field is constituted by different studies concerned with the ‘public 
understanding o f  science’ (PUS) — here SSK has successfully furnished critiques o f  approaches which have 
unthinkingly used the distinction between public knowledge and science by carrying out surveys on the 
public attitudes towards science or public literacy or developed mental models which serve to analyse ‘lay* 
understanding o f  science and technology; instead SSK has shown how the terms ‘science’ and ‘public’ are in 
fact variable and that the way in which people engage with scientific knowledge takes place on multiple 
levels. Cf. Wynne (1995) and Lewenstein (1995) for an overview o f  this field.
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pure, genuine scientific knowledge* which accords scientists an ultimate claim to knowledge.75 
Some sociologists o f science have argued that scientists actively enlist this notion o f 
popularisation in order to legitimate their own authority and to exclude accounts o f scientific 
knowledge which may not conform to their own views or interests. In opposition to such an 
hierarchical view, sociologists o f science argue that the boundaries between what is 
considered proper science and a ‘popularised* version o f science is not clear-cut and that the 
way in which scientific knowledge is presented, distributed and legitimated follows varied and 
complex patterns.76 Additionally, the view that an understanding o f communication within 
and about science needs to be extended beyond the simplistic distinction between science and 
its popular accounts, means that the dissemination o f scientific knowledge cannot be 
conceived o f as one-directional (whereby knowledge travels from science to society). Rather, 
it has to be conceived o f as a cyclical flow o f information. As part o f this flow, popularised 
accounts o f science may feed back into and mediate the practices o f scientists themselves.77 
What makes a study o f the lie detector and the polygraph especially intriguing in this context 
is that the ‘lie detector’ emerged into the public realm before the ‘polygraph* had been 
developed. This allows for an examination o f the reactions o f lie detection specialists to the 
lie detector, as well as a consideration o f how the notion of the lie detector informed their 
practices and representations o f lie detection. This evaluation will draw on the analysis o f the 
media representation o f the lie detector which has been provided by Bunn, a historian o f 
psychology. Bunn locates his analysis between the history and sociology o f science 
popularisation, but stresses a different (albeit related) perspective in the literature first 
systematically promoted by Cooter and Pumfrey.78 This perspective is not only concerned 
with demonstrating that there are no rigid boundaries between science and its popularisation, 
but additionally, seeks to provide an analysis o f popular science itself as a specific field o f 
knowledge. The focus therefore shifts to an analysis o f how scientific knowledge is taken up 
in popular culture and how it may be transformed to form ‘its own natural knowledge which 
differs from and may even oppose elite science.’79 Bunn applies this perspective to an
75 Hilgartner, 1990, p. 521.
76 Rather than opposing the scientific text as expression o f pure knowledge to all other accounts o f  science, 
processes o f  science communication may be conceptualised along a continuum moving ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ depending on their relative closeness to the locations in which scientific knowledge is produced. 
In this model the communication o f scientific knowledge is broadened beyond the scientific text to include 
different forms in which scientific knowledge is shaped and communicated about ranging from lab shop talk, 
grant proposals to mass media articles (Hilgartner, 1990, p. 528). The inclusion o f  different genres o f  
communication rather than an exclusive focus on texts has lead to a consideration o f  language use in the 
generation o f  scientific knowledge including interactions between scientists, as well as scientists and ‘lay’ 
audiences. Additionally, analyses o f  the enlistment o f  visual media in the representation o f science are carried 
out (Myers, 2003).
77 Myers (2003).
78 Cooter and Pumfrey (1994).
79 Ibid, p. 249.
38
examination o f the history o f the lie detector by locating the instrument within the interstices 
o f popular psychology, the police professionalization movement and the mass media. In the 
course o f his analysis, Bunn applies a Foucauldian approach in order to reconstruct the 
discourse that developed around the lie detector. In part, my study seeks to re-interpret and 
extend Bunn’s analysis o f the discourse surrounding the lie detector. While Bunn’s analysis is 
valuable, it tends to run together the history o f lie detection on the one hand, and the history 
of the lie detector on the other. This is a reflection o f his particular use o f sources, which are 
mainly drawn from newspaper and magazine articles. Within the terms o f his own framework, 
this allows Bunn to make a cogent argument as regards the placement o f polygraphy as 
‘popular science.’ Yet as I argue in the thesis, while lie detection came to be located outside 
what might be considered an ‘elite’ scientific arena, it nevertheless cannot be reduced to the 
history o f the lie detector. Rather, the consideration o f archival and primary sources throws up 
a more complex picture o f the role o f  the lie detector in the development o f practices o f lie 
detection.
2.6 Sources
The difference between my approach to the history o f lie detection and that o f Bunn, who 
constructs the history o f the lie detector on the basis o f the analysis o f media sources, has 
been the result o f my own tracing o f the different sources that are available on the history o f 
lie detection. These sources have had a significant influence on the construction o f my 
analysis. Any piece o f historical research is guided not only by its own research questions but 
also by the available sources. In some cases the choice o f sources relates to the questions one 
is asking or how one understands history — as in the case o f Bunn. In other cases, the nature 
o f available sources will tell its own additional story, and thus contribute to the modification 
o f the research question or the understanding o f the nature of the historical entity that one is 
studying. This has been the case with my research. The detection o f deception emerges in the 
early 1900s. In its early period, not only media sources on the detection o f deception can be 
found — which Bunn uses in constructing a pre-history o f the lie detector. Rather, in the 
period from the early 1900s until the late 1920s, the detection o f deception mainly appears in 
academic publications in psychological and criminological journals. However, from the 1930s 
academic publications on lie detection increasingly disappear, while academic publications 
start re-appearing in the scientific journals from the late 1970s. The scarcity o f historical 
sources on the development o f lie detection in this period made the location o f different 
materials on its further development necessary.
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Firstly, I traced the institutional connections that were formed and the individuals that were 
involved in the development o f lie detection. Secondly, I contacted several institutions which 
hold archives on the history o f psychology as well as the main professional polygraphic 
association, the American Polygraph Association.80 O n this basis, I was able to locate archival 
material on the further development o f lie detection from the 1920s until 1950s. There are 
two institutions in the history o f lie detection, which proved to be o f significance in its 
development: first, the Berkeley Police Department, which became one o f  the main 
institutions in a police reform movement that sought to professionalise the police and 
implement scientific methods o f criminal investigation in the first third o f the 20th century. Its 
efforts to integrate scientific methods o f criminal investigation came to include the use of lie 
detection. In researching this connection, I was able to locate not only archival material on 
the history o f the police department, but in addition, collections o f the papers o f the two 
m ost significant individuals involved in the early development o f lie detection — Larson, who 
initiated the use o f lie detection examinations in criminal investigation in the early 1920s, and 
Keeler, who developed the polygraph in the 1920s and whose practices were instrumental in 
shaping the development o f polygraphy as a separate profession. These are located at the 
Bancroft Library at the University o f Berkeley. The second major institution which served as 
a hub in the development o f lie detection was the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory 
(SCDL), which was the first major crime laboratory to have been opened in the US, in 
Chicago in 1929. The formation o f the laboratory was again an expression o f the increased 
modelling o f crime control in terms o f scientific practices. Keeler was employed by the 
laboratory and from this setting facilitated the spread and commercialisation o f polygraphy. 
Between 1929 and 1938, the laboratory was affiliated to the Law School o f Northwestern 
University. Tracing this connection, I located archival sources on the history o f the SCDL 
and lie detection at Northwestern University Archives, where I also came across an additional 
collection containing Keeler’s papers at the Dr. William J. Yankee Library, Department of 
Defence Polygraph Institute in South Carolina. The papers include further material on 
Keeler’s activities in commercialising polygraphy. An overview o f  the sources that I consulted 
can be found in Appendix A.
The different nature and availability o f historical sources in the different periods o f the 
history o f lie detection resulted in the finding that a change in the location o f the detection of 
deception took place from an academic setting to the setting o f criminal investigation in its 
early history. This change is connected to the institutionalisation o f polygraphy as an applied
80 While this American Polygraph Association maintains an archive o f  the professional journal Polygraph, it does 
not hold any sources on the history o f  lie detection. I additionally contacted the Archives o f  the History o f  
American Psychology at the University o f  Akron, which maintains a collection o f  psychological instruments 
but does not hold any sources relating to the history o f lie detection.
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technique. Unlike Bunn, who does not consider this shift, I have sought to examine to what 
extent this shift points to a change in lie detection practices also in light o f Alder’s analysis 
referred to above. I proceeded by carrying out an in-depth analysis o f  the academic sources 
published between 1900 and 1930 in connection with the broader psychological and 
criminological literature o f the time. This led to the identification o f the first strand o f my 
analysis, namely, the tracing o f how it became possible to capture the lie on the subject’s body 
within the framework o f early psychological discourse and the broader framework o f the 
human sciences. In  this context, I have tried to reconstruct methodological shifts in how the 
detection o f deception went about capturing deception, leading eventually to the constitution 
o f the straightforward ‘lie’ as an object o f knowledge on the subject’s body. It is this object 
which forms the basis o f the polygraph examination. I have approached the literature that 
emerges in the detection o f deception from the 1970s in a similar manner, tracing how 
methodological shifts in the detection o f deception from an emotional to a cognitive 
conception o f deception are set within psychological discourse and practice.
By equally taking the primary academic sources as an expression o f the move o f lie detection 
from one setting to another, my analysis o f archival material was geared towards tracing the 
developments which mediated the placement o f lie detection outside the academic setting, 
and establishing how this movement shaped lie detection as a knowledge practice in the 
period from 1920 until 1970. This was done by charting the technical development of the 
instrument and its commercialisation through the analysis o f notes on experiments, technical 
drawings, Keeler’s correspondence with instrument manufacturers, and the patent application 
process. In conjunction with an examination o f different representations o f lie detection in 
the media (as analysed by Bunn) and by lie detection specialists, this allowed for the 
development o f the second strand o f my analysis. This strand concerns the role of the 
instrument itself in shaping lie detection practices. I analysed the shift o f  lie detection from 
the academic setting to the law enforcement setting by reconstructing a conflict that 
developed between Larson and Keeler. My analysis o f this conflict, which has already been 
mentioned in section 2.4 above, was based on correspondence that took place between key 
figures who were involved in early lie detection, speeches, and a manuscript drafted by 
Larson. These sources have allowed me to elaborate different models of expertise that were 
connected to the emergence o f polygraphy as an applied knowledge technique and the 
disappearance o f Larson’s academically oriented model. The analysis o f academic sources 
from the 1970s onwards, not only in terms o f the move from an emotional to a cognitive 
conception o f deception, but also in terms o f their institutional location, allowed me to 
further expand on the historical evaluation o f  the success o f polygraphy in instituting itself 
versus the failure o f recent academic methods in the cognitive detection o f deception to take
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root. These considerations have constituted the third strand o f my analysis, regarding the 
change in lie detection practices and the status o f the expert.
O n the basis o f an historical examination o f each o f the four strands identified in the sections 
above, this thesis seeks to provide a sociological analysis o f how the polygraph examination is 
constituted as an applied technique o f knowledge production and intervention at the entry o f 
the criminal justice system and beyond -  as one o f the ‘bits and pieces,’ which constitute and 
intervene on the ‘modern’ soul as part o f the ‘political technology of the body.’
A final note needs to be taken o f the main geographical site o f this study, which so far has 
remained implicit. As regards the location o f the history o f lie detection, at least physiological lie 
detection, which forms the focus o f this study, it is to a large degree an American history. As 
discussed in the next chapter, the first experiments into lie detection were carried out in Europe 
and the United States. As historical sources show, from the 1920s, however, research and 
application o f physiological lie detection methods became (and have remained until recently) a 
mainly American affair.81 Consequendy, this thesis takes the US as its main geographical site. 
However, this thesis does not focus on explaining the specifically ‘American character’ of lie 
detection perse by seeking to, for example, explicate its cultural determinants. As I elaborated on 
above, it focuses on developing an understanding o f the development o f lie detection as a 
particular knowledge practice and its mode o f operation. In this it must self-evidently take into 
account the context in which it developed, e.g. the American movement o f police 
professionalisation and the structure and functioning o f the criminal justice system. However, 
this does not provide an answer to the question why physiological lie detection as regards its 
early development as well its current use has largely been based in the United States. This is an 
intriguing question. It has been suggested that the success o f lie detection might have been due 
to a naive trust in the power o f science or things appearing as scientific in the solution o f social 
problems in the United States which is not apparent in Europe.82 This explanation is 
unsatisfactory for it takes the view that lie detection is pseudo-scientific for granted and makes a 
broad claim about American culture which is not historically grounded. The examination o f the 
specifically ‘American’ character o f physiological lie detection, in my view, would require a 
broader comparative history o f the development o f legal and criminal psychology and its varied 
integration in different national criminal justice systems in the US and in Europe.
81 As I elaborate on in chapter 7, the use o f  polygraphy in the monitoring o f  paedophiles and sex offenders has 
started to spread beyond the confines o f  the US. Additionally, other countries have taken up polygraphy in 
criminal investigation. However, this has taken on the form o f  adopting American practices in polygraphy 
and an overall dependence on the US polygraph industry. Polygraph operators are frequendy trained either 
in the US or by American polygraph operators. Moreover, the instruments are bought from US 
manufacturers. Additionally the US remains the leader in the development and application o f  polygraphy. 
The polygraph is used in criminal investigations in Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand (Vrij, 2000, p.171).
82 Ben-Shakhar and Furedy, 1990, p. 117.
42
Such a comparative history may take on the form o f a history o f the development o f the 
Cscience(s) o f credibility’ from the beginning o f the 20th century. The question o f the ‘truth’ 
status o f an individual’s utterances has been one of the central problematics in the 
administration o f (criminal) justice. This problematic has been connected to different 
strategies in externalising subjective truth, which are linked to different notions o f how it can 
be captured. With the emergence o f legal and criminal psychology from the end o f the 19th 
century, the notion developed that the ‘science o f mind’ could provide a scientific assessment 
o f the truth status o f the subject’s utterances and thus put the elaboration o f judicial truth on 
a scientific footing. It was claimed that the construction o f  judicial truth on the basis of 
subjects’ statements could be rendered in terms o f scientific -  psychological — truth. The 
psychological assessment o f statements o f subjective truth took on two forms, both o f which 
were pursued in Europe and the US at the end o f the 19th and early in the 20th century. One 
form o f elaborating the truth o f the subject’s statements involved early methods in detecting 
deception, which usually centred on detecting the suspect’s truthfulness or deception 
regarding his guilt. The other form -  identified as ‘witness psychology’ or ‘psychology of 
testimony’ — centred on establishing the credibility o f the witness’ statements. This line o f 
research conceived o f the problematic o f the truth status o f the subject’s statements in 
different terms. It ventured to establish whether a witness’ statement could count as a ‘true’ 
representation o f a certain event based on studies o f perception and memory. Here the 
scientific establishment o f the credibility o f the subject’s utterances was constructed not in 
terms o f the intention o f the subject (to deceive or be truthful) but rather in terms o f the 
‘objective’ mental capacity o f the subject to represent a past event.83 Thus, the question was not 
so much whether he was deceptive but rather to what extent he might be ‘deceived’ by his 
own mind. However, in the further development o f legal psychology these two forms 
diverged as regards their geographical placement. In the US, the question o f credibility was 
soon exclusively framed in terms o f constituting the suspect’s guilt or innocence on the basis o f 
his ‘lie’ or ‘truthfulness’ using physiological methods o f detecting deception. The psychology 
o f testimony was no longer systematically pursued. By contrast, physiological methods o f 
detecting deception disappeared in Europe and legal psychology became centred on 
establishing the credibility o f the witness' statements (which might include the suspect’s 
statements). Here the institutionalisation o f ‘witness psychology’ and the ‘psychology o f 
testimony’ took precedent. This not only involved the question whether the witness’
83 Cf. Binet (1905); Binet and Clarparede (1906); Stern (1910; 1939) for European experiments on the 
psychology o f  testimony, cf. Cattell (1895); Bolton (1896); Miinsterberg (1907; 1908) for American ones. 
Stern was an important figure in the introduction o f  the psychology o f  testimony founding the journal 
Beitrdge %ur Psychologie der Aussage (Contributions to the Psychology o f  Testimony) in 1903 (Hale, 1980, p. 
108). He was also crucial in the general establishment o f  applied psychology in Germany (Bartol and Bartol, 
1999, p. 5).
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statements could be counted as ‘true’ representations. Rather, it considered which objective 
methods o f  questioning needed to be implemented in eliciting a ‘truthful’ account 
(‘suggestibility’ being identified as one o f the central problems).84 As part o f the psychology of 
testimony an interest in the detection of deception re-emerged in the 1960s. However, the 
psychology o f testimony in European countries, especially Germany and Sweden, moved 
towards the analysis of the subject’s speech searching for ‘objective cues’ o f truthfulness and 
deception in the ‘verbal content’ o f his utterances,85 by contrast to the detection of deception 
in America which located the lie in the movements o f the body.86
As these different developments imply a comparative history o f the ‘science(s) o f credibility’ 
would examine the enmeshment o f psychological and legal practices with the regard to how 
the former become enlisted in the latter (the detection o f the guilt o f the suspect vs. the 
assessment o f  the witness’ testimony). In this context, it would evaluate how the problematic 
o f ‘subjective truth’ is differently framed at the intersection o f psychology and jurisprudence. 
This would take into account the varied locations o f where the ‘truth’ o f the subject’s speech 
may be found (his body, his memory or his speech) and would open out to a broader analysis 
of different conceptions o f the ‘psycho-legal’ subject and varied constructions o f  judicial truth 
in the accusatorial system o f the US versus inquisitorial systems that are prevalent in 
(continental) Europe. It is only on the basis o f such a comparative analysis, that the 
specifically American character o f physiological lie detection could be established. The scope 
of this thesis is too limited for a comparative evaluation o f this scale. However, the history o f 
physiological lie detection as it is presented in this thesis might serve as a basis for such a 
broader analysis in the future.
84 Cf. Stem (1905); Monkemoller (1930); Amtzen (1993); Bender, Roder and Nack (1995). The psychology o f  
testimony has constructed certain types o f  individuals, especially the child and the teenager but also women, 
as less credible and thus in need o f  particular methods in the establishment o f  the truth status o f  their 
statements (cf. Michel, 1907; Steller, Wellershaus and Wolf, 1992; W olf and Steller, 1993).
85 Cf. Undeutsch (1967); Trankell (1963/1971); Granhag and Stromwall (2004).
86 However, there has been an increasing exchange between European researchers on the verbal assessment o f  
‘credibility* and the American physiological detection o f  deception in recent years. Three international 
conferences were held in 1981, 1988, and 2003 in Italy and Sweden (Yuille, 1989; Granhag and Stromwall, 
2004), which brought together European analysts o f  verbal contents o f  deception and American 
polygraphists. A comparative history o f  the ‘science o f  credibility* would trace the increasing exchange 
between practitioners in witness psychology and lie detection at the backdrop o f  their varying 
implementation in European and US criminal justice systems.
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Chapter 3 The Lie as an Object o f Knowledge
This chapter traces the first attempts to establish a scientific way o f capturing deception. 
These attempts were made at the intersection of criminology and psychology in the period 
from 1904 until about 1923. They constituted what is now commonly referred to as lie 
detection, and provide the starting point for a plethora o f techniques that have been 
developed since the beginning o f the 20th century and continue to be developed as a means of 
‘catching’ the lie. Although people went about capturing the lie in different ways, there was 
one particular instance o f this which came to attract the most attention: the criminal lie. One of 
the founders o f ‘criminalistics,’ Hans Gross, stated:
‘In a certain sense a large part o f  the criminalist’s work is nothing more than a battle against lies. He has 
to discover the truth and must fight the opposite. He meets this opposite at every step. [...] Utterly to 
vanquish the lie, particularly in our own work, is o f  course, impossible, and to describe its nature 
exhaustively is to write a natural history o f  mankind. We must limit ourselves to the consideration o f  a 
definite number o f  means, great and small, which will make our work easier, will warn us o f  the presence 
o f deception, and will prevent its playing a part.’87
As regards the development of the means that would warn o f deception, the psychological 
practices and the criminological context in which they were to be applied were bound up with 
each other from the beginning. As we will see, research on the detection o f deception was 
characterised by the way in which experimental set-ups directly mirrored or simulated criminal 
justice settings, and were marked by a concern with the applicability of the methods or results in 
a criminological setting. Moreover, this research was not carried out in the laboratory first and 
only then applied in the criminological context. Rather, in the early development o f the 
detection of deception, research and application were closely intertwined: simultaneously, 
psychologists carried out experiments on the detection o f deception as well as using these 
methods on criminal subjects. As we will see in the following chapters, as research on the 
detection of deception developed further it lost its link to the experimental setting. This was 
connected to a second movement, occurring later on, whereby the detection o f deception 
instituted itself as a separate profession — polygraphy. It was no longer to be carried out by 
academically educated individuals, who also engaged in research on lie detection, but rather by 
the police officer or independent polygraph operator trained exclusively in its application.
This chapter shows how the detection o f deception became intelligible within the broader 
framework o f how the human sciences went about creating and intervening upon the human 
subject and became elaborated on the basis o f the knowledge practices o f early psychology. 
At the basis o f the endeavours o f  the human sciences lay a certain way o f constructing 
knowledge o f the human subject, which centred on the body and the idea (in part, elaborated
87 Gross, 1905/1911, p. 474-475.
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on the basis o f 19th century physiology) that measuring its movements by means of 
physiological instruments would allow for a scientific analysis o f the subject’s inner life, the 
criminal’s character, and the psychiatric patient’s maladies.
This chapter traces how the straightforward ‘lie’ as object o f detection emerged as the basis on 
which the guilt o f the subject could be established. In doing so, the chapter examines how 
changing techniques employed in the detection of deception implied different understandings of 
what psychologists were detecting and how, in turn, these techniques shaped the way in which 
deception was framed in each setting. As I will argue, these changing techniques can be 
understood in terms o f two reconfigurations on the basis o f which the lie emerged as a seemingly 
physiologically discrete, recordable -  in short, an objective — phenomenon. This process involved 
the move o f the detection o f deception from the mind to the body becoming associated with the 
emotion o f fear and the reframing o f deception itself. In the final constitution o f the detection of 
deception the lie as simple falsification was rendered as a measurable entity on the basis o f an 
evolutionary split between cognition and emotion that was drawn in early psychology. This split 
between the ‘truthful’ emotional body o f the criminal on the one hand, and the lying subject (who 
could control his thought and his speech) was made possible through the material elaboration of 
the body as a moral and epistemological entity. As the lie became legible on the script o f the 
subject’s body, the moral evaluation o f the lie was translated in terms o f one o f the guiding 
distinctions according to which the human sciences conceptualised human behaviour: the normal 
and the abnormal. As a result, the lie was rendered as a psychological condition expressed by the 
abnormal functioning of the body on the basis o f which not only the guilt o f the criminal suspect 
could be established, but the subject could also be termed as immoral.
i .  1 Measurability
A crucial precondition for the development o f lie detection was the use o f physiological 
techniques o f measurement. These techniques were underwritten by a commitment to the 
idea that measurements could be translated into an objective understanding of the human 
subject’s inner life. To this end, a range o f techniques were applied: in the development o f lie 
detection, they revolved around externalising deception by means o f physiological 
measurements such as blood-pressure, respiration, and reaction-times.
The use o f such measurements in the detection o f deception stemmed from the more general 
study o f mental phenomena across criminology, psychiatry and psychology. In replacing the 
ephemeral soul o f the subject with the scientific study o f mind — or, as Hacking has argued, 
by inventing a ‘surrogate for the soul’88 — physiology was used to construct the human subject
88 Hacking, 1994, p. 36-37.
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on the basis o f movements o f the body.89 This construction drew on a mechanical conception 
o f the body which had emerged only recently, alongside the development o f physiology and 
medical science in the 19th century. The earlier ‘anatomical’ conception o f the human body 
elaborated knowledge on the basis o f the dissection o f the dead (diseased) body. By contrast, 
the development o f physiology brought with it a change in focus: while anatomy was based 
on a structural view o f the body, physiology centred on explaining the human body through 
its functions.90 This was connected to the elaboration o f knowledge based on the living body, 
which was to be gained by making its internal functions visible through the use of 
instruments. The modern human body was thus constituted by a new mode o f observation as 
part o f which apparatuses increasingly mediated the relationship between the human body 
and its observer in physiology as well as medical science. Some o f these instruments, such as 
the stethoscope or the ophthalmoscope, worked by modulating the observer’s perception. 
Others transformed the observer’s mode o f observation itself, and as a result, the body that 
was to be observed. Instruments such as the sphygmograph (indicating changes in blood 
pressure) or the galvanometer (indicating changes in skin resistance) created ‘a pattern that 
was not a picture of reality but a manufactured or constructed representation.’91 These representations 
gained their authority as ‘objective representations’ by virtue o f the fact that they had been 
manufactured by instruments that operated independently o f the observer, whose senses were 
deemed to be increasingly unreliable. The patient’s (or the experimental subject’s) body was 
transformed into an inscription, which took on the form of graphs or charts to which 
numerical values could be assigned. By means o f these inscriptions, the body was transformed 
into a continuous ‘body-in-time’, whose functions could be quantified and its patterns 
compared across time. Furthermore, the quantification o f the body’s functions lent 
themselves to a comparison across bodies, and to the establishment o f regularities. As 
‘immutable mobiles,’92 graphs and charts could travel as a patient’s case file or as the results of 
physiological experiments: to be compared, ordered, and systematised.93
89 As is well-known early criminology, especially as practiced by Lombroso also drew on other techniques - 
anthropometry, phrenology, and physiognomy - which sought to construct the character o f  the criminal 
based on external measurements o f  the body. These disciplines, especially phrenology and physiognomy 
became highly disputed by the end o f  the 19th century. For an insightful history o f  how Lombroso used 
measurements in constructing the criminal, cf. Horn (2003; 2006).
90 Tansey (1993).
91 Frank, 1988, p. 213.
92 Latour (1986).
93 For histories o f how the development o f  physiological and medical instruments transformed the elaboration 
o f knowledge o f  the body in physiology cf. Frank (1988) and in medical practice cf. Reiser (1978; 1993) and 
Bynum (1994). The implementation o f  a changed conception o f  the medical body was by no means linear. 
For example, Evans (1993) provides an analysis o f  the resistance o f  medical practitioners against an 
‘instrumentalised’ mode o f  observation as part o f  the introduction o f  blood-pressure measurements in the 
US. For the role that instruments have played in the history o f  psychology, cf. Albert and Gundlach (1997) 
and the special issue o f  the journal History ofPychotogp, Vol. 8, N o. 1.
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In the human sciences, physiological measurements became the basis on which to variously 
construct the human subject and study a range o f mental phenomena. Thus, depending on 
the context in which physiological measurements were used and the setting in which they 
were applied, they could become the means through which to develop different 
interpretations o f what they denoted. At the intersection of criminology, psychiatry and 
psychology, they were used to construct human types that were conceptualised as ‘abnormal’ 
— specifically the criminal and the mental patient, two categories which overlapped and which 
moved along a continuum. In psychology, physiological measurements could denote the 
emotional life o f the individual subject. In elaborating their knowledge o f the individual, these 
disciplines borrowed from one another. It was in the midst o f  such borrowing that methods 
o f lie detection developed and came to centre on capturing the lie on the basis o f the 
emotions. Emotions were seen as remnants o f our evolutionary history which we share with 
other animals and, being connected to certain bodily states, prepare us to react appropriately 
in dangerous situations. Emotions were defined through their visceral expressions that were 
seen to be beyond our control. According to this view, our common evolutionary roots as 
they are expressed in the emotions were to be distinguished from that which makes us unique 
as humans and which is under our control: our capacity to think.
As a well-known psychologist o f the time, Jastrow, put it:
‘The life o f  feeling and emotion is aeons older than that o f  thought, o f  cerebral redirection and control.
We are far older emotionally than intellectually and can never deny, never outgrow our evolutionary
birthright, whatever its handicaps. In the duality o f  the nervous system is written the organic preamble to
the chapters on feeling and thinking.’94
While the earliest type o f measurement which was used in the detection o f deception -  
reaction-time in word-association experiments — constructed mental processes through 
physiological measurements, it did not follow the logic o f distinguishing between cognition 
and the emotions in terms o f an evolutionary, biological mechanism. In the final elaboration 
o f the lie detection examination, however, the detection o f the subject’s lie was to be made 
intelligible on the basis o f the split between cognition and emotion elaborated in early 
psychology: the subject’s lie was interpreted as an expression on the body’s script o f the 
‘evolutionary birthright’ which the criminal suspect cannot control. As a result, the lie was 
moved from the ‘chapters on thinking’ to the ‘chapters on feeling.’
Four measurements were used in early lie detection research. Three o f these concerned bodily 
measurements related to blood circulation (pulse, blood-pressure, etc.), respiration, and 
galvanic skin resistance. The fourth type o f measurement centred on the reaction-times o f 
subjects in word-association tests. As early as 1895 one o f the arguable founders of
94 Jastrow, 1928, p. 35.
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criminology, Cesare Lombroso, used a so-called plethysmograph (which measured changes in 
blood volume) in order to assess the guilt o f a criminal suspect.95 In 1904, the German 
researchers Wertheimer and Klein developed a so-called ‘Tatbestandsdiagnostik’ (translated as 
‘Association Reaction Method o f Mental Diagnosis’96), using word-associations in 
overcoming the ‘deceptive will’ o f the suspect.97 In a similar vain, the renowned Swiss 
psychoanalyst C.G. Jung, who carried out word-association tests to assess psychopathological 
conditions, used the technique to establish the guilt o f potential culprits.98 In the United 
States, these word-association tests were emulated by Hugo Miinsterberg, an early figure in 
‘applied psychology,’ and by a number o f other American psychologists.99 The Italian 
psychologist Vittorio Benussi — working at the University o f Graz, Austria — was the first to 
carry out research into the respiratory symptoms o f lying in 1914.100 While galvanic skin 
resistance only became integrated as a measurement in 1934 (when the polygraph as an 
instrument had already been developed), its potential in the detection o f deception was 
acknowledged by researchers early on.101
As the national backgrounds o f the above-named researchers suggest, the first researches into 
and application o f methods o f lie detection were carried out in both Europe and the United 
States. From roughly 1920 onwards, however, methods o f lie detection had mainly become an 
American endeavour. Two formats o f experimentation or examination were used: one form 
o f deception test direcdy mirrored, and was applied in, a criminal justice setting. The other 
format involved some kind o f mental task such as adding or subtracting numbers. Subjects 
who lied disobeyed the experimenter’s instructions: for example, by adding when being asked 
to subtract. These experimental tests in the laboratory as well as word-association tests were 
increasingly abandoned in the 1920s and the ‘criminological test format’ using physiological
95 Ferrero-Lombroso (1911).
96 Yerkes and Berry (1909).
97 Wertheimer and Klein (1904).
98 Jung (1905; 1910).
99 Miinsterberg (1908).
100 Benussi (1914).
101 In the late 19th century, the first experiments involving human skin conductivity and its possible relationship to 
psychological processes were carried out by Tarchanoff and Fere (Binswanger, 1907/1908; Prideaux, 1920; 
Hilgard, 1987). Concurrendy with the rise o f  an interest in this phenomenon, debates emerged as to its 
psychological significance. Was it related to emotional processes? If it was, was it an expression o f  conscious or 
subconscious emotions? Or was it related to the attempt to suppress emotions (this was the question most 
relevant to forensic practice, as suppressed emotion was translated into suppressed guilt)? Was it merely a sign 
o f  attention? Although forensic opportunities in the study o f  psychological processes through this physiological 
phenomenon were acknowledged, early researchers o f  lie detection were sceptical o f  its use. The lie detection 
researchers Marston and Larson believed that it was an indicator o f  emotional processes, but noted that the 
measurement was too sensitive for a meaningful ‘diagnosis’ o f  deception (Marston, 1938; Larson, 1921; 1922; 
1923). However, in 1939, the galvanometer became integrated into the polygraph (LKC, Box 49, Folder 1059, 
Box Vol. 3: ‘From Handbook o f  Operation and Service Keeler Polygraph,’ n.d). In 1939, an article was 
published which described the galvanometer as the most valid instrument in the detection o f  deception 
(Summers, 1939). In more recent research on the detection o f  deception galvanic skin resistance has even 
become the most significant bodily measurement (cf. Chapter 7).
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measurements became the focal point o f lie detection research. In this movement, which I 
will be discussing in the following sections, deception was transformed from a construct 
which could be located in the mind to a sign which could be read on the script o f the 
subject’s body.
In the following analysis, I will focus on the word-association technique developed by Jung, 
Wertheimer and Klein from 1904, the ‘discontinuous’ blood-pressure method developed by 
Marston between 1913 and 1915, and the continuous method (developed by Larson between 
1921 and 1923) which marks the final structure o f the lie detection examination. In each 
description, I will consider how deception is framed as an object o f knowledge. In tracing the 
two reconfigurations on the basis o f which the detection o f deception moved from the mind 
to the body and came to centre on the lie, we will see that each o f these reconfigurations 
contributed to what was to become the basic model o f polygraphy.
3.2 The Deceptive W ill
In his inaugural lecture at the University o f Zurich in 1906, C.G. Jung elaborated on the 
significance o f association experiments for psychopathology. He argued that ‘the ancients 
already knew that the flow o f our representations and ideas does not proceed without any 
laws.’102 Rather, on the basis o f the first experimental researches by Francis Galton and 
Wilhelm Wundt, it could be shown that when a subject was asked to respond to a word 
presented to him with a word that immediately appeared in his mind, certain necessary 
relationships could be deduced between the ‘stimulus’ word and the ‘associated’ word, and 
that these relationships allowed for the postulation o f the ‘lawfulness o f ideational 
associations’ {Geset'^ mafiigkeit der Ideenverbindungeti).103 As a result,
T he [association! experiment would assume the character o f  something implacable, o f  something 
causally inevitable. The experimental subject cannot do otherwise, he must produce the respective 
representation that pertains to a certain stimulus, just like the nervous system, that has been stimulated at 
the same point ceteris paribus, also must always contract the same muscle. If we accept the necessity o f  the 
laws o f  association, we have to conclude that the experimental subject is completely at the mercy o f the 
experiment, because he necessarily has to have the thought that is associated with the stimulus word.’104
These ‘necessary’ responses, which would allow for an analysis o f the subject’s thought 
processes, were combined with a form o f  measurement that had first been used in the 
analysis o f perception: reaction-time. Reaction-time was measured by means o f a
102 Jung, 1906, p. 146 [my translation].
103 Association psychology can be traced further back than Galton, who published association processes based 
on his introspections in 1879 (Galton, 1879). Locke introduced the term ‘association o f ideas.’ The English 
philosopher Hartley provided physiological speculations as to the nature o f  associations as early as the 
middle o f  the 18th century. The early English psychologist Bain published the first monographs on the topic 
in the middle o f  the 19th century (Hilgard, 1987, p. 18).
104 Jung, 1906, p. 147 [my translation].
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‘chronoscope,’ which could indicate the most minute time intervals.105 In the first 
psychological laboratory instituted by Wilhelm W undt in Leipzig in 1879, for example, it was 
used to study how long it would take an experimental subject to react to different colours o f 
light, numbers, and simple geometric shapes. In combination with word-association tests, 
reaction-times were examined to trace processes o f thought: were there differences in 
reaction-times depending on the kind o f associations that experimental subjects produced, i.e. 
were certain representations more complex than others?106 But for Jung and others, words 
and their reaction-times revealed a different relationship: rather than, as previously, 
establishing the basic relationships o f processes o f thought, Jung held that association words 
and reaction-times could allow access to a subject’s inner psychical life. In short, they could 
be used to detect emotional ‘complexes’ which could result in the diagnosis o f  a psychological 
pathology.107
This development may be interpreted as having been inspired by a different model o f 
experimentation in early psychology, first developed in France in the second half o f the 19th 
century. Danziger calls this model the ‘clinical experiment.’ Early experiments that were 
carried out by Wilhelm Wundt had been geared towards developing a general understanding 
o f the workings o f human consciousness. In these experiments, the subject did not attain 
significance as a specific individual. Rather, the reactions o f experimental subjects were taken 
as expressions o f how the mind (universally conceived) worked. By contrast, having 
developed in a medical context, the clinical experiment constructed the subject as a particular 
individual suffering from a certain psychological condition, which was to be researched and 
treated.108 Researching and diagnosing the particular individual proceeded by elaborating 
human types (e.g. the ‘hysteric,’ the ‘epileptic,’ etc.) that were considered to be ‘abnormal’ or 
‘pathological.’ This depiction o f the human subject as a certain type based on his
105 The chronoscope, i.e. a device which could measure minute time intervals (up to 1/1000 o f  a second) using 
electromagnetism, was developed from the 1840s. Originally developed in a military setting and also used in 
physics and ballistics, it was transferred to physiology on the basis o f  early physiologists’ interest in the 
nature o f  reflex action (Schmidgen, 2004; 2005a).
106 Schmidgen (2005b). The early experimental psychology as carried out by Wundt initially placed an emphasis 
on the study o f  sensation in elaborating a science o f  human consciousness. This was pardy due to the 
methodological indebtedness o f  psychology to physiology, which had studied processes o f  sensation from its 
beginnings. It was also connected to the second discipline from which psychology elaborated its 
epistemological foundations: philosophy. Psychology was elaborated on the basis o f  a Kantian notion o f  
science, which drew on a mechanistic conception o f  the natural sciences (Kant himself denied that 
psychology could be constituted as an empirical science). Early psychology sought to institute itself as a 
legitimate science following this mechanistic model by conceiving o f  the processes o f  the mind in terms o f  
components or elements. According to this view, if  the most basic components o f  the mind — such as 
sensation — could be identified and described in quantifiable terms, psychology had a claim to scientific 
status (Zupan, 1976, p. 147-149). This ‘elemantarism’ was also connected to the idea that more complex 
processes o f  the mind resulted from a combination o f  its basic components. As a result, in Wundt’s 
laboratory, research into reaction-times was geared towards identifying the different processes which were 
thought to make up more complex psychical processes (ibid, p. 155-156).
107 Cf. Jung (1906; 1910; 1918/1969).
108 Danziger, 1990, p. 52-53.
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psychological make-up did not remain restricted to the mental patient. It also came to include 
the criminal, whose ‘criminality’ was equally thought to be grounded in psychological 
abnormality. The clinical experiment expressed the notion — increasingly prevalent in 
experimental psychology and fields drawing on its methods, but still foreign to Wundt’s 
programme -  that the object o f experimentation or investigation might at the same time be 
the object o f a particular treatment or intervention. In Jung’s conception the word-association 
test was thus
‘not merely a method for the reproduction o f  separated word couplets, but it is a kind o f  pastime, a 
conversation between experimenter and test person. In a certain sense it is even still more than that. 
Words are really something like condensed actions, situations, and things. When I present a word to the 
test person which denotes an action it is the same as if  I should present to him the action itself, and ask 
him, "How do you behave towards it?" "What do you think o f  it?" "What do you do in this situation?"’109
In this ‘conversation,’ a list o f  words was presented to the subject or the patient and he was 
asked to respond as quickly as possible to each word. The time it took the subject or patient 
to respond to each word was recorded. In his studies Jung came to construct a list of one 
hundred words, which he stated ‘are chosen and partially arranged in such a manner as to 
strike easily almost all complexes o f practical occurrence.’110 The following table shows a list 
o f response words and reaction-times:
Stimulus Word Reaction Reaction-time (Min. Sec.)
Head Hair 1.4
Green Meadow 1.6
Water Deep 5
Stab Knife 1.6
Long Table 1.2
Ship Wreck 3.4
Question Answer 1.6
Wool Knit 1.6
Insolent Gende 1.4
Lake Water 4
111 Well 1.8
Ink Black 1.2
Swim Know 3.8
Table 1: Results o f  a Word-association Test111
109 Jung, 1910, p. 223.
110 Ibid, p. 220.
1,1 Taken from Jung (1907).
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The words ‘water,’ ‘ship,’ ‘lake,’ and ‘swim’ might seem innocuous, but in combination with 
reaction-times that are much longer than for the other words, they assume a new significance. 
And indeed, upon further questioning, the subject admitted that she had considered 
committing suicide by drowning herself.112 Thus, lengthened reaction-times — as well as the 
production o f senseless or unfitting reaction words — acquire a meaning regarding the state o f 
the subject’s mind. They point to the fact that the person’s ‘adaptation to the stimulus word is 
disturbed,’113 and as a consequence, that the person is ‘imperfectly adapted to reality.’114 The 
‘actions, situations, or things’ called forth by the stimulus word are connected to resentful 
emotions, which impede a quick and certain response to the stimulus word. The subject’s 
‘mal-adaptation’ to reality, his pathology, is made intelligible on the basis o f interpreting time 
intervals in terms o f the deviation from a normal, unimpeded state.
I f  the word-association test could bring out emotional complexes, could it also touch on 
those ‘actions, situations, or things’ which a criminal suspect concealed and which therefore 
assumed a special significance in his mind? Jung affirmed that it could, reporting his first case 
o f trying and successfully detecting the guilt o f a criminal suspect in 1905.115 Concurrently, the 
German psychologists Wertheimer and Klein, having carried out a number o f experiments 
proposed a so-called lTatbestandsdiagnostik,Ub (‘Association Reaction Method o f Mental 
Diagnosis’117) based on the principles o f word-association tests. Just as an emotional complex 
could be struck in a mental patient expressing his pathology, a complex might be struck in the 
suspect expressing his criminal guilt. Thus, the technique o f detecting psychic disturbance or 
trauma as deviation from a norm could be transferred to the criminal case and transformed 
into a means o f making visible the ‘deceptive will’ (Tauschungsmlle).118 Wertheimer and Klein 
argued that the ‘deceptive will’ o f  the suspect was the most ‘dangerous’ factor in ordinary 
statements, for their contents could be shaped by the suspect’s will.119 But as word- 
associations called forth necessary associations, the ‘deceptive will’ could be overcome: words 
relating to the details o f a crime could be presented to the suspect, and if he was guilty, would 
touch upon the ‘representational complex’ (VorsteHungskomplex) o f his crime.120 He would thus 
unwillingly produce an association word which related to his crime. Moreover, if he 
attempted to escape the necessary association, his ‘deceptive will’ would turn against him,
1,2 Jung, 1907, p. 249-250.
m  Jung, 1910, p. 225.
114 Ibid, p. 225.
"5 Jung (1905).
1,6 Cf. Wertheimer and Klein (1904); Gross (1905); Wertheimer (1906). A dispute developed as to who was to 
be credited for the development o f  the word-association technique in relation to ‘emotional complexes.’ For 
a review o f  the dispute cf. Wertheimer, el a I. (1992).
117 Yerkes and Berry (1909).
118 Wertheimer und Klein, 1904, p. 79.
1,9 Ibid, p. 75-76.
120 Ibid, p. 77.
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because the attempt to push the representation out o f his mind and replace the immediate 
association with an alternative one would focus his attention even more on the complex o f 
his crime.121 He might thus be able to produce a simulated association word, and this would 
be given away by a lengthening o f his reaction-time or the nature o f his response word.122 By 
contrast, the innocent suspect could be distinguished from the guilty criminal as the stimulus 
words would not strike an existing complex. The format of the experiment or examination 
followed the same format explained above. As words encompassed a person’s actions, 
expressions denoting the criminal act and material details o f the site where it had taken place 
were rendered into a list o f  words to be interspersed with words that were not o f significance 
to the particular case. In examining a nurse suspected o f having stolen money from another 
nurse, for example, Jung used the words ‘cupboard, door, open, key, yesterday, banknote, 70, 
50, 20, money, watch, pocketbook, chain, silver, to hide, fur, dark reddish, leather, centimes, 
stencil, receipt, Dosenbach,’ and ‘theft, to take, to steal, suspicion, blame, court, police, to lie, 
to fear, to discover, to arrest, innocent’ as ‘stimulus words.’123
Jung’s and Wertheimer’s research was soon taken up by researchers in the United States. 
Jung’s work, in particular, was published in English and well-known in the US, where he 
accompanied Freud on a lecture trip in 1909. He lectured on the association technique in the 
establishment o f psychopathologies and the detection o f guilt at Clark University. The latter 
was emulated in university experiments.124 One o f the most prominent proponents o f the 
word-association technique in the United States was Hugo Miinsterberg, who had carried out 
his doctoral research under Wilhelm Wundt. Subsequently, he became professor at the 
Philosophy Department o f Freiburg University, teaching courses in philosophy and 
psychology and setting up one o f the first psychological laboratories at a German university. 
While his work in experimental psychology was not received as amicably in Germany, it was 
well-regarded in the United States. William James, one o f the central figures in early American 
psychology, who valued Miinsterberg’s work and referred to it in his Principles of Psychology, 
invited him in 1892 to join Harvard as professor o f psychology and to reinvigorate the 
Harvard Psychological Laboratory as its director.125 While at Harvard, Miinsterberg 
increasingly occupied himself with developing ‘applied psychology’ as an independent field o f 
knowledge which could actively aid in the solution o f social problems as well as the 
advancement o f society. He argued that experimental psychology had matured to a stage 
where its knowledge and methods should be applied to the solution o f practical problems in
121 Ibid, p. 79.
122 Ibid, p. 79-81.
123 Jung, 1910, p. 231.
124 Spillmann and Spillmann, 1993, p. 322-324; Hale, 1980, p. 45.
125 Spillmann and Spillmann, 1993, p. 322-324; Hale, 1980, p. 45.
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such areas as education, medicine, art, economics and law.126 Thus Miinsterberg was part o f 
the movement in psychology that I referred to above: the psychological laboratory 
increasingly took part in the ordering o f the social world, and conversely, the social world and 
its subjects (the worker, the pupil, the criminal, etc.) were increasingly defined and intervened 
upon using knowledge practices that had been developed in the laboratory. In his work on 
industrial psychology, for example, Miinsterberg developed measures for best performance 
for different vocations by analysing work tasks and connecting these to tests o f attention, 
memory, intelligence, and so on.127 By these means, the individual worker was assessed for his 
psychological ‘fitness’ for a particular job. His individual performance as defined by 
psychological tests was set in relation to other individual performances by means o f statistical 
analysis, resulting in the ranking o f individuals on the basis o f ‘norms’. This ranking o f 
individuals then became the basis o f their management, the definition o f measures in order to 
increase their performance.128
Miinsterberg was also vocal in his views as to how the expert psychologist could put the 
establishment o f ‘truth’ in legal proceedings on a scientific footing through the application o f 
his methods. In a similar vein to other reformers o f the criminal justice system who 
campaigned that the application o f  science would lead to ‘true justice’, he sought to enlist 
public support for the application o f psychological knowledge to the elaboration o f judicial 
truth, publishing articles in popular magazines and writing a monograph entitled On the 
Witness Stand. In this book, Miinsterberg referred to Jung’s and Wertheimer’s work and 
elaborated on the usefulness o f the word-association test in combination with reaction-times 
in testing the truthfulness o f criminal defendants.129 In opposition to the ‘barbarism’ o f  the 
third degree, i.e. violent methods o f interrogation geared towards eliciting a statement from 
suspects — which ‘decent public opinion’ could only reject rightly on the basis o f ‘the 
instinctive conviction that the method is ineffective in bringing out the real truth’130 — 
experimental psychology could provide a scientific means o f assessing the criminal’s mind by
126 Miinsterberg, 1908, p. 10.
127 van Strien, 1998, p. 207-208.
128 Cf. Hacking, 1994, p. 36-37; Danziger, 1990, p. 190. This is a classic example o f  how, according to Foucault, 
‘individualisation’ (i.e., techniques which allow for the ranking o f  individuals in relation to others) and 
‘normalisation’ (i.e., definition o f  measures on the basis o f  these techniques in order to amend individuals’ 
behaviour) come to form the basis o f  the human sciences in implementing the modem ‘disciplinary regime’ 
(Foucault, 1975/1991).
129 Miinsterberg himself used the technique to evaluate the confession o f  a criminal defendant in a court case in 
1907. The case evoked nationwide and even international attention involving a bombing carried out by a former 
labour unionist, Harry Orchard, and lead to demonstrations by unionists across the country. Miinsterberg 
attended the trial and subsequently carried out a number o f  psychological tests including a word-association test 
on Orchard. Before the verdict had been given, Miinsterberg gave a press interview which was taken up by the 
European and American press reporting on the ‘lying-machine’ and raising questions as to the effect o f  his 
disclosure regarding the impartiality o f  the trial (Hale, 1980, p. 116-118).
130 Miinsterberg, 1908, p. 74.
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uncovering the ‘facts which he wants to keep hidden in his soul/131 using the word-association 
technique. Placing an emphasis on reaction-times, he stated that
*1116 chronoscope o f  the modem psychologist has become, and will become more and more, for the 
student o f  crime what the microscope is for the student o f  disease. It makes visible that which remains 
otherwise invisible, and shows minute facts which allow a clear diagnosis. The physician needs his 
magnifier to find out whether there are tubercles in the sputum: the legal psychologist may in the future 
use his mental microscope to make sure whether there are lies in the mind o f  the su sp ect.32
In word-association, the idea o f the lie as a ‘quantum phenomenon’ (i.e. as an intentional 
effort to deceive or misrepresent reality at a specific junction in time) is as yet undeveloped. 
Instead, the goal is to tease out through measurement a general will to deceive. The suspect’s 
attempt to hide the ‘true’ representation by replacing the immediate association with an 
alternative one and thus to simulate ‘actions, situations, or things’ is indicated by the time 
which is required for the replacement o f the ‘true’ representation to be pushed aside. 
Alternatively, the nature o f the association word signifies a disturbance between the subject’s 
thought processes and his speech. In this process, the ‘deceptive will’ o f the suspect is turned 
against him, as the attempt to focus his attention on something other than the ‘true’ 
representation focuses his mind even more on it. In a similar vein to the complex o f  the 
mentally ill, deception becomes apparent as a deviation from ‘normal’ reaction-times, which 
denote ‘true’ representational processes o f the mind. We find here a reasoning which will also 
transpire in later methods o f the detection o f deception, and which is connected to how the 
notion o f normalcy operates in the human sciences. The notion o f the ‘normal’ comes to 
pervade the human sciences: taken up from physiology, in which the notion o f pathology 
denotes its corresponding binary as well as most intimately connected to the development o f 
statistics in the 19th century, it makes possible the classification and differentiation o f 
individuals in relation to a (variously defined) norm. A divergence from this norm does not 
simply point to something that differs from it. Rather, it is indicative o f something that 
‘deviates’ from it in a normative sense, and which must therefore be remedied. In the context 
o f the detection o f  deception, deception is thus made intelligible not only as an act which 
becomes apparent through mental measurements. Rather, by conceptualising deception in 
terms o f deviation, the detection o f deception translates a moral valuation o f deception into 
psychological terminology and establishes ‘truthfulness’ as the ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ state o f 
the individual’s mind.
Overall, however, word-association tests were to remain rooted in the study o f human types 
elaborated in psychopathology and psychoanalysis: Jung turned increasingly towards 
psychoanalysis on the basis o f Freud’s influence and thus moved the word-association test
131 Ibid, p. 82-83.
132 Ibid, p. 77.
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from the realm o f experimental testing and more firmly towards clinical analysis. His 
publication on studies in word-association reflects this: it contained word-association studies 
on ‘imbeciles and idiots/ the ‘epileptic/ and the ‘hysteric.’133 In the US, word-association tests 
took a different route in contributing to the development o f standardi2ed mental testing: the 
American researchers Kent and Rosanoff developed the Kent-Rosanoff test to assess the 
mental state o f subjects on the basis o f a comparison o f their responses to frequency tables 
that had been drawn up from the word-associations o f 1000 ‘normal’ subjects.134 
Between 1910 and 1920 a shift became apparent in the development o f lie detection. The 
focus o f study was no longer on the identification o f the deviation o f utterances from thought 
processes through variations in reaction-times. Rather, it moved from the measurement of 
mental processes to the measurement o f bodily processes. While deception was still 
conceptualised as a ‘complex’, this complex was now to be found in the body’s viscera and 
associated with the ‘basic’ emotion o f fear. As we will see, the transformation o f the location 
of deception also brought with it a change from the identification o f deception to the 
identification o f the lie — it was transformed from variable responses into a simple falsification. 
While the detection o f deception was significandy reframed in this process, the identification 
o f the lie on the subject’s body was still indebted to the early attempts to externalise the 
subject’s ‘will to deceive’ on the basis o f measuring the processes o f the mind. It appropriated 
its method of isolating deceptive from truthful statements by means o f relevant and irrelevant 
‘stimuli.’
The shift o f the detection o f deception from the mind to the body was not sudden - research 
into the potential use o f word-association tests continued into the 1920s.135 Moreover, as 
deception moved from the mind to the body, word-association tests were used in some set­
ups before the lie took the form o f a simple ‘no.’136 Additionally, research on word- 
associations using reaction-times and psychological research using other physiological 
measurements should not be seen as two completely separate traditions on a more general 
level. In studying the psychopathology o f individuals, Jung and others also combined both, a 
fact which is elaborated upon in a more detailed fashion by Geoffrey Bunn, whose analysis I 
consider in the next chapter.137
133 Jung (1918/1969).
134 Kent and Rosanoff (1910), Hilgard (1987).
135 Cf. Marston (1920; 1925); Goldstein (1923); Crosland (1929).
136 Larson, who will be discussed at greater length below, used a mixed format o f  direct questions and the 
Kent-Rosanoff and Woodworth questionnaires in his early research on lie detection (these questionnaires 
were developed to assess the mental state o f  individuals) (cf. Larson, 1921; 1922; 1923). In 1923, he 
concluded that the asking o f  questions was more ‘practical’ than the use o f  word-association lists (Larson, 
1923, p. 424).
137 Cf. Jung (1907); Jung and Peterson (1907); Jung and Ricksher (1907); Binswanger (1907/1908).
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3.3 The Emotional Body
In transforming the lie from a mental construct into a bodily one, blood-pressure 
measurements became the central physiological measurement in the detection o f  deception. 
In 1895, Lombroso had been one o f the first criminologists to use a plethysmography which 
measured changes in blood-volume, in order to assess the affective state o f a suspect and his 
potential guilt. His technique focused on evoking an emotional response by suddenly 
mentioning the crime or confronting the suspect with a picture o f its victim.138 He thus 
posited a direct link between the emotional reactions o f the suspect (as evidenced by the 
plethysmograph) and the suspect’s guilt. In transforming deception into an object of 
knowledge on the basis o f which the guilt o f the suspect could be established, this chain o f 
translation was lengthened: deception became connected to the emotion o f fear, which in 
turn pointed towards the suspect’s guilt.
From 1913 until 1915 William Moulton Marston carried out research into measuring 
physiological concomitants o f deception at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. In 1917, 
he applied these physiological concomitants in connection with medical and psychiatric 
examinations o f criminal defendants that had been referred to him by a probation office. 
He did so in order to determine whether the defendants should be kept on probation, or 
whether their case should be dismissed or in order to make other recommendations 
regarding the defendant’s status.139 Marston had studied law and psychology and was 
working under Hugo Miinsterberg, who (as we saw in the previous section) was an avid 
proponent o f  applying the methods o f experimental psychology to concrete or practical 
ends. Similarly, and to an even greater extent than Hugo Miinsterberg, Marston did not 
confine himself to the academic realm. Although he published academic articles during the 
1920s on lie detection as well as putting forth a theory o f the emotions, he also promoted 
the use o f lie detection in popular magazines. N ot being able to secure an academic 
position, he successfully established himself as ‘consulting psychologist’ in the 1930s, 
providing psychological insights into widely discussed topics such as crime and sex in the 
media and developing the comic character Wonder Woman in the 1940s.140 Additionally, as 
we will see in chapter 5, Marston was the first to attempt the introduction o f  lie detection 
examinations as scientific evidence in court in the so-called Frye case. This case not only 
became the precedent on the basis o f  which lie detection examinations were to remain 
excluded from the criminal courts.
138 Lombroso-Ferrero, 1911, p. 225.
139 Marston, 1921, p. 554.
140 Bunn (1997a), cf. chapter 5, p.175-235.
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Among the different measurements that Marston tested (including reaction-times and 
galvanic skin resistance), he came to regard systolic blood pressure as the most reliable 
measurement o f physiological concomitants o f deception.141 In 1917, he published an article 
entitled ‘Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms o f Deception’142 in the Journal of Experimental 
Psychology'43 His experimental set-up used the following format:144
“The subject came to the experiment as to an examination by a prosecuting attorney, resolved to save a 
friend who was accused o f  a crime. He sat down at a table beside the experimenter (but protected by a 
screen) and found on the table two papers face down; one marked “L” (Lie) and the other marked “T” 
(Truth). If, in saving his friend, the subject chose to lie, he turned over and read the “L” paper. This was 
a story prepared by the experimenter relating simple events, supposed to have been witnessed by the 
subject, and proving the friend guilty. At the end o f  the story were recorded certain facts, supposed to 
have been established by other witnesses, which the subject must admit in forging an alibi for his friend. 
He then proceeded, with these facts and the true story before him, to think out a consistent lying alibi. If  
the subject chose to tell the truth, he turned over the “T” paper, the contents o f  which were unknown to 
the experimenter, and found a consistent story, admitting the facts supposed to have been established, 
but completely exonerating his friend. This story was the truth, it was the only account he knew o f  the 
affair, and he told it as such. In either case the subject had 10 min., or until he announced he was ready, 
to thoroughly familiarize himself with the story he was about to tell, but was free to refer to the chosen 
paper any time he wished. The experimenter had prepared ten questions covering the incidents o f the 
“L” story and an assistant had prepared the “T” story to successfully cover the questions, and the facts 
supposed to have been established. [...] Thus it was impossible for the experimenter and jury to know 
whether the subject was telling a story o f  his own, or the one composed by the assistant. The questions 
were then put to the subject, and the jury closely observed his manner while answering. They rendered a 
“verdict” as to whether he had lied or not, basing their judgment upon the internal consistency o f the 
story as well as upon the subject’s appearance while answering questions. These verdicts were written and
141 Some o f  Marston’s research into different methods o f  detecting deception was undertaken at the instigation 
o f the Psychological Committee o f  the National Research Council ‘with a view to determining their value in 
government service during the war [...]’ (Marston, 1921, p. 553). Together with Marston, the psychology 
professors, Leomard, D . Troland and Harold E. Burtt — who later published on respiratory symptoms in the 
detection o f  deception — formed a ‘testing committee’ which surveyed the association technique, and 
galvanometric, respiratory and blood pressure measurements o f  deception (Marston, 1938, p. 59). In his 
‘popular’ description o f  the development o f  the lie-detector test, Marston states that ‘the Army Intelligence 
Service and the Bureau o f  Criminal Investigation, Department o f  Justice, needed some practical method o f  
distinguishing German spies from loyal Americans’ (Marston, 1938, p. 59). While Marston was not employed 
by the army as an officer subsequent to the submission o f the report o f  the testing committee, he 
nevertheless worked on spy cases for the Bureau o f  Investigation as a civilian (ibid, p. 59). In 1918, Marston 
carried out experiments and training measures with the Psychological Co. 1 at Camp Greenleaf in an effort 
to train officers as deception testers (Marston, 1921; 1938). The programme did not last for long: the 
armistice was declared soon after it was established. I cannot elaborate on the military aspects o f the 
detection o f  deception here. The use o f  lie detection methods in the identification o f  potential spies or 
‘security leaks’ in government departments was taken up in the 1940s. I shall discuss this use o f  lie detection 
methods in Chapter 6.
142 The pumping cycle o f  the heart is divided into two phases: the systole during which the blood is ejected, 
and the diastole during which blood fills the ventricles (Thews, Mutschler, and Vaupel, 1999, p. 186). 
Marston maintained that the use o f  the systolic blood-pressure was preferable to the diastolic pressure: 
Tirst, the use o f  the systolic eliminates the local effects o f  minor affective states; secondly, it eliminates 
the important and irrelevant factor o f  intellectual work; thirdly, its is less susceptible to modification by 
physical pain than is the diastolic; and fourthly, it tends to record only the unequivocal changes in the b.p. 
system brought about through increase o f  heart-beat unimpeded by inhibitory reflexes or antagonistic 
functioning o f  the vaso-motor apparatus’(Marston, 1917, p. 121-122). As I show in further detail below, 
the argument that systolic blood-pressure eliminates the factor o f  intellectual work is especially significant. 
It is indicative o f  the transformation o f  deception from a mental to a bodily and emotional construct set 
within the distinction o f  cognition and emotion o f  early psychology.
143 Marston, 1917, p. 125-126.
144 This set-up was emulated by other researchers (cf. Burtt, 1921; Landis and Gulette, 1925; Landis and Wiley, 
1926). Landis and Gulette concluded that on the basis o f  their results they could not make a significant and 
reliable distinction between truth and falsehood based on blood-pressure. They also arrived at the result that 
no uniform truth or falsehood graphs could be plotted (Landis and Gulette, 1925, p. 231-235).
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passed in. The jury then left the room, and the experimenter recorded his own judgment, which was 
based entirely upon the b.p. record. The subject gave his introspection, a final reading was taken and the 
instrument removed. The b.p. was recorded five times, in each experiment o f  Series A, (1) before the 
subject turned over the paper, (2) after he announced that he was ready, (3) after the fifth question, (4) 
after the last question, and (5) after his introspection. Complete notes o f  the subject’s story were taken by 
the experimenter.’145
Note that Marston’s set-up was marked by the attempt to simulate in as realistic a manner as 
possible a criminal court proceeding. The subject was instructed to act as a witness, he was 
questioned by an experimenter who acted as a prosecuting attorney, and there was a jury which 
passed judgment on the subject’s credibility. The normative character o f the experiment is 
expressed in the formal requirement o f the set-up which connected the T  (Truth) story to the 
virtual suspect’s innocence and the L (Lie) story to the suspect’s guilt. Marston’s results 
showed £a uniform and significant systolic pressure curve’ indicative o f the ‘deceptive 
consciousness.’146 Additionally a Truth curve was identified which indicated
‘that, during the telling o f a truthful story to a suspicious and critical audience there is more or less typical 
emotional (or other central) grouping o f  conscious factors which tend to inhibit any general emotional 
reactions to an environment capable o f  increasing pressure, and which exert a positive influence over 
physiological conditions.’147
Deception, on the other hand, produced a marked rise in blood-pressure. It is precisely here 
that the emotion o f  ‘fear’ first appears. This rise in blood pressure was so high and so 
prolonged that, for Marston, it could only be attributed to the emotions o f fear and (to a lesser 
extent) anger. The resulting lying curve or “L” curve was characterised by the fact that
‘the rise o f  an “L” curve occurs in regular, climactic manner. The pressure starts its rise close to the 
beginning o f  the recital in every record as in the typical curves above, climbs with varying abruptness but 
the great consistency o f movement to a definite climax, and then recedes. Subsequent questions may 
cause secondary climaxes, but these are patently subsidiary to the steady, persistent climb and fall o f the 
pressure curve taken as a whole.’148
Additionally,
T he apex o f  each curve is correlated very closely with that point in the subject’s testimony which marks 
the crisis, or climax, o f the whole “job” before the subject. This was determined partly by introspection, 
but chiefly by observations on the manner and attitude o f  the subject, and by noting the whole 
construction and plan o f  the false “alibi.” Thus, like the other elements o f  “significance” in “L” curves, 
such correlation is capable o f  objective determination.’149
Figure 1 shows the lying curve and the truth curve that were plotted for one o f the subjects in 
the experiment:
145 Marston, 1917, p. 124-125.
146 Ibid, p. 128.
147 Ibid, p. 129.
148 Ibid, p. 130.
149 Ibid, p. 130.
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Figure 1: ‘Lying Curve’ and ‘Truth Curve’150
When discussing the introspective records of the experimental subjects, Marston returned 
to the quesdon as to which emodons accompany deception. On the basis o f the subjects’ 
reports, he concluded that fear and anger were the two major emotional concomitants o f 
deception, fear being always present and anger only being present when the subject felt in 
danger of being detected.151 However, it is not just fear that resulted in the characteristic 
shape of the lying curve. It was also the result o f the struggle of the subject to conceal his 
fear:
‘Thus a significant lying curve is a function o f  the struggle between the involuntary impulse to 
express fear in response to awareness o f danger, and the voluntary focusing o f  attention to exclude 
the fear from consciousness. As the ideational elements o f the deception become more and more 
complex, the awareness o f  danger becomes more and more firmly established in the foreground o f  
consciousness, and, as the stimulus is thus enhanced, the “natural response” o f  fear becomes 
stronger and stronger.’152
Deception in Marston’s set-up is constructed as a narrative. This narrative should be as
 -------------- : u i„  — J ---------- ..
a long build- 
milarly to the 
he struggle is
physiological changes takes on the shape of a classical narrative -  that is to say 
up o f tension resulting in a climax which is followed by a short anti-climax. Si 
word-association test, deception is marked by a struggle. But in this instance,
capacity for thought and speech. It is this capacity which defines our social order, but which also 
brings with it the social possibility o f misrepresentation.
The emotional processes identified by Marston became the central focus in the 
development o f  lie detection. In  particular, fear came to be seen as the primary emotion 
which defines the ‘lying complex.’ However, as the basic set-up o f the lie examination was 
developed, the mode o f their extemalisation changed. The mode in which deception and its 
underlying emotions were externalised was, in fact, reminiscent o f the logic o f the word- 
association test. In  a similar vein to the insignificant and significant ‘stimuli’ which were 
used to distinguish the reaction-times o f the guilty subject from the reaction-times o f  the 
innocent subject, deception was now isolated by asking ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ questions. 
Yet following Marston, the emotional reactions o f the body (rather than the reaction-times 
produced by the ‘deceptive will’) now served as the basis on which to distinguish between a 
truthful answer and a deceptive one. Thus, by reconfiguring the comparative logic o f  the 
word-association test on the basis o f asking questions that could only be answered by ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’, and by connecting the subject continuously to the instrument, the straightforward 
lie emerged as object o f knowledge to be identified as a discrete sign on the subject’s body. 
In the next section, I provide a description o f the institution o f what came to be the final 
set-up o f the lie detection examination. Subsequent to this description, I shall return to an 
analysis o f the broader shift in transforming the lie from a mental construct into a 
bodily/emotional one.
3.4 The Reduction of the Lie
The next step in the development o f lie detection brought with it a changed institutional 
setting - it involved a move from the psychological laboratory to the police department, 
more specifically the Berkeley Police Department. In the 1910s, the Berkeley Police 
Departm ent had become a national model o f ‘progressive’ law enforcement in the US under 
the auspices of its chief, August Vollmer. He was considered one o f the main figures o f a 
police reform movement that had started at the end o f the 19th century in the US and which 
sought to re-organise what was perceived to be a corrupt and partisan organisation into an 
efficiendy run professional organisation. Vollmer was guided by the belief that the social 
and behavioural sciences should be applied to police work and that ‘scientific methods’ o f 
criminal detection and identification should be a central part o f crime control.153 As I will 
elaborate on in the following chapter, the police department was to become one o f  the 
central institutional loci o f the detection o f  deception as tool in the establishment o f
153 Carte and Carte (1975); Walker (1977).
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criminal suspect’s guilt. In  1920, John A. Larson, holding a Ph.D. in physiology and 
biochemistry, joined the Berkeley Police Department to establish a classification system for 
fingerprint records. Having developed an interest in lie detection and read Marston’s work, 
Larson
‘[ ...] felt that Marston’s reported method had many limitations because predicated upon a rise o f  blood 
pressure as well as upon a discontinuous method. He had the laboratory technician, Earl Bryant, 
assemble a smoked drum, a Jaquet Chronometer, an Ellis Pneumograph and a modified Erlanger Capsule 
and was ready for test procedure.’154
Larson did only rarely carry out experiments in a laboratory setting as (for example) 
Marston and Wertheimer and Klein had, but investigated the possibility o f using methods 
o f lie detection in actual criminal cases from the very beginning. In later years, he even 
denigrated the value o f  laboratory research in the detection o f deception, arguing that only 
‘real’ cases would allow for an adequate study o f deception. His first case involved a theft at 
a dormitory o f a sorority in Berkeley. Larson questioned all students living at the dormitory 
and — based on the results — identified a ‘guilty’ suspect who subsequently confessed. 
Referring to this and similar cases, Larson published an article on the ‘Modification o f the 
Marston Deception Test’ in 1921. In the article, he agreed with Marston that blood pressure 
was a valid measurement in deception detection. However, in elaborating on his doubts 
stated in the passage just cited, he criticized Marston’s technique on the grounds that by 
only taking blood-pressure measurements at certain intervals ‘during the intervening 
periods, any fluctuations were lost.’155 Rather, by connecting the subject to a blood-pressure 
instrument, a sphygmomanometer, for the entire duration o f the examination, one should 
be able to trace the body’s changes over time. Additionally, by simultaneously recording the 
subject’s changes in breathing by means o f a pneumograph, one might be able to determine 
the effect o f breathing changes on the heart-rate.156 Denoting the different types o f 
measurements, Larson called his instrument assembly ‘cardio-pneumo-psychograph.’ 
Furthermore, Larson argued that deception might not necessarily be accompanied by a rise in 
blood pressure. Rather, a deceptive response could produce the most varied changes in 
blood-pressure and respiration depending on the individual’s make-up:
‘1. Increase in blood pressure — a rise.
2. Decrease in blood pressure
3. Increase in height.
4. Increase in frequency.
5. Summative effects.
6. Incomplete inhibition.
154 JLP, Carton 2, Folder 15: John Larson, “Police and Forensic Psychiatry Needed in State Hospitals,’ p. 5-6, 
April 1950.
155 Larson, 1921, p. 392.
156 Ibid, p. 392.
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7. Complete inhibitory effect.
8. Irregular fluctuations, especially noticeable at the base o f each cardiac pulsation.
9. Combination o f  any o f  the above effects in the same individual.
10. These changes may occur with but litde latent period, or then may be accumulative in effect, and 
more generally distributed/157
In terms o f the format o f the examination, the subject no longer told a story which was 
deemed true or false, as in Marston’s discontinuous set-up. Instead, closed questions were 
asked. These questions only allowed for a “yes” or “no” answer. The exact time when a 
question was asked and answered was recorded. The questions and answers thus became 
discrete entities-, ‘psychological stimuli’ which were designed in such a way as to direcdy tap into 
a ‘deception complex.’ Deception, here reduced to the falsification o f a particular state of 
affairs, was directly correlated with the concurrent physiological changes recorded on to a 
graph by the instrument. Here, we begin to see the emergence o f the bi-partite transition 
from the detection o f deception in the mind to its detection in the body, and the 
accompanying shift in understandings o f deception itself.
As regards the methodology o f the detection o f deception, Larson’s set-up recalls the logic 
o f the word-association test, which sought to isolate deception by comparing responses to 
‘significant’ and ‘insignificant’ stimuli. There are two different types o f questions which are 
asked in Larson’s set-up: ‘relevant’ questions which concern a particular crime or a 
transgression (e.g. ‘Did you steal X?’); and ‘irrelevant’ questions which do not concern the 
crime and the answers to which are known (e.g. ‘Is your name X?7). And yet in Larson’s 
hands, this approach relies on a vastly different understanding o f what it means to 
‘externalise’ a ‘deception complex’ than we encountered in the word-association test. That is 
to say, it is an approach that fundamentally transforms the object o f  detection. The word- 
association test was marked by the attempt to detect a complex through the study o f  the 
relationships between words and the subject’s reaction-times. Deception in this context is 
conceived o f  as an attempt by the subject to produce associations other than the ones he or 
she would ‘normally’ make, and to produce these alternative associations as quickly as he or 
she would on stimulus words that do not touch on a guilt complex. In Larson’s detection 
set-up, by contrast, the meanings o f words are shifted into the body’s responses. Whereas in the 
word-association test, deception is identified on the basis o f the analysis o f variable 
relationships between utterances, Larson’s technique for detecting deception confine 
‘semantic’ possibilities, and focus instead on the interpretation o f variable physiological 
responses to binary declarations. Having been moved to the body’s reactions, deception is 
no longer identified through the measurement o f a mental process — the replacement o f a 
‘true representational complex’ with an alternative one which is indicated through a
157 Larson, 1923, p. 450.
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lengthening o f reaction-time. The process o f making the lie apparent on the body’s script 
might be seen to be analogous to what Latour calls ‘shifting.’ Shifting denotes a process 
whereby the action o f a particular actor is delegated to another one — most notably a 
material one. W hat is special about the process o f shifting is that the ‘very matter o f 
expression’158 is changed. In this case, the lie is transformed from a speech act into a 
squiggly line on graph paper, thereby folding the subject’s inner life into the body’s chart. 
The continuous recording o f bodily reactions, in combination with the questions asked and 
the answers given, could allow for the comparison o f reactions to questions not only across lie 
detection examinations but also within a single lie detection examination:
‘In addition to controlling the innocent person against the suspect, the questions should be so planned
that the emotional response o f  the same individuals should be controlled as fully as possible.’159
The nature o f the irrelevant questions was geared towards eliciting a ‘neutral’ response 
indicating a specific level o f tension which could be contrasted with the fear o f the 
detection o f deception. Thus, by contrast to M arston’s set-up where an entire narrative is 
declared either truthful or deceptive and in integrating the logic o f the word-association 
test, Larson’s set-up emulates a more ‘experimental logic’ by attempting to isolate a 
deceptive response as definitely and discretely as possible. The table below illustrates the 
manner o f questioning used by Larson. It is an excerpt from a list o f  questions that Larson 
asked suspects in a watch theft case. Figure 2 below shows a reproduction o f a prisoner’s 
‘deceitful’ record in which deviations from a relatively consistent pattern have been 
‘diagnosed’ as lies.
1. D o you like the movies?
2. D o you like to swim?
3. D o you like to work?
4. D o you like to dance?
5. Did you take the watch from the top o f the towel rack?
6. Did vou sell the watch belonging to ?
7. Have you ever been arrested?
8. Have you lied yet?
Table 2: List o f  Questions Posed by Larson in a Lie Detection Examination160
158 Latour, 1999a, p. 186.
159 Larson, 1921, p. 394.
160 Taken from Larson (1932).
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*[...] the record o f  the suspect at the comme 
type o f the individual.’162
of examination was as follows: phase one - Thus the overall organisation o f this typ<
measurement o f the rise or fall o f blood pressure counts, Larson establishes the lie as a discrete 
phenomenon. His analysis is based on a comparison o f  the variation o f physiological reactions 
recorded alongside an interrogation which follows a tightly controlled format. The 
physiological reactions are compared to a ‘normal’ physiological state o f the individual 
ascertained at the beginning o f  the examination. Thus the presence o f the apparatus has 
shifted from being an intermittent one. In Marston’s set-up the instrument is completely 
controlled by the examiner who attaches the instrument to the subject’s arm, obtains a 
reading which is noted down and removes the instrument again. The ‘lying curve’ is plotted 
after the examination, which signifies the general pattern o f its progression. In  the case o f 
the cardio-pneumograph, the apparatus assumes a role o f co-presence in which it acts as a 
mediator between the subject’s body and the examiner. The machine ‘translates’ or 
externalises ‘in time’ (i.e., continuously) the physiological changes o f the subject during the 
examination into a script which can be read by the examiner and is interpreted in a process 
that synchronises the read-out, the questions asked by the examiner, and the responses 
given by the subject.
In Marston’s work, deception takes on the form o f a story elaborated by the subject, which 
accordingly follows the typical structure o f a narrative containing a long build-up of 
tension, a climax, and an anti-climax. The ‘lying curve’ assumes this shape mirroring a 
classical narrative. In Larson’s set-up, by contrast, deception is reduced to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answer and, increasingly, the examination is divided into discrete phases that are defined in 
terms o f temporal units o f oral or silent activity that bear a special relationship to the 
recording o f bodily changes taking place during the examination. The lie’s discrete 
physiological pattern emerges out o f  the comparison o f the reactions and replies o f the 
subject across the entire examination and -  potentially -  with the records o f other subjects. 
This is, however, not a unique pattern in Marston’s sense — there is no ‘lying curve,’ the 
general shape o f which can be identified in all cases o f lying. The physiological pattern o f 
the lie can take on many different patterns and can be characterised by a wide variation o f 
changes in respiration and blood pressure, as Larson’s list o f physiological indicators o f the 
presence o f the lie (reproduced above) aptly demonstrates. Nevertheless, the physiological 
pattern that is shown on the read-out o f the instrument is specific to the lie — it becomes 
apparent in its deviation from the ‘normal’ physiological responses o f the subject’s body. 
With Larson’s set-up then, what has emerged on the basis o f the reconfiguration o f the 
comparative logic o f the word-association test and the movement o f deception from the 
mind to the body, is the straightforward ‘lie’ as a seemingly discrete and recordable sign on 
the script o f the subject’s body.
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The most philosophically minded researcher on the detection o f  deception, Vittorio Benussi, 
who carried out experiments on the respiratory symptoms of deception had stated in 1914 that
‘[...] the successful lie is a bigger achievement than the telling o f  the truth as much as the ethical 
judgement might be to the contrary. Intellectually speaking the person who conveys something, which he 
has gained through insight, or which he remembers does hardly have to achieve something; he only has to 
translate the thoughts given to him into words, he does not have to work on creating those thoughts 
themselves in that instance. [...] The intellectual state o f  a person, whose goal it is to lie actually, that is 
successfully, is completely different; this is especially the case when he does not only convey something 
completely imaginary, but precisely when he wants to replace something, which to him corresponds to the 
state o f  affairs, with something invented.’163
By 1923, deception had been transformed in such a way that its cognitive achievement was no 
longer at issue — rather, the physiological processes were designed to betray a lie that was not 
cunning, but a simple falsification: a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.
3.5 Fear in Deception
Having provided an historical description of the way in which the detection of deception became 
reconfigured in its early development between 1904 and 1923, I will now return to a broader 
analysis o f how the straightforward lie had become intelligible as object o f detection. In a more 
general sense, it did so on the basis o f psychology’s conception o f the interaction between the 
mind and the body. In capturing the lie on the basis o f an interpretation o f bodily functions in 
terms o f fear, and in reducing deception to a simple falsification, lie detection operationalised a 
distinction between emotion and cognition that had been elaborated in early psychology.
In writings in 19th century ‘mental’ philosophy — a branch o f philosophy out of which American 
psychology partly emerged — emotions had still been portrayed as ‘physical, aesthetic, and 
volitional and were appreciated for their multitudinous, nuanced, and both culturally and 
cognitively diverse forms.’164 By contrast, from the middle o f the 19th century onwards, 
psychological knowledge o f the emotions was formed around ‘describing them as natural and 
biological mechanisms. The location o f emotions simultaneously was moved from volition -  in 
the head — to the physiological and visceral — in die body.Mh The emotions o f fear and anger were 
seen to be basic — as Jastrow put it at the beginning of this chapter, they attested to our 
‘evolutionary birthright.’166 As biological mechanisms which humans shared with their
163 Benussi, 1914, p. 262 [my translation].
164 Morawski, 1997, p. 226.
165 Ibid, p. 226-227.
166 In early psychology a distinction was drawn between feelings and emotions. There was much debate as to 
how this distinction could be drawn and different suggestions were provided as to the basis o f  their 
classification. Feelings were conceptualised as being marked by a qualitative difference, while emotions 
(such as fear, love or rage) were characterised by their unchangeable quality. This again points towards a 
conception o f  the emotions as uncontrollable by the subject. For a then current authoritative collection o f  
positions on feelings and emotions based on papers held at the so-called Wittenberg Symposium cf. 
(Reymert, 1928).
68
ancestors, they were perceived to be beyond the control of the subject. Rather, fear and anger 
were expressions o f the so-called ‘fight-or-flight’ mechanism o f the human Autonomic Nervous 
System.167 This mechanism was explained in terms o f its evolutionary utility:
Numerous ingenious suggestions have been offered to account for the more obvious changes 
accompanying emotional states — as, for example, the bristling o f the hair and the uncovering o f  teeth in 
an access o f  rage. The most widely applicable explanation proposed for these spontaneous reactions is 
that during the long course o f  racial experience they have been developed for quick service in the 
struggle for existence. McDougall has suggested that an association has become established between 
peculiar emotions and these ingrained native reactions; thus the emotion o f  fear is associated with the 
instinct for flight, and the emotion o f anger or rage with the instinct for fighting or attack. Earlier James 
had pointed out that “fear has bodily expressions o f  an extremely energetic kind, and stands, beside lust 
and anger, as one o f  the three most exciting emotions o f  which our nature is susceptible.’”168
The physiological changes o f fear and anger prepare the human subject to act, to flee or to 
attack: ‘the “tripod o f life” (heart, lungs, and brain) as well as the skeletal muscles — are, in 
times o f excitement, when the adrenal glands discharge, abundandy supplied with blood taken 
from organs o f less importance in critical moments.’169 These emotional processes are 
‘involuntary’ (as opposed to ‘voluntary’) processes o f the body, which the human subject can 
control. In the context o f the detection o f deception, these ‘involuntary’ processes o f  the 
body betray the processes o f the subject which are under his control: his thought and his 
speech. Even those bodily processes which he can partly control — his breathing, for example 
-  turn against him, as the attempt to suppress the fearful state o f the body becomes apparent 
as a pattern on the body’s script. As a result, the body’s mechanism designed to protect the 
subject in situations o f danger turns against him in the lie detection examination. The 
psychological explanation o f the basic emotion o f fear allows deception to become intelligible 
in the context o f the criminological setting. The biological mechanism of the fight-or-flight 
mechanism is transformed into the fear of detection. As Keeler states:
‘Although little is known concerning the mental processes involved in deception, the apparent effect is 
observed in the bodily changes accompanying the emotion of fear, primarilyfear of the consequences of exposure. Awareness 
on the part o f  the guilty subject o f  the procedure and o f  the resultant physiological changes intensifies 
this fear, thereby further accentuating the accompanying bodily changes.’170
167 Modern physiology conceptualises the human body in terms o f  the human nervous system, which is divided 
into two parts: the Central Nervous System comprising the brain and the spinal cord, and the Peripheral Nervous 
System which consists o f  ‘the nerves and ganglia outside the central nervous system’ (Carlson, 1998, p. 60). 
The peripheral nervous system is further divided into the somatic nervous system, which controls the 
movements o f  the skeletal muscles and is subject to voluntary control, and the autonomic nervous system 
(ANS), which controls the vegetative functions o f  the body and cannot be consciously controlled. The 
physiological reactions thought to accompany the emotions o f  fear and anger in polygraph examinations are 
attributed to the sympathetic division o f  the ANS which ‘controls functions that accompany arousal and 
expenditure o f  energy’ (Carlson, N ., 1998, p. 83) Researchers into lie detection working during the period 
covered in this thesis used Cannon’s work (Cannon 1915/1953) as the authoritative account o f  the 
connection between the sympathetic division o f  the ANS and the emotions o f  fear and anger.
168 Cannon, 1914, p. 263-264.
169 Ibid, p. 269.
170 Keeler, 1934, p. 154-155 [my italics].
69
In  turning the lie into an emotional construct, deception becomes increasingly defined in 
terms o f the split between uncontrollable emotion (that can be measured on the body) and 
cognition: to quote Jastrow again, it is moved from the ‘chapters on thinking’ to the ‘chapters 
on feeling.’ As we saw in my description o f the earliest attempts at detecting deception, the 
word-association test, deception is conceptualised as a mental process, which might be 
captured on the basis o f the deviation o f reaction-times o f the subject’s utterances. 
Deception in this case does not yet take on a definite form. Rather, what is externalised 
through the analysis o f utterances is a general will to deceive. Along, with the word- 
association test, there were other experimental formats which sought to detect deception on 
the basis o f setting mental tasks, some of which already employed bodily measurements. In 
such formats, subjects were instructed to deceive the experimenter by misrepresenting 
items that had been printed on a card or to reverse mathematical instructions by (for 
example) adding when being asked to subtract.171 Just like the word-association test, these 
tests disappeared in the 1920s, as the detection o f  deception shifted to the detection o f the 
simple lie on the emotional body o f the criminal suspect. As fear and anger become 
apparent in Marston’s discontinuous blood-pressure tests, Marston seeks to reduce 
deception to its emotional concomitants by excluding possible bodily processes which might 
accompany mental work. He argues that by using the systolic rather than the diastolic 
blood-pressure, one can be quite certain that blood-pressure measurements will only be 
connected to emotional changes, for it ‘eliminates the important and irrelevant factor o f 
intellectual work.’172 However, in his set-up the shift to the lie as a fully emotional construct is 
not yet complete. In M arston’s set-up, deception still takes on the form o f  a story — it is still 
a fully formed speech-act, involving a complex narrative o f an event whose ‘falsity’ does not yet 
contain a precise reference point.
As the straightforward lie emerges as a sign on the subject’s body, the move towards 
capturing deception as an emotional construct is completed. In keeping with the physiological 
understanding o f the emotions, Larson argues that the reduction o f the lie to a one-word 
reply is intended ‘to minimize disturbances incident to the mechanism o f speech.’173 Thus as a 
physiologically defined entity, deception can only become apparent on the subject’s body if its 
‘voluntary’ aspects are reduced to a minimum. For this reason, the attempt to capture 
deception, somewhat ironically, involve its increasing disappearance,174 N ot only the 
discreteness o f the lie as it is framed as a physiological response, but also the form that the lie
171 Benussi (1914); Burtt (1921); Landis and Gulette (1925).
172 Marston, 1917, p. 121-122 [my emphasis],
173 Larson, 1923, p. 424.
174 This ‘disappearance’ o f  the lie as a speech act becomes most explicit in the late 20th century as the detection 
o f  the lie moves into the brain. In experiments that measure changes in brain waves or functions, subjects no 
longer even reply, but rather press buttons indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no.’
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takes as a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answer, point to an additional aspect o f lie detection which is most 
pronounced in Larson’s set-up. As indicated in Montaigne’s observation that was cited in the 
Introduction to this thesis, the lie comes in a thousand different shapes. Deception as a 
speech act may, for example, take on the form o f an evasion by elegantly side-stepping an 
issue: it can involve the embellishment o f certain aspects o f a story, or their dramatisation. It 
could be a careless white lie told in order to please or avoid offense. The different shapes of 
the lie which reach so far that one might wonder whether to call them a lie (and thus make 
one think that truth might indeed come in different colours and shades as well) are here 
reduced to a binary distinction. As a result, lie detection operates on the basis o f a conception o f 
the lie and truthfulness which reduces the complexity and ambiguity o f these various 
instances o f the lie, letting them emerge as seemingly distinct categories on the script o f the 
subject’s body which can be modelled on the scientific binary o f ‘true’ and ‘false.’
The evolutionary split between cognition and emotion that is elaborated in early psychology 
is put to work in the lie detection examination through the distinction between the 
emotional body o f the suspect and the deceptive subject. In the next section, I provide an 
analysis o f how the distinction between the emotional body and the deceptive subject is grounded. 
The elaboration o f the body as an epistemological and normative entity is crucial to this 
process.
3.6 The Truthful Body and the lying Subject
In the last section, I discussed the distinction between cognition and emotion that was 
developed in early psychology. Increasingly, this distinction came to define the lie detection 
examination as the lie emerged as a discrete entity that could be measured on the body. 
However, in order for the lie to be read in terms o f fear, the body must be elaborated in a 
certain way. In this section, I provide an analysis of how the split between the emotional body 
and the deceptive subject is instituted in the lie detection examination. This depends on the 
setting up o f a ‘triad’ consisting o f the subject, the examiner and the instrument. In making 
the lie apparent on the suspect’s body, the way in which experimental psychology constructs 
and intervenes upon the body in generating knowledge is translated into the lie detection 
examination itself. The body is placed in a grid, as part o f which a normative and 
epistemological distinction between the internal and the external movements o f the body is 
developed.
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Figure 3: Spatial Set-Up o f  the Lie Detection Examination'75
We might start by taking a look at the different constituents o f the triad of the lie detection 
examination and how they are positioned vis-a-vis each other. In the above figure, the 
classical set-up of the polygraph examination from the 1920s onwards can be seen. The 
subject was attached to the instrument. He or she was seated in a chair placed next to the 
instrument, or sometimes sat with their back to the instrument. As a result, the subject could 
not see the machine or the examiner who sat behind the instrument. The examiner was seated 
in front o f the instrument panel so that he could manipulate the instrument and the read-outs 
which it produced during the examination. This triad was placed in a room which, it was 
intended:
Should be quiet, modest, uniform in temperature, and well ventilated. Colours should be conservative, 
and should create an atmosphere o f comfort and ease.176
Engineering a space which neither imposed nor distracted was supposed to have a certain 
effect on the body:
‘Man responds almost continuously to his immediate environment, to other individuals, to sounds, to 
doors, to pain, and to other stimuli. Therefore, since the value o f  the deception test depends upon bodily 
responses to certain stimuli, all attending circumstances must be devoid o f irrelevant factors. External 
stimuli that cannot be eliminated must be kept constant throughout the examination. Quiet, modest 
surroundings and a comfortable position add immeasurably to the accuracy o f the results obtained. 
Elimination o f extraneous noise, drafts and any factors which will influence the subject is essential.’177
In this way, the set-up of the lie detection examination mirrored the setting o f the classical 
psychological experiment, which similarly proceeded by constructing knowledge on the basis 
of a logic of exclusion. This meant that the subject was only to be affected by the 
experimenter’s stimuli, set against a neutral background. The construction o f knowledge in
175 Taken from LKC, Box Vol. 3: ‘Handbook o f Operation and Service Keeler Polygraph,’ n.d.
176 LKC, Box 29, Folder 777: Associated Research Inc, ‘Keeler Polygraph, Instruction Manual,’ p .5 ,1940.
177 Ibid.
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this space was intimately connected to the implementation o f a power structure. In terms of 
this structure, the subject’s body was placed inside a grid in which his bodily movements and 
his speech were subjected to observation, control and intervention. The spatial organisation 
o f the psychological experiment was to become mirrored in the later setting o f interrogation 
rooms where lie detection examinations were carried out. These examinations further 
intensified the surveillance effect that was already implicit in the experimental set-up. The 
distinctness o f their function — interrogation — was geared towards creating an atmosphere of 
confrontation with the suspect, underlining that any attempt to escape from detection would 
be futile.
In terms o f the elaboration o f the social roles taken by the subject and the examiner, lie 
detection drew both on the experimental set-up as it was elaborated in experimental 
psychology from the end o f the 19th century, and the power structure which it implemented in 
the generation o f knowledge. In early psychological experiments in W undt’s Leipzig 
laboratory, the experimenter and the experimental subject exchanged roles frequently -  
experiments consisted o f groups o f colleagues studying related phenomena o f the ‘individual 
consciousness.’ While a psychologist might pose as an experimental subject in one 
experiment, he would take on the role o f experimenter in another. As a result, the social roles 
o f experimenter and subject were symmetrical and exchangeable.178 However, as psychological 
research moved away from the study o f the fundamental processes o f the ‘individual 
consciousness,’ and towards the intervention upon the subject, the roles o f the experimenter 
and the subject became hierarchical and static. The experimenter now took on the role o f a 
psychological expert versed in scientific knowledge vis-a-vis the ‘lay’ subject, who was 
instructed and exposed to differential treatment and who was not part o f the process o f 
knowledge generation as regards the interpretation and the use o f research.179 Rather, as 
experimental practices developed, subjects were frequendy not informed (or even 
misinformed) as to the actual aims o f the experiment. In the lie detection examination, the 
role o f the examiner as a psychological expert — as representative o f ‘science’ — was emulated. 
As we will see in the following chapters, from the 1930s this role came to intersect with the 
role o f the criminal investigator and his role as a ‘representative’ o f social control.180 While 
drawing on lie detection as a psychological technique, the examiner came to represent a 
‘specialised technician’ rather than an academic psychologist who was applying his expertise 
in the area o f lie detection. This would eventually lead to conflicts over the form of expertise 
that the lie detection specialist should have in the detection o f the lie.
178 Danziger, 1990, p. 49-52.
179 Ibid, p. 64-67.
180 Bunn, 1997a, p. 240-241; Bunn elaborates this argument from Danziger’s analysis.
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Within this space, a distinction was opened up between the uncontrollable emotional body of 
the criminal suspect and the deceptive subject. The distinction worked in two ways: on the 
one hand, it was constituted by the way in which its placement elaborated an 
espistemologico-normative grid. On the other hand, it was constituted by the way in which its 
epistemological boundaries were defined. Both dimensions o f the body intersected and served 
in the production o f the body as a site for externalising the lie.
1. The placement of the body. Starting with the very first experiments in lie detection, the subject’s 
body was always placed in such a way that the subject could not see the graphs that were 
produced by the physico-mechanical interaction o f his body and the instrument. This arrangement 
expresses an epistemological and normative structure which deems the connection between 
the body and the instrument to be a reliable and controllable source o f externalising the truth 
of the subject’s lie in opposition to the subject’s appearance and his speech, which can be 
controlled by the subject and therefore enable him to hide the ‘truth.’ In turn, the reactions o f 
the body are hidden from the subject, ‘protected’ from his interference. There is a mirroring 
of processes in this game o f hiding the truth and making it visible — the subject’s hiding is 
accompanied by the hiding o f the extemalisation o f his physiological processes from him. 
The underlying logic o f this split between the body and the machine on the one side, and the 
subject’s speech and his appearance on the other, is that o f non-contamination o f  the one by the 
other. It also reinforces the dual and impersonal character o f the examiner’s superiority. His 
role as representative o f science and social order is heightened by the seating arrangement in 
which he is removed from the immediacy o f face-to-face interaction. By facing away from the 
examiner, the subject does not only interact with an unequal interaction partner, but is also 
unable to address that partner. I f  he utters a lie, it is not a lie that can be directed at the 
examiner. As a result, the examiner is not subject to the subject’s utterances but only judges 
them.
2. The boundaries of the body: The spatial placement o f the subject’s body vis-a-vis the instrument 
is further supplemented by the division between internal and external bodily processes. At the 
beginning o f this chapter, we saw how psychology elaborated a research programme in which 
mental events were studied through physiological measurements. I discussed how the 
connection between the bodily reactions and emotional processes was framed in terms o f 
voluntary and involuntary processes. This distinction was further elaborated by the spatial 
division o f  the body into its internal and its external processes. In 1914, Vittorio Benussi, who 
had carried out experiments into the respiratory symptoms of deception, argued that 
intellectual as well as emotive processes were marked by definite somatic expressions and 
while the external instantiations o f those processes could be controlled by the subject, the
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internal processes were beyond his or her control.181 As a result, tapping into these internal 
processes could lead to a reliable statement about the mental state o f the subject.
TMow all these external symptoms o f  internal processes can mostly be repressed through practice or can 
at least be minimised to such a degree that they will become undetectable for a very experienced 
observer. [...] However, the experimental treatment o f  these external forms o f  expression takes up from 
where the ordinary human ability to observe can hardly provide any clues. Man’s inability to 
observe/sense (Merkunfahigkeii) is replaced by the recording precision (Registrieifeinheii) o f  the 
apparatuses.’182
According to this view, the boundary between internal and external bodily processes 
constitutes an epistemological boundary in so far as reliable knowledge can be found ‘within’ the 
body. This knowledge cannot be captured by the human eye, which is limited to observing 
the unreliable external appearance o f the human subject. The unreliability o f appearances is 
here depicted as a mechanical relationship established between the subject’s capacity to 
control his outward bodily reactions, and the limited (and therefore equally unreliable) senses 
o f the observer -  the examiner. In this portrayal, the ‘recording precision’ o f the instrument 
does not just provide an extension o f the human senses, or a kind o f prosthetic enhancement 
o f human vision. Rather, it establishes a new relationship in which the ‘true’ state o f the 
subject’s being is transformed into a script that can be read by the examiner. Because the 
emotions that are expressed in the viscera cannot be controlled by the subject, their 
translation into a script reveals the subject’s lie. As a result, the epistemological distinction 
between the internal and the external processes o f the body that is part o f the scientific 
construction o f the subject’s inner life in the human sciences is complemented by a normative 
distinction in the lie detection examination: the emotional body as it is transformed into an 
inscription on the basis o f the mechanical interaction between the instrument and the 
subject’s body is translated into a body which cannot lie, a ‘truthful’ body. In the next chapter, 
we will see that the role o f the instrument in the lie detection triad is more intricate still. N ot 
only does the instrument serve in the mechanical translation o f bodily movements into a 
script. In  addition, the instrument comes to play a performative role in the modulation o f the 
subject’s bodily responses.
3.6 Lying as Complex
In the last two sections I established how the lie is constituted as an emotional construct on 
the basis o f the distinction between cognition and emotion. It is the uncontrollable emotional 
body o f the subject that gives the deceptive subject away. This becomes possible through the 
way in which the subject’s body is elaborated as a site o f knowledge and intervention in the lie
181 Benussi, 1914, p. 244.
182 Ibid, p. 244-245.
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detection examination. The notion that the internal processes o f the body can be translated 
into a ‘true’ representation o f the subject’s inner state that had been elaborated in the human 
sciences is carried into the lie detection examination, establishing the emotional body as a 
‘truthful’ body. On the basis o f this moral elaboration o f the body, the lie emerges on the 
body’s script as a result o f the entwinement o f a physiological and normative evaluation, 
centring on the notion o f the ‘normal.’ In  the section on the word-association test, I already 
pointed towards the significance o f how the notion o f the normal and the ‘abnormal’ or 
‘pathological’ operates in the human sciences. In the lie detection examination, the reference 
point for the ‘diagnosis’ o f the lie is the ‘normal,’ which is established at the beginning o f the 
lie detection examination itself. It reflects the subject in his normal — that is to say, truthful — 
state. Like in the word-association test, the designation o f bodily reactions as ‘normal’ allows 
for the same operation, which has made the term so powerful in the human sciences since the 
19th century.
The term ‘normal’ combines two connotations: it refers at once to what is average or typical and 
to what is good and right,183 O n the basis o f this dual connotation, the human sciences are able 
to differentiate types o f  people in relation to pre-defined norms, and to intervene on those 
who are not deemed to correspond to the norm. For those subjects who are classified on the 
basis o f the corresponding binary o f  the normal, the abnormal or the pathological are not 
only considered to differ from the norm. In being elaborated from the second meaning o f the 
‘normal,’ they are also deemed to deviate from it in a normative sense. Having been 
elaborated from physiology, the normal is constructed in terms o f ‘health.’ Those that are 
construed as abnormal — the criminal as well as the mental patient — are therefore held to be 
in need o f treatment or intervention. This two-sided notion o f the ‘normal’ is carried into the 
lie detection examination by linking a normative and physiological evaluation: the lie is an act 
which deviates from the norm in two senses. Truthful behaviour is seen as the norm based on 
a moral evaluation o f socially desirable behaviour o f the individual. The physiological 
expression o f truthful behaviour corresponds to ‘normal’ physiological reactions o f the body. 
It is marked by a physiological pattern that is consistent (for there may be pathological 
conditions such as hypertension, etc. which are accompanied by physiological variations, 
which nevertheless show a consistent pattern) and invariable to a certain degree. A ‘deceptive’ 
pattern, by contrast, is marked by the deviation from this physiological norm, which can take 
on many forms — it is marked by inconsistency and variation. On this basis it comes to 
encompass the contravention o f the moral and social norm of ‘truthful’ behaviour.
The distinction between the consistency o f the truthful subject, as opposed to the variability 
o f the deceptive subject, is carried into the emotions o f fear which are thought to be present
183 Hacking, 1990, p. 163.
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whenever the subject is lying. One o f  the main issues in the translation mechanism, which 
seeks to capture the lie on the basis o f the body’s response o f fear is the criticism, still 
dominating the critique o f lie detection techniques today, that the lie detection examination 
might capture fear but it cannot distinguish between the fear o f the innocent and the subject’s 
lie.184 Early lie detection specialists surmise that the fear o f the innocent is a ‘nomal’ fear -  it is 
constant and can therefore be easily distinguished. It is comparable to tension or nervousness 
rather than ‘full-blown’ fear and the fear inherent in deception proper. In an article o f 1923, 
Larson discusses twelve cases which he regards as exemplary o f the ‘thousands’ o f cases 
carried out by him and his colleagues. Case 4 deals with the examination o f a group o f 38 girls 
that was carried out in an effort to detect a shoplifter. Larson discusses the role o f fear in the 
context o f the examination. With respect to the former he states that while there may be a 
certain amount o f nervousness or fear present in innocent subjects, ‘the tension usually 
remains at about the same level, decreases, or else fluctuates slightly, whereas in the case o f 
the guilty suspect in whom the tension is increased by deception, the record changes and 
often very markedly.’185
According to this reasoning, the physiology o f the lie can be clearly distinguished from other 
conditions by virtue o f the establishment o f the normal at the beginning o f the examination. 
This allows for control over ‘physiological’ and ‘pathological’ conditions (which can 
additionally be studied using the cardio-pneumograph):
‘Pathological or physiological factors do not interfere with the interpretation o f  the records, provided 
that the suspect is conscious o f  deception, if  present, as the condition o f  the subject can be obtained in 
the first portion o f  the test. Thus the time o f  say, relation to meals, sleep, etc., in no way interfere with 
the test since the changes in the record are relative and the condition, pathological or physiological, is 
ascertained at the beginning o f  the experiment and any changes due to deception will cause variations in 
the record.’’86
The lie thereby becomes a psychological condition which can be set apart from the conditions 
o f  the sick and the pathologies o f  the mentally ill. While it can be distinguished from them, 
the lie nevertheless moves on the same plane as medical illness and psychopathologies: it is 
organised around an understanding which identifies the lie as a ‘complex’ or ‘syndrome.’ In 
the same manner as medical conditions and psychopathologies, the lie as ‘complex’ is in need 
o f treatment. This function o f purging the complex is fulfilled by the confession at the end o f 
the detection o f deception examination: ‘the marked irregularities due to the effects o f 
repression involved in the deception process disappear with the confession.’187 Thus, to 
return to the beginning o f  this section, the normative relief o f confessing one’s guilt is
184 Cf. Chapter 7.
185 Larson, 1923, p. 436-437.
186 Ibid, p. 452.
187 Larson, 1922, p. 326.
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accompanied by the body returning to its normal (truthful) state. In this way, the lie detection 
examination carries the idea that the confession provides relief. It also carries inklings o f the 
sinner’s redemption drawn from the Christian confessional, whose consoling function is 
integrated into the way in which the human sciences elaborate the confession as one of the 
main techniques o f constituting the individual as well as disciplining the individual on the 
basis o f the discourse which he proffers about himself. Yet as a psychological technique 
which seeks to elicit a confession by means o f turning the body against the subject, this 
function of the lie detection examination equally masks the inquisitorial mechanism which 
underlies the lie detection examination and which I will discuss further in chapter 6.
The subject’s denial is betrayed by a body which cannot lie, but is constructed as a reliable 
source o f making the subject’s hidden emotions visible. In its ‘truthful’ reactions it portrays 
the ‘abnormality’ o f the subject’s speech. Thus the lie becomes a complex, a syndrome to be 
classified along other psychological conditions involving some kind o f repression. The 
construction o f the lie as psychological condition which points towards the suspect’s guilt 
fulfils a special function, which is most pronounced as the final elaboration o f the lie 
detection examination is developed. As noted above, the framing o f the lie as a simple 
falsification which can be read on the emotional body o f the suspect establishes it as a 
discrete sign on the subject’s body. In this way, the detection o f the lie comes to fit the 
scientific binary o f true/false, which in turn is translated into the statement o f the subject’s 
guilt or innocence. In framing the detection o f guilt in terms o f a ‘scientific’ statement o f the 
subject’s lie, the lie detection examination does not only seek to establish whether the suspect 
has committed a certain act. Rather, the detection o f guilt is connected to a moral valuation. 
The suspect is not only established as guilty o f a crime. He is equally established as immoral 
on the basis o f the ‘abnormality’ o f his body’s functioning.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the emergence o f the lie as an object o f knowledge on the basis o f 
which the subject’s guilt could be established. This was made possible by developments in 
early psychology, as part o f which the ‘inner life’ o f the individual was subjected to scientific 
observation and analysis on the basis o f physiological measurements. I argued that the 
straightforward lie emerged as an object o f knowledge on the basis o f two re-configurations. I 
showed that in its early development, the detection o f deception was geared towards 
overcoming the ‘deceptive will’ o f  the subject through an interpretation o f the relationship 
between the subject’s utterances and his reaction-times. In this conception, deception was 
located in the mind and had not yet taken a definite form. As detection o f deception
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techniques developed, decepdon was moved from the mind to the body, particularly in 
Marston’s discontinuous use o f blood measurements. Here, deception took the form o f a 
narrative, and for the first time became connected to the emotions o f fear (and, in early 
research, anger). As part o f the institution o f the final set-up o f the lie detection examination, 
Larson appropriated the logic o f the word-association test by (in a similar manner to the 
word-association test’s significant and insignificant stimuli) distinguishing between ‘relevant’ 
and ‘irrelevant’ questions. However, deception was no longer apparent in the deviation 
expressed in the lengthened reaction-times o f the mind’s ‘deceptive will,’ but rather appeared 
as a sign on the body’s script. But by contrast to Marston’s set-up which conceived of 
deception as a narrative that could be represented by the plotting o f the lying curve on the 
basis o f measurements taken at certain intervals, Larson’s continuous measurement o f bodily 
changes which allowed for the comparison o f bodily reactions to relevant and irrelevant 
questions reconfigured the detection o f deception in such a way that deception took a definite 
form. By configuring questions so that they could only be answered by ‘yes’ and ‘no’ and be 
correlated with the body’s responses, the detection o f deception had been reframed in such a 
way that what had become detectable was the straightforward lie. No longer constructed in 
terms of a generalised conception o f deception and the different forms that deception might 
take, the lie as a simple falsification had appeared as a seemingly discrete and objective entity, 
which could render the intentional categories o f truthfulness and deception in terms o f the 
scientific binary o f ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood.’
In this movement, making the lie legible as a discrete entity on the body’s script became 
intelligible within wider psychological discourse on the basis o f the distinction between 
cognition and emotion and the understanding o f the lie as complex expressed through its 
deviation from normal physiological functioning. As a biological mechanism which humans 
had inherited from their ancestors in the fight for survival, the emotion o f fear was 
understood as being beyond the subject’s control. Raging freely inside the body, it could 
betray the subject’s lie, whose mental properties had been reduced to its barest minimum. 
Externalising the lie was dependent upon an epistemological and normative elaboration o f the 
‘truthful’ body and the ‘deceptive’ subject in the triad o f the examiner, the subject, and the 
instrument. The body’s internal processes — translated into a script through the mechanical 
interaction o f the body and the instrument -  seen to be uncontrollable by the subject, were 
taken as a ‘true’ reflection o f the subjective state o f the individual. This was in contrast to the 
individual’s external deceptive appearance and his speech, which were thought to be under his 
control. The lie became apparent on the body’s script through its physiological evaluation as a 
deviation from the ‘normal’ state o f the body. The distinction between the normal and the 
abnormal combined a physiological as well as moral evaluation o f the subject’s responses: the
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normal functioning o f the body as an expression o f what is good and right were associated 
with truthfulness, while abnormal responses corresponded to the breach o f the moral order 
by the lying subject. As physiological deviation, the lie could be elaborated into a 
psychological condition — a ‘syndrome* or ‘complex* — which was in need o f treatment in the 
same manner as other psychological or pathological conditions. Rendering the detection o f 
the guilt in terms o f the lie as a psychological condition fulfilled the special function o f not 
only establishing whether a suspect had committed a certain act, but equally rendering him as 
immoral.
This chapter has focused on tracing the methodological changes in the emergence o f lie 
detection, which were necessary in transforming a generalistic detection o f the deceptive will 
into the detection o f the straightforward lie. However, this analysis o f the development o f lie 
detection remains incomplete. As we have seen, early techniques in the detection o f deception 
were developed by experts trained in one o f the disciplines from which lie detection 
elaborated its framework — psychology, psychiatry, physiology. These experts did not only use 
physiological measurements in the detection o f deception, but equally applied them in the 
elaboration o f ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’ human types on the basis o f an analysis o f their 
‘complexes.’ There were especially two human types, the mental patient and the criminal, 
which came to be studied in this vein. In this early period, then, while the straightforward lie 
had emerged as object o f detection, methods o f detecting deception were still set within a 
psychological analysis which was geared towards developing an understanding o f the nature 
o f  the individual, his character and personality. However, as lie detection developed in the 
1920s and 1930s, it was to lose its connection to the academic setting in which it had 
emerged. This meant that it was no longer to retain the ‘epistemological depth’ which formed 
part o f the analysis o f the offender. Rather, it was to move to the area o f criminal 
investigation as represented by the police department and the crime laboratory and to follow 
more immediate epistemological aims. In this, the further development o f lie detection was to 
be crucially influenced by the emergence o f two entities: the ‘lie detector’ and the ‘polygraph.’ 
While the former related to the media representation o f lie detection, the latter became the 
main instrument to be used in lie detection and contributed to its institutionalisation outside 
the academic setting. In the next chapter, I shall trace the movement o f lie detection from the 
academic realm to criminal investigation by placing a special focus on the role that the lie 
detector and the polygraph played in the development o f lie detection practices.
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Chapter 4 Disentangling the Polygraph, the Lie Detector and Lie 
Detection
The purpose o f the last chapter was to show how the simple lie as object o f detecting the 
suspect’s guilt emerged from the practices and conceptual framework o f early psychology. I 
suggested that in its early history, the detection o f deception underwent a set o f interrelated 
transformations through which deception was moved from the mind to the body. As part o f  
this transformation, the lie as a speech act was reduced to a simple falsification modelled on 
the distinction between cognition and emotion that was drawn in early psychology. In 
chronological terms, Chapter 3 took us from the early 1900s to the 1920s. But while the 
straightforward lie had been construed as object o f detection in John Larson’s set-up by 1923, 
lie detection had not yet established itself as a separate endeavour. This chapter concerns 
itself with the beginnings o f how lie detection — more specifically polygraphy -  began to 
develop into a separate practice during the 1920s and 1930s.188 In particular, it will examine 
the role that the instrument has played in the development o f lie detection.
Up to this point in the analysis, we have come across a variety o f instruments and instrument 
assemblies which were used in lie detection: the chronoscope (measuring minute time intervals), 
the galvanometer (measuring changes in skin resistance), the pneumograph (measuring changes in 
respiration), the plethysmograph (measuring changes in blood volume), the shpygmograph 
(measuring changes in the pulse rate), the sphygmomanometer (measuring changes in blood- 
pressure), and the kymograph (a recording device for translating measurements into graphs). 
There were different makes o f these instruments and a series o f manufacturers who produced 
them. They belonged to the standard equipment o f any physiological or psychological 
laboratory. Depending on the research interests o f individual researchers and their preferences 
for certain makes, these instruments could be modified and combined into instrument assemblies. 
The same practice applied in early lie detection research: the Italian psychologist Benussi used a 
Marey pneumograph, a Marey or Lehmann sphygmograph, and a kymograph at the University 
o f Graz in his research on respiratory symptoms o f deception.189 Larson’s assembly at the 
Berkeley Police Department consisted o f an Ellis Pneumograph, an Erlanger
188 In this thesis I use the term ‘lie detection’ to refer to the knowledge practice o f  physiological lie detection 
more generally. Equally, the term ‘lie detection specialist’ is used to denote individuals who act(ed) as experts 
in lie detection. By contrast, the terms polygraphy and ‘polygraph operator’ are more specific. They refer to a 
particular type o f  lie detection practice, first instituted by Leonarde Keeler on the basis o f  his development 
o f  the polygraph (which gave the profession its name) and the commercialisation o f  the instrument and 
training in lie detection, which established physiological lie detection as a separate profession focused on its 
application. Polygraphy today has become coterminous with physiological lie detection. It is one o f  the tasks 
o f this thesis to describe this development as well as the specific shape that polygraphy took and where it 
settled as it became separated from its academic beginnings.
189 Benussi, 1914, p. 247.
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Sphygmomanometer, and a Jaquet chronometer, which translated the respiratory and blood- 
pressure tracings onto smoked paper.190 However, the list o f different instruments associated 
with lie detection in its early history might strike us as odd, for when we speak of lie detection 
in an everyday context we would not refer to plethysmographs, sphygmographs, or 
pneumographs. Rather, we would simply talk about only one instrument: the lie detector.
So, if the lie detector had not made an appearance in the early history o f lie detection, how 
did it emerge and what did it consist of? The historian o f psychology, Geoffrey Bunn, 
provides an analysis o f the emergence o f the lie detector in which he argues that it was 
constituted at the intersection o f popular psychology, the professionalising police force and 
the media. In  the 1920s, not only the ‘lie detector’ emerged, but efforts were being made by 
one lie detection specialist, Leonarde Keeler, to develop a single instrument which could be 
used in lie detection. O n the basis o f a patent which he secured in 1931, Keeler had the first 
such instrument manufactured and called it the ‘Keeler polygraph.’ The commercialisation o f 
this polygraph was crucial in facilitating the institutionalisation o f  lie detection as 
psychological expertise in criminal investigation and the development o f polygraphy as a 
separate profession.
The chapter proceeds first by furnishing a historical narrative o f the polygraph and the 
context o f the police professionalization movement within which it became set based on 
archival material. Secondly, I provide an extended summary o f Bunn’s history o f the lie 
detector. These two narratives will then allow me to extend and reframe Bunn’s approach to 
the history o f lie detection and present an analysis o f the role that the instmment(s) have 
played in its development. Bunn’s study conceptualises the history of lie detection in terms of 
the history o f  the lie detector. This reinforces his central thesis that lie detection was constituted 
as a popular form of knowledge. By contrast, I will show that while the history o f lie detector 
is indeed intimately linked to the history o f lie detection, they must not be run together. In 
disentangling the history o f the polygraph and the lie detector, I provide an analysis o f how lie 
detection practices became reframed in their move from the academic realm to criminal 
investigation and how the media representation o f the lie detector as an instrument which 
could read the subject’s mind came to mediate these practices.
4.1 The Development of the Polygraph
Through Larson, lie detection had moved from the psychological laboratory to the Berkeley 
Police Department. The individuals involved in the early development o f methods o f lie
190 JLP, Carton 2, Folder 15: John Larson, “Police and Forensic Psychiatry Needed in State Hospitals/ p. 5-6, 
April 1950.
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detection that we encountered in the last chapter — Jung, Wertheimer and Klein, 
Miinsterberg and Marston — had all been working with methods o f the detection o f 
deception within academic institutions. This did not mean that they had carried out 
experiments without applying their methods. Rather, they had equally applied lie detection 
methods in a small number o f criminal cases as individual psychological experts. Larson’s 
application o f lie detection examinations at the police department was significant insofar as 
lie detection became integrated into a movement that had started at the end o f the 19th 
century. This movement sought to professionalise the police and to model criminal 
investigation according to scientific methods o f crime detection.
However, while Larson initiated the application o f lie detection examinations within police 
departments, he also represented a transitional figure in the development o f lie detection. 
On the one hand, by arguing that the detection o f deception could only be studied in actual 
cases, he legitimised the removal o f lie detection from its study in the laboratory. He justified 
this by drawing a distinction between ‘criminal’ and ‘experimental’ deception, thus driving a 
wedge between the knowledge that could be generated in the laboratory and its application 
in the social world.191 This division allowed him to establish criminal deception as a separate 
phenomenon in need o f a practical solution, which could only be defined in its place o f 
existence: that is to say, criminal investigation. Yet his own model o f  lie detection was to 
diverge from how lie detection came to be elaborated in criminal investigation at police 
departments. Larson remained connected to the academic approach. It was linked to a 
model o f lie detection which sought not only to detect the subject’s lie but to understand the 
criminal on the basis o f an analysis o f his personality and potential pathology. This was to 
take him from the police department to other institutions including mental hospitals, 
prisons and children’s detention homes in seeking to study and apply the detection o f 
deception. In this, he ventured towards ‘ascertaining how far abnormal individuals may be 
grouped according to type,’ by means o f ‘[...] a survey o f  several thousand individuals in 
the penal and insane institutions o f  the state. These cases are treated first by securing 
controls and then probing for complexes.’192 By contrast, as methods o f lie detection 
became used at police departments, they became remodelled around the aim of 
apprehending the subject on the basis o f his lie and centred on the application rather than 
simultaneous research on lie detection.
The Berkeley Police Department was considered to be one o f  the major institutions in the 
police reform movement. The central modem law enforcement agency -  the police — had 
only evolved as an independent institution in the US from the older system of the ‘watch’
191 Larson, 1923, p. 448.
192 Larson, 1922, p. 328.
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from the 1830s onwards.193 The novelty o f this agency was two-fold. Firsdy, law enforcement 
activities were for the first time vested in an independent agency with full-time staff. This 
became connected to the developing notion o f the police as a profession. Secondly, this 
agency also assumed a novel function: taking an active role in the prevention o f crime by 
means o f continuous and regular patrol, thus instituting modern surveillance.194 By contrast to 
their European counterparts, American police forces were locally controlled and closely 
entangled with the ‘political machines’195 that operated in American cities.196 The police were 
central to these political machines in maintaining control over the wards o f the cities and also 
provided an employment opportunity for the great influx o f immigrant groups such as 
Germans and Irish populating the cities. The police were therefore rooted in the lower and 
lower-middle class immigrant communities among whom they worked. For this reason, the 
police fulfilled a crucial role in defining, regulating, sanctioning (and also profiting from) 
‘vices’ such as gambling, prostitution, etc. in such a way that it conformed with the values and 
morality o f the constituent community.197 This conflicted with the values o f middle- and 
upper-class Americans, who ‘feared that urban America was literally going to the devil.’198 The 
representation o f the police that served as backdrop for progressive reform was the picture o f 
a corrupt, partisan, unprofessional and violent organisation.
From the late 19th century a reform movement which was part o f broader ‘progressive’ 
currents in the US sought to ‘professionalise’ the American police on the basis o f ‘scientific 
principles.’199 Law enforcement agencies were reformed and ‘professionalised’ so as to 
provide continuous social control in terms of the policing o f communities and the 
investigation o f crimes. As a result, the integration and elaboration o f scientific discourses in
193 The system o f the ‘watch’ involved the patrolling o f  cities in order to protect the city against crime, fire, and 
public disorder in colonial America. At first, the watch was only carried out a night-time. Later on day 
watches were implemented. The watch was not initially organised as a profession. Rather, borrowing from it 
English origins, the watch was defined as a collective responsibility. All adult men were required to serve on 
it and developed into a paid professional activity over time (Walker, 1992, p. 6) Another precursor o f  the 
police in the Southern US was the slave patrol system (Walker, 1998, p. 52). It is generally held among 
historians o f  the police that the American police developed as a result o f  a radical increase in public disorder, 
i.e. rioting and mob violence between the 1830s and 1870s. This was due to a number o f  reasons: ethnic 
conflicts between immigrant groups (mainly German and Irish), racial conflicts, and economic and labour 
conflicts — but also vigilantism in newly settled Western areas in the absence o f  government structures 
(Walker, 1977,1998; Monkkonen, 1992). The first police departments were formed in Boston in 1938 and 
New York City in 1844 (Walker, 1977, p. 4).
194 Walker, 1977, p. 7.
195 According to Fogelson, a political machine ‘was an association o f  loosely affiliated and largely autonomous 
ward organizations whose power depended on their ability to get out the vote on election day’ (Fogelson, 
1977, p. 17). The police played a central role in organising and controlling votes frequendy involving ‘voter 
fraud’ (Walker, 1977, p. 26).
i% por comparative histories o f  European and American police systems, cf. Fogelson (1977), Walker (1977), 
and especially Miller (1976).
197 Fogelson, 1977, p. 20-21.
198 Ibid, p. 20.
199 Fogelson argues that the police reform movement can in part be seen to reflect ‘the struggle between the 
Progressive elites and the political machines or between the upper-middle- and upper-class native Americans 
and the lower- and lower-middle-class first- and second-generation newcomers’ (Fogelson, 1977, p. 11-12).
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the criminal justice system that had started in the 19th century was extended into the area o f 
law enforcement on the level o f the organization o f  law enforcement agencies themselves, as 
well as on the level o f the control they sought to exert.
According to Walker, there were three strands o f reform efforts which emphasised different 
aspects. The first strand stressed the ‘professionalization’ o f law enforcement in crime control, 
including the development o f scientific methods o f crime detection. This orientation towards 
crime control came to take precedent over the other strands in the definition o f the role o f the 
police. A second strand focused on crime prevention and the definition of the social work role 
o f the police.200 The third strand sought to develop efficient administrative structures modelled 
on emerging industrial conceptions o f scientific management.201 As regards the first strand, the 
emergent human (in addition to the natural) sciences served as a basis for a call for ‘scientific’ 
methods as a necessary response to the changing nature o f crime:
‘It may seem a paradox, and yet it is true, that no line o f  human “endeavour” is progressing as rapidly as 
criminality. The modern criminal is fully equipped with all the latest achievements o f  technique, and 
consequently, criminal activities have assumed a highly efficient at times a strictly scientific character.’202
Therefore, it was held, ‘the fantastic atmosphere o f the Sherlock Holmes type’ operating on the 
basis o f his ‘mysterious “intuition”’203 was an image o f the past. The professionalism and 
scientific acumen o f criminals needed to be matched by the equivalent use o f scientific 
techniques to combat them. The ‘scientific’ techniques that were considered covered a range o f 
different methods. First and foremost, fingerprint identification, which at the beginning was 
principally used for collecting criminal records that allowed for the identification and keeping o f 
records o f criminals, but later also came to be seen as infallible form of evidence.204 In addition, 
ballistics, chemical analysis, but also more disputed forms o f evidence such as handwriting 
analysis or graphology. All o f these techniques were elaborated on the basis o f the analysis of 
‘traces’ o f the crime, which instituted a new form o f reconstructing crime. A whole plethora o f 
disparate knowledge practices was enlisted in transforming the crime into an event that could 
be ‘known’ on the basis o f the ‘deconstruction’ o f the site into its infinite details. This narrative 
assumed its authority as a ‘true’ narrative: that is to say, a narrative o f what really happened by 
virtue o f the transformation of traces into ‘scientific facts.’ Thus it was argued that on the basis 
of science not only could truth be found, but also, real justice implemented. Methods o f lie 
detection became part of this movement and assumed a special function in portraying the 
police as a new force oriented towards scientific methods o f criminal investigation. They were
200 Douthit (1975).
201 Walker, 1977, p. 33.
202 Brasol, 1930, p. 100.
203 Ibid, p. 101.
204 Cole (2001).
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especially suited to such a representation. The use o f methods of lie detection in the ‘scientific’ 
construction o f guilt could be employed to distinguish this new force from the picture o f the 
old unprofessional and corrupt police, which had used brutal interrogation techniques -  the so- 
called third-degree — in eliciting confessions from suspects.205 Those techniques were not only 
portrayed as inhumane and torturous, but were held to mask rather than bring out the real 
truth. The use o f violence carried with it the danger o f false confessions.
The enlistment o f knowledge practices in criminal investigation was defined by a particular 
epistemology which was characterised by the simple aim of the quick identification and 
apprehension o f the offender. Thus unlike the conglomerate o f disciplines that underlay 
criminal psychology and criminology, criminal investigation did not draw on the aetiology o f 
the crime in order to develop a deeper understanding o f the perpetrator that stood behind the 
offence. Rather, the focus was often on the quick processing o f cases. This (more immediate) 
epistemological aim was translated into a particular organisation o f knowledge practices and a 
construction o f ‘scientific expertise’ at police departments and other institutions involved in 
criminal investigation.206
The elaboration o f ‘scientific methods o f criminal investigation’ entailed the definition o f new 
functions at police departments, among them the fingerprint examiner or ballistics expert. 
They assumed their status as experts not by virtue o f academic credentials but rather on the 
basis o f specialised training and apprenticeship.207 For this reason, they resembled technicians 
who were versed in the application o f a particular technique. As lie detection became 
institutionalised at police departments and institutions in the service o f criminal investigation, 
the expertise o f lie detection specialists was constructed in a similar way. That is to say, their 
knowledge practices came to correspond to the epistemological aim o f criminal investigation 
at police departments. Meanwhile, the detection o f deception as carried out by academics had 
been set within a deeper understanding of the criminal’s personality. By contrast, as lie 
detection moved to criminal investigation it became centred on simply identifying the 
offender on the basis of his lie. The orientation o f lie detection according to this more immediate
205 Bunn, 1997a, p. 86-87.
206 Valier (1998) makes a similar argument. She contends that many methods o f scientific criminal investigation did 
not seek to establish a ‘deeper reality o f  the crime’ but rather treated evidence in terms o f  a superficial 
processing. This argument is framed in terms o f  a critique o f  Ginzburg’s (1980) analysis o f techniques o f  
identification. He sets this analysis within a broader discussion o f  the emergence o f  what he calls the 
‘conjectural’ paradigm at the end o f  the 19th century. He seeks to show that this paradigm became a dominant 
mode o f  elaborating knowledge at the end o f  the 19th century, especially in the human sciences but was also 
apparent in fields such as art history and criminal investigation. The conjectural paradigm is modelled on a 
‘medical semiotics’ as part o f  which an involuntary and seemingly trivial symptom or sign is interpreted in terms 
o f a deeper underlying reality (disease, an individual’s character, etc). While Valier agrees that this paradigm 
might be valid in some areas such as criminal psychology as well as early methods o f  identification, it did not 
apply in other areas such as chemical analysis or graphology. Rather, the development o f  these techniques and 
their area o f application have to be taken into account in analysing their epistemological depth.
207 Dillon (1977); Cole (2001).
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epistemological aim o f criminal investigation was to become possible on the basis o f the 
development o f the polygraph, which allowed for the reframing o f lie detection as knowledge 
practice around the notion of technical expertise prevalent at law enforcement agencies.
If  scientific techniques were to be used in the establishment o f the truth o f crimes, then the 
institutional setting o f scientific crime detection should resemble the one o f ‘the scientist’. The 
laboratory — signifying the central locus where knowledge is generated — became a model 
institution for scientific crime investigations. While there was a call for the implementation of 
laboratories and institutes for the scientific study of crime and the criminal from early in the 20th 
century (and the first efforts were being made at implementing police laboratories up until the 
mid-twenties),208 the first major crime detection laboratory -  the ‘Scientific Crime Detection 
Laboratory’ — was founded in 1929 in Chicago. After the Berkeley Police Department, the 
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory was to become the next institutional hub in the 
development o f lie detection.
August Vollmer, the head o f the Berkeley Police Department, became one o f the central figures 
in the police reform movement. At the Berkeley Police Department, he advocated the 
professional training o f policemen, the recruitment o f college students and graduates -  so-called 
‘college cops’ — into the police force, the organisation of the police department along rational 
principles of public administration, a changed organisation o f patrolling through the 
implementation o f technological innovations such as radio communication and the automobile, 
the keeping o f criminal records and the introduction o f scientific methods o f criminal 
investigation.209 As part o f his belief that police officers should receive professional and 
scientific training, Vollmer established the Berkeley Police School in 1908. This training 
programme consisted o f a series o f lectures in the forensic sciences, and an introduction to 
practical police work by Vollmer and Walter Peterson from the Oakland Police Department.210 
In his endeavours to institute training in scientific methods o f crime detection, Vollmer 
successfully enlisted experts from the University o f Berkeley to give these lectures. In 1916, a 
permanent three-year training programme was instituted at the University of Berkeley on the 
basis o f Vollmer’s initiative. As part o f the programme and his wider efforts at implementing 
college-level education programmes in policing, Vollmer gave lectures in police administration 
at the University o f Berkeley and lectured at the University o f  Chicago as professor for police 
administration from 1929 until 1931.211 As part o f his broader engagement in police reform, he 
promoted the introduction of a national clearing house for criminal records and -  based on his 
reputation as police chief in Berkeley — was called to carry out surveys and participate in the
208 Dillon, 1977, p. 106.
209 Carte and Carte (1975); Parker (1972); Walker (1977).
2.0 Walker, 1977, p. 72-73; Carte and Carte, 1975, p. 26-27.
2.1 Carte and Carte, 1975, p. 64-65.
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organisational reform of the police departments o f San Diego, Los Angeles, Havana, Detroit, 
Chicago, Kansas City, Missouri, Minneapolis, Syracuse, Dallas and Portland.212 Additionally, he 
was responsible for the drafting o f the police section of the so-called ‘Wickersham Report/ 
which had been commissioned by the government to assess the state of ‘lawlessness in law 
enforcement.’213 With Berkeley as one o f the central hubs in the development of a ‘modern/ 
‘scientifically’ oriented police force, and Vollmer as one of the gatekeepers in the police reform 
movement, it made sense that the early endeavours at applying psychological techniques to the 
solution o f crimes might find a home there.
As noted above, John Larson was instrumental in developing what became the basis o f the lie 
detection examination and in establishing a link between the institution o f criminal investigation 
and the application o f lie detection methods. Yet a further step was required before lie detection 
became fully settled in criminal investigation. This step was to depend on the development of 
an instrument specifically designed and promoted for use in lie detection. Larson, holding a 
Ph.D. in physiology and biochemistry, joined the Berkeley Police Department as a ‘college cop’ 
in 1920. Vollmer had heard Larson give a talk on ‘Dactyloscopy and Heredity’ at a symposium 
in Boston and had subsequently invited him to work for the department to set up a single 
fingerprint system for the Berkeley police records.214 Larson accepted, and was made aware o f 
Marston’s work through a colleague. Having ‘been thinking in this [Marston’s] direction/215 
Larson had the laboratory technician set up an assembly consisting o f a Jaquet Chronometer 
(measuring time), an Ellis Pneumograph (measuring changes in breathing), and an Erlanger 
capsule (measuring changes in blood-pressure).216 As with most instrument assemblies in 
psychological laboratories at the time, there was one big draw-back in Larson’s set-up. It was 
heavy and took up a lot o f space: ‘At Berkeley the apparatus filled a table including two smoked 
drums.’217 Additionally, the recording o f blood pressure and respiratory changes onto smoked 
paper was inconvenient. Besides the fact that the setting up o f two smoked drums required a lot 
o f space, the use o f smoked paper necessitated the sooting o f the paper with an oil or gas lamp, 
and the shellacking o f the paper in order to make the record permanent. This was a time- 
consuming, not to mention unhealthy, procedure.218
212 Parker, 1972, p. 29.
2,3 Vollmer (1932); National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931).
214 JLP, Carton 2, Folder 15: John Larson, “Police and Forensic Psychiatry Needed in State Hospitals/ p. 5-6, 
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While Larson was carrying out deception tests at the Berkeley police department in the early 
1920s, Leonarde Keeler had become interested in lie detection. Keeler had become connected 
to the Berkeley Police Department through his family’s acquaintance with the chief of the 
department, August Vollmer. As a result o f his reputation as a key figure in professionalizing 
the police force, Vollmer was called to Los Angeles in 1924 to reform the Los Angeles Police 
Department. Keeler accompanied Vollmer to Los Angeles, and during Vollmer’s one-year stay 
carried out deception tests on 500 criminal suspects.219 While in Los Angeles, Keeler set out to 
modify Larson’s assembly. The changes that he made to the assembly took two directions: one 
concerned the transformation o f the clunky apparatus into an integrated instrument that could 
easily be moved; the other concerned the production o f more detailed tracings, that would not 
only allow for a more precise interpretation o f relative changes across the record but also for a 
‘quantitative’ statement o f the variations in blood-pressure and respiration in standard units o f 
measurement The first interpretations of lie detection records had proceeded on the basis of 
relative changes. The possibility o f rendering interpretations on the basis o f being able to assign 
numbers to physiological changes, o f providing a quantitative statement, was considered 
important in order to legitimatise lie detection as a scientific endeavour, corresponding to 
psychological notions o f ‘objectivity’ which were constructed on the basis o f measurability and 
quantifiability. With the help o f Hiram Edwards, a physiology professor at the University o f 
California at Los Angeles, a new kymograph was integrated into the assembly. This was driven 
by an electrical motor and used ink pens to record physiological changes on white paper.220 
With this new addition, tracings were no longer recorded on ‘a long belt o f smoked paper’ o f a 
particular length, but could instead be recorded on ‘a nice clean strip o f paper o f any length.’221 
As a result, a continuous graph o f  the subject’s blood-pressure and respiratory tracings could be 
produced for 20 minutes or more instead o f just a few minutes. Additionally, a new ‘pressure- 
reducing device’ was integrated into the sphygmograph, which was sensitive to small changes in 
pressure and resulted in a greater amplitude o f the blood-pressure tracings. Moreover, ‘this 
machine weighed about twenty pounds, so that it was easy to carry.’222
Once Keeler had left Los Angeles, he started studying psychology at Stanford University, where 
he continued carrying out experiments on different blood-pressure measuring devices and 
developing an instrument that would integrate blood-pressure and respiratory measurements.223 
While in Los Angeles, he had found that the blood-pressure changes o f subjects were greater 
than could be recorded, due to ‘the rubber diaphragms that had been used in the pulse
2,9 Keeler, 1932a, p. 4.
220 This kymograph had been developed by Adalbert Ford (Ford, 1924) and was modified by Edwards (1925).
221 Edwards, 1925, p. 311.
222 Ibid, p. 311.
223 Cf. LKC, Box 19, Folder 645: Leonarde Keeler, ‘Notebook on Experiments, Leonarde Keeler 1925-1928, 
Stanford/
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recording system/224 Working under the direction o f the Stanford psychologist Walter Miles, 
Keeler developed an instrument which eliminated the rubber pressure reducer, as well as the 
rubber tambours ‘replacing the rubber pressure reducer and tambours with metal tambours 
thus making possible a quantitative blood pressure curve coincidental and in combination with 
the pulse beat curve.225 Meanwhile, John Larson had moved to the Institute for Juvenile 
Research in Chicago, where he worked as a research psychologist, and continued his research 
into lie detection methods while training as a psychiatrist. Here, he also attempted to have a 
new apparatus designed. However, he could not acquire the necessary funds from the institute, 
nor a technician to build the instrument. He stated that he did not have the necessary technical 
skills to assemble a new instrument: nor had he ‘come to this institution for the purpose of 
making apparatus/226 Larson’s conviction that he was not a technician but rather an 
academically trained expert became a resource upon which he was to depreciate Keeler’s 
expertise in coming years. However, at this point he was still cordial towards Keeler, as ‘the 
progressive individual’ who had gone ahead and developed ‘an improved instrument with more 
accurate quantitative blood pressure readings.227
Keeler was to follow Larson to Chicago. While he also worked for the Institute for Juvenile 
Justice for a year, from 1929 he started working for the newly instituted Scientific Crime 
Detection Laboratory, thereby taking lie detection into its next major institutional hub. The 
laboratory was instigated by Chicago businessmen who were concerned over the state o f crime 
in the city. It was set up as a non-profit organisation in affiliation with Northwestern University 
Law School. 228 Thus the movement for the institution o f scientific methods o f criminal 
investigation was not only driven by a network o f police reformers who enlisted academic 
institutions, but also by economic elites, and by citizens’ perceptions of mass crime. The 
objective of the SCDL was ‘to engage in the practical application o f all branches o f science to 
the detection o f crimes and for this purpose to maintain a laboratory and a library; to conduct 
investigations, to cooperate with public officials and institutions o f learning, to give instructions 
and expert advice, and to carry on and do all other acts and things that are necessary and 
incidental to carrying out the foregoing purposes.’229 In putting its objective into action, in the
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1930s it came to integrate a microscopy laboratory, a ballistics laboratory, an ultra-violet laboratory, a 
photographic laboratory, and an electrical laboratory.230 In addition, it set up a ‘psychology 
department,’ which was lead by Keeler, and focused exclusively on lie detection.
As part o f its efforts at promoting itself and the implementation o f scientific methods of 
criminal investigation, the laboratory set up the American Journal of Police Science. This journal 
was geared specifically towards the discussion o f scientific methods o f criminal investigation, 
and sought to enlist the support o f the professions engaged in the criminal justice system, 
ranging from police officers to legal practitioners. For example, in 1936, an ‘Annual Short 
Course for Prosecuting Attorneys’ was organised, lasting one week and providing lectures on 
various methods o f scientific crime detection including lie detection and the legal admissibility 
o f scientific evidence by the staff o f the SCDL.231 Additionally, all staff members of the 
SCDL engaged widely in recruiting public support by giving public lectures, talks in front of 
different citizen associations, appearing on radio shows, and giving interviews.232 Thus at the 
SCDL, lie detection became set within and drew support from wider efforts to implement 
and promote scientific methods o f crime detection in law enforcement. It was here that 
Leonarde Keeler was to further the commercialisation o f his instrument, as well as to initiate 
the development o f ‘polygraphy’ as a distinct profession.
As an individual with business acumen, Keeler made the simultaneous recording o f the blood- 
pressure curve and pulse beat curve as one superimposed curve the basis for a patent 
application. This was filed on July 30, 1925, under the heading ‘Apparatus for Recording 
Arterial Blood Pressure.’233 The application process was lengthy and the patent was only finally 
granted in 1931. As part o f this process, the nature o f the novelty of the instrument became 
subject to intense negotiation and the claims underwent a series o f modifications. Keeler sought 
to have both the complete apparatus and the records that it produced patented, claiming that ‘[i|t 
is an object of my invention to provide means whereby the sphygmogram or cardiac cycle may 
be recorded simultaneously with and be superimposed on the slower oscillations in the arterial 
pressure, whereby the characteristics o f each as well as their relation to each other at any 
moment may be readily ascertained.’234 In this way, Keeler and his attorneys presented both the
230 Northwestern University Archives, School o f  Law, Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory: ‘The Scientific 
Crime Detection Laboratory o f  Northwestern University’ n.d.
231 cf. LGP, Box 17, Folder 12, for the programmes o f  the three courses held in the period between 1936 and 
1938.
232 This was also due to the fact that the laboratory was under constant financial strain and thus on the look-out 
for potential sources o f  funding. Pardy supported by the businessmen who had been involved in its 
foundation, mainly Burt Massee (a major corporate figure in Chicago), as well as being funded through the 
university, the laboratory had problems in generating enough income from case work and expert advice to 
meet its allocated budget. One o f  the main sources o f  income was through the case work generated by lie 
detection cases (cf. LGP, Boxes 17 and 18).
233 US Patent Office, Leonarde Keeler, o f  Berkeley, California, Apparatus for Recording Arterial Blood 
Pressure, Serial N o. 46,986 taken from Polygraph, Vol. 23, N o. 2 ,1994, p. 128.
234 Ibid, p. 128.
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instrument itself and the record that it produced as an invention which would open up a new 
field o f investigation for physicians and psychologists ‘a curve that more accurately and more 
completely represents the blood variations in the patient’s system, and by a study o f this curve 
the investigator may ascertain a variety o f facts which are not otherwise ascertainable.’235 The 
patent examiner took the position that while there may reside some novelty in the structural 
components — such as the metal tambours that Keeler had integrated into the instrument — the 
combination o f measuring devices which produced a particular curve did not in itself constitute 
an invention. Rather, the combination o f measuring and recording devices for blood-pressure 
measurement constituted a well-established practice. Additionally, the production o f a single 
curve was a function o f the combination o f measurements which did not constitute a novelty in 
itself.236 In reply, Keeler’s patent attorneys asked that the examiner reconsider his position, 
arguing that ‘[a] comparison o f the applicant’s disclosure with the prior art readily shows that 
the application has devised a blood pressure recording apparatus which brings out totally 
different results from similar apparatus shown in the prior art. The applicant’s apparatus 
produces a record which is fundamentally and essentially different from any records produced 
by any of the devices of the prior art.’237 These records were already being favourably used in 
‘various psychological investigations’ and doctors and psychologists had shown an interest in 
the apparatus.238 After a six-year process o f negotiation, the patent was finally granted, and 
covered claims for both the novelty o f the apparatus and the curve that it produced.
The patent application process, and the patent itself, presented the instrument and the curve 
that it produced as a physiological innovation which would further the generation o f knowledge 
across the medical and the psychological field. In the patent section describing the instrument, 
Keeler even argued that his ‘invention probably has its greatest value in the field o f the medical 
profession.’239 However, the medical profession was to take little interest in Keeler’s invention. 
Likewise the psychological community. Rather, Keeler’s argument represented a rhetorical 
strategy in constructing the instrument as scientific novelty in gaining a patent. In 1930, before 
the patent was granted, Keeler and his father entered into an agreement with Western Electro- 
Mechanical Company in Oakland, California to have the instrument manufactured for sale as 
‘Keeler Polygraph.’240
235 LKP, Carton 1, Folder Keeler Polygraph Early Research: letter by White, Prost and Fryer, patent attorneys, 
to patent examiner, 13/8/1929.
236 LKP, Carton 1, Folder Keeler Polygraph Early Research: letter by Patent Examiner to White, Prost and 
Fryer, dated 14/2/1929.
237 LKP, Carton 1, Folder Keeler Polygraph Early Research: letter by White, Prost and Fryer, patent attorneys, 
to patent examiner, 13/8/1929.
238 Ibid.
239 US Patent Office, Leonarde Keeler, o f  Berkeley, California, Apparatus for Recording Arterial Blood 
Pressure, Serial N o. 46,986 taken from Polygraph, Vol. 23, N o. 2,1994, p. 129.
240 LKP, Carton 1, Folder Keeler Polygraph Early Research: ‘Agreement between Leonarde Keeler and Charles 
Keeler and Western Electro-Mechanical Co., Inc,’ 3 /3 /1930 .
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The final instrument, as it came to be manufactured,
‘consists o f three units, one recording continuously and quantitatively the blood-pressure and pulse; 
another giving a duplicate blood-pressure pulse curve taken from some other part o f  the subject’s body 
or may be utilized for recording muscular reflexes o f the arm or leg; the third unit recording respiration. 
The paper, perforated on its edges, is drawn by a sprocket feeder roll which is driven by a synchronous 
m otor similar to that used in electric clocks. A differential gear train provides for three speeds and is 
easily shifted by the movement o f a small lever. A ninety foot roll o f  paper supplies the recording chart, 
and the curves are recorded by means o f combined lever arm and fountain pen.’
[...]
The whole is contained in a carrying case measuring 16x8x9 inches. All accessories, the lead to the 110 v 
oudet, signal magnet cord, blood-pressure cuffs and tubing, and pneumograph are carried in a compartment 
below the mechanism compartment. The instrument is portable and always ready for immediate use.’24'
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The figure below shows Keeler’s polygraph:
Figure 4: Picture o f  Keeler Polygraph (Model 302)242
he development o f  the polygraph constituted an im portant m oment in the history o f lie 
etection. But this was not by virtue o f its declared novelty. As we saw, the patent examiner
1
d
matter o f fact, Keeler was not quite sure as to what his curve represented until he carried out 
an experiment at the Mayo Clinic in 1934, four years after the Keeler polygraph had gone into 
manufacturing:
‘Then a very important matter had to be settled once and for all. What does the polygraph curve really 
represent — blood-pressure, blood-volume or what? The opportunity to experiment on a dog at the 
experimental laboratories was afforded. We canulated the femoral artery o f  a large dog and made direct 
blood pressure tracings with a mercural manometer and smoked drum kymograph. On the other leg the 
polygraphy cuff was wrapped and our usual curve recorded. Adrenalin was injected into the dog on two 
occasions and histamine once. Although the blood pressure changes were not o f  as great a magnitude on  
the polygraph as the direct method, the direction o f  change was the same and relative in magnitude. In 
other words, we are recording blood-pressure continuously.’243
Rather, the polygraph was to play a major role in creating the field, for which its developer had 
designed it: lie detection. The patenting o f the instrument as an integrated whole enabled Keeler 
to legitimise it as a scientific instrument and provided a condition upon which he could enlist a 
manufacturer to market it as such. Its serial production meant that it could simply be bought by 
individuals -  such as the police officer — unfamiliar with the construction o f instrument 
assemblies and the measurements that they represented, which were traditionally the province 
o f the psychologist’s and the physiologist’s expertise. In the marketing o f the instrument Keeler 
specifically addressed the law enforcement community. For example, a brochure o f the 
instrument was headed: ‘A practical scientific instrument to aid in police interrogation, and for 
the study o f psychological and physiological reactions.’244 The production o f an integrated 
marketable instrument for the use in lie detection completed its move to criminal investigation 
for it catered to the way in which knowledge practices were constructed at police departments. 
In being able to acquire a defined set o f technical equipment, a ‘black box,’ in conjunction with 
specialised training carried out by Keeler and his associates, the academic lie detection specialist 
was reframed into a police officer resembling a specialised technician trained in the simple 
application o f lie detection. Moreover, in organising lie detection in this way it corresponded to 
the immediate epistemological aim of criminal investigation to apprehend the offender rather 
than to understand his individual nature and potential pathology as had been the focus o f earlier 
academic detection o f deception specialists, who conceived o f it in broader psychological
245terms.
Does this trail o f technical developments, however, also mark the birth o f the lie detector? As 
we will see in Bunn’s history o f the lie detector, the process whereby the lie detector was
243 AVP, Box 17, Folder 5 Keeler, Leonarde: letter by Leonarde Keeler to August Vollmer, 19/3/1934.
244 LKC, Box 29, Folder 777: ‘Keeler Polygraph’ [brochure by Associated Research Inc.], 1940 [my emphasis].
245 This does not mean that no research into lie detection was carried out as polygraphy developed. Yet it came 
to be carried out within the confines o f  polygraphy rather than being tied to a broader psychological setting. 
Additionally a division o f  labour developed which marks professions generally. The main body o f  polygraph 
operators were to simply work as practitioners while a smaller number o f  individuals engaged in the 
advancement o f  the method, which was filtered back to the profession through changed training measures.
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‘invented’ was not simply a technical affair, indeed to all intents and purposes it had already 
happened in the early 1920s. As Bunn suggests, the lie detector was invented somewhere else: 
in the newspapers. Nevertheless, the polygraph and the lie detector were to enter into a close 
relationship. This relationship was at once beneficial and threatening to the designer and 
future users o f the instrument.
4.2 The Emergence of the Tie Detector
In his doctoral thesis, Bunn argues that the lie detector was created in the 1920s at the 
intersection o f popular psychology, the police professionalization movement, and a 
‘sensationalist’ media. He argues that the lie detector emerged not on the basis o f the 
invention o f a novel instrument, but rather through a shift o f the target o f criminology. While 
the same instruments — the pneumograph, the galvanometer, and blood pressure 
measurements -  had been used in early criminology to study the ‘soul’ o f the criminal in the 
period from 1907 until 1920, when criminology shifted its target to the criminal’s lie, the lie 
detector first emerged as a new entity in the newspapers.
In tracing the emergence o f the lie detector, Bunn constructs a pre-history o f the lie detector 
following Foucault’s methodological precepts. He argues that in the earlier period, newspaper 
accounts emerged on the use o f physiological instruments in studying the criminal and the 
insane, which portrayed them as ‘soul machines,’ ‘machines for the cure o f liars’ or ‘truth- 
compelling machines.’246 In his discussion, he especially focuses on newspaper accounts o f the 
work o f the psychoanalyst C.G. Jung and the experimental psychologist, Hugo Munsterberg. As 
we saw in the last chapter, both Jung and Munsterberg used word-association tests in 
conjunction with reaction-times, as well as the galvanometer and the pneumograph to study 
‘emotional complexes’ but also found that they could be used to establish a criminal’s guilt. 
However, according to Bunn these measurements could not be termed ‘lie detectors’. Rather, 
the measurements were used in elaborating and treating certain human types which ranged from 
the mentally ill to the criminal. Thus their analyses centred on the evaluation o f personality, 
where the criminal (along with the mentally ill) was constituted as a certain type o f human being 
where the detection o f guilt might constitute a first step in this analysis. Thus, when the lie did 
appear in the soul machine discourse, ‘the lie’ was only significant insofar as it was linked to a 
personological type -  the patient or habitual criminal.’247 In newspaper articles, psychology was 
hailed as a new scientific means o f dealing with crime which could revolutionise the criminal 
justice system by providing a scientific way o f bringing out the real truth. In providing an
246 Bunn, 1997a, p. 24.
247 Ibid, p. 51.
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alternative to brutal interrogation methods, the above-mentioned ‘third degree/ they not only 
provided a scientific way of establishing guilt, but were portrayed as progressive in that they 
were humane. While the lie detector would be greeted in the same way, the ‘soul machines’ were 
doomed to ‘historical obscurity’ since they were embedded in a ‘medico-eugenic discourse’ 
which targeted certain types of people considered to be abnormal such as the habitual criminal, 
the degenerate and the feeble-minded child. The use o f instruments such as the galvanometer, 
the sphygmograph, and the pneumograph in the study o f pathologies was to be replaced by 
intelligence testing and psychoanalysis, while the instruments themselves acquired a new name 
and a new target: the lie.’248
According to Bunn, from 1921 articles appeared which reported on a new invention: the lie 
detector. These articles were marked by the fact that different inventors were named and that 
different stories were built around their invention. There were two main stories which either 
placed the invention o f the lie detector at the Police Department in Berkeley or at the 
Harvard Psychological Laboratory in Boston. The first story located the lie detector in the 
context o f the professionalising police and identified Larson, Keeler, or Vollmer (or all three) 
as inventors o f the lie detector. According to the second story, the lie detector was invented 
by Marston at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory (we encountered Marston’s use o f the 
discontinuous method o f detecting deception in the last chapter).249 Depending on which 
story was picked, the other story had to be disregarded. After all, if the lie detector was an 
invention, there could only be one inventor of the lie detector.250 Apart from these two 
central stories, other individuals involved in lie detection also were credited with the invention 
o f the lie detector. Having reviewed different stories o f invention, Bunn seeks to problematise 
the notion o f the ‘invention’ o f the lie detector.
Elaborating on the fact that these lie detectors did not actually consist o f novel instruments 
but were rather based on measuring principles that had been developed in the 19th century — 
the measurement o f the action o f the lungs going back to the 1860s, the sphygmograph to the 
1860s, and the galvanometer to the 1890s -  Bunn argues that in material terms these
248 Ibid, p. 75.
249 In the analysis that I present below I will not elaborate further on Marston’s role in the development o f  lie 
detection. Marston plays a more prominent role in Bunn’s account, which is geared towards showing how lie 
detection specialists participated in the media discourse. While I will return to Marston in chapter 5 as part o f  
my discussion o f  lie detection as scientific evidence, since my focus is on the development o f  lie detection as 
a discipline, I shall focus mainly on Larson and Keeler. In the 1920s and 1930s, Marston moved away from 
academia and established himself as a ‘consulting psychologist.’ He wrote articles and popular books and 
additionally designed the comic character Wonder Woman (Bunn, 1997a, chapter 4). While he was still engaged 
in lie detection, it was more as part o f  his activities as popular psychologist — for example, he carried out lie 
detection tests in establishing the Tjest’ razorblade as part o f  a Gillette advertising campaign - rather than in 
terms o f  the development o f  lie detection in criminal investigation and as a separate discipline. For a more 
detailed account o f  Marston’s role in the development o f  lie detection and an analysis o f his role in popular 
psychology cf. Bunn (1997b).
250 Bunn, 1997a, p. 116.
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instruments could not be called inventions. Additionally, in methodological terms, the work 
o f Marston and Larson was partly indebted to the methods o f the ‘soul machines.’ While 
Marston was among the first to focus specifically on developing a means o f detecting 
deception using blood-pressure measurements, he also continued research on the possibilities 
o f using the word association test in detecting deception — the very test which had been part 
o f the discourse o f the soul machines. In this research, he identified different types o f liars -  
the positive and the negative reaction type. For this reason, his research remained wedded to 
methods which sought to analyse persons in terms o f types rather than specifically focusing on 
the //>.251 In Bunn’s view, Larson’s work was equally reminiscent o f the soul machine insofar 
as he still made use o f the word-association test and using his instrument carried out research 
on the feeble-minded.252 As can be seen in my own analysis, Larson’s psychiatric application 
o f his ‘cardio-pneumo-pychograph’ in his research on the detection o f deception covered a 
large range o f construction o f human types: from the detection o f deception in the criminal 
to the identification o f the psychotic.
In methodological terms, the implementation of the lie detector was completed when the 
subject had to answer closed questions. Thus on the level o f the development o f methods of 
lie detection, the shift from the soul machine to the lie detector was not immediate. Given 
that the instruments used — even the newly developed polygraph — were based on 19th century 
technology, and that the questioning techniques developed over a period o f time (as I 
elaborated on in the preceding chapter), Bunn concludes that the notion o f invention with 
regard to the lie detector is misleading.
Rather, what was involved in the implementation o f the lie detector, was first, the coining of 
the term ‘lie detector’ in 1921 itself, and a shift o f the target in criminology. One important 
moment in that shift was the publication o f an article in the Scientific American in 1925, 
according to which the new scientific criminology saw lying as ‘the criminal’s first step.’253 
With regard to the notion o f invention, then, Bunn concludes that the media portrayal o f the 
lie detector as an invention cannot be answered simply by trying to identify an original inventor 
or an original instrument. Rather, he seeks to answer the question W hy has the notion of 
invention been so important throughout the instrument’s history?’254 It was not the lie 
detector as a particular instrument that was invented. Rather what had been invented was a 
new term-, lie detector. With that term, the idea o f its ‘invention’ became possible. Bunn argues 
that the portrayal o f the lie detector as invented formed part o f a rhetoric which lent it 
scientific credibility. For the very reason that the lie detector constituted ‘an amalgamation of
251 Ibid, p. 101-102. Cf. Marston (1920).
252 Ibid, p. 97-98.
253 Ibid, p. 105.
254 Ibid, p. 80.
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old technology applied to new ends/255 the notion o f invention was necessary to establish it as 
a novel scientific instrument. As a result, Bunn argues, the lie detector was provided with an origin 
— a date and place o f invention, whether Boston or Berkeley. The notion o f invention 
provided it with an ‘origin myth/ constituting a starting point for the establishment o f lie 
detection as a scientific specialty. Additionally, the notion o f invention was connected to a 
‘mythic tradition’ which was inaugurated after the Civil War as part o f which invention was 
considered the backbone o f progress in industrializing America and inventors considered 
heroes. The notion o f invention thus constituted one important aspect through which the 
scientificity o f the lie detector in the media discourse was established.256
In elaborating on the constitution o f the discourse on the lie detector, Bunn identifies three 
forms o f rhetoric which came to define it: the rhetoric o f science, mafic and law and order. As 
part o f the first two forms o f rhetoric, the lie detector assumed its ‘scientific’ as well as 
‘magical’ status through being constructed as a machine which could detect the lie by itself. 
As part o f the first form o f rhetoric, the notion o f invention constituted one aspect through 
which the scientificity o f the lie detector was established. Another aspect was its portrayal as a 
‘black box.’ Newspaper articles often included photographs o f the instruments themselves. 
However, the instrument was never described in detail. Rather its photographic portrayal was 
taken as self-explanatory: here was a scientific instrument. Newspaper articles even called it 
‘black box.’257 Once Keeler had constructed his polygraph as a portable integrated instrument, 
the effect o f the black box was strengthened further, as the ‘guts’ o f the instrument remained 
hidden within its container. Additionally, many newspaper articles included reproductions o f 
charts. One chart would present the even curve o f the truth-telling individual, while another 
chart would show a peak identified as lie, often with an arrow pointing towards it. The chart 
had a double function -  representing the curves on graph paper, it represented a scientific 
inscription. Secondly, it turned the lie into an event that could be ‘fixed in time and captured 
on paper.’258 As a result o f the signification o f the lie on graph paper it appeared as if the 
chart ‘could speak for itself.’259 The photographic depiction o f  the black box and the 
reproduction o f the chart suggested that no human operator was necessary in its operation or 
the interpretation o f the charts.
Bunn here points to a tension that I will elaborate on below, namely, that the portrayal o f the 
lie detector as instrument which could detect lies without any intervention seemed to make 
the expert unnecessary, necessitating the stressing o f expertise on the part o f lie detection
255 Ibid, p. 119.
256 Ibid. 114-122.
257 Ibid, p. 135-138.
258 Ibid, p. 144.
259 Ibid, p. 144.
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specialists. In Bunn’s view, the idea o f invention, the depiction o f the lie detector as black 
box, and the reproduction o f the chart served the construction o f an ‘ideological edifice’: 
‘Because the physiological detection o f deception was essentially an interpretive and therefore 
a human enterprise, an ideological edifice has to be constructed around the instrument to 
deflect potential criticisms o f its subjective and therefore possibly arbitrary nature.’260 The 
scientific construction o f the lie detector was mediated by another dimension: what Bunn 
calls the rhetoric o f magic. In newspaper accounts, the so-called card trick was used to 
elucidate the workings o f the machine: the subject had to pick a card from a deck o f cards 
and the operator would tell him which one he had picked. Additionally, high accuracy rates 
were reported so that the lie detector was constructed as an instrument which was so accurate 
that it ‘worked like magic.’261
The most important aspect o f what Bunn calls the rhetoric o f magic was the attribution of 
agency. Being portrayed as an instrument which could detect lies automatically, newspaper 
articles also personified the instrument: The lie detector acted ‘as a mechanical conscience.’ It 
pointed its accusing finger, could read a person like a book, or had a peculiar genius for 
geography. It assumed a consciousness, having to be outwitted, betraying the subject or 
knowing all the answers.262 According to Bunn, then, the machine possessed an almost 
supernatural agency which was constituted through the entanglement o f its scientific and 
magical attributes. This agency was o f  an intimidating character while at the same time being 
constructed as a humane and scientific way of establishing a suspect’s guilt. Connecting to the 
third form of rhetoric — the rhetoric o f law and order — the lie detector could be enlisted as an 
expression o f the new professional police force, which no longer engaged in brutal and 
coercive methods o f interrogation, the ‘third degree,’ but instead relied on the lie detector as a 
scientific aid. Again drawing on its agency, the lie detector could take on the role o f the 
policeman, the judge, the jury and the witness in detecting the lies o f the guilty.263 The portrayal of 
lie detector in terms o f its apparent ability to replace the central constituents o f the criminal 
justice process in the media can be interpreted as one aspect for its exclusion as scientific 
evidence from the criminal courts. I will elaborate on this in the next chapter.264 
In concluding his analysis, Bunn argues that the lie detector was not an instrument which was 
developed in the laboratory first and was then reported on by the newspapers. Rather, the lie 
detector was constituted as popular science at the intersection o f popular psychology, the 
police professionalization movement and the media, keen on reporting on crime, from its
260 Ibid, p. 145.
261 Ibid, p. 151.
262 Ibid, p. p. 152-153.
263 Ibid, p. 155-156.
264 Bunn himself does not elaborate on the exclusion o f  lie detection evidence in court.
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beginning.265 Bunn therefore seeks to undermine the traditional divide between science and 
popular culture. Drawing on Cooter’s and Pumfrey’s approach,266 he suggests that the lie 
detector serves as an example o f how the popular domain can elaborate its own ‘natural 
knowledge’ which contradicts elite science and thus undermines the traditional ‘diffusionist 
model’ o f the popularisation o f science as part o f which science is made in the laboratory and 
then disseminated in a simplified manner to the public. This view assumes that science has 
ultimate authority over the generation o f knowledge and exists independendy o f the popular 
realm. Instead, according to Bunn, ‘the history o f the lie detector breaks down these 
oppositions. The instrument was not created in the laboratory first and ‘popularized’ later; the 
lie detector was a creation o f popular culture from the moment o f its inception. Polygraphy is 
popular science.’267 In that respect, he argues that his approach differs from Cooter’s and 
Pumfrey’s approach in that they stress the interaction between science and popular culture, 
whereas Bunn contends that the emergence o f the lie detector was not the result o f an 
interaction between science and popular culture. Rather, it was ‘constructed through 
negotiations between lie detector pioneers, popular psychologists, police reform publicists, 
newspaper reporters, magazine article writers and other actors o f the mass media.’268
4.3 There Is No Such Thing A.s a Tie Detector
While Bunn’s analysis of the lie detector is valuable as regards the media discourse surrounding 
the instrument, it can be usefully extended and reframed. Bunn tends to conflate the emergence 
o f the lie detector with the development o f lie detection. This, I want to argue, is a function of his 
conceptualisation o f the development o f the lie detector at the intersection o f the police 
professionalization movement, the mass media and popular psychology. It is this location o f the 
instrument which leads him to conclude that polygraphy constituted ‘popular science.’ In doing 
so, Bunn leaves some important aspects o f the development o f lie detection untouched.
Firstly, I would like to contextualise Bunn’s arguments within the approach that I have taken 
and secondly, extend his analysis by providing an examination o f the role that the lie detector 
came to play in lie detection practices. Bunn constructs the history o f lie detection around a 
narrative which focuses almost exclusively on how the instruments came to be portrayed in the 
media. This allows him to conceptualise the emergence o f the lie detector in terms o f a horizontal 
shift whereby the same measurements which were used in the ‘prehistory’ o f the lie detector in 
the analysis o f the criminal’s personality came to centre on the subject’s lie. Thus in his analysis,
265 Bunn extends his analysis o f  the logic o f  the lie detector as a form o f  psychological knowledge by arguing 
that it can be understood on the basis o f  Foucault’s notion o f  ‘semio-technique’ developed in Discipline and 
Punish (cf. Bunn, 1997a, chapter 6).
266 Cooter and Pumfrey (1994).
267 Bunn, 1997a, p. 299.
268 Ibid, p. 301.
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neither the development of apparatus, nor technology, nor shifts in measurement appear to have been 
significant: ‘rather, it was a change in the object of knowledge. What made the lie detector 
possible was the repudiation o f the importance o f analysing the criminal in favour o f detecting 
the lie/269 While Bunn’s perspective is not incommensurable with my own, there are 
nevertheless different fod in our approach . The difference occasions the identification of 
alternative shifts in the development o f lie detection up to this point in its history.
My analysis in the last chapter, while covering the same period as Bunn’s soul machines, was 
concerned with tracing the set o f transformations in the early developments o f the detection of 
deception on the basis o f which the subject’s guilt could be established within psychological 
discourse. For this reason, I focused on a vertical shift whereby the change of the locus o f the 
detection o f deception was deemed as highly significant. This runs contrary to Bunn’s analysis. 
In examining this shift, I showed how — on the basis o f methodological changes — the 
straightforward lie emerged by virtue o f a transition from externalising deception by means o f 
measurements o f the mind towards making the lie apparent as a discrete sign through bodily 
measurements. I argued that this shift was made intelligible on the basis o f the distinction 
between emotion and cognition that was elaborated in early psychology. This does not 
contradict Bunn’s broader analysis o f the shift from the analysis o f the criminal’s personality to 
the detection o f  the lie, but complements it by showing how capturing the lie became possible 
within psychological discourse on the basis o f what might be called an ‘epistemology o f fear’. 
Bunn, too, argues that the shift from the soul machine to the lie detector was completed 
only after the simple lie had emerged as object o f detection. However, this shift was 
connected to a more specific set o f  changes concerning the development o f lie detection as 
a practice than is covered by Bunn’s analysis. The move from the analysis o f the criminal’s 
personality to the detection o f the lie was centrally related to the movement o f early 
research and application in the detection o f deception from the academic setting to its 
institutionalisation in criminal investigation. It is on this level that Bunn’s and my 
perspective diverge. While his construction o f the lie detector within the triangle o f police 
professionali2ation, the media and popular psychology is effective in arguing for the 
constitution o f polygraphy as ‘popular science,’ it leaves the movement o f the detection of 
the lie between distinctive institutional settings aside. This is significant, because this 
movement entailed quite differing models o f lie detection and, as a consequence, different 
notions o f expertise with regard to the detection o f the lie. As will be discussed in further 
detail in the next chapter, these models were to become highly contested. For this very 
reason, it is vital that we keep the polygraph and the lie detector separate: the production and 
commercialisation o f the polygraph made the institutionalisation o f lie detection as a certain
269 Ibid, p. 69.
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form o f technical expertise in criminal investigation possible. In this, crucially, the 
polygraph did not correspond to the ‘lie detector.’ Rather, the portrayal o f the lie detector in 
the media served in the promotion o f lie detection as a scientific method o f criminal 
investigation. But it equally threatened the institutionalisation o f lie detection as a form of 
expertise. In the following then, I will take Bunn’s analysis o f the lie detector as an 
expression o f the media discourse which developed around it and examine its role in 
relation to how lie detection was constructed as practice and special form o f expertise.
In elaborating on Bunn’s analysis, I examine more closely the reactions o f lie detection 
specialists to the lie detector and the claims they themselves made on behalf o f the use o f 
instruments. As we saw above, Bunn argues that the lie detector was constructed as an 
instrument which could detect lies by itself. In the media discourse, the lie detector was 
constructed along the technological lines o f ‘invention’ and ‘machine.’ By contrast to this 
portrayal o f the lie detector, which Bunn also points to, lie detection experts at the same time 
denigrated the fact that the lie detector had been ‘invented’ and that it was a ‘machine.’ By 
drawing an analogy to other scientific techniques, which employed laboratory equipment in 
order to develop new knowledge, Marston argued that he had ‘merely assembled some 
standard laboratory equipment, [...], and used it in a new way for lie detection just as 
everyone else has done since and just as chemists use test-tubes, retorts and Bunsen burners 
to perform experiments and discover new formulae.’270 Thus in his lie detection experiments 
‘he did not “invent” any o f these instruments, nor did any living person.’271 
Like Marston, not only did lie detection specialists deny the fact that the ‘lie detector’ had 
been invented, they also declared that there was no such thing as a lie detector. Keeler stated: ‘the 
polygraph is not a mind reader, nor does it ring bells, flash lights, or shock the subject when 
he lies. It is simply an apparatus that records the physical changes in the subject’s body which 
accompany his emotional changes.’272 Rather, the instrument used was to be seen as a 
diagnostic tool. Drawing an analogy between lie detection and medical practice, Keeler argued 
that just like ‘a stethoscope, a clinical thermometer, or a blood count apparatus’ could not be 
called an ‘appendicitis detector,’ the instruments used in lie detection could not be called ‘lie 
detector.’ Rather, in the same manner as the physician,
‘in every case, the examiner must make his diagnosis from tangible symptoms, using whatever mechanical 
aids he has at his disposal. For instance, a patient is found to have a temperature o f 102 degrees F., rigidity 
and pain in the appendix region, and a high leucocyte count. From this combination o f  symptoms the 
physician concludes that his patient is suffering with an infected appendix. Or, in another case, the patient 
has delusions o f  persecution, either systematized or ever changing fantasies, and various other symptoms 
which lead the psychiatrist to render a diagnosis o f  schizophrenia or some other psychopathic condition.
270 Marston, 1938, p. 23.
271 Ibid, p. 50.
272 Keeler, 1940, p. 16.
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In detecting deception the same general procedure is followed. Certain situations, or conditions produce 
emotions which are accompanied by bodily changes. The flushing o f  anger, and the paling with fear, for 
example, need no introduction. But to discover, measure, and evaluate the less obvious bodily changes 
which accompany the emotions involved in deception requires just as much specialized care as the 
physician must exercise in making a complicated medical diagnosis.’273
As the above quotation suggests, in counteracting the image o f lie detector where the lie is 
simply and unproblematically shown on the graph produced by the instrument, the lie is the 
result o f a complex diagnosis which the expert renders on the basis o f the physiological changes 
which indicate the lie. Thus the instrument plays only a minor part in the detection of the lie. 
That is to say, it provides an objective translation o f bodily changes, but these can only be 
rendered meaningful by the expert. Thus the media discourse and the account o f lie detection 
specialists regarding the status o f the lie detector diverged. O n this level, the lie detector and the 
polygraph — which Keeler developed at the same time as the term Tie detector’ became 
common — alongside other instruments used in lie detection — were different objects.
When it came to lie detection practices themselves, however, lie detection specialists also 
drew on the notion o f the lie detector. In the lie detection examination, specifically, they used 
a preamble to introduce the subject to the examination. One o f these earlier preambles reads:
T his is a test to find out whether or not you told the truth during the trial. Remember that any lies will 
be at once recorded by this machine, and these ties will be counted against you. So, think carefully upon 
your answers for any untruth may result in your going to jail. Answer all questions as briefly as possible 
and whenever possible by yes or no.5274
This preamble very closely mirrors the way in which the lie detector was portrayed in the 
media. The instrument is represented as a ‘machine’ which records lies. Just as in media 
representations, then, the instrument itself acquires super-human abilities oscillating between 
science and magic. At the same time, the role o f the examiner in interpreting the charts 
produced by the examinee is implicitly diminished. In later versions o f the preamble, 
examiners even drew directly on the ‘popular name’ o f the instrument:
T his instrument to which you are attached is the well known lie detector, which has been used 
successfully for many years for detecting guilt or innocence, and I’m sure it will not fail in your case. 
N ow  sit as quietly as possible and just answer my questions “yes” or “no.” If you have any explanations 
to make, you may do so after completion o f  the test.’275
As we saw in Bunn’s argument, this portrayal o f the lie detector as a recorder o f lies could be 
intimidating. Its portrayal as an agentic machine which could not be beaten and would catch 
anyone was geared towards creating ‘awe’ and ‘fear.’276 Representing the machine as lie 
detector imported this fear into the lie detection examination itself:
273 Keeler, 1934, p. 153-154.
274 JLP, Carton 3, Folder 2 Polygraphs: typewritten copies o f  preamble, n.d.
275 Lee, 1953, p. 104.
276 Bunn, 1997a, p. 154.
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This preamble has a dual purpose, aside from the instruction it contains. It tends to reassure the 
innocent suspect and at the same time serves as a mild build up to enhance fear o f  detection in the guilty, 
for we know that if  there is no fear o f  detection there will be litde if  any reaction and a definite diagnosis 
will be difficult to make.’277
Thus the instrument not only served to translate the body’s responses into a script which 
could then be interpreted by the examiner. By attributing the status o f a ‘lie detector’ to the 
instrument, the instrument also assumed a performative function. By virtue o f its performativity, 
the instrument assumed an uncertain ontological status. On the one hand, it was described as 
‘just’ an instrument: an appendange to the expert. On the other hand, it was depicted as a machine 
which took on agentic qualities in being able to detect the lie on its own. Thus we can extend 
the analysis o f the triad o f the examiner, the subject and the instrument that I introduced in 
chapter 3. It seems that the instrument became part o f a power structure that was 
implemented in the construction o f psychological knowledge o f the subject’s lie. Having been 
made intelligible on the basis o f an ‘epistemology of fear’ — which was elaborated from the 
psychological distinction between emotion and cognition — the examiner enlisted the 
instrument in modulating the responses o f the subject’s body. Thus the role o f the instrument 
in the translation mechanism, which defined the production o f the ‘truthful’ body, was not 
only to make the internal processes o f  the body visible by means o f the mechanical 
interaction o f the subject’s body and the instrument. In addition, it was constructed in such a 
way that it took an active role in producing the responses o f fear which appeared on the 
subject’s script and which — in turn — were taken to point towards the subject’s lie. In 
following the arguments made by sociologists o f science and technology that there is no-clear 
cut distinction between an ‘authoritative’ account o f science or expertise and its popular 
representation, the history o f lie detection thus provides an example o f how the media 
representation o f a ‘scientific’ artefact fed back into and came to increasingly mediate lie 
detection practices.
Why was it so important to lie detection experts to argue that there was no such thing as the 
lie detector given that they themselves attributed this status to the instrument in the 
examination? As Bunn suggests in his analysis, one o f the paradoxes o f the lie detector 
discourse was the fact that if  the machine could detect lies o f itself, no expert would be 
needed at all. Thus, while the media attention served lie detection specialists -  especially 
Keeler — in the promotion o f the technique, it equally threatened their status resulting in their 
continual emphasis o f their expertise.278 In his articles, Keeler pointed to the fact that
‘[i]n the hands o f  a highly trained operator, the polygraph offers very reliable and extremely critical data 
for the separation o f  truth from falsehood. But, as in the case o f  the physician’s diagnostic aids, the
277 Lee, 1953, p. 104.
278 Bunn, 1997a, p. 144-145.
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interpretation o f  the data is the important portion o f  the process. The careful training o f  die polygraph 
operator therefore is as important as the exact training o f  the physician in the field o f  medicine.’279
This stressing o f expertise constituted a form of boundary work which served to insulate lie 
detection from untrained individuals -  ‘certain so-called experts’ who might pretend that they 
actually did have a ‘lie detector.’280 This was especially so once Keeler had the polygraph 
patented and manufactured as an instrument specifically designed for the detection o f 
deception. His commercialisation o f the polygraph was soon emulated by other instrument 
manufacturers. For example, Captain CJD. Lee o f the Berkeley Police Department had a 
competing instrument, the ‘Berkeley Psychograph,’ manufactured from the late 1930s.281 
Other instrument manufacturers, most notably the major instrument manufacturers 
LaFayette and Stoelting, were to follow with various models o f the instruments designed for 
the detection o f the lie. By the end o f the 1930s, at least 15 police departments had 
purchased a polygraph or instruments marketed by other instrument developers and trained 
their own ‘polygraph operators.’282
While the manufacturing o f the instruments allowed for the spread o f lie detection methods, 
it also meant that there was less control in terms o f who might acquire them. In conjunction 
with the media portrayal o f the ‘lie detector,’ this endangered the status o f lie detection as 
specialised expertise. In order to protect lie detection as a form o f ‘scientific expertise,’ Keeler 
drew up an agreement with the manufacturer that each sale o f a polygraph would be 
subject to his approval. It was part o f the sales policy that instruments would be sold to 
individuals, usually from police departments, only when they agreed to obtain training in 
the use o f the polygraph.283
However, as I will elaborate in the next chapter, when it came to defining what kind o f training 
was necessary in constituting lie detection as scientific expertise, a conflict soon developed 
between Keeler and Larson, who had developed the final set-up o f the lie detection 
examination and had initiated the use o f lie detection at police departments. While he had 
brought lie detection to the police department, he was still linked to research and application 
o f the detection o f deception within an analysis o f the criminal’s personality. In this, he was 
rooted within the academic background from which lie detection had emerged. Consequently,
279 Keeler, 1940, p. 164.
280 Keeler, 1934, p. 153.
281 LKC, Box 29, Folder 780: ‘Brochure o f  Berkeley Psychograph,’ 1938.
282 Cf. LKC, Box 35, Folder 851 for a list o f  owners o f  the polygraph.
283 Keeler wrote in a letter ‘Individuals that we are instructing in the use o f  the Polygraph pay thirty dollars a 
week for approximately two or three weeks in order to leam the “ropes” and have what experience we can 
give them in that short time. We are trying to protect the field by not selling instruments except to those 
who are qualified in their operation, and we have therefore turned down a number o f  individuals because 
they were unwilling to go through a course o f  training. I believe that is the only way that we can protect the 
field for ourselves and others who are eamesdy endeavoring to use the technique in their police work’ (LKP, 
Carton 2, Folder 3 L.K. Technique Policy Legal Status: Letter by Leonarde Keeler to W.A. Wiltberger, 
Director o f  Public Safety, St. Petersberg, FL, n.d.).
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as regards the expertise in the application o f lie detection, he stressed academic (and, 
especially, clinical) training. By contrast, as we saw, Keeler’s commercialisation o f the 
instrument facilitated a new conception o f expertise in lie detection which matched the way in 
which ‘scientific’ expertise was being constructed within police departments — as technical 
skill using specialised equipment. Having lauded Keeler’s efforts at developing a standardized 
instrument, Larson subsequently criticised Keeler’s commercialisation o f the polygraph and 
reproached him for having turned lie detection into a ‘racket.’ 284 In trying to put lie detection 
back on a scientific footing he devised an alternative approach. As I will try to show in the 
next chapter, Larson’s attempts at instituting his own approach were in vain for they 
corresponded to an older model o f expertise that was incommensurable with the lie as the 
only and specific target o f lie detection as practiced in criminal investigation.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I examined the further development o f lie detection in the 1920s and 1930s by 
placing a special focus on the role o f instruments in its history: in this period the emergence 
o f the lie detector in the media coincided with the creation o f the polygraph as integrated 
instrument specifically designed for its application in lie detection.
In my analysis I drew specifically on Bunn’s history o f the lie detector. He conceptualizes the 
emergence o f the lie detector as a horizontal shift from the soul machine to the lie detector. 
This shift is taken to express a move from the criminal type to the detection o f the lie. While 
I agreed with his broader analysis, I argued that the history o f lie detection cannot be reduced to 
the history o f the lie detector. Instead I first argued that the consideration o f the development 
o f lie detection as a separate discipline requires an analysis o f the role o f the lie detector in 
mediating lie detection practices. Secondly, I argued that the shift from the analysis o f  the 
criminal to the detection o f the lie needs to be understood also in terms o f the move o f the 
detection o f deception from an academic setting to criminal investigation. In this move, lie 
detection became part o f the police reform movement, which sought to turn the police into a 
profession oriented towards the use o f scientific methods o f criminal detection. Lie detection 
thus came to correspond to the more immediate epistemological aim which characterised 
criminal investigation: the simple apprehension o f  the criminal rather than an understanding o f  his 
individual nature. This shift was made possible through the development and 
commercialisation o f the polygraph as an integrated instrument to be used in the application 
o f lie detection. Thus I contextualised the methodological and technological changes which 
underlie Bunn’s broader shift through my analysis o f how the detection o f the lie became
284 LKP, Carton 2, Folder 15 L.K. Business Associates: Letter by John Larson to George W. Haney, 27 /6 /1939 .
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possible in psychological discourse in Chapter 3 and an analysis o f the development o f the 
polygraph in this chapter.
I therefore reframed and extended Bunn’s analysis by arguing that the polygraph and the lie 
detector have to be considered as separate entities. In media discourse, the lie detector was 
constructed as a machine which could detect lies by itself. While lie detection specialists 
benefited from and actively enlisted media attention, the lie detector threatened their 
expertise. In countering the representation o f the lie detector, they argued that there was in 
fact no such thing as a lie detector and that only the trained expert could ‘diagnose’ the lie. 
Yet when it came to lie detection practices, lie detection experts also presented the instrument 
as a machine. In being enrolled in modulating the body’s responses, the instrument thus 
assumed a performative function oscillating between instrument and machine. It was crucial 
for lie detection experts to stress their expertise because the representation o f the lie detector 
as a machine which could detect lies by itself seemed to make the expert unnecessary. But as 
we will see in the next chapter, when it came to the nature of the expertise required in the 
‘diagnosis’ o f the lie, a heated debate developed. This debate continues to mark the 
construction o f lie detection as contested knowledge today. It is on the site o f this debate that 
the notion o f the ‘machine’ will reappear as a rhetorical resource: employed by Larson in 
denigrating the expertise o f the emergent class o f polygraph operators. In undermining their 
authority as experts, he will argue that they do not in fact represent experts but simply draw 
on the performative function o f the instrument. That is to say, they use the instrument as i f  It 
were a lie detector: intimidating subjects in order to elicit confessions.
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Chapter 5 Lie Detection as Science
As I stated in the methodology chapter, my analysis of lie detection as a technique o f knowledge 
production and intervention proceeds along four strands. Having provided an analysis o f how the 
lie was turned into an object of knowledge in chapter 3 and analysed the role of the instrument in 
lie detection practices in chapter 4, this is concerned with the third and fourth strands. It begins 
with a consideration o f the status o f lie detection as scientific evidence in the courts. Building on 
this discussion, I move on to provide an analysis of lie detection practice as form of expertise. 
Although lie detection was presented as a scientific technique of interrogation by its practitioners, 
it nevertheless remained excluded as scientific evidence from the courts. Different explanations 
for the continued judicial rejection o f lie detection evidence have been advanced by historians o f 
science. Their arguments centre on the power rather than the questionability of lie detection methods. 
According to this line of argumentation, judges wanted to protect the ‘credulous’ jury from 
expertise by which it might be too easily swayed and which it was incompetent to judge. 
Moreover, as lie detection addressed the central question of criminal guilt, it threatened to 
undermine the jury system as such. Ken Alder provides an extension of this argument in 
explaining the rejection of lie detection examinations from criminal court proceedings. He 
furnishes a detailed analysis which contrasts the ‘knowledge strategies’ employed by two of the 
principal figures in the development o f lie detection, Larson and Keeler, who we encountered in 
the preceding two chapters. Conceptualising the former’s practices as knowledge-on&nttA and the 
latter’s more successful practices as /oa^r-oriented, Alder concludes, that the rejection of lie 
detection evidence resulted from the particular kind o f lie detection which became 
institutionalised, and which had turned lie detection into a coercive technique which was akin to 
judicial torture.
On the basis o f a re-consideration and extension o f the historical narrative on which Alder’s 
portrayal o f the different knowledge strategies o f Larson and Keeler is based, I problematise 
Alder’s differentiation o f lie detection practices according to the distinction between a knowledge- 
oriented versus a power-oriented technique. Rather, I argue that an historical analysis o f the 
development o f polygraphy needs to consider both Larson’s and Keeler’s lie detection practices 
on an equal footing. In my analysis I suggest that their practices might be considered according 
to different notions o f expertise in part already referred to in chapter 4. On this basis I provide 
a sociological explanation for why Larson’s influence declined and Keeler’s turned out to be the 
more successful. Building on my reconsideration o f Alder’s analysis, I aim to provide an 
alternative evaluation of the lie detection examination as technique of knowledge production 
and intervention in chapter 6, in which the different threads that have been running through
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this thesis — the lie as an object o f knowledge, the role o f the instrument in lie detection 
practices, the status o f lie detection as expertise, and the status o f lie detection within the 
criminal justice system and beyond — will be drawn together and expanded upon.
5.1 The Frye Decision
In the following two sections we will review the court case which provided the precedent for 
the continued exclusion o f lie detection evidence from the criminal courts. N ot only did it 
lead to the exclusion o f lie detection evidence from the courts, but as we will see, it also 
implemented a new standard for the admissibility o f scientific evidence in US court cases in 
general. This new standard, the so-called Frye rule, was to regulate the admission o f scientific 
evidence for a large part o f the 20th century.
In 1922, William Moulton Marston — who as we saw in chapter 3, had developed the systolic 
blood pressure test in measuring deception — sought to have results o f a lie detection 
examination admitted as scientific evidence in court for the first time.285 The criminal case to 
be presented was the following: on November 27, 1920 one Dr. Robert W. Brown was shot 
in his office. On August 16, 1921 James A. Frye was arrested in connection with a robbery 
and routinely questioned about the murder, to which he confessed on August 22.286 Two 
eyewitnesses had been present at the murder scene and so the evidence against Frye including 
his confession seemed to make for certain conviction. But Frye retracted his confession and 
presented an alibi for his defence instead. However, no witnesses were available to testify on 
Frye’s behalf to substantiate the alibi.287 Frye’s attorney, Mattingly, turned to Marston hoping 
‘to convince their client that his lies were known to everybody and that he’d better tell the 
truth.’288 The results o f the lie detection examination were unexpected: ‘N o one could have 
been more surprised than myself,’ states Marston, ‘to find that Frye’s final story o f innocence 
was entirely truthful! His confession to the Brown murder was a lie from start to finish.’289
285 My account o f  the trial is based on Starrs (1982) and Golan (1997). Starrs examined the remaining trial 
records which are held by the National Archives in File 3968, retired files, and in Pardon File RG 204, Box 
1583, Pardon Case Files 1853-1946, Record 56, pp. 384-412, National Record Center, Suidand, Md. I was 
not able to consult these files as part o f  my archival research. I have also taken into account Marston’s 1938 
account o f his involvement in the Frye case (Marston, 1938). However, this account is rather idiosyncratic 
and there are incongruences between Marston’s story and the facts established by Starrs.
286 Starrs, 1982, p. 688.
287 Golan, 1997, p. 360-361.
288 Marston, 1938, p. 71.
289 Ibid, p. 71. There are differing accounts as to why Frye allegedly made a false confession. According to 
Marston ‘he had made this false confession because a certain negro friend whom we may call J.W. had 
assured Jim that he would fix it so he got half the reward for his own conviction and a full pardon soon 
after’ (Marston, 1938, p. 71). According to the case files, Frye claimed in his application for executive 
clemency in 1936, that the detective w ho interrogated him had promised him that if  Frye pleaded guilty 
for the murder, the robbery charge would be dropped. Once the detective had collected the reward the 
murder charge would also be dropped as Frye had a convincing alibi (Starrs, 1982, p. 689).
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Having no means to put up a strong defence, Mattingly ventured to have the results of the 
examination admitted as scientific evidence to support Frye’s case, but without avail. The 
presiding trial judge, Chief Justice McCoy, ruled that the results o f the examination would not 
be admissible in court as the records might well show whether Frye had lied on the date he 
was examined but could not be taken to support the truth or falsehood of his statements in 
court. I f  the records were to be admissible at all, they would have needed to have been made 
while Frye was testifying. Following this, Mattingly tried to have Marston qualified as an 
expert witness so that he would take the stand and provide expert testimony on the 
examination records. However, Justice McCoy argued that he would not admit lie detection 
examinations unless ‘there is an infallible instrument for ascertaining whether a person is 
speaking the truth or not.’290 To this, Mattingly replied: W e have proof to offer on this point, 
that it is a scientifically proven fact that certain results will be accomplished under certain 
conditions. It seems to me that the very least Your Honor can do is to permit us to attempt 
to qualify the expert. I think we are entitled to it as a matter o f law.’291 Again, Justice McCoy 
declined. Frye was convicted o f second degree murder -  and Marston claims that had the jury 
not known about the lie detection examination (it is not clear how they may have been 
informed of its existence) he would have ended up at the gallows.292
In 1923, the case was appealed in Frye v United. States, which was not only to affirm the exclusion 
o f lie detection examinations as evidence but also to establish the precedent on the basis o f 
which the admissibility o f novel scientific evidence in general was to be tested in American 
courts for most o f the 20th century. The oft-cited passage of the concise opinion reads:
‘Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and the 
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force o f  the 
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiendy established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs/293
Traditionally, no restrictions had been placed on the admissibility o f scientific evidence. 
Rather, it was up to the jury to decide on the weight and credibility o f the scientific evidence 
presented. Expert testimony was admitted in court if an expert could show that he was 
‘qualified.’ The increasing use o f scientific evidence by adversarial parties in court, however, 
resulted in ‘the paradoxical situation in which the lay jurors were supposed to resolve disputes 
about which they knew nothing other than what partisan experts selected and paid by the 
litigants had told them. And, as the authority o f science grew during the 19th century, so did
290 Cited in Starrs, 1982, p. 691.
291 Ibid, p. 692.
292 Marston, 1938, p. 72.
293 Frye v. United States 54 App.D.C 46, 293 F. 1013.
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the court’s mistrust in the ability o f the credulous jury to resist the lure o f the scientific expert
-,294witness.
According to Golan, the solution to the problem o f sustaining a jury-based system,295 in which 
the jury passed judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by adversarial parties, was for 
the court to give up its neutral position and act as a gate-keeper with regard to the evidence that 
was allowed to enter into the jury’s deliberations.296 As part o f this new position, the court 
incorporated the changing nature o f scientific practice and its potential in regulating the 
admissibility o f scientific evidence. In the 19th century, the scientific expert had been something 
o f an ‘individualist’ who first developed and then marketed his expertise. His qualification as an 
expert was based on an evaluation o f the ‘marketability’ of his knowledge.297 Towards the end of 
the 19th century, however, communities o f experts began to develop who shared standards of 
practice and ethics and presented themselves as professions sanctioning knowledge practices 
which were perceived not to conform to their stated standards.298 The rule o f ‘general 
acceptance’ put forward in the Frye opinion reflected this model of scientific practice.299 But 
what did ‘general acceptance in a particular field’ entail? While the indeterminacy o f the 
terminology of the opinion was criticised, Golan argues that it was this very indeterminacy which 
allowed for a wide scope on the part o f the courts to regulate the evidence permitted to enter the 
courts depending on their variable interpretations o f the meaning o f ‘general acceptance.’300 As 
we will see in the next section, the fact that the court chose to give up its neutral position and 
start protecting the jury from the ‘lure of the scientific expert witness’ in the particular case of lie 
detection evidence rather than any other type o f novel evidence was not so much related to its
294 Golan, 1997, p. 367.
295 The jury system developed when the judicium dei, i.e. the ordeal and other forms o f  test to establish the guilt 
o f  a person by means o f  divine judgment, fell into disuse after the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 forbid the 
involvement o f  priests in ordeals and instituted the confession as religious form o f  penance. Following the 
council, the English legal system established the jury, while Roman-canon law was adopted in continental 
Europe (Fisher, 1997/1998). The first criminal trial to have been decided by a jury arguably took place in 
Westminster in 1220 (ibid, p. 585).
296 Golan, 1997, p. 375-376.
297 Landsman, 1995, p. 150-151.
298 Golan (1997); Landsman (1995). This was arguably an expression o f  a wider movement o f  
professionalization. Landsman argues that this movement was also connected to progressivism, which 
sought to apply rational and scientific principles to the ‘management’ o f  society (Landsman, 1995, p. 151). 
Drawing on Charles Pierce, Landsman further argues that progressivism was connected to the emerging 
philosophy o f  pragmatism as part o f  which truth was no longer seen as an individual matter but was 
conceptualised as the outcome o f  the (potentially conflictual) interaction o f  individuals within a community. 
Landsman suggests that the development o f  scientific communities and the adoption o f  a community-based 
evaluation o f  scientific knowledge by the courts reflect this changing conception o f  the social elaboration o f  
truth (ibid, p. 152).
299 Golan, 1997, p. 376-377.
300 Additionally, it provides the possibility o f  turning the question o f  admissibility from a scientific question into a 
socio-bistorical one. Rather than having to evaluate the scientific validity o f  a certain form o f  evidence requiring 
detailed technical knowledge, the judge can simply ask: ‘As a matter o f  historical fact, has this forensic 
technique gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific circle?’ (Imwinkelried, 1981, p. 273). 
Jasanoff and Lynch argue that in answering this question, the courts pass decisions on whether scientific 
controversies have achieved closure (Lynch and Jasanoff, 1998b, p. 679) rather than passing judgment on the 
nature o f  knowledge per se.
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scientific credentials, but to the nature of the evidence and to the threat that it posed to the 
criminal justice system.
5.2 The credulous jury and the lie detector as witness, judge, and jury
Lie detection evidence presented a radical case in terms o f the nature o f the evidence 
proposed and the potential consequences o f its admission. As Golan seeks to show, it was the 
radical nature o f the evidence, rather than its status as a scientific technique, which not only 
occasioned its exclusion but also lead to the establishment o f a new standard for the 
admissibility o f scientific evidence in general.
First, it can be argued that lie detection examinations were not able to overcome the 
boundary o f the courts by virtue o f their power, not the uncertainty o f their status.301 This 
power may be partly attributed to the machine — the lie detector. As shown by Bunn, the lie 
detector was widely discussed in the newspapers as a machine which could detect the 
criminal’s guilt by reading his mind, stimulating the popular imagination. As an answer to the 
most central question that the criminal justice system posed — is the person that has been 
brought before this court guilty or innocent? — the court needed to make doubly sure that a 
‘credulous jury’302 would not be blinded by ‘scientific evidence’ whose accuracy, in the courts’ 
view, it was not competent to judge.
As we saw in our discussion o f Bunn, the popular appeal o f the lie detector was due to three 
interlocking forms o f rhetoric — the rhetoric o f science, the rhetoric o f magic, and the rhetoric of 
law and order. These organised the media discourse on the lie detector. As part o f the rhetoric o f 
science, newspaper and magazine articles portrayed the lie detector as a scientific instrument 
which could detect lies Jy itself. The attribution of near infallibility in detecting what the mind 
was attempting to hide -  in combination with the attribution o f agentic qualities — suggested 
super-human abilities, thus providing the lie detector with an air o f magic.303 
As part o f the third form o f rhetoric — the rhetoric o f law and order -  the lie detector was 
portrayed as a solution to the problem o f the so-called ‘third-degree.’ The ‘third degree’ 
referred to brutal methods o f  interrogation practiced by the police in order to elicit 
confessions or information relating to a crime from suspects. As I already mentioned in
301 Alder, 2002, p. 22.
302 In this discussion I am using Golan’s term. I have put it in quotation marks in order to indicate that the 
‘credulous jury,’ is a representation o f  lay people as not fully competent to judge scientific knowledge which 
was elaborated by the courts at the end o f  the 19th century. While Golan does not make this explicit in his 
discussion, it would be intriguing to further investigate how changing representations o f  the ‘layness’ o f  the 
jury as fit or unfit to judge scientific knowledge developed alongside the increased integration o f  expert 
knowledges in the court system. For example, Maranta et al. (2005) trace different conceptions o f  ‘imagined 
lay persons’ and their role in the application o f  expertise in different areas o f  society.
303 Bunn, 1997a, p. 126-155.
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preceding chapters, as part o f the progressivist movement to professionalise the police 
along scientific principles, the third degree had become a much discussed issue not only in 
the media but in the criminal justice system itself. Committees and commissions were 
formed to investigate its prevalence -  e.g. the Senate Select Committee to Investigate the 
Administration o f the Criminal Law by Federal Officials formed in 1910.304 The most 
comprehensive study o f the problem o f ‘lawlessness in law enforcement’ was carried out 
and presented by the so-called Wickersham-Commission (The National Commission on 
Law Observance and Enforcement) in 1930.305 The third degree was portrayed as one in a 
series o f irrational and violent forms o f detecting guilt and innocence, such as the ordeal 
and torture, which did not serve to bring out the truth but instead obscured it. By contrast, 
the lie detector was represented as a humane form o f interrogation which allowed for the 
establishment o f the truth o f the subject’s innocence or guilt by means o f reliable scientific 
methods. Moreover, as a technology which could establish the guilt o f any criminal, it could 
function as witness, judge and jury, thus sidestepping the legal system altogether.306 
It was this aspect o f lie detection which connected to the second rationale for rejecting lie 
detection examinations as scientific evidence. In providing an assessment o f the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence, lie detection could undermine the criminal justice process as such. If  the 
truthfulness o f a subject’s statement could be established by means of a certain technique, the 
jury’s task o f assessing the credibility o f witnesses would be undermined. More to the point, the 
jury system itself would potentially be redundant.307 Indeed the jury’s competence to adequately 
assess evidence had been under attack from scientists since the 1880s.308 The ‘progressive’ ideal 
that science (rather than a group of jurors) furnished the means to institute true justice was 
reflected in Keeler’s statement:
‘Some day I can picture a medical-legal committee with no judges, no lawyers in the particular, but 
instead some scientific experts who will examine suspects and render a decision as to their guilt and 
opinions o f  their personality. Such well-trained men can better judge the reactions and social possibilities 
o f a man than a haphazard group o f  business men and lawyers. We are already progressing toward such 
an ideal but it will be many years before it is realized.’309
In implementing the ‘general acceptance rule,’ the Frye opinion had stated that W e think 
the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific
304 Larson, 1925, p. 234-235.
305 The report consisted o f  a literature review, an examination o f  legal statutes, newspaper coverage, legal cases 
and appeals involving the third degree, and the carrying out o f a questionnaire among relevant officials, 
public defenders and legal aid societies and bar associations (National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, 1931).
306 Bunn, 1997a, p. 156.
307 Golan, 1997, p. 366-367; Alder, 2002, p. 22.
308 Golan, 1997, p. 375-376.
309 LKP, Carton 1, Folder 16 Research Assorted: Leonarde Keeler, “Notes on Interview between A.E. Wiggam 
and Leonarde Keeler,’ p. 2,1931.
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recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in 
admitting expert testimony from the discovery, development and experiments thus far 
m ade/310 Golan points to the fact that the court did not provide any guidance as to how the 
‘particular field’ in which detection o f deception tests belonged was to be defined. 
Moreover, the court did not furnish any references as to the physiological and psychological 
authorities on which it had based its decision. Rather, Marston was a well-recognized 
authority in his field, providing impressive accuracy rates in his research. Furthermore, at 
that point, the field itself was small — in addition to Marston, Larson, Burtt, and Troland 
and a few others with an interest in the field could be counted. Golan takes a survey that 
was sent to 88 members o f the American Psychological Association in 1926 by C.T. 
McCormick to be representative o f  views o f  expert psychologists on lie detection at the 
time. 38 members replied, out o f which 18 psychologists agreed with the statement that the 
polygraph examination was advanced enough to be considered as a test o f the credibility o f 
the testimony o f a witness. 13 psychologists disagreed, while 7 were undecided.311 I f  one 
takes a closer look at their comments, two o f  those who were undecided and one o f those 
who thought lie detection evidence was not ready for court usage, were o f the opinion that 
test results should not be introduced without the testimony o f  experts. This suggests that, 
with qualifications, the number o f psychologists who were in favour o f court usage might 
be increased to 21.312 Thus there seemed little doubt, to put it in the Frye Court’s terms, as 
to the ‘thing from which the deduction is made’ in principle — only two psychologists 
voiced a general doubt as to the utility o f the method overall. Rather, opinions seemed to 
be dominated, first, by the conviction that only psychologically trained experts would be 
able to provide adequate interpretation o f the records, and second, by the feeling that 
further research might be done in a very promising area. As we will see, the question o f just 
what ‘psychological training’ entailed was to become one o f the central areas o f contention 
in the institutionalisation o f  polygraphy. Additionally, Golan interprets the emphasis on 
trained experts, the comments that lie detection evidence should not be considered as sole 
evidence, and remarks as to the questionable suitability o f the jury (and even judges) to 
assess such evidence as yet another indicator that what was at issue in the disputation o f  lie 
detection evidence was not the principles on which it was based, but rather concerns about 
the ‘credulous jury.’313
Lie detection experts generally seemed to share the views voiced by psychologists as to 
research and expertise in McCormick’s survey. In 1923, Larson stated that ‘[t]he present
3.0 Frye v United States 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013
3.1 Cf. McCormick (1927).
3.2 Ibid, p. 495-498.
3.3 Golan, 1997, p. 380.
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attitude o f the court suggests that it is too premature to attempt to secure court cognizance. 
Before such an attempt is made there is a necessity for much experimental work with 
thousands o f actual cases o f deception, which have been successfully dealt with. It will only 
be by the correlation and standardization o f thousands o f cases by experts using uniform 
technique that the time will be ripe for court presentation.’314 Keeler, was ‘alarmed and rather 
unhappy’ when another lie detection specialist, Orlando F. Scott, managed to have results o f 
an examination admitted in a lower court — one o f the rare exceptions to the general 
exclusion o f lie detection evidence.315 In a letter to Scott he wrote:
‘Frankly, 1 am exceedingly troubled over the possibility o f  the courts moving too swifdy in admitting 
such testimony. I have studied the method minutely for twelve years, and feel that I know the many 
pitfalls that may be and are encountered. The test is not infallible, and in the hands o f  the inexperienced, 
extremely unreliable. Hence, if  we push this type o f  evidence into our own courts o f  law, every “Tom, 
Dick and Harry” will build some sort o f  contraption that will be labeled “lie-detector,” then pass as 
qualified experts, and do an immeasurable amount o f  harm in the field.’316
As a solution to the problem o f unqualified experts Keeler set up a model o f  the 
conscientious polygraph operator and called for the licensing o f operators:
‘Yes, anyone can purchase medical instruments, but fortunately the state forbids him using them — even 
on dogs! And anyone can purchase or build a polygraph, or any other medico-legal apparatus and 
paraphernalia, but no one can prevent him from shouting aloud that he is an expert or prevent himfrom practicing on the 
unsuspecting public. Competent men o f  integrity must be carefully trained to conduct various types o f  
medico-legal examinations, and each should be backgrounded in the particular branch o f  the profession 
he is to practice. The legal psychologist must have a background o f  psychology, physiology, and the more 
basic sciences upon which they are founded before he starts his apprenticeship in the various legal- 
psychology practices. Some day, it is hoped, the state will license {but keep free from politics) medico-legal 
technicians today, but in the meantime it rests with the honor and integrity o f  each member to keep the 
profession purged o f incompetency and dishonesty.’317
This professed self-restriction o f lie detection specialists served the legitimisation o f lie 
detection as valid scientific practice. By announcing that more careful research into lie detection 
was needed and the competency o f polygraph operators to be assured, both Keeler and Larson 
asserted the scientific authority o f lie detection, albeit in quite different ways. As we will see in 
my discussion o f Larson’s and Keeler’s models of expertise below, their differing ways of 
legitimising lie detection can be seen as an expression o f their distinct approaches to lie 
detection which came to form the basis of a conflict that developed between them. While 
Larson stressed the scientific validation o f lie detection practices, Keeler stressed the training
314 Larson, 1923, p. 426
315 Keeler, however, was confident regarding his own expertise with regard to the introduction o f  lie detection 
evidence into court. In 1935, he testified in the Wisconsin court case State v. honiello and Grignano — arguably 
the first court case in which lie detection evidence was introduced (Inbau, 1935). The evidence could only be 
introduced on the basis o f  a stipulation by the defence and the prosecution in which both agreed to the use 
o f  the examination results in Keeler’s testimony regardless o f  their outcome (Inbau, 1935). In the exceptional 
cases in which lie detection evidence has been introduced as evidence into court proceedings it has been on 
the basis o f  a stipulation between the prosecution and the defence.
316 LKP, Carton 2, Folder Miscellany: Letter by Leonarde Keeler to Dr. Orlando F. Scott, 20/5 /1935 .
317 Keeler, 1934, p. 158-159.
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and individual conscientiousness o f members o f the growing profession. The competent 
polygraph operator was not only marked by his expertise but by his ‘honor’ and his ‘integrity’ in 
using it responsibly. In calling for the licensing o f polygraph operators, an external means by 
which professions legitimate themselves as such and set themselves off from the lay person’ 
(every ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’), Keeler drew on a professional model o f community-based 
scientific practice which had been set out in the Frye ruling. This demonstrated his optimism 
regarding the inclusion o f lie detection evidence in court, which was less concerned with its 
further validation but rather centred on its professional application.
By contrast, Larson was increasingly pessimistic regarding the inclusion o f lie detection 
evidence itself.318 Yet, in an indirect way, his self-restriction also served to legitimise lie detection 
as a valid scientific endeavour outside o f the court in the face o f the court’s rejection. For, in 
the meantime, there might be another benefit which could be derived from lie detection 
examinations. Larson stressed their benefit in criminal investigations not only in terms o f the 
value o f the records that could be amassed for purposes o f scientific validation, but also in 
terms o f their practical utility. He stated that while it was too early to have lie detection 
examinations admitted in court, ‘for the purposes o f practical police investigation the present 
deception test, or allied ones, are useful for not only may the necessary scientific data 
concerning the validity o f such a test be secured, but the public may be benefited by the solving 
o f cases and the elimination o f innocent persons.’319 The results o f these examinations would 
not concern the ‘legality o f the case, except indirectly where confessions result from the test.’320 
In establishing ‘objective norms’ for lie detection examinations, he suggested that in every 
criminal case an examination could be carried out so as to ‘include every possible type of 
experimental situation and every possible difference in human response,’ which could be 
labelled as to its ‘truth’ or ‘falsehood’ once the case had been ‘cleared’ — either by confession 
and/or other evidence.321
As I outlined when discussing the analyses o f Golan, Bunn and Alder above, there were two 
factors which contributed to the exclusion o f lie detection evidence in the Frye case and the 
implementation o f a new standard o f admissibility. First, lie detection evidence was excluded 
because o f the power that the lie detector exuded in reading the criminal’s mind from which the 
courts wanted to protect the credulous jury. Secondly, and maybe more significandy, lie 
detection evidence threatened to undermine the criminal justice process as such by usurping the
3.8 Nine years after Larson’s initial statement regarding the use o f  lie detection evidence in criminal proceedings, 
Larson and Haney were still o f  the view that ‘the cardio-respiratory technique affords valuable but not 
infallible criteria for practical use in deception tests, and is certainly not adequate for court usage’ (Larson 
and Haney, 1932, p. 1051).
3.9 Larson, 1923, p. 426.
320 Ibid, p. 426.
321 Larson, 1927, p. 668.
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jury’s function o f assessing the credibility o f the defendant and providing a direct answer to the 
question o f criminal guilt. Thus one could extend Gieryn’s notion o f boundary-work, which 
focuses on the resources scientists use to mark off the authority o f science from non-science. 
The institution o f the rule o f ‘general acceptance’ to reject lie detection evidence might likewise 
be interpreted as a form o f boundary-work. In this case, the courts — a non-scientific institution 
-  implemented a community-based conception of science, which allowed it to exclude lie 
detection evidence by circumventing the expertise o f the individual expert. This was 
undisputable in Marston’s case as well as regards the evaluation of the principles o f lie detection 
themselves, which again proffered impressive accuracy rates. Taking up Golan’s argument, in 
putting into practice a community-based conception o f science, the very indeterminacy of the 
diction that scientific evidence had to have achieved ‘general acceptance in the field that it 
belongs,’ availed the court with considerable interpretive leeway as to how a ‘field’ and ‘general 
acceptance’ were to be defined. In protecting its own working mechanisms that were threatened 
by lie detection, the court was thus enabled to legitimate the exclusion o f lie detection evidence 
and to assert authority over the types o f knowledge allowed to cross its boundaries.322 The 
general acceptance rule thus constituted a resource by which the system o f jurisprudence was 
able to assert its procedures for establishing judicial truth over and against potentially 
undermining ways o f elaborating scientific truth. This argument makes further sense 
considering that the courts were prepared to accord other forms o f scientific evidence — 
including evidence that was considered to be just as questionable as lie detection methods, such 
as handwriting, ballistics, or medical evidence323 — an ever-increasing role in the adjudication of 
court cases. In light o f the promising future that psychologists and lie detection specialists 
accorded lie detection evidence, we might wonder to what extent the development o f lie 
detection as a discipline contributed to the continued exclusion o f lie detection evidence from 
the courts. In the next section, I will therefore consider the work o f Alder more closely, for his 
analysis takes the practices o f the two central figures in the development o f lie detection, Larson 
and Keeler, as a starting point for the persistent judicial rejection o f lie detection evidence. His 
analysis is not only connected to an evaluation o f lie detection in relation to the courts, but 
opens out to a more general assessment o f the status o f lie detection as a scientific endeavour.
5.3 Disinterested science and the discretionary expert
In his work on the history o f lie detection, Alder provides a detailed evaluation o f the 
connection between different lie detection practices in the 1920s and 1930s and their public
322 Golan, 1997, p. 376-377.
323 Golan, 1997, p. 365; Alder, 2002, p. 21.
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and judicial reception. He frames his analysis in terms of two different strategies of 
knowledge production that were employed by two early lie detection specialists -  Larson and 
Keeler. In comparing their approaches to lie detection, Alder develops two heuristics to 
assess their practices: one was based on a model o f ‘open science’ and the other centred on 
the idea o f ‘proprietary knowledge.’ 324 He concludes that their approaches lead to a certain 
perception o f lie detection in the courts which occasioned its continued exclusion.
Alder’s ‘open model o f science’ achieves the status o f objective knowledge through the 
‘disinterestedness’ o f the scientist. This disinterestedness is engineered through ‘(1) norms 
that denounce venality and reward priority of discovery, (2) the public dissemination o f those 
discoveries in journals vetted by expert peers, and (3) meritocratic institutions that translate 
those assessments into a livelihood and the resources to continue research.’325 This type of 
knowledge production is further legitimised by the claim that it will yield useful knowledge. By 
contrast, the model o f proprietary knowledge is geared towards the generation o f ‘rents (or 
coercive power) from knowledge as it is substantiated in products or services, and this means 
holding that knowledge as private, so as not to dilute its market value.’326 This model is 
supported by mechanisms o f negotiating the keeping secret o f and the dissemination o f 
knowledge such as patenting which will at the same time ensure its marketability and thus 
secure continued investment in the production o f knowledge.327 Alder argues that while 
Larson pursued the strategy o f open science and Keeler pursued the strategy o f proprietary 
knowledge, these strategies were interdependent.
In following the strategy o f  ‘open science’, Larson published his findings on lie detection in 
academic journals such as the Journal of Experimental Psychology, the Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, and the Journal o f Criminal Caw and Criminology,328 In the 1920s, he worked 
on advancing lie detection as a scientific technique by arguing for the standardisation o f the 
method by means o f a double-blind analysis o f polygraph records and an extensive study o f 
the validity o f the technique on the basis o f cases that had been cleared up. As he continued 
his research, Larson became increasingly disenchanted with the scientific promise o f the 
technique. Instead, he sought to develop lie detection as a psychiatric technique creating the 
so-called ‘clinical team approach’ as part o f which a team consisting o f a psychiatrist, a 
medical expert and a lie detection specialist were to form an overall assessment o f the
324 There are three publications by Alder on the history o f  lie detection (Alder 1998; 2002; 2007). My analysis in 
this chapter has mainly drawn on the article published in 2002. While he equally discusses Larson’s and 
Keeler’s knowledge strategies in his recent monograph (Alder, 2007), the arguments o f  sociological relevance 
are already contained and most succincdy developed in his earlier publication. By contrast, the remainder o f  
the monograph is marked by a detailed coverage o f  cases in the history o f  lie detection and a focus on the 
personal histories o f  the two developers.
325 Alder, 2002, p. 12. Cf. Alder, 2007, p. 76-77.
326 Alder, 2002, p. 12.
327 Ibid, p. 12-13.
328 Cf. Larson (1921; 1922; 1923); Larson and Adler (1928); Larson and Haney (1932).
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criminal or patient. He called for restraint in the application o f the lie detection 
examination, arguing that it should not be used as a tool to extract confessions, and became 
increasingly critical o f the lie detection practices carried out by Keeler.329 Towards the end 
o f his life he referred to lie detection as a ‘Frankenstein’s monster,’ which he had created 
and that had taken on its own nature in Keeler’s and others’ hands and which he had fought 
for over 40 years.330 At the same time, Larson earlier acknowledged Keeler’s efforts to 
develop a standardised instrument for the detection o f deception.
Keeler, on the other hand, followed the strategy o f ‘proprietary knowledge.’ As we saw in 
chapter 4, he developed the first instrument specifically geared towards lie detection -  the 
polygraph -  for which he secured a patent in 1931 and commercialized it as ‘Keeler 
Polygraph.’ While Alder points to Keeler’s agreement with the manufacturer that each sale 
was subject to his approval in order to prevent it from being sold to untrained individuals 
who could endanger the reputation o f lie detection, he stresses that Keeler abandoned the 
restriction on sales once the patent had expired and established a training program for 
operators instead. As part o f this program, individuals were trained in lie detection in 
(merely) two-week or six-week courses.331 Additionally, Keeler actively exploited the media 
attention that was accorded to the polygraph. His marketing o f the polygraph examination 
helped foster the popular belief in the efficacy o f the ‘lie detector.’ Moreover, by contrast to 
Larson, who worked on the improvement o f the lie detection examination as a diagnostic 
technique, Keeler devised the polygraph examination in such a way that it was based on 
intimidation and deception o f the suspect by means o f the lie detector and deceptive 
questioning techniques.
Alder singles out the so-called card test which Keeler used in polygraph examinations. The 
card test was (and is) carried out at the beginning o f the examination. As part o f the test, the 
subject was told to choose a card from a deck o f cards. The entire deck o f cards was then 
shown to the subject and the subject instructed to reply ‘no’ each time the examiner asked the 
subject whether the relevant card was the one that he had chosen. On the basis o f the 
polygraph record, the examiner then told the subject, which card he had picked. In Alder’s 
interpretation, this test was a means o f tricking suspects into producing a lying response 
which could be compared with other responses during the examination. Moreover, it 
functioned as a means o f persuading subjects o f the efficacy o f the examination, thereby 
enhancing the subject’s fear of being caught.332 As the lie detection examination worked on 
the basis o f registering the subject’s fear on the polygraph chart, the heightening o f the
329 Alder, 2002, p. 14; 20-21.
330 Alder, 2007, p. 249.
331 Alder, 2002, p. 14.
332 Alder, 2002, p. 15; Alder, 2007, p. 82-83.
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subject’s fear resulted in an increased chance o f the subject actually being caught. For this 
reason, Keeler’s organisation o f the polygraph examination turned the polygraph examiner 
into a ‘discretionary expert:’
‘Indeed, the lie detector exam, at least as Keeler devised it, ultimately operated according to the same 
logic as the ancient regime's practice o f  judicial torture: both were held up as the most reliable means 
o f  extracting a confession, itself held to be the most reliable information about culpability. The 
polygraph examiner knows that a confession is the only sort o f  outcome that will hold up in a court o f  
law. And the examiner is allowed to use deception to get it. The polygraph thereby becomes a method 
o f  tricking and intimidating a suspect to testify against himself. This is why the police have ultimately 
welcomed the technique. N ot only did Keeler make the lie detector into an instrument that almost 
anyone could operate, even a minimally trained police officer, but because o f  the way he conceived o f  
its operation, it actually enhanced the discretionary power o f the examiner, who was less interested in 
the polygraph record per se than in using the process to intimidate the subject into confessing — which 
was (please recall) the only sort o f  lie detector evidence acceptable in court during the post-Frye era.333
In this account o f Keeler’s polygraph examination, Alder implicitly opposes the generation o f 
knowledge and the power effects which it institutes. Larson’s attempt at a ‘scientific’ conception 
o f lie detection which seeks to conform to physiological and psychological discourse is opposed 
to Keeler’s ‘rogue’ methods. These methods turn the polygraph examination from a technique 
o f knowledge production, which might be problematic but is nevertheless geared towards 
scientific approval, into a torturous practice o f deception and intimidation which is geared 
towards extracting confessions and based on commercial profit. Alder concludes that the 
continued rejection o f lie detection evidence results ‘not simply from Larson’s assertion that lie 
detection was “unscientific,” but from the success of Keeler’s brand o f salesmanship’ and 
suggests that polygraph examinations remained excluded from the courts on the basis o f ‘the 
sort o f lie detector — and examiner — that emerged in the United States.’334
In the next section, I would like to retrace some o f the steps which Alder has taken in the 
construction o f his analysis by exploring the different routes taken by Keeler and Larson. I 
will also provide an account o f the conflict which developed between Larson and Keeler, 
which led Larson to condemn Keeler’s branch o f lie detection. This discussion will provide 
a basis on which (in section 5.5) to begin raising questions regarding Larson’s and Keeler’s 
practices and the polygraphy that emerged on the basis o f these practices. In addition, we 
can problematise Alder’s assessment o f ‘the sort o f lie detector’ — or rather the ‘sort o f lie 
detection’ -  which developed in the United States.
5.4 Larson and Keeler
Before moving the discussion on, let me briefly recapitulate on the foregoing chapters. Larson 
had come to the Berkeley Police Department in 1920 in relation to his work on fingerprint
333 Alder, 2002, p. 16.
334 Ibid, p. 22.
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identification. Having become interested in lie detection through Marston’s work with the 
discontinuous method, he had his own instrument assembly set up and developed his own 
questioning technique (see Chapters 3 and 4 above). Using the examination set-up in the 
solution o f actual criminal cases, Larson experimented with the technique between 1921 and 
1923.335 As a high-school student, Keeler had started spending time at the Berkeley Police 
Department where he was introduced to lie detection methods. When August Vollmer, the 
head o f the department and one o f the major figures in the movement for police 
professionalization, was called to Los Angeles to reform the Los Angeles Police Department in 
1924, Keeler accompanied him in order to carry out detection o f deception tests there. As we 
discussed in chapter 4, with the help o f the physiologist Hiram Edwards and under the auspices 
o f his psychology professor Walter Miles at Stanford (where he secured an A.B. degree in 
psychology in 1930) Keeler developed his own instrument for which he secured a patent in 
1931. This instrument was subsequently manufactured by Western Electro-Mechanical 
Company as the ‘Keeler Polygraph.’336
Having left the Berkeley Police Department in 1923, Larson worked as Experimental 
Psychologist at the Institute for Juvenile Research and in the Illinois Department o f 
Criminology in Chicago for four years.337 During this time, he also trained as a psychiatrist, 
which was to become his occupation for the rest o f his professional career. While working at 
the Institute for Juvenile Research, he continued research into lie detection methods, applying 
them as a criminologico-psychiatric technique. As a ‘substitute for the orthodox 
psychoanalytical method,’ 235 children with ‘behavior difficulties’ were examined at the home 
detention branch o f the Juvenile Court out o f which 113 had been referred because of 
‘problems revolving about deception,’338 and were tested as to other possible ‘complexes.’ 
Larson held that one o f the problems in psychiatric examinations involving delinquencies was
335 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson, ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects 
o f drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.),’ p. 9, 
1958.
336 In 1939, Keeler ended the contract with Western Electro-Mechanical Company. He was dissatisfied with the 
quality o f  instruments, a lot o f  which, according to him, suffered from mechanical defects (LKP, Carton 2, 
Folder L.K. Business Matters: Letter to W.J. Foster, Western Electro-Mechanical Company, by Leonarde 
Keeler, 26/4/1939). He entered into a new agreement with the manufacturer Associated Research Inc. in 
Chicago, The company produced two models o f  the Keeler Polygraph. Model 301 was based on Keeler’s 
original instrument, while a galvanometer was added to the new Model 302 (cf. LKC, Box 49, Folder 1059, 
Box Vol. 3, and Binder 5 for instruction manuals). Keeler’s dissatisfaction with the quality o f  instruments 
produced did, however, not disappear (cf. LKP, Carton 2, Folder L.K. Business Matters: Letter to James 
Inman, Associated Research Inc., by Leonarde Keeler, 15/4/1941).
337 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson, ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects 
o f  drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.),’ p. 9, 
1958.
338 Larson and Haney, 1932, p. 1054-1055.
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the establishment o f the true state o f the individual so that a proper treatment could be devised. 
The identification o f the mental state o f the individual could involve detecting lies about 
delinquencies, the detection o f malingering o f individuals feigning mental illness, and the 
identification o f complexes pointing towards mental conditions such as psycho-neuroses. The 
use o f the examination could even allow the establishment o f the gradation of mental 
abnormality through the distinction between the self-deception apparent in the complexes o f 
psychoneurotics and the hallucinations o f psychotics.339 Arguing that ‘actual experience’ had a 
‘quality o f reality’ which ‘sets a standard for matching belief,’ Larson maintained that in cases of 
psychoneurosis an individual (‘because o f fear or desire’) would build up a belief whose lack o f 
the ‘quality o f reality’ he would be aware of, ‘however dimly at times.’ This awareness would 
translate into physiological reactions in the examination. By contrast, psychotic individuals 
suffering from genuine hallucinations would regard their beliefs, however objectively false, as 
‘real experiences,’ thus producing no changes in their records.340
Additionally, Larson carried out a study among 500 inmates at Joliet Penitentiary, an Illinois 
prison, who had denied their guilt. Again, he stressed the utility of the lie detection examination 
in the diagnostic work o f the psychiatrist. The prison psychiatrist was confronted with the 
problem of ‘involuntary patients’ who had not approached the psychiatrist for help, coupled 
with ‘deliberate evasions which are ingrained in the habitual criminal.’341 The criminal who was 
‘perfected in deception’ would appear to be honestly seeking the psychiatrist’s rapport only for 
his own gain, e.g. securing parole. Since the psychiatrist was ‘handicapped by a lack o f time’ but 
the ‘sorting o f truthful statements from evasions and falsifications has a direct bearing on the 
effectiveness o f the psychiatric approach,’ the lie detection examination provided a quick and 
objective method o f assessing the truthfulness o f the subject and to ‘differentiate between 
malingering and true mental disorders, whether psychosis or psycho-neuroses.’342 Furthermore, 
in assessing a prisoner’s progress, he could be examined as to whether he was honestly striving 
for betterment, or whether he was ‘merely biding his time, assuming an appearance of 
willingness and cooperation as a cover for anti-social sentiments and evasion o f 
responsibility.’343
While Larson continued testing prison inmates, he extended the use o f lie detection in the 
assessment o f ‘complexes’ beyond the testing o f children to other mental patients. Additionally,
339 Larson and Adler, 1928, p. 364.
340 Ibid, p. 364.
341 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 16: Draft o f  John A. Larson and Herman M. Adler (1925) ‘A Study o f  Deception in 
the Penitentiary,’ p. 6, 1925. This was that was later published in the Institution Quarterly o f  the Illinois 
Department o f  Public Welfare, Illinois. 117 prisoners who claimed to be innocent were interviewed. 16 
refused to take the test. 2 records indicated innocence, whereas the guilt in other cases seemed to be 
confirmed on the basis o f the records.
342 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 16: Draft o f  John A. Larson and Herman M. Adler (1925) ‘A Study o f  Deception in 
the Penitentiary,’ p. 6,1925.
343 Ibid, p. 29.
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he developed a system for the classification o f records for lie detection examinations.344 In 
Larson’s application, the lie detection examination assumed a different scope than in criminal 
investigation. As I pointed towards in chapter 4, while in criminal investigation the 
establishment o f guilt became the singular aim of the lie detection examination, in Larson’s 
application it assumed a dual status in criminal as well as psychiatric assessment as partly still set 
within an academic discourse which was geared towards the analysis of human types rather than 
exclusively focused on the lie.
In the meantime, Keeler had also come to Chicago to work for the Institute for Juvenile 
Research, and in 1930 was employed by the newly founded Scientific Crime Detection 
Laboratory (SCDL), the first crime detection laboratory in the US. He continued working 
there until 1938, when the financially strained Laboratory was sold to the Chicago Police 
Department and before opening his own business.345 While working at the Institute for 
Juvenile Research, Keeler tested inmates who denied their guilt at Joliet Penitentiary as well.346 
His work at the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory mainly involved the use o f lie 
detection methods in criminal investigations (and later in personnel screening), and although 
the position was intended as a research position, most o f his time was taken up by criminal 
case work which constituted an important source o f income for the struggling laboratory. In a 
much more limited fashion than Larson, Keeler experimented with the possibility o f using 
polygraph records in the diagnosis o f mental illnesses. In 1930 he examined 100 mental 
patients at the U.S. Veterans Hospital in Palo Alto on the polygraph, drafting a research paper 
with his collaborator Gertrude Baker347 and subsequently reporting on his findings at a
344 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson, ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects 
o f drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.),’ p. 11, 
1958.
345 As elaborated in Chapter 4, the funding o f  the laboratory was a constant concern resulting in its sale to the 
Chicago Police Department in 1938. After its sale, Keeler was not retained by the SCDL. Rather he was 
offered a one-year contract by Northwestern University. Keeler had been one o f the central members o f  the 
laboratory, acting as its unofficial director for some time. This throws up the question to which extent 
politics were involved in his non-retention. Instead, Fred Inbau who had also worked on methods o f  lie 
detection at the laboratory became its new director before taking up a position as law professor at 
Northwestern University. As there was no assurance on the part o f  the University that the contract would be 
renewed, Keeler stated that while he wanted to devote himself to full-time research he was worried that he 
would lose his case contacts and asked for a half-time professorship (LGP, Box 18, Folder 6: Letter to Leon 
Green by Leonarde Keeler, 8 /8 /1938). The Dean o f  the Law School, although originally wanting Keeler to 
work full-time recommended that his wish o f  half-time employment be fulfilled (LGP, Box 18, Folder 6: 
Letter to Franklin Bliss Snyder by Leon Green, 18/8/1938). Subsequently, Keeler did not continue his 
association with the university but rather focused on expanding his private business.
346 Keeler, 1932b, p. 743.
347 LKC, Box 45, Folder 1012: Leonarde Keeler and Gertrude Baker, ‘Application o f  the Aneroid Polygraph to 
Abnormal Psychology,’ 1930. Cf. also LKP, Carton 1, Folder Material Pertaining to Training Courses: 
Leonarde Keeler, F.T Flood, and C.G.Martin, ‘Respirations in the Psychotic Compared with Those o f  
Normal Individuals,’ n.d. This four-page typewritten paper elaborates on the differences and similarities 
between normal and ‘psychotic’ individuals.
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meeting o f the Chicago Medical Association, probably in 1931.348 Additionally, Keeler 
obtained permission to secure records from 150 mental patients during a visit to the Mayo 
Clinic in Rochester, MN in 1934.349 Ultimately, however, his focus lay in the application o f lie 
detection in criminal cases.350
Although Keeler and Larson were in regular contact, the former often giving advice to the 
latter, Larson became increasingly critical o f Keeler’s conduct o f lie detection examinations. 
In a letter to Vollmer dated April 24, 1931, Larson asked Vollmer ‘to use whatever influence 
you have on Leonarde.’351 Larson stated that ‘unfortunately Leonarde hadn’t gone over too 
well with the scientists because they look on him as a clever technical operator only, but one 
who has not had sufficient controlled academic training.’352 Larson was worried about how 
Keeler presented the lie detection method in public demonstrations — in order to show its 
working principles Keeler used the card test explained above, which Larson considered an 
inadequate method o f demonstrating the working principles o f lie detection, representing a 
method outside o f ‘the realm o f scientific experimentation.’ 353 To prevent lie detection 
research falling into disrepute, Larson asked Vollmer to talk to Keeler and ‘hold him down to 
getting formal training, preferably his M.D. because if he goes out for his Ph.D. he probably 
will not receive enough of the fundamental sciences [...].>354 N ot only Keeler’s lack o f formal 
training, but his research practices too, did not go down well with Larson. He argued that 
Keeler did not credit people who had collaborated with him in his publications or in his talks, 
and that getting a patent on an instrument contradicted common practice in physiologists’ 
circles.355
Meanwhile, Keeler had developed new avenues for the application o f lie detection 
examinations. In 1929, he wrote to Vollmer that his ‘foolish mind has been tossing about 
among the fleeting clouds again.’356 He had found that large department stores lost considerable 
amounts o f money each year due to employee thefts. He surmised that if polygraph operators 
were employed to examine employees, ‘lifters’ could be eliminated and ‘the fear o f the Lord’ be 
put in the remaining employees.357 As a result of the ‘weeding process and the psychological 
effect on all employees probably the enormous losses would be reduced some seventy-five per
348 Larson refers to the meeting and Keeler’s results in one o f  his articles (Larson and Haney, 1932, p. 1071).
349 AVP, Box 17, Folder 5 Keeler, Leonarde: Letter to August Vollmer by Leonarde Keeler, 19/3/1934.
350 In his exchange with his mentor August Vollmer, Keeler continuously re-iterated his plan o f  getting further 
medical training as well as writing a research monograph on his case work — the book never materialised 
(AVP, Box 17, Folder 5 Keeler, Leonarde: Letter to August Vollmer by Leonarde Keeler, 19/3/1934).
351 BPDR, Box 10, Folder Larson, John 1927-1932: Letter to August Vollmer by John Larson, 28 /4 /1931 .
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 BPDR, Box 10, Folder Larson, John A. 1927-1932: Letter to August Vollmer by John Larson, 2 /7 /1931 .
356 CKP, Box 7, Folder Keeler Leonarde, 1913-1933: Letter to August Vollmer by Leonarde Keeler, 
17/12/1929.
357 Ibid.
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cent or more.’358 While the department stores would have to pay polygraph operators for their 
services, this would only account for a small proportion o f the funds saved through the 
prevention o f employee thefts. Keeler’s enterprising spirit made for even bigger plans: I f  the 
business proved to be a success, branch offices would be opened in all major U.S. cities. Once 
the business had grown to allow for further expansion a research laboratory and a 
criminological school could be founded to ‘be used solely for the study o f various sciences as 
direcdy related to crime.’359 The laboratory and the school would be funded by the commercial 
enterprise.
The use o f lie detection examinations in personnel screening proved successful — the first 
customer was to be a bank. By 1933, the polygraphers o f the SCDL had examined 919 
employees in 37 banks. The use of the polygraph in banks was considered so successful that in 
December 1932, a major bank insurance company, Lloyd’s, decided to lower their premium for 
banks that agreed to have regular polygraph screenings.360 The use o f lie detection examinations 
in personnel screening was to initiate a new function for the lie detection examination, which I 
will discuss in the next chapter: the polygraph was no longer to be used only in criminal 
investigations but became a tool in the disciplining of employees. It became a ‘moral 
technology.’
After Keeler had started the sale o f  his polygraph and commercialised lie detection 
examinations by extending them to personnel screenings at the SCDL in the early 1930s, 
Larson turned away from Keeler. In a letter to Vollmer dated June 2, 1951, Larson claimed 
credit for being the first to have developed the detection o f  deception technique. He argued 
that no significant advances had been made by operators such as Keeler who focused on 
developing and marketing their own machines. Moreover, he stated that he had finally 
broken with Keeler in Illinois ‘because I could not agree with his commercialization and he 
did not go ahead, as agreed, for further basic training after receiving his A.B.’361 The lack o f 
formal training -  not only as far as Keeler was concerned but also among the growing 
community o f police polygraph operators -  became a central pillar o f Larson’s criticism o f 
Keeler’s lie detection practices.362 As Alder states, when Keeler set up his own business in 
1939, which he registered as Keeler, Inc. in 1940,363 and as, his patent had expired, he 
commercialised the training o f polygraph operators by offering two- to six-week training
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
360 LGP, Box 17, Folder 2: Calvin Goddard ‘Report o f  the Director. Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory’ 
1932. Cf. also LGP, Box 18, Folder 4: Letter by Calvin Goddard to William Dyche, 11/1/1933.
361 AVP, Box 18, Folder Larson,John 1930-1951: Letter to August Vollmer byjohn  Larson, 2 /6 /1951 .
362 The account o f  Larson’s criticisms is based on a series o f  different early drafts to be found in the John 
Larson Papers, which were intended as a basis for a revised edition o f  his monograph hying and Its Detection 
originally published in 1932 (cf. especially JLP Carton 1, Folders 3 ,4 , and 5).
363 Matte, 1996, p. 25.
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courses. Again, most o f the trainees were police officers. To Larson this was unacceptable — 
in his view since 1930 ‘the country became overrun with unskilled operators and 
commercial salesmen who obligated the purchase o f the “machine” to expand several 
hundred dollars to take the course. The number o f operators o f these “lie boxes” has 
increased to several hundreds. The army and several universities have been giving courses 
without requiring preliminary clinical training.’364 In a letter to George Haney, with whom 
he had collaborated earlier but who was working for Keeler, Larson stated ‘I am working 
with medical groups to stop what, as far as I am concerned, is a racket.’365 
In March, 1938, a ‘Medico-Legal Symposium’ on polygraphy was organized in Detroit, at 
which Larson set out to ‘combat the non-scientiflc trends’ in polygraphy. 366 In his speech, 
Larson argued that
‘Most o f  the lay operators naturally are unfamiliar with the basic principles involved and are widely 
exploiting “machines.” They write chiefly for popular magazines or the newspapers and most o f  the 
articles are unscientific and uncritical, concentrating chiefly upon attempts to have “lie detector” records 
forced into judicial procedure without having any idea o f  the actual validity o f  the methods.*367
In summarizing his speech, Larson presented 14 points on lie detection (the Police Journal drew 
an analogy to Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points when publishing them) as part o f which he 
stressed that lie detection was a useful tool in preliminary investigations but should not be 
admitted as evidence or taken as sole basis for evaluating a suspect’s guilt. He stated that a 
study on the validity o f lie detection methods was in process, and called for what he would 
later refer to as the ‘clinical team approach’:
‘All deception tests should be a part o f  an analysis o f  the crime setting integrated with each individual 
personality analysis. Neither medical nor criminological training alone is a requisite but a combined staff 
consisting o f  the investigators, the examiner ideally with legal psychological training, and a psychologist 
and licensed physician or a forensic psychiatrist. These last three should be present throughout every 
examination.’368
Another Medico-Legal Symposium was held in Gary, Indiana in 1951 at which the 
‘International Society for Police Psychiatry and Criminology’ was formed. The aims o f  the 
association were to promote the clinical team approach in criminology and to develop 
standards o f  ethics and training among the members o f the association. An additional
364 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects 
o f  drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.)’, 1958.
365 LKP, Carton 2, Folder 15 L.K. Business Associates: Letter by John Larson to George W. Haney, 27 /6 /1939 .
366 JLP, Carton 4, Folder 22 Biography: John Larson [typewritten paper on his biography probably to form part 
o f  the draft o f  a new edition o f  his Lying and Its Detection, n.d.
367 JLP Carton 1, Folder 25 “The Lie Detector: Its History and Development”: John Larson T he Lie D etector 
Its History and Development,’ 1938. This is a typewritten draft o f  the speech given by Larson at the Detroit 
symposium which was subsequendy published as T h e Lie Detector: Its History and Development’ in the 
Journal of the Michigan State Medical Society in October 1938.1 could only secure a typed copy.
368 Larson, 1938, p. 11-12.
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symposium was held in 1953 at Logansport, Indiana.369 By contrast to the practices carried 
out by ‘non-clinical’ lay operators, Larson argued that virtually from the beginning, he had 
used a team approach which allowed for the comparison o f interpretations.370 In 1953, Larson 
sent an announcement through the APA mail pouch offering an ‘Orientation Training Course 
in the Detection o f Deception’ in which he intended to provide a ‘course to a clinical team- 
investigator, physician and psychologist.’371
T h e following announcement was published in a newsletter and distributed to every member o f  the 
American Psychiatric Association describing a non profit educational and research study.
D o c t o r  J o h n  L a r s o n  A n n o u n c e s  C o u r s e s  In  S c i e n i t i f i c  B a s is  O f  L ie  D e t e c t i o n  
A course o f  instruction designed to return lie detection to a scientific basis is announced by John A. 
Larson, M.D. superintendent, Logansport (Ind.) State Hospital, who pioneered routine usage o f  a test for 
deception.
Dr. Larson will use, in part, material previously published in scientific journals. [...] It is his belief that 
diagnosis o f  lying is a psychiatric function and his desire is to reestablish the polygraph as a scientific tool 
in the detection o f  deception and in psychiatric diagnosis.
Dr. Larson points out that “instead o f  the crude bluffing practiced by many operators without proper 
training, the ideal approach is through a team including a psychiatrist, psychologist, soda! worker and 
sociologist investigating cooperatively and reaching a conclusion following staff conferences.”
Dr. Larson will present training for such teams. Full information concerning the lectures and laboratory 
work, the faculty and arrangements may be obtained from him at Indiana State Hospital Logansport, 
Indiana/372
When only three interested individuals replied, the course was cancelled. In 1955, Larson sent 
out a questionnaire to polygraph operators in which he asked operators to provide statistics on 
their polygraph records — again he only received few replies.373 Larson’s efforts at ‘returning lie 
detection to a scientific basis’ using the clinical team approach seemed to have been in vain. 
Once Keeler had established the first training institution for polygraph operators, others 
followed suit. John Reid, who had worked for Keeler and been employed by the Chicago 
Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory (as the successor organisation o f the SCDL was 
called when it was sold to the Chicago Police Department in 1938) and trained as a 
polygraphist at the Keeler Polygraph Institute, set up his own consultancy (John E. Reid and
369 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 29 “Present Limitations and Possibilities o f  Deception Tests or So-Called Lie 
Detectors”: John Larson Present ‘Limitations and Possibilities o f  Deception Tests or So-Called Lie 
Detectors,’ 1951. Cf. also JLP, Carton 4, Folder 25 John A. Larson Clippings About 1947-1961.
370 Cf. JLP, Carton 1, Folder 4 Lying and Its Detection Draft 1932: John Larson [typewritten outline o f  the new 
draft o f  his earlier monograph Lying and Its Detection], n.d. In this draft Larson argues that the police officers 
that he worked with at the Berkeley Police Department functioned as lay control persons when interpreting 
the records and that he worked with collaborators who had Master’s degrees in psychology when he had 
moved to Illinois. It is questionable whether this constituted the ‘clinical team approach’ that he later 
advocated. Rather, it might be taken as a rationalisation for his later promotion o f  this approach.
371 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects 
o f  drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.),’ p.3, 
1958. For a copy o f  the course outline cf. JLP, Carton 2, Folder 2 Detroit Police Training School 1961.
372 For a copy o f  the questionnaire cf. JLP, Carton 2, Folder 3 Detroit Training School n.d.
373 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 3 Lying and Its Detection: Outline and Draft 1932: John Larson ‘Psychophysiological 
Laboratory in Police Departments, Clinics, Prisons and Mental Institutions with special reference to 
standardization, detection o f  complexes or resistances and removal o f  them (physiological reaction, effects o f  
drugs, changes in oxygen tension and use o f  apparatus combining hypnosis and sound stimuli.),’ p. 3,1958.
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Associates) together with a training institution called Reid College. Cleve Backster, who had 
been employed by the newly formed CIA in 1948 and had previously worked as an 
interrogation instructor for the US Counterintelligence Corps, received training in polygraphy 
at the Keeler Polygraph Institute in 1948. Backster was representative o f the increased 
involvement o f government agencies in polygraphy. N ot only was the application of 
polygraphy extended into matters o f national security. Additionally, government agencies 
started setting up their own polygraph branches and training institutions, which became 
major stakeholders in maintaining polygraphy. In 1959, Backster formed the National 
Training Center o f Lie Detection in New York City with Richard Arther, an associate of 
Reid’s. However, their different approaches to lie detection soon resulted in a conflict which 
led Backster to establish a competing school, the Backster School o f Lie Detection, in 1962.374 
I f  we recall the discussion in chapters 3 and 4, the early figures in the detection o f deception 
(such as C.G. Jung, Wertheimer and Klein, Hugo Miinsterberg, and Troland and Burtt) had 
all been psychologists working within academic institutions. Larson and (to some extent) 
Marston were transitional figures. While they were working within the frame o f the 
academically trained psychologist (in Marston’s case) and the academically trained physiologist 
and psychiatrist (in Larson’s case), they, and most notably Larson, became increasingly 
embroiled in the development o f lie detection and the establishment o f its field o f application. 
By contrast, as the discipline developed into a separate profession, most polygraph operators, 
as well as leading figures in the development o f polygraphy, mainly had a background in 
interrogation but not necessarily a background in academic psychology. These were police 
officers, other law enforcement officials or private operators offering their services in criminal 
investigation and personnel screening. Thus, as polygraphy instituted itself as a separate 
discipline, it became increasingly disconnected from the institutional and disciplinary 
background within which it had developed and formed its own professional basis — as we saw 
above with the disapproval of Larson.
In addition to training institutions, professional associations started to form. The aim o f such 
associations was to advance lie detection techniques, implement standards o f ethics and 
qualifications, and to represent lie detection practitioners. One o f the first associations was 
the ‘International Society for the Detection o f Deception’ formed by Leonarde Keeler and 
other lie detection specialists in 1947 375 The association was renamed into ‘Academy for 
Scientific Interrogation’ in the early 1950s. In 1952, the academy formed a ‘Certification
374 Matte, 1996, p. 41-43.
375 AVP, Carton 6, Folder 3 Miscellaneous: International Society for Detection o f  Deception Bulletin, Vol. 1, 
N o. 1, August 1948. The idea o f  a professional association was developed by Keeler, Reid, Haney, Trovillo 
and others while employed to screen German Prisoners o f  War by the US Government in 1945 (LKP, 
Carton 2, Folder 27 Miscellaneous correspondence and biography: V. Stevens [Keeler’s secretary] ‘History,’ 
n.d.).
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Committee/ which was to implement qualification standards in the field by testing and 
certifying lie detection specialists with a view towards building the profession and 
marginalising untrained operators.376 In 1966, the American Polygraph Association, the largest 
professional association in polygraphy was founded, which in 1988 had certified 30 polygraph 
schools spread across US American states and had about 3000 members.377 Today, there are 
polygraph associations in all US States and 28 state licensing boards.378 However, the 
certification o f professionals through an external body such as the state and specific 
legislature, which lends a profession further authority, was never fully implemented in the 
case o f polygraph examiners. For this reason, uncertified polygraph examiners can still 
operate in a range o f states.
As regards the further development o f polygraphy as a ‘scientific’ technique, two different 
strategies were followed which, respectively, drew on an experimental and a psychological logic. In 
1947, Reid introduced the so-called comparative response question — now called ‘control 
question technique’ — into lie detection. In trying to control for the possibility that the 
innocent might appear as guilty because o f his fear o f the examination rather than because o f 
his lies, known ‘true’ answers and potentially mendacious ones were additionally to be 
compared with known (or what polygraph examiners conceived o f  as highly probable) ‘lying’ 
responses. Thus an individual might be asked whether he had ever stolen anything or whether 
he had ever lied, on the assumption that even the ‘honest’ citizen would have committed a 
minor transgression in their lives. The assumption was that the innocent would fear that a 
straightforward answer would reflect badly on him, while the guilty would be more concerned 
about the actual crime. Thus, lying responses could be compared and the innocent and the 
guilty told apart. Over time, different versions o f possible ‘control questions’ were developed 
in the attempt to mirror the experimental control situation o f the psychological experiment.379 
A second movement aimed at rendering the interpretation o f polygraph records ‘objective’ by 
disciplining the polygraphic observer: the qualitative interpretation o f the graph’s curves was 
to be replaced with ‘a single prediction number.’380 For while ‘[t]he idea o f mere numbers 
determining whether a person is guilty or not can seem too cold and too simplified, [...] 
numbers are the inevitable basis o f science. Therefore, if polygraphy was to progress, it had 
‘sooner or later change from the art o f polygraph reading to the scientific estimation o f the 
probability o f guilt.’381 O n this basis, the physiological responses were to be correlated and a 
numerical estimation o f deceptiveness obtained. As part o f this movement, from the 1960s,
376 Steel, 1958, p. 43-44.
377 Levey, 1988, p. 75.
378 American Polygraph Association, “http://www.polygraph.org/statelicensing.cfm” (20/2/2007).
379 Reid, 1947, p. 544.
380 Hathaway and Hanscom, 1958, p. 112.
381 Ibid, p. 112.
129
Backster developed a ‘numerical* approach which sought to exclude the ‘subjective* 
assessment o f the polygraphist by making the evaluation o f the polygraph chart the only basis 
for lie detection. Backster devised a special technique — the ‘Backster Zone Comparison 
Technique* -  on the basis o f which physiological responses were compared and quantified 
across the chart rendering an ‘objective* analysis o f the examination subject’s truthfulness by 
means o f an overall numerical score. By supplying rules as to how different types o f questions 
were to be scored in relation to each other, Backster sought to provide a standardised 
technique to be applied across examiners, which could, in turn, serve for the validation of lie 
detection.382
Developing a technique by which the operators would be collectively socialised into ‘seeing’ 
and ‘counting* in the same way, and thus to supply the same results regardless o f the 
individual examiner, constituted a further attempt to make the polygraph examination 
conform to a psychological logic o f testing — in this case the notion o f reliability. I f  polygraph 
examiners could show that they arrived at the same results independently o f the individual 
examiner, and furthermore that their analysis was rendered in quantitative terms, then the 
knowledge that they produced could be counted as ‘objective.’
Backster’s efforts continued along a ‘global’ or ‘clinical’ approach for a while: his earlier 
associate Arther, following Reid’s model, continued a version o f polygraphy which stressed 
an overall assessment o f the behaviour o f the examination subject. In this format, the role o f 
the polygraphist resembled that o f a skilled individual interpreter who took on the role o f a 
hermeneutician in interpreting the script by drawing on the subject’s overall behaviour. 
However, as polygraphy developed the movement towards quantified approaches became 
increasingly stronger.383 The development o f the ‘control’ question, as well as the 
development o f an increasingly quantified approach to polygraph examinations, testifies to 
the ongoing effort to construct the scientific authority o f polygraph examinations on the basis 
o f psychological practices.
382 Matte, 1996, p. 42-43; Abrams, 1989, p. 5; Lykken, 1981, p. 32.
383 From the 1980s, statistical models as opposed to a simple quantitative reading o f  polygraph charts were 
introduced as part o f  the movement o f  polygraphy back into academia. Even software algorithms which 
provide an estimate o f  the deceptiveness o f  the record have been developed (cf. Olsen et a l, 1997). This 
denotes a shift in the conceptualisation o f  the polygraph examination. As I argued in Chapter 4, early lie 
detection specialists constructed the scientificity o f  lie detection on the basis o f the expertise o f  the 
individual examiner as a skilled diagnostician of the lie over and against the notion o f  the lie detector. In current 
developments, by contrast, polygraphy is moving towards legitimating its authority less on the basis o f the 
ability o f  the examiner to diagnose the lie, but rather on the basis o f  the ability of the instrument to compute it. In 
this respect, polygraphy, intriguingly, seems to approximate a representation o f  polygraphy that — 
analogously to the lie detector discourse — seeks to construct its scientificity on the ability o f  the ‘machine’ to 
detect the lie independently o f  the examiner. This is in order to deflect the charge o f  ‘subjectivity,’ which is 
enlisted as one o f  the main arguments o f  the proponents o f  an alternative technique to detecting guilt — the 
so-called ‘guilty knowledge test.’ The contestation o f  polygraphy and the development o f  alternative methods 
will be covered in Chapter 7.
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Thus lie detection experts were indeed able to establish polygraphy as a profession. From the 
late 1930s, specialised training institutions were opened and professional associations founded 
which certified members and aimed for the standardisation o f polygraph practice based on 
standards that were being developed internally within the discipline. Polygraphists either 
operated as private investigators offering their services to commercial and law enforcement 
institutions, or were based at police departments or government agencies such as the 
Department o f Defence or the Department o f Energy. Their practices continued largely 
independently o f academic involvement up until the 1970s.
5.5 Two Models of Expertise
At this point in the discussion we could draw two conclusions. Going back to Golan’s 
analysis, which showed how the admissibility o f scientific evidence became subject to 
regulation and emulated a community-based model o f scientific practice, we might note that 
even though polygraphy underwent a process o f professionalization it nevertheless remained 
excluded from the criminal courts. This conclusion would appear to support his argument 
that the exclusion o f lie detection evidence from the courts was due to the nature o f the 
evidence that it represented and the dangers that its acceptance posed to the organisation o f 
the court system. By providing a direct assessment o f the question o f the individual’s guilt or 
innocence, the evidence o f the lie detection expert thereby threatened to replace the status o f 
the jury as the only institution able to pass judgment on the guilt o f the accused. The very 
least that lie detection could do was to sway the opinion o f a jury that was overly ‘credulous.’ 
In implementing the rule o f ‘general acceptance’ the court thus engaged in boundary-work in 
order to protect its own functioning.
However, having examined Alder’s account o f the development o f lie detection methods, we 
could also conclude that the continued protection o f the ‘credulous jury’ by the criminal 
courts was due to the way in which polygraphy was professionalised. Rather than developing 
polygraphy within the realm o f controlled scientific (clinical) practice as Larson wished, 
polygraphy was turned by Keeler’s practices into an enterprise characterised by ‘consummate 
anti-professionals.’ Professional associations may have developed, such as the American 
Polygraph Association, which implemented standards o f qualifications and accredited training 
institutions. But these standards are not mandatory for polygraph operators, rendering 80% 
‘incompetent.’384 As a profession, polygraphy thus became marked by operators ‘who have 
deliberately shied away from even the most basic self-regulating norms and standards’385 and
384 Alder, 2002, p. 22.
385 Ibid, p. 22.
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who pose as ‘discretionary experts’ intimidating subjects in order to extract confessions.386 
Alder seems justified in pointing to the lack o f regulation o f polygraph examiners, which has 
continually created concern in different arenas: the public, the scientific, the legal and the 
polygraphic arena itself. However, we must not overlook the 20% o f  polygraph examiners 
who did abide by professional standards and who sought to further the scientific status o f 
polygraphy. As we saw above, the same issues which had preoccupied Larson, most notably 
the question o f training and the standardization o f polygraph practice, continued to shape the 
development o f polygraphy as a discipline. By devising means o f standardising techniques, 
polygraphists attempted to emulate psychological standards. Having developed largely outside 
the institutionalised academic realm until the 1970s, an academic interest in the physiological 
detection o f deception emerged among a group o f psychophysiologists who integrated 
developments in lie detection by hailing the ‘ingenious methods’ which had been developed 
by field workers in polygraphy.387 While polygrapy was (and is) keenly debated by another 
group o f psychophysiologists who disputed its scientific basis, its consideration by what 
would commonly count as ‘scientists’ complicates Alder’s picture o f the polygrapher as a 
‘consummate antiprofessional.’
I agree with Alder’s interpretation that the inability of polygraphists to establish themselves as a 
profession that regulates all its members on the basis o f integrated internal as well as external 
(e.g. state) systems of certification and training contributed to the continued exclusion o f lie 
detection evidence from the criminal courts. However, rather than framing this in terms o f a 
normative reading o f the polygraph operator as ‘consummate antiprofessional,’ I would like to 
qualify this interpretation. As we saw in my discussion of Golan, the professional model o f 
science only developed towards the end o f the 19th century and has since become the main 
organisational model by which scientific practice attains and legitimates its authority. The fact 
that polygraphy has not implemented this model as successfully as other disciplines — such as 
fingerprinting — provides another explanation for how the courts, which implemented this very 
model in the Frye decision, were provided with a further rationale to keep lie detection outside 
o f their boundaries. I f  framed in this way, however, the underlying assumptions o f Alder’s
386 Gross (2001) provides an interesting extension o f  this interpretation. In his article, he compares handwriting 
evidence, which remains a contested form o f  expertise in the courts but is nevertheless routinely admitted, 
with the continued rejection o f  polygraph evidence. He agrees with Golan’s interpretation that lie detection 
threatened to undermine the main competence o f  the jury, while handwriting expertise could be counted 
among other contested forms o f  evidence which did not interfere in the court’s judging processes. He sees 
the rejection o f  polygraph evidence as one o f  the potential causes o f  the development o f  polygraphy along 
the lines examined by Alder, and poses the hypothetical question whether polygraphy would have developed 
in a different fashion had it not remained excluded. While this question might be interesting in terms o f  
‘fictional history,’ I will take a different turn in investigating the knowledge/power mechanism o f  lie 
detection at the entry o f  the criminal justice system. For a history o f  how handwriting expertise as judicial 
evidence, cf. Mnookin (2001).
387 Podelsney and Raskin, 1978, p. 344.
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explanation must be changed: rather than taking the professional model as guarantor o f valid 
scientific knowledge at face value, it is transformed into a socio-historical interpretation o f how 
polygraphy lent itself to continual contestation and was less successful in legitimating its 
scientific authority on the basis o f how its practices were socially negotiated.
O n the basis o f these qualified agreements with Alder’s evaluation o f the status o f lie 
detection as scientific evidence, I would like to further problematise Alder’s normative 
account o f the development and scientific status o f polygraphy as a profession. Alder’s 
evaluation is facilitated by his construction o f the history o f lie detection in terms o f the 
opposition o f two of its main developers, Larson and Keeler. As I outlined above, Alder 
frames their opposition in terms o f two heuristics: He identifies Larson’s practices as 
corresponding to an ‘open model o f science,’ whereas Keeler’s practices are connected to the 
model o f ‘proprietary knowledge.’ The open model o f science is linked to the construction o f 
science as ‘disinterested’: a practice marked by norms which credits discoveries and sanctions 
personal gain, whose results can be checked publicly by publication in peer-reviewed journals, 
and which is set in meritocratic institutions. By contrast, the heuristic o f proprietary 
knowledge is associated with the production o f financial gain based on the protection o f that 
knowledge and (as Alder states in Keeler’s case) further gains in coercive power.
However, Alder’s use o f these heuristics is problematic in so far as they are based on a 
hierarchical conception o f knowledge. Intriguingly, Alder’s ‘open model o f science’ 
corresponds closely to a Mertonian view of science. In this model, science is conceived o f in 
terms o f the norms which guide scientists in generating ‘objective knowledge’: scientific 
knowledge is not subject to sociological investigation. Rather, the validity o f scientific 
knowledge is presupposed. Thus it is a sociology o f scient/>/r rather than o f science.388 
Additionally, those norms that are alleged to guide science are conceived o f  in terms o f a 
liberal model o f democratic process (and progress) — characterised by openness, 
disinterestedness and peer criticism, and geared towards the benefit o f the many rather than 
the one or the few. It is a model o f science which is devoid o f power relations, or rather, it 
makes it possible to explain the maintenance o f  types o f knowledge that are not considered
388 There are slight divergences between Alder’s model o f  open science and Merton’s norms o f  science — for 
example, the former includes the setting o f  scientific practice in meritocratic institutions, which the latter 
does not refer to. Yet Merton’s four social norms o f  science which function alongside technical and 
methodological rules to constitute a scientific social system are virtually identical with Alder’s model. They 
comprise: communism, meaning the mutual sharing o f  findings; universalism, denoting the evaluation o f  
knowledge by means o f  ‘pre-established impersonal criteria’; disinterestedness, i.e. the advancement o f  science 
for other than purely personal reasons; and organised scepticism, referring to making judgments only when 
sufficient evidence warrant them (Gieryn, 1995, p. 398-399). In connection to the more fundamental 
problem that this model does not allow for a sociological investigation o f scientific knowledge itself, 
sociologists have additionally criticised Merton in that he ‘tends to assume that the social system o f  science 
works as a system, that deviance is idiosyncratic, and that the social structure o f  science is [...] fundamentally 
stable’ (Restivo, 1995, p. 99).
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valid as resulting from (illicit) structures o f domination. By considering Larson’s version o f lie 
detection in this way, Alder accords Larson’s practices a scientific as well as normative 
authority by virtue o f the fact that they correspond more closely to the norms of what seem 
to him to be established scientific (in this case, psychological) practices. Rather than 
functioning as heuristic, the ‘open model o f science’ in conjunction with Alder’s description 
o f Larson’s apparent efforts at a scientifically valid lie detection examination in effect 
becomes a measure against which Keeler’s practices are evaluated. In this connection, the 
‘model o f proprietary knowledge’ then becomes the negative, illicit power-oriented counter­
part of Larson’s version of lie detection. Keeler is depicted as a profit-oriented individual who 
designed the lie detection examination in such a way that it became a means o f persuasion 
and intimidation for the simple purpose o f extracting confessions rather than a controlled 
technique geared towards the scientific evaluation o f polygraph charts. The quick commercial 
training o f operators in conjunction with the sale o f the polygraph testifies to Keeler’s greed 
rather than his aim to establish lie detection as a scientific technique. As a result o f this 
normative description, Larson’s approach is held to have been oriented towards the impartial 
and fair development o f the lie detection examination, which is decoupled from the effects of 
power that his version o f the lie detection examination might institute, while Keeler’s method, 
which forms the basis o f later developments in polygraphy, is seen as a ruthless and purely 
power-oriented, coercive technique.
If, however, we consider Larson’s practices by an equal measure as Keeler’s, the picture 
changes. This is not to dispute that Larson and Keeler followed different strategies in 
establishing their version o f lie detection. Rather, it is to argue that if one is to consider the 
development o f knowledge practices, it is problematic to introduce criteria o f evaluation. As 
I stated in my methodology chapter, it becomes necessary to investigate both the seemingly 
more or less acceptable or valid knowledge practice and how it seeks to legitimate itself. As 
the more recent sociology o f science and technology has shown, processes o f knowledge 
construction and legitimisation are always ‘interested.’ Instead o f opposing Larson’s and 
Keeler’s versions o f lie detection, then, we might take them as two different models o f lie 
detection. First, instead o f taking Larson’s criticisms o f Keeler’s and other polygraphers’ 
practices at face value as Alder seems to have done, one may consider them on the basis o f 
my extended account o f the conflict that developed between them. As a consequence, they 
become a resource in Larson’s attempts at legitimating his own version o f  lie detection 
rather than a disinterested and seemingly more valid approach to lie detection pushed aside 
by rogue and profiteering polygraph operators.
Secondly, in expanding on my analysis o f the reformulation o f lie detection in its move from 
the academic to the criminal realm, we can see how Larson’s and Keeler’s models corresponded
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to different conceptions o f elaborating knowledge and constructing expertise. This, in turn, 
provides an explanation for Larson’s failure to implement the clinical team approach. As I 
noted above, Larson represented a transitional figure in the development o f lie detection. On 
the one hand, as we saw in chapter 3, Larson developed the format of the lie detection 
examination on the basis o f which the simple lie emerged in the detection o f guilt. He was also 
the first to introduce lie detection to one o f its main institutions o f application: criminal 
investigation in police departments. On the other hand, Larson’s use o f the lie detection 
examination was mediated by his rootedness within an earlier model o f the assessment o f the 
criminal. As Bunn’s analysis o f the development o f the lie detector in chapter 4 showed, the 
early development of methods of lie detection by academic psychologists such as Jung and 
Miinsterberg was set within the construction and analysis o f the criminal as a certain 
pathological human type. Larson’s use o f the lie detection examination once he had left the 
police department in the assessment o f delinquent children at the Institute of Juvenile Research, 
mental patients and prisoners at the penitentiary is reminiscent o f this framework. Additionally, 
the training that he received -  securing a Ph.D. in physiology before his move to the Berkeley 
Police Department and training as a psychiatrist in the period following his appointment as 
police officer — more closely corresponded to the background o f the early figures in the 
detection o f deception. In Larson’s conception, the lie detection examination not only 
functioned as a means of constituting the guilt o f the criminal, but also formed the basis o f his 
psychiatric examination. As we saw in my description of Larson’s early application o f the lie 
detection examination, it could serve to establish the guilty subject’s lie, the psychoneurotic’s 
self-deception, and the psychotic’s insanity. Thus the lie detection examination was directed at 
the assessment o f abnormality in its different gradations from the criminal to the mentally ill 
coupled with a moral assessment. The lie constituted the starting point on a continuum which 
moved from criminality to mental illness, where at one end the lying criminal was mentally sane 
but morally deficient, and on the other end the psychotic was mentally insane but morally inept (for 
he had no sense o f reality). On the basis o f this assessment o f these types, an individualised 
treatment was to be directed at them. Equally, the ‘clinical team approach,’ which Larson later 
developed for criminal investigation was geared towards the establishment of the subject’s guilt 
in conjunction with an analysis o f his personality -  the type o f human being that the 
apprehended individual represented. Accordingly, his notion o f ‘scientific expertise’ was 
constructed around academic and especially clinical training which would enable the lie 
detection specialist not only to provide a diagnosis o f the subject’s lie but also to render a 
deeper analysis o f the individual. The broader clinical training of the expert was necessary in 
enabling him to detect all those different grades o f abnormality which defined the suspect as a 
particular type. In the clinical team approach, the clinically trained examiner was further to be
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supported by other academically trained experts — the psychologist, the sociologists, the 
psychiatrist or the physician — in providing an assessment o f the individual and elaborating 
measures for his treatment.
By contrast, in the lie detection examination as it came to be used by Keeler and those 
polygraph operators that were to follow him, the subject’s lie did not reach beyond the 
simple assessment o f guilt or innocence. Rather, in criminal investigation as practiced by 
police officers and polygraph operators, the establishment o f guilt became the singular aim 
o f the lie detection examination. It operated on the basis o f a simple binary classification, 
where the lie equalled guilt and truthfulness equalled innocence. This also meant that in this 
model the lie detection examination was no longer geared towards an understanding o f  the 
individual as a certain type o f human being to be intervened upon. The lie detection 
examination thereby assumed less depth in terms o f the knowledge o f the individual 
offender that it sought to gain. This was in line with scientific techniques o f criminal 
investigation more generally -  rather than trying to establish a ‘deeper’ reality of the crime 
or the criminal, as Valier argues, they were defined by an epistemology which was geared 
towards a more superficial and immediate establishment o f a link between the criminal and 
his deed,?s9 For example, a similar development occurred in the history o f fingerprint 
identification, where in its early period, the analysis o f fingerprints was not only used as a 
means o f identification, but ‘dactyloscophers’ sought to develop classifications o f mental 
abnormalities and thus to establish different human types on the basis o f analysing 
fingerprints.390 Yet as fingerprint identification became rooted in criminal investigation, 
fingerprints assumed their power as infallible evidence precisely because they could be 
taken as a unique but superficial link to identify a particular individual and took on no 
meaning in and o f themselves.391 The lie detection examination, o f course, made a much 
more ambitious claim in venturing that it could read the subject’s mind. However, as 
regards the status o f the individual within the examination, a similar movement occurred as 
with fingerprint identification -  a movement away from the classification o f human types 
and their individualised treatment on the basis o f this classification, to the simple 
establishment o f the guilt o f any individual. The more immediate epistemology which 
defined criminal investigation was translated into how ‘scientific’ expertise’ was constructed 
at police departments and institutions involved in criminal investigation.
As I discussed in the last chapter, as scientific methods o f criminal investigation were 
implemented at law enforcement institutions and spreading crime laboratories, new
389 Valier, 1998, p. 93.
390 Cole, 1999, p. 163.
391 Cole (2001).
136
functions emerged in the application o f various ‘scientific’ techniques. Its practitioners were 
not necessarily academically trained scientists but rather law enforcement officers who 
received specialised training or learned techniques through an apprenticeship.392 Thus, the 
form taken by their ‘scientific expertise’ resembled much more the one o f a technician 
versed in a specialised technique. In a similar vein, in Keeler’s model o f lie detection and 
how it became institutionalised in the further development o f polygraphy, the polygraph 
examiner was not an academically trained expert — he was also a police officer or individual 
with a background in interrogation. His training equally came to represent that o f a 
specialised technician. In training courses, future polygraph operators who had bought a 
Keeler polygraph could receive lectures on the history o f lie detection, its method, the 
instrument and on basic assumpdons about the emodonal concomitants o f deception, 
observe cases and practice the technique.393 As can bee gleaned from my quote on Keeler’s 
notion o f the expert as marked by honor and integrity in section 5.2 above, Keeler even 
likened the training o f the ‘legal psychologist’ to an apprenticeship.394 In following the logic 
o f an apprenticeship, his training was to be complemented by the experience which the 
polygraph operator gained in conducting polygraph examinations. Newly trained operators 
were advised to ‘use the technique experimentally for a period o f eight months or one year 
before venturing forth into actual case work.’395 The specialised training had been made 
possible through the production o f the instrument, the polygraph, which furnished 
polygraph examiners with a standard set o f equipment, the working mechanisms o f which 
operators did not have to know and which thus represented a ‘black box’ simply to be used
392 In this regard other areas o f  what now comes under the general heading o f  ‘forensic science,’ such as 
fingerprinting, document examination, or firearms identification, have followed the same route o f  
professional development as described with regard to polygraphy above. Experts in these areas are trained in 
specialised training courses and a focus is placed on the gaining o f  experience by means o f  apprenticeship 
with a supervisor or trainer. The development o f  these functions was closely connected to and set within the 
institution o f  governmental crime laboratories on the national, state and municipal level from the 1920s 
onwards (Dillon, 1977). Additionally, just as in polygraphy, specialised training institutions and courses were 
set up in close connection with governmental institutions as well as professional associations developed, 
such as the Association o f  Firearms and Toolmarks Examiners (AFTE), the Association o f  Forensic 
Document Examiners (AFDE), and the International Association o f  Identification (IAI). As part o f  the 
professionalisadon movement more graded training and certification measures have developed in these 
‘disciplines.’ For histories o f  fingerprint examination cf. Cole (1999; 2001). For an historical overview o f  
fingerprint examination, document examination and firearms identification within the movement towards 
‘scientific’ criminal investigation in the US, cf. Dillon (1977). Over time some general academic programmes 
in ‘forensic science’ have been instituted. The first institution to offer ‘criminalistic’ training was the 
University o f  Berkeley, which instituted a criminology programme on the basis o f Vollmer’s initiative in 1931 
(ibid, p. 200). However, the main focus in these programmes is the application o f  certain techniques 
borrowed from various sciences and translated into criminal investigation, i.e. the vocational training o f  
future evidence examiners. For a recent academic programme in ‘forensic science,’ cf. University o f  
Oklahoma, “Forensic Sciences.” http://www.healthsciences.okstate.edu/forensic/index.cfm (29/03/2007).
393 LKP, Carton 1, Folder 17 Material Pertaining to Training Courses: Leonarde Keeler, ‘Schedule for Training 
Course,’ 1946.
394 Keeler, 1934, p. 158-159.
395 LKP, Carton 2 Folder 3 L.K. Technique Policy Legal Status: Letter by Leonarde Keeler to E.T. Adams, 
Detroit Michigan, 26/11/1934.
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by them. Thus as polygraphy developed into a separate discipline it matched the immediate 
epistemology which marked criminal investigation and the way in which knowledge 
practices were organised in the construction o f ‘scientific’ expertise. By understanding 
Keeler’s model o f lie detection in terms o f the epistemological context to which it 
corresponded, it becomes more difficult to formulate a critique o f lie detection practices on 
the basis o f quick and commercial training measures as Alder does. This should become 
clearer if  we return to our comparison with the fingerprint examiner. He was a similar 
figure to the polygraph operator in terms o f the construction o f his ‘expertise.’ He was not 
an academically trained scientist but rather a police officer or private individual trained as a 
fingerprint examiner through apprenticeship or even through professionally organised and 
commercially run correspondence schools.396 And yet to this day, the fingerprint examiner is 
taken as providing expertise which is hardly dubitable.397
This model o f ‘scientific’ expertise was precisely Larson’s point o f attack when justifying his 
‘clinical team approach.’ In legitimating his approach he engaged in boundary-work which 
took three directions. Firsdy, Larson sought to enlist his academic background as physiologist 
and psychiatrist in establishing his ‘scientific’ authority in lie detection over and against the 
technical notion o f expertise implemented in polygraphy. In this, he took recourse to 
academic credentials, arguing that Keeler did not receive enough formal training and stating 
that scientists viewed him only as a clever technician. He thereby portrayed Keeler as not 
sufficiendy qualified by contrast to Larson himself, who held a Ph.D. in physiology and was a 
trained psychiatrist. This criticism was extended to other polygraph operators in terms of 
their lack o f clinical training and the swift training measures implemented by Keeler and 
(subsequendy) other institutions.
Secondly, Larson’s boundary-work centred on the general conduct o f polygraphers. He 
argued that the patenting and commercialisation o f the polygraph constituted a breach o f the 
code o f scientific practice. Generating a long list o f  different ‘graphs,’ Larson pointed out 
that the names o f physiological instruments referred to the diagnostic technique involved or 
carried the company name rather than the name o f  the principal developer o f the 
instrument. In this case, the naming o f instruments not only pointed to a failure to conform 
to established rules o f academic practice, which served to demonstrate that in contravening 
its norms, Keeler and other polygraphers were not to be counted as members o f the scientific
396 Cole, 1999, p. 159.
397 Cf. Cole (1998) for a discussion o f  how fingerprint examiners managed to construct and maintain the 
infallibility o f  fingerprint evidence. In more recent papers, Cole (2004; 2006) discusses current debates by 
fingerprint examiners to reshape their technique on the basis o f  probabilistic measures, moving away from 
the portrayal o f  fingerprint examination as technique to framing it as science. This results from the courts’ 
changed conception o f  scientific evidence centring on broader probabilistic understandings o f  science. This 
is illustrated by the emergence o f DNA-evidence as new form o f infallible evidence. Ironically this renders 
evidence that is constructed as ‘certain’ increasingly dubious.
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community. Additionally, it was geared to render their practices in terms o f a lack o f integrity. 
By giving their own names to instruments, polygraph operators demonstrated their economic 
self-interest and desire for publicity rather than an honest scientific motivation. This aspect o f 
Larson’s boundary-work thus sought to undermine their scientific expertise in terms o f a 
moral evaluation o f their conduct.
Thirdly, Larson’s boundary-work centred on the use and role of instruments designed for lie 
detection, which again entailed a normative evaluation o f polygraph operators’ practices. O n 
the level o f  instrumentation he undermined the quality o f Keeler’s polygraph. While, in 1927, 
he had still hailed Keeler for developing an instrument which provided more accurate 
readings, he subsequently argued that Keeler’s instrument not only had mechanical faults, but 
that the measuring principles established by Larson himself had not changed and thus no 
improvements were to be gained by novel instrumentation.398 In  Larson’s opinion, ‘[i]n this 
test just as in the electroencephalograph, electro-cardiograms and hundreds o f other 
graphic tests, the procedure is not determined by the modification o f a given apparatus but 
by the mode o f conducting the test.’399 In this he suggested that the polygraph operators’ 
design and use o f integrated technical equipment did not augment their role as experts but 
rather translated into a more general lack o f expertise not only regarding the status o f the 
measurements but with respect to their overall application o f the technique. This connected 
to his enlistment o f the notion o f the ‘machine’ as a rhetorical device in pointing towards 
polygraph operators’ lack o f competence. By arguing that they were using ‘machines’ or even 
‘lie boxes,’ he consciously alluded to the ‘lie detector’ as it was portrayed in the media. As we 
saw in chapter 4, lie detection specialists argued that there was no such thing as a ‘lie 
detector,’ but rather that lie detection was dependent on the interpretation o f  the trained 
expert. By suggesting that polygraph operators used the instrument ‘as i f  it were a lie 
detector, Larson portrayed them as charlatans lacking the expertise required in rendering a 
valid diagnosis o f the lie. In depicting this alleged practice as a ‘psychological third degree5400 
in the elicitation o f confessions from subjects, he again combined the undermination o f 
polygraphy as expertise with a moral evaluation by likening it to the violent and corrupt 
methods o f the old police force.
Lastly, his call for ‘technique controls’ further served to offset his own model as more 
scientific from Keeler’s model. Yet this in itself might be equally seen as a rhetorical strategy 
to undermine polygraphy, since as we saw in my narrative o f the development o f the
398 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 5 Lying and Its Detection Reprint 1963: John Larson [2 typewritten pages which 
formed part o f  a new draft o f  his earlier monograph Lying and Its Detectionj, n.d. and Larson, 1932, p. 268.
399 Ibid.
400 JLP, Carton 1, Folder 29 “Present Limitations and Possibilities o f  Deception Tests or So-Called Lie 
Detectors”: John Larson Present ‘Limitations and Possibilities o f  Deception Tests or So-Called Lie 
Detectors,’ p. 14,1951.
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discipline, polygraph operators ventured to implement the very same measures. Equally, 
Larson’s apparent caution and call for the validation o f lie detection on the basis o f 
preliminary investigations can be seen as forming part of his boundary-work by which he 
sought to construct the scientificity o f his own model of expertise through marking it off 
from polygraphy. His charge that polygraph examiners merely used the technique with the 
aim o f  extracting confessions, which provide the basis for judicial prosecution is relativised 
when we take into account his statement that when used in preliminary investigations, lie 
detection methods might serve the practical end o f the securing o f confessions, which could 
in turn be taken as means to verify the technique.
Thus in Larson’s apparently more scientific approach to lie detection, the aim of eliciting a 
confession cannot be disentangled from the construction o f its scientific validity. In the 
verification o f the accuracy o f the measurement o f the lie, it has to draw on judicial truth — 
the cleared case — the production o f which it mediates through the eliciting o f confessions. 
This is a conundrum which not only defines Larson’s endeavours at verification but have 
defined polygraphy’s attempts to legitimate itself as a scientific technique in its further 
development. I f  reconceptualised in terms o f the notion o f boundary-work, Larson’s 
criticisms o f polygraph operators then become rhetorical resources in setting his version o f lie 
detection off from Keeler’s which are based on a different organisation o f knowledge 
practices corresponding to divergent epistemological aims.
O n the one hand, by reframing Alder’s hierarchical analysis o f Larson’s and Keeler’s versions 
o f lie detection along the lines o f two com peting^/ equal models o f lie detection, it becomes 
possible to provide an answer as to why Larson’s efforts at instituting his ‘clinical team 
approach’ were not successful. Larson’s model o f the lie detection examination, which was to 
include an analysis o f the offender’s personality, was at once reminiscent o f the earlier 
academic model o f the detection o f deception which had been set within an analysis o f the 
nature o f the offender and which sought to combine the detection o f the lie with an analysis 
o f the criminal’s personality. In this, it did not match the more immediate aim o f the swift 
apprehension o f the offender as they were set out in criminal investigation. In a 
corresponding fashion the notion o f the expert as a clinically trained operator or academic did 
not fit with the way in which expert knowledge was constructed within police departments 
and other institutions involved in criminal investigation: here, the expert represented a 
technician trained in the application o f a specialised technique. By contrast, Keeler’s version 
o f lie detection, which centred on the training o f operators on the basis o f specialised training 
courses and apprenticeship, not only matched the model o f scientific expertise in criminal 
investigation but also corresponded to its aims by centring on the apprehension o f the 
offender by means o f the simple detection o f his lie.
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On the other hand, my consideration o f Larson’s boundary-work — as part o f which he 
sought to undermine Keeler’s model o f expertise and offset his approach as geared towards 
scientific validation -  throws up a conundrum in the construction o f its scientific validity. 
This conundrum points to an essential feature o f lie detection as an applied knowledge 
production technique ranging across different models o f expertise: the intricacy that defines 
the status o f lie detection as a knowledge production technique is that its aims are intimately 
linked to the construction and legitimisation o f its scientific status. The lie detection 
examination cannot verify itself independently, it depends upon the subject’s confession. As a 
result, it becomes not only difficult but impossible to distinguish between a ‘legitimate’ 
application o f the epistemology o f fear by the trained psychologist (which modulates the 
responses o f the body in capturing the lie) and the ‘illegitimate’ power-oriented enlistment of 
the machine by the polygraph examiner that might serve in the subject’s intimidation. Rather, 
on the level o f the nature o f the knowledge that lie detection represents it seems that they are 
intimately linked making it necessary to delve deeper into the fundamental structure that 
characterises lie detection and how knowledge and power become entwined in it. My 
argument is that the history o f polygraphy cannot be framed in terms o f a normative 
evaluation on the basis of a distinction between Larson’s and Keeler’s knowledge practices 
along the lines o f a knowledge-oriented versus a power-oriented technique by taking recourse 
to seemingly more accepted psychological standards versus the coercive use o f the technique. 
This argument then brings us to the question o f how we might go about developing an 
alternative yet critical understanding o f lie detection as a technique o f knowledge production 
and intervention.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to provide an historical examination o f lie detection as scientific 
evidence by means o f an analysis o f the Frye-case. This case formed the basis for the 
continued exclusion o f lie detection examinations as scientific evidence as well as the 
precedent for the testing o f the admissibility o f all scientific evidence in the US throughout 
the 20th century. In this analysis I drew on the explanation that has been provided by Tal 
Golan. By extending his interpretation o f the Frye case, we established that lie detection was 
excluded from the courts not on the basis o f the questdonability o f its methods but rather on 
the basis o f its power. In providing a direct answer to the most central question that the 
criminal justice system posed — namely whether the defendant was guilty or not - the courts 
feared that the ‘credulous’ jury might be too easily swayed by lie detection evidence. More 
significandy, by establishing the credibility o f the subject as to his guilt, lie detection evidence
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threatened to undermine the structure o f the criminal court process as such by potentially 
usurping the function o f the jury. In seeking to protect the structure o f its functioning, the 
court engaged in boundary-work by drawing on a professional model o f scientific expertise 
which had developed towards the end o f the 19th century. By implementing the rule o f 
‘general acceptance’ in the Frye case, the court availed itself o f the possibility o f regulating the 
evidence allowed to enter the court on the basis o f its own interpretation o f how general 
acceptance was to be defined. This enabled the courts to exclude lie detection evidence, 
which otherwise provided impressive accuracy rates and Marston’s indisputable scientific 
credentials.
Secondly, I examined Alder’s account o f the development o f lie detection in which he 
provides an alternative explanation for the continued exclusion o f lie detection evidence. I 
took his analysis as a means o f opening out the discussion to a broader consideration o f the 
development o f polygraphy. His analysis was framed in terms o f two heuristics — the ‘open 
model o f science’ and the ‘model o f proprietary knowledge’ — on the basis o f which he 
opposed Larson’s and Keeler’s ‘knowledge strategies.’ According to Alder, Larson employed 
the open model o f science in seeking to develop lie detection along accepted psychological 
practices and oriented towards the scientific validation o f the technique. By contrast, Keeler 
employed the model o f proprietary knowledge, seeking to wrest financial profits from the 
commercialisation o f his instrument and polygraph training. In this model the lie detection 
examination became carried out by a ‘discretionary expert,’ whose practice was oriented 
towards the coercive extraction o f a confession by means o f tricking and intimidating the 
subject. In addition, by portraying polygraphy as it emerged from Keeler’s model as being 
marked by ‘consummate antiprofessionals,’ Alder concluded that lie detection remained 
excluded from the courts as a result o f  the kind o f  lie detection that developed in the US. 
While I agreed in a qualified manner with Alder’s analysis o f the continued exclusion o f 
polygraph evidence, I problematised the normative analysis which underlies his evaluation o f 
the development o f polygraphy as a profession. I showed that the way in which he framed 
Larson’s practices as following an open model o f science corresponded to a Mertonian model 
o f science which is organised around the study o f the norms o f science while taking for 
granted the objectivity o f scientific practices. This resulted in the portrayal o f Larson’s model o f 
lie detection as scientifically and normatively valid. It thus became a measure rather than 
functioning as a heuristic against which Keeler’s practices were evaluated as an illicit, coercive, 
and profiteering technique.
By contrast, I argued that rather than distinguishing between Larson and Keeler by means o f 
a normative construction o f knowledge practices, both Larson’s and Keeler’s approach 
needed to be considered on an equal footing. I showed that they could be conceived o f in
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terms o f two different models o f expertise. The former built on an academic conception o f 
the detection o f deception which was set within an earlier approach to lie detection. This was 
still connected to an analysis o f the criminal’s personality. In correspondence to the ‘deeper’ 
aims in the construction o f knowledge o f the offender, Larson constructed expertise in terms 
o f academic and clinical training. This, however, did not fit the way in which expertise was 
elaborated within police departments and other institutions connected to criminal 
investigation. By contrast, Keeler’s model o f lie detection matched the more immediate 
epistemological aims o f criminal investigation by being centred on the simple detection o f the 
subject’s lie. In this sense, the organisation o f knowledge practices came to correspond to the 
way in which scientific expertise was constructed at law enforcement agencies: the polygraph 
operator resembled a technician versed in the specialised application o f the technique.
In the next chapter I will provide an alternative interpretation o f how we might go about 
evaluating polygraphy as a technique o f knowledge production and intervention. As I 
demonstrated in this chapter, it becomes problematic to construct an historical critique o f lie 
detection on the basis o f knowledge-orientation versus a power-orientation: that is to say, on 
the basis of a more or less legitimate model o f lie detection. In the next chapter, I would like to 
suggest that it is important to examine the nature o f the knowledge that lie detection 
represents. In this respect, it becomes a matter o f outlining the space in which psychological 
knowledge and interrogation techniques became interwoven and the power mechanism that 
defines lie detection as a technique whose aim and only verification is the confession. My 
analysis will apply Foucault’s notion o f the ‘grotesque’ and his analysis o f the function o f 
psychiatric knowledge in the criminal justice system which he sets out in Abnormal to an 
analysis of the ensemble o f  the lie detector/instrument and the expert/interrogator in the 
triad o f the examiner, subject and the instrument.
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Chapter 6 Lie Detection as Grotesque Knowledge
In the last chapter, I provided an analysis of the continued exclusion of lie detection as scientific 
evidence. Based on an elaboration o f the arguments advanced by Golan and Alder, I concluded 
that lie detection evidence was excluded on the basis o f its potential power rather than its 
uncertain status as a scientific technique. The Frye ruling provided the criminal courts with a 
means to protect the ‘credulous jury* and, more significantly, the jury-based system as such. 
Additionally, I agreed with Alder, albeit with qualifications, that the inability o f polygraphy to 
institutionalise a unified system o f  licensing and certification, which provides a profession with 
legitimacy through occupational closure, served as an additional rationale for the exclusion of 
polygraphy from the court system. However, in addition to my qualification o f Alder’s 
argument regarding the professionalization o f polygraphy, I problematised his normative 
evaluation of the development o f the discipline, which was based on framing it in terms o f the 
opposition o f Larson’s knowledge-oriented versus Keeler’s power-oriented technique. I argued 
that such a distinction was based on a hierarchical conception of knowledge. By contrast, I 
provided an analysis o f Larson’s and Keeler’s versions of lie detection in terms o f two models 
o f expertise, whereby the former’s model o f lie detection was still set within a ‘deeper’ analysis 
of the personality of the criminal and the latter was organised in terms o f the more immediate 
aim o f detecting the subject’s guilt on the basis o f his lie. Following this analysis, I suggested 
that instead o f evaluating the development o f polygraphy on the basis o f a more or less 
legitimate conception of the lie detection examination grounded in a normative conception o f 
science, we might take an alternative route in investigating the power/knowledge mechanism 
that comes to define the lie detection examination on a more fundamental level.
In pursuing such a line in this chapter, I will draw on Foucault’s notion o f ‘grotesque 
knowledge,’ which he develops in his lecture series Abnormal. In his analysis the category o f the 
grotesque comes to denote a power mechanism whereby an individual — in his case, the legal 
psychiatrist — exerts an absolute power while disqualifying himself in the process o f yielding this 
very power. I apply his notion o f the grotesque to the lie detection examination, demonstrating 
how the ensemble o f the expert/interrogator and the lie detector/instrument can be 
conceptualised as grotesque in the triad o f the subject, the examiner and the instrument. This 
analysis, in turn, will allow us to develop an understanding o f the function o f the lie detection 
examination as a technique o f knowledge production and intervention constituting a hybrid o f 
an inquisitorial technique and a psychological examination. Additionally, drawing on the 
analyses o f Alder and Hanson, I will provide an analysis of the role that it comes to play as a 
‘moral technology’ beyond the criminal justice system in the further institutionalisation o f
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polygraphy. Being utilised in personnel screenings, it comes to operate as a tool for the 
inclusion or exclusion o f employees on the basis o f an assessment o f their ‘trustworthiness.’ In 
a more noteworthy fashion, it becomes a disciplinary tool in controlling employees’ behaviour.
6.1 Grotesque Knowledge
In his 1974-1975 lecture series on the ‘abnormal’ at the College de France, Foucault provides a 
relatively brief discussion o f the category o f the ‘grotesque’ in relation to power in 
characterising psychiatric discourse in the criminal justice system. The modem criminal justice 
system is marked by the fact that some evidence presented in court carries a more serious 
weight by virtue o f the person who presents it — the expert. The statements that an expert 
makes in court carry ‘specific effects of truth and power.’401 Western thought assumes an 
essential link between the establishment o f truth and justice so that ‘where the court and the 
expert encounter each other, where judicial institutions and medical knowledge, or scientific 
knowledge in general, intersect, statements are formulated having the status o f true discourses 
with considerable judicial effects.’402 However, in Foucault’s view, these statements -  and here 
he seems to refer specifically to medico-legal discourse - are at the same time marked by the fact 
that they neither correspond to the rules which govern the construction o f scientific discourse, 
nor do they match the rules o f legal discourse. Rather, these statements are characterised by the 
fact that they are ‘grotesque’ or ‘Ubu-esque.’
In identifying psychiatric discourse as ‘grotesque,’ Foucault seeks to argue that ‘by virtue o f their 
status, a discourse or an individual can have effects o f power that their intrinsic qualities should 
disqualify them from having.’403 Psychiatric-penal discourse is a ‘puerile’ discourse, a childish 
discourse operating with a terminology such as ‘psychological immaturity,’ ‘a purely structured 
personality,’ ‘a poor grasp o f reality,’ ‘profound affective imbalance,’ ‘serious emotional 
disturbance,’404 etc. in the assessment o f the accused. This discourse is childish not only in the 
epistemological sense but also as far as its content is concerned. In providing an assessment o f 
the potential guilt o f the subject ‘you are given biographical elements that do not in any way 
explain the action in question but are kinds o f miniature warning signs, little scenes of 
childhood, little childish scenes that are presented as already analogous to the crime. It is a kind 
o f scaled-down criminality for children characterized by the language used by parents or by the 
morality o f children’s books.’405 The use o f this terminology works as a ‘switch-point’ as ‘the 
whole field o f notions o f perversity, converted into their puerile vocabulary, enables medical
401 Foucault, 2003, p. 11.
402 Ibid, p. 11.
403 Ibid, p. 11.
404 Ibid, p. 15.
405 Ibid, p. 33.
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notions to function in the field of judicial power and, conversely, juridical notions to function in 
medicine’s sphere o f competence.’406 This switch-point functions better the less epistemological 
weight the terminology on the basis of which it operates carries.
The inclusion o f psychiatric discourse in the criminal justice system occasions the construction 
o f a ‘psychologico-ethical doubling of the offense’ as part o f which it becomes no longer simply 
a question o f applying a legal judgment to the question o f guilt o f a particular individual for a 
certain action, but rather o f creating a ‘delinquent,’ a character defined by his irregular form of 
conduct which contravenes psychological and moral rules.407 In judging this ‘delinquent,’ the 
doctor or psychiatrist assumes the function of a judge and, conversely, the judge the function of 
a doctor who in assigning a punishment in fact prescribes a treatment. Punishment is then no 
longer directed at the offence as such, but at the delinquent’s conduct and character which 
underlies and causes the offence — in this view the question o f responsibility is superposed as 
‘the subject is responsible for everything and nothing.’408 As a result, the nature o f punishment 
changes as ‘we have gone from what could be called the target o f punishment, the point of 
application o f a mechanism o f power, that is to say, of legal punishment, to a realm of objects of 
a knowledge, a technique o f transformation, a whole set of rational and concerted coercions.’409 
The medico-legal assessment o f the individual on the basis o f the notion o f ‘perversion’ and 
terms that are related to it, which allows for the linking o f medical and judicial judgment, makes 
possible the continuous institution and alignment o f penal and medical institutions. These 
institutions provide a graded response in terms o f social control across society — rather than just 
being punished in legal terms the individual becomes subject to different techniques o f 
‘normalisation.’ The target o f their operation is the ‘dangerous’ individual, i.e. ‘the individual 
who is not exactly ill and who is not, strictly speaking, criminal.’410 This combination o f 
perversion and danger in psychiatric discourse characterises what is grotesque about it. O n the 
one hand, it is a discourse that is marked by ‘a discourse o f fear whose function is to detect 
danger and to counter it.’ On the other hand, as we already saw above, it is a discourse o f 
childish moralisation. In invoking this discourse, the psychiatric expert turns into Ubu:
‘If we accept that Ubu is the exercise o f  power through the explicit disqualification o f the person who 
wields it, [...] then we can see how the psychiatric expert can only be Ubu himself. He can exercise the
406 Ibid, p. 33.
407 Ibid, p. 17-18.
408 Ibid, p. 21.
409 Ibid, p. 18.
4,0 Ibid, p. 34. Foucault’s analysis o f  course continues in the direction o f  the ‘power o f  normalisation’ (Foucault, 
2003, p. 42) that is instituted through medico-legal discourse. As the focus o f  this discussion is on an 
elaboration o f  the category o f  the grotesque I shall not extend my summary o f  Foucault’s analysis o f  the 
modem penal system at this point Neither will I introduce a comparative perspective which would analyse 
the differences between the structure o f  European continental law and Anglo-American case law in 
Foucauldian terms. My analysis draws on Foucault on the level o f  the connection o f  mechanisms o f  power 
and knowledge in this context.
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terrible power he is asked to take on — which in the end is to determine, or to play a large part in 
determining, an individual’s punishment — only through a childish discourse that disqualifies him as scientist 
at the very moment he is appealed to as a scientist, and through a discourse o f  fear, which makes him 
ridiculous as soon as he speaks in court about someone accused o f  a crime who is in the dock and 
consequendy deprived o f  any power. The scientist, who is sheltered, protected, and even regarded as sacred 
by the entire institution and sword o f justice, speaks the language o f  children and the language o f  fear.’411
In the following analysis, I would like to present an analogous argument about the function o f 
lie detection as switch-point in regulating statements o f criminal guilt and elaborate on the 
grotesque, as Foucault identifies it above, this mechanism which is based ‘on the 
maximization o f effects o f power on the basis o f the disqualification o f the one who 
produces them.’412 There is, o f course, one significant difference between the psychiatric 
expert and the polygraphist. While the psychiatric expert is licensed to make statements o f 
truth in court, the polygraphist, as we established in the last chapter, is not. Nevertheless, I 
think that Foucault’s argument can be extended to gain an understanding o f the truth effects 
that the lie detection examination implements at the entrance o f  the criminal justice system. 
There is another difference between the psychiatrist’s statements in court and the statement of 
the polygraphist. Larson’s ‘clinical team approach’ still shares certain affinities with the way in 
which Foucault portrays psychiatric knowledge. In this version of the lie detection examination, 
the establishment of guilt is to be combined with an assessment o f the suspect’s personality. 
This involves the construction o f the character, which stands behind the offence. As we have 
seen, as polygraphy develops, the ‘contravention o f psychological and ethical rules’ on which 
the lie detection examiner bases his analysis is contained within the simple statement o f the 
subject’s lie. As a result, in the case of the polygraph examination the elaboration of guilt is no 
longer directed at determining the nature of the individual that hides behind the offence and 
fixing this nature on a scale of abnormality. Rather, the lie detection examination pursues the 
more immediate aim of identifying the author of a particular crime through the binary 
classification o f truthfulness and deception.
Does the police officer carrying around a polygraph, playing card-tricks on suspects and 
declaring the subject’s guilt not correspond to this notion o f the ‘grotesque’? And is not the 
team o f experts who venture to provide an assessment o f the individual’s lies on the basis o f a 
quickened heart beat or shortened breath in conjunction with an analysis o f the suspect’s 
personality equally ‘grotesque’? Finally, what about the current day psycho-physiologist 
endeavouring to improve the scientific validity o f the polygraph examination in the same 
manner as Larson did — is he ‘grotesque’?
Foucault argues that one central characteristic o f medico-legal knowledge as switch-point 
between medical and judicial discourses is the epistemological weakness o f  its structure. I have
4,1 Foucault, 2003, p. 36.
412 Ibid, p. 12.
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devoted a considerable amount o f space to describing the translation mechanism which 
constitutes the lie detection examination. Additionally, I argued in the methodology chapter 
that in analysing polygraphy one needed to take a symmetrical view of knowledge, that is, we 
must suspend the distinction between true and false knowledge. This is o f special significance 
in the context o f this discussion, because traditional accounts o f knowledge have construed 
what is perceived as valid knowledge to exist independently o f its context o f production. By 
contrast, false knowledge has often been portrayed as being the result o f power relations. In 
comparing what Foucault calls the epistemological weakness o f psychiatric terminology and 
the translation mechanism which characterises lie detection, I do not wish to make an 
argument for the unscientific nature o f the polygraph examination. Foucault’s statement 
certainly points to a normative evaluation o f the status o f psychiatry, and could superficially 
be read in terms o f a distinction between knowledge which is independently valid and 
knowledge that is infused with the social relations that determine its production. However, 
this would mean ignoring the power mechanisms with which all knowledge is so intimately 
related in Foucault’s analyses.
Foucault does not analyse scientific discourses with respect to their validity, which would 
require the presupposition o f a framework for the evaluation of knowledge, but rather seeks 
to analyse knowledge in terms o f its discernible ‘truth effects.’ In doing so he focuses on the 
relations, both social and material, which have to be put in place in order to make these 
effects possible. In drawing an analogy between the ‘epistemological weakness’ o f psychiatric 
knowledge and lie detection, I would rather like to point to the indeterminacy in the 
translations, which make lie detection techniques work and which constitute it as a technique 
o f knowledge production and intervention.
6.2 U e Detection as ‘Switch-Point’ Between Psychological Knowledge and Criminal Interrogation
As should become clear in the following paragraphs, the lie detection examination 
constitutes a switch-point between (physio)-psychological knowledge and the establishment 
o f criminal guilt. In chapter 3, we saw that psychological knowledge o f the lie became 
possible on the basis o f a distinction between emotion and cognition drawn in early 
psychology. Here, the emotions are conceived o f as uncontrollable bodily expressions in 
opposition to the subject’s thought and speech. Thus, the subject’s lie is betrayed by an 
emotional body, which cannot lie. In the lie detection examination, capturing the lie on the 
basis o f the emotional body is established through posing a link between the lie and guilt 
through the ‘fear o f detection.’ This fear o f detection is translated onto a chart on the basis 
o f the interaction o f the body and the instrument that can be read by the examiner. As a
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result, the lie emerges as a sign on graph paper — signifying the truth o f the subject’s guilt. 
This transformation o f the lie into a sign centres on the management o f fear, the fear that 
the lie will be detected. The lie has a specific function in the translation mechanism between 
truth and guilt: in lie detection examinations, the suspect has no choice but to lie in order to 
hide his guilt. In this it applies a particular pressure to the individual in comprising the 
threat that the lie will be known. For the lie is connected to the possibility o f hiding one’s 
thoughts, it is the most personal form o f  resistance — knowing the lie, this most elusive o f 
human actions, transforming it into a sign on graph paper signifies the absolute power o f 
reading the subject’s mind. The lie thus forms an integral part o f a circular mechanism: first 
creating a fear that the lie will be known, and then measuring this fear. The circular 
mechanism in the generation o f fear and its measurement is elaborated in how 
psychological knowledge is translated into criminal interrogation in the polygraph triad by 
means o f how the ensemble o f the expert/interrogator and the instrument/lie detector 
intervene upon the human subject/suspect.
The instrument is enlisted in modulating the body’s responses in oscillating between the ‘lie 
detector’ and a scientific instrument — the polygraph. The popular discourse on the Tie 
detector’, as we saw in our discussion o f Bunn in chapter 4, cuts out the socio-technical 
relations between the instrument, the examiner and the subject, and instead represents the 
instrument as a ‘black box’ which can detect lies by itself. In this representation, the scientific 
instrument is accorded ‘superhuman’ abilities in being able to transform the subject’s thoughts 
into a legible script. As we saw in chapter 4, this is achieved by means o f a ‘preamble’ at the 
beginning o f the examination, which is meant to ‘introduce’ the subject to the examination yet 
carries the function o f enrolling the instrument in managing the fear o f the subject:
“If you are telling the truth, you have nothing to worry about — this instrument will indicate you are telling 
the truth, and I’ll report that fact to the officers who requested me to make this test. However, if  you are not 
telling the truth, the machine mil show it, and I’ll tell you so, and then I’ll ask you to let me hear the truth.413
By announcing that ‘if you are not telling the truth the machine will show it,’ the examiner 
implies that the instrument could detect lies independendy o f the examiner’s interpretation or 
intervention. He also implies that the instrument direcdy records the subject’s thoughts, not 
his bodily responses. As a result, it assumes an ambiguous status. O n the one hand, it appears 
to be an automated scientific instrument. On the other hand, the personification o f the 
machine bears the resonance o f a utopia/dystopia — as in media representations a technology 
with superhuman powers.
The dual nature o f the instrument as lie detector and polygraph is complemented by the dual 
role o f the polygraph operator as scientific expert and representative o f social control who is in
413 Inbau, 1942, p. 9 [my emphasis].
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a position to present a ‘diagnosis’ o f deception and the conclusion o f guilt or innocence to the 
suspect. His role as scientific expert is mediated in a quasi-experimental setting, which mirrors 
the role o f the psychological expert in the clinical experiment as it emerges in psychology at the 
end o f the 19th century. As I elaborated in chapter 3, by contrast to early psychological 
experiments in which the roles o f the experimental subject and the experimenter were 
symmetrical and exchangeable, from the end o f the 19th century the psychologist took on the 
role o f an expert who, by virtue o f his authority in relation to the subject, attains a license to 
intervene upon the subject on the basis o f his knowledge. In the lie detection examination, the 
lie detection specialist models criminal interrogation along the lines o f the controlled 
interventions of the psychological expert by means o f the setting o f ‘stimuli’: these ‘stimuli’ take 
on the form of ‘relevant’ or ‘critical’ questions and as ‘comparators’ irrelevant questions. 
Additionally, his expert status is reinforced through manipulation o f the instrument and 
interpretation o f the polygraph chart. In this, the polygraph examiner becomes a hybrid o f a 
psychological expert and a police interrogator — the scientific (and normative) authority which 
he exerts as psychological expert is combined with his normative authority as police officer, as 
enforcer of the law. This hierarchical position o f the scientific expert and the law enforcement 
official vis-a-vis the subject is a central part of the power structure which serves to mediate the 
responses o f the subject’s body.
Finally, in taking up from my analysis o f the constitution o f the truthful body in chapter 3, the 
setting in the lie detection examination itself serves in the management o f fear. It appropriates 
the setting o f the psychological experiment in elaborating a space which is devoid o f any 
influences and which comes to match the modern interrogation room. This is a space in which 
the subject becomes an object o f knowledge while equally being made subject to an air o f 
intimidation. Additionally, the positioning of the elements of the polygraph in this space serves 
to enhance the authority o f the examiner and the instrument through being placed in such a 
way that the subject cannot see them. By facing away from them, the impersonal character of 
their scientific authority is materialized. Thus, it is this ensemble o f the scientific 
expert/interrogator and the instrument/lie detector in a setting in which the experimental set­
up o f the psychologist comes to match the one of the interrogation, which sustains the circular 
mechanism of the evocation of fear and its measurement.
The lie detection examination is not merely a function o f the examiner’s skill at persuading and 
intimidating the subject. The lie detection examination is not, as Alder states in the context o f his 
analysis o f the polygraph examination, ‘an example o f opening a technological black box and 
finding it empty.’414 Rather, the performative function o f the lie detector is intertwined with the 
measuring function o f the polygraph as a scientific instrument in the management o f the subject’s
414 Alder, 2002, p. 16.
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fear by the expert/interrogator. This fundamental mechanism of lie detection, in bringing to bear 
on the subject an absolute power through the declaration that what he hides will be known, is 
the same in Larson’s and in Keeler’s set-up o f the examination. Both depend on the 
performative and the measuring function o f the polygraph triad, albeit to different degrees. We 
therefore need to qualify the ‘grotesque’ nature o f the lie detection examination. It is not the 
expert/interrogator who appears as ‘Ubu.’ Rather, it is the organisation o f the ensemble o f the 
expert/interrogator and the lie/detector instrument in the polygraph triad which is ‘ubuesque.’ 
The lie does not only serve the function of instituting an absolute power but also serves to 
mask it. The lie stitches together psychological knowledge and an inquisitorial technique, 
which seeks to extract knowledge from the suspect by turning his body against himself. The 
polygraph operator does not state: from these records I can conclude that your heart-beat 
increases when I ask you this question. The polygraph operator does not even say: from these 
records I conclude that you are afraid when I ask you this question. N or does he state: You 
are afraid, but nevertheless you are innocent. Rather, he might state: these records show that 
you have lied. Or: these records show that you are truthful. The lie detection examination 
manages to turn a physiological measurement, an expression o f fear, into a moral evaluation: 
You are not to be believed (for you are afraid) and therefore you need to explain yourself. 
Upon first consideration, we find a more cautious approach in Larson’s assessment o f the lie 
detection examination, which Alder points to as an example o f Larson’s aim at a controlled 
rather than intimidating procedure. When reporting on the results o f lie detection tests that 
were carried out on children at the home detention branch o f the Institute o f Juvenile 
Research, it was stated that
‘in no way were these juveniles intimidated by the examiner nor were the results o f  the polygraph 
examination misrepresented to them. [...] When specific disturbances are noted in responses to critical 
questions, the subject is asked to explain the possible reasons for these disturbances. In no instance is he 
told that he has bed or that his story is incorrect/415
Although this seems like a benign mechanism, it follows the same logic as I outlined above. 
Indeed if  anything, it is more cunning in its inquisitiveness, for it couches a moral evaluation in 
the language o f the psychological expert. It suggests to the subject that the expert knows on the 
basis o f a scientific procedure that something is wrong with him, and takes the body’s response 
as a means by which to question the subject, to divulge what is going on in his mind, and to tell 
the expert o f his thoughts. We must only consider the sentence, which follows the quote above 
‘|y]et in 33 per cent o f the cases examined, admissions o f deception directly followed this 
procedure,’ in order to acknowledge that just like the polygraph examiner, the expert 
psychiatrist or clinical investigator seeks to initiate what is ultimately a confessional ritual
415 Lyon, 1936, p. 496.
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Do we ultimately know whether the subject lied? This question seems to go against the 
inquisitorial logic o f the lie detection examination for it is in its verification — the confession — that 
we also find its aim (and its downfall, for it always harbours the danger o f the false confession). 
The management o f fear in the polygraph examination, which is geared towards making the lie 
appear on the subject’s body, simultaneously depends on the performative as well as the 
measuring aspects o f the examination in bringing to bear a pressure on the subject that his lie 
will be known. In this, neither its performative nor its measuring aspects can be disentangled. 
They form part o f the same power mechanism in the stitching together o f psychological 
knowledge and the elaboration o f criminal guilt. The transformation of the suspect’s fear into 
the knowledge o f his lie is geared towards enticing him into an avowal o f his own guilt. It is this 
entanglement o f the performative and measuring aspects o f the lie detection examination in 
connection with the confession as its aim and confirmation that make it not only impossible to 
judge the allegedly sincere efforts o f the psychologist versus the bmte intimidation by the 
polygraph operator. Rather the attempt at such a judgment fails to account for the special status 
that lie detection assumes as an applied psychological technique.
It is one o f the particularities o f  this knowledge production technique that its confirmation 
could not be construed independently o f the confirmatory statement o f the object o f study 
— the suspect — him- or herself. Yet it is also what defines its character as switch-point 
between psychological knowledge and the elaboration o f guilt. In the current psychological 
literature, this conundrum in which lie detection is caught as an applied psychological 
technique is referred to as the problem o f ‘ground truth.’416 In legitimating its method, it can 
only revert to the construction o f  accuracy on the basis o f truth that is o f a different order: 
judicial truth — confessions and other evidence — which serve in the constitution o f  an 
individual’s guilt. Yet at the same time, it is this truth which the lie detection examination 
has itself brought forth and upon which its own legitimisation depends. Thus at the very 
moment at which the validity o f  the examiner’s analysis is confirmed through the subject’s 
confession, lie detection itself turns into a grotesque form o f knowledge. In eliciting a 
confession, the qualification o f  the expert/interrogator and the lie detector/polygraph 
becomes questionable — whether he is an academic working as part o f a team to assess the 
personality o f the criminal, a polygraph operator having received short-term training, or a 
current-day psycho-physiologist working on the scientific validation o f polygraphy.
Thus I hope to have demonstrated that rather than problematising lie detection on the level 
o f a normative evaluation o f the development o f  its knowledge practices as Alder did in the 
last chapter, we might gain a more fruitful understanding by analysing the deeper 
mechanism that comes to define it as switch-point between psychological knowledge and
416 Cf. Ben-Shakhar and Furedy (1990).
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criminal interrogation on the basis o f Foucault’s notion o f grotesque knowledge. In 
extending this analysis, I now turn to a discussion o f its function as technique o f knowledge 
production and intervention at the entrance o f  the criminal justice system.
6.3 Lie Detection as Confessional Technique
While lie detection evidence was rejected as scientific evidence in the courts, it nevertheless 
came to play a crucial role at the entrance o f the criminal justice system. This is because the 
main outcome o f the lie detection examination — the confession — was not generally excluded 
from the criminal courts. The confession still occupied a central (if problematic) space as form 
o f judicial proof. In the American legal system, rules abounded from the early 1900s which 
specified the circumstances under which a confession might be judged to have been 
‘voluntarily’ made, and thus to be trustworthy. However, the definition o f  ‘voluntariness’ 
proved to be problematic — how was one to evaluate what is essentially a particular state o f 
mind, and how to judge whether that mind was capable o f withstanding not only physical 
pressure but mental duress? Is not the interrogation situation itself, as Justice Jackson stated in 
his dissenting opinion in the landmark case Ashcraft v Tennessee (1944), ‘inherently coercive’?417 
As I suggested above, as a ‘scientific’ technique o f interrogation based on psychological 
knowledge, lie detection could be seen as a humane way o f eliciting confessions which 
masked the coercive nature o f  interrogation by establishing the truth o f the subject’s guilt on 
the basis o f the diagnosis o f the lie. Additionally, the lie detection examination provided an 
economic solution for the modern criminal justice system, which had massively expanded 
since the 19th century 418 Polygraph operators argued that the securing o f confessions and the 
weeding out o f innocent individuals would result in the saving o f costs during the process o f 
criminal investigation and at criminal trials:
417 Cited in Brooks, 2000, p. 30. Jackson by no means suggested that criminal interrogation as such was a 
questionable enterprise — quite to the contrary, his statement was rather cynical. He had dissented from a 
decision which ruled the prolonged questioning o f  suspects as ‘inherendy coercive’ and that more humane 
measures o f  interrogation should be implemented (Brooks, 2000, p. 30).
418 This was due to the growth o f  substantive criminal law which came to include a great range o f  newly defined 
illegalities especially concerned with the protection o f  private property accompanying urbanisation and the 
rise o f  capitalism. In the US this coincided with the abolition o f  the common-law crime and the introduction 
o f criminal codes (Friedman, 1973, p. 508-517). Criminal law experienced another expansion as a result o f  
moral hygiene movements seeking to do away with ‘social ills.’ Here, the temperance movement was 
especially successful leading up to National Prohibition from 1920 until 1933 as part o f  which the sale and 
production o f  alcohol was criminalised. The temperance project ultimately failed. However, it arguably 
brought with it the spread o f  organised crime in conjunction with a clogging up o f  criminal justice system 
(Friedman, 1973, p. 568; Walker, 1998, p. 158-159). Additionally, the growth o f  criminal law was 
accompanied by the increased routinisation and professionalisation o f  the criminal justice system including 
the rise o f  public prosecutors to initiate cases, the creation and professionalisation o f  law enforcement 
agencies elaborated on in chapter 4 and the expansion and functional differentiation o f  the penal system to 
manage a delinquent population (Walker, 1998, p. 49-167).
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‘A single confession in a felony case by saving the time and expense o f  a superior court trial, may save 
several times the cost o f an instrument. Statistics based on the thousands o f  cases examined in Berkeley 
and elsewhere provide that from sixty to seventy-five percent o f  those in which guilt is indicated are 
cleared by confession. In 1935 a state police department estimated that the test had saved the taxpayers 
in cost o f  trials approximately % 25,000.’419
As the quotation suggests, the lie detection examination could potentially support the 
regulation o f punishment outside o f  the criminal courts. Alder states that only 10% of 
criminal cases are settled in criminal trials while, in 90% o f cases, punishment is negotiated 
through confessions or plea bargains420 outside o f court. Thus the polygraph examination, 
according to him, ‘plays a crucial sorting role in American justice even though it has been 
banned from the courtroom.’421 We might note in this regard that the institution o f the lie 
detection examination at the entrance o f  the criminal justice system was equally made 
possible by Larson’s practice o f using lie detection examinations in preliminary 
investigations and submitting ‘indirect’ evidence, i.e. confessions, to legal proceedings, as 
well as Keeler’s expansion o f polygraphy.
The lie detection examination then comes to match the demands o f a system of criminal 
justice which, on the one hand, in meeting its own expansion since the 19th century 
continually tries to combat its outgrowths by efficient measures o f processing criminal cases. 
On the other hand, it equally meets the desire o f this very system to speak judicial truth in a 
scientific language. This is a language which cannot, however, free itself o f the old forms of 
judicial proof as expressed in the confession, for the very reason that it provides a swift 
solution to criminal cases. In so doing, the lie detection examination represents a hybrid 
between an older inquisitorial logic and the modern attempt o f constructing the guilt o f  the 
criminal on the basis o f the psychological examination. It follows the older coercive aim of 
wresting a confession from the subject by means o f bringing a power mechanism to bear on 
the subject’s body. In this, it harks back to its dark predecessor, the system o f torture, which 
equally intervenes on the body. Yet it is also reframed. Torture depends upon what Silverman 
calls an ‘epistemology o f pain’ which, in overcoming the subject’s will, must break the
419 LKC, Box 29, Folder 780: T h e Berkeley Psychograph [Brochure],’ 1938.
420 Plea bargaining is a process whereby the prosecution and the defence negotiate the setdement o f  a 
criminal case on the basis o f  a guilty plea by the criminal defendant in exchange for the reduction o f  
charges. It had developed in the middle o f  the 19th century and its use increased dramatically from 1900 
onwards. By far the largest share o f  convictions in Anglo-American justice is currendy secured through 
plea-bargaining. In negotiating a guilty plea, the defendant effectively waives his constitutional right to a 
trial by jury. The negotiation o f  guilt outside o f  court was enabled by the development o f  the police as 
agency o f  apprehension and criminal investigation and the institution o f  full-time prosecutors, w ho unlike 
their European counterparts enjoyed greater discretion and fewer checks on their authority (Friedman, 
1979; Langbein, 1979; Haller, 1979; Mather, 1979). Historians argue that plea-bargaining came to provide 
(and still provides) an economical solution to increasing caseloads brought forth through the radical 
growth in punishable crimes in the 19th century and the increasing complexity o f  the conduct o f  the 
criminal trial itself (Alschuler, 1979, p. 242). Thus it can be seen to match a system which is less 
concerned with the establishment o f  guilt as with the insertion o f  the offender into a regime o f  control 
coupled with the criminal justice system’s drive for efficiency.
421 Alder, 2007, p. 127-128.
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corporeal shell to reach a truth that is hidden inside the body.422 By contrast, as I argued 
above, the lie detecdon examinadon applies a more benign mechanism in elaboradng an 
‘epistemology o f fear/ as part o f which the moduladon of the body’s responses becomes the 
basis o f the physio-psychological and moral evaluation o f his lie aimed at enticing the subject 
into a confession.423 Thus the polygraph examination represents something o f  an 
anachronism, combining an inquisitorial logic with the knowledge practices o f the human 
sciences. In  drawing out this discomforting form of proof, always being haunted by the 
potential o f a false confession, it still renders it in similar terms to the ‘psychologico-ethical’ 
double o f the offence’ as it is described by Foucault: it constitutes the subject not only as 
guilty but also as immoral on the basis o f the ‘abnormality’ o f his bodily responses.
While seemingly outmoded in the age o f DNA-analysis, it may be that it is this very nature o f the 
lie detection examination as hybrid o f an inquisitorial and a psychological technique which 
constitutes its fundamentally modem character. This character, however, is specific to the US: in 
serving the rapid regulation of criminal cases in a quasi-judicial space that has been constituted 
outside the criminal courts, it matches the aims o f a system which is no longer so much 
interested in the old system of assigning a legal punishment for a particular offence, but is rather 
geared towards the management of a ‘delinquent’ population. Yet not only has the lie detection 
examination served in instituting a mechanism which is efficient in the regulation and 
constitution o f the guilty subject on the basis o f a moral and physiological evaluation at the entry 
o f the criminal justice system. As I pointed out in the last chapter, it also moves beyond the 
criminal justice system as a moral tool for identifying minor transgressions but more significantly 
for disciplining subjects in personnel screening. Here again, lie detection comes to fit the drive 
for efficient mechanisms o f controlling and optimising human subjects’ behaviour that defines 
the capitalist nation state. Thus it serves as one o f the tools and methods that are part o f what 
Foucault calls ‘the political technology o f the body5, a technology that comes to define 
disciplinary society in constructing ‘productive bodies’ that are, equally, ‘subjected bodies.’
6.4 Moral Technology
While lie detection assumed a central role in criminal investigations, it also spread beyond the 
confines o f the interrogation room of the police department and the criminal laboratory. As I
422 Silverman (2001)
423 In this context, Gibson (2001) provides an analysis o f  the role o f  the conception o f  the inside and the outside 
o f the body in wresting subjective truth from it. She argues that while torture depends on a distinction between 
inside and outside, whereby the truth is hidden within the body, polygraphy abolishes this distinction in turning 
the body into a site o f  borderless information processing’ (Gibson, 2001, p. 70). As my analysis in chapter 3 o f  
the significance o f  the distinction between the internal and the external movements o f  the body shows, I do not 
think that this ‘semiotic’ reading o f  the polygraph examination is fully valid, for it neglects the material 
processes which are crucial in the construction o f  the ‘epistemology o f  fear.’
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outlined in my discussion o f the Larson-Keeler conflict, Keeler developed the idea that the 
polygraph might be used in the investigation of thefts in banks and department stores who were 
complaining about major financial losses each year due to the stealing of money or merchandise 
in 1929. In this development, the function o f lie detection in establishing guilt in criminal 
investigations was extended to commercial enterprises and, in the 1940s, to government 
institutions. However, lie detection was not only used to identify a culprit in particular cases, but 
instead was used in regular screenings o f employees. While it operated as a tool o f criminal and 
moral exclusion in this context, it also assumed an inclusive disciplinaiy junction. Additionally, lie 
detection assumed a new role in commercial and (again, from the 1940s) in government 
institutions whereby it came to be used in the screening o f potential employees. Applicants who 
‘failed’ lie detection examinations were constituted as untrustworthy on the basis o f past 
transgressions and their morally dubious nature.
In 1941, Henry Scarborough, who represented the insurance firm Lloyd’s o f London in 
Chicago, estimated that $250,000,000 were embezzled in banks in the United States each year. 
The American Bankers’ Association was o f the view that 75% o f these embezzlements 
stemmed from ‘employees’ dishonesty.’424 Keeler had first examined employees in a bank at 
the request o f the State Attorney o f Illinois in 1929.425 This represents the common procedure 
by which the lie detection service o f the SCDL would be called on in criminal investigation 
until the 1930s. Lie detection services would be solicited by members o f the criminal justice 
system — state attorneys, police departments, and attorneys for the defence — in the solution 
o f particular criminal cases. However, when Scarborough first enlisted the services o f Keeler 
to investigate the source o f losses o f a Chicago bank, a change occurred in the use o f lie 
detection examinations. First, lie detection examinations were now ordered by commercial 
organisations. Second, they were not only carried out in particular cases, but became 
regularised in the general screening o f employees. Scarborough brought in more business for 
Keeler and by 1933 he had examined employees in thirty-seven banks. The first movement is 
significant insofar as it denotes the spread o f the functional mechanism of the lie detection 
examination as a hybrid between an inquisitorial technique and a psychological examination in 
criminal investigations beyond the criminal justice system and its agencies as it becomes 
‘privatised,’ at once making its reach more pervasive.
With respect to the second movement, as the number o f examinations carried out in banks 
and department stores increased, Keeler concluded from those examinations he had carried 
out that there was an average rate o f about 15% of employees o f banks who could be
424 McEvoy, 1941, p. 69.
425 LKP, Carton 2, Folder 3 L.K. Technique Policy Legal Status: letter by Leonarde Keeler to Prof. Newman F. 
Baker, 21 /7 /1933.
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classified as ‘petty thieves’, that is to say, who had stolen small amounts o f money from the 
bank at one point or another.426 At first, these thieves were made redundant, but soon Keeler 
found that instead o f firing employees who had only stolen small amounts and confessed to 
their wrongdoings, they should instead be retained by their employers, because
‘We have found in all but three individuals, to whom we have given another chance, strict reliability and 
honesty after they had made complete confessions.’427
A newspaper article even increased the figure o f petty thieves, stating that as much as 76% of 
employees had been found to steal money or merchandise. But when these employees were 
kept with the warning that in 6 months time, they would have to go through a lie detection 
examination again, the number o f employees who committed thefts was reduced to 3%. In 
the article’s terms, the lie detector was ‘an eye-opener.’428 Furnishing the machine with moral 
powers, another article stated that the lie detector was a ‘mechanical conscience,’ working like 
a ‘moral vaccination, a shot o f integrity in the arm.’429
Thus polygraphy was transformed from a technique for detecting guilt and innocence into a 
tool for reforming normal people, who had given in to temptation and committed minor 
offences. This tool o f reform operated through control:
‘Although many o f  these petty defaulters cannot be considered dangerous thieves, each one is a potential 
embezzler, and from our experience in examining the personnel o f  these many banks, it seems that the 
tests function as a deterrent, helping to correct the errors o f  individuals who might otherwise become a 
menace to the bank and endanger their own well-being.’430
Employees who confessed to having stolen money but were given a ‘clear record’ on their 
subsequent examination would thus be retained, while those who had not been reformed 
were dismissed. In this way, lie detection was used as a disciplinary technique which would 
correct the failings o f people who were not stricdy to be considered criminal but rather 
represented an average. Similarly to a technique o f normalisation, lie detection not only 
provided a way o f incriminating the guilty individual in the court system, but also o f 
correcting the petty thief who represented no real menace to society but needed to be 
controlled in order to protect the economic interests o f large organisations.431
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
428 McEvoy, 1941, p. 70.
429 Johnston, 1944, p. 9.
430 LKP, Carton 2, Folder 3 L.K. Technique Policy Legal Status: Letter by Leonarde Keeler to Newman F. 
Baker, 21/07/1933.
431 N ot only could the financial interests o f  capitalist organisations potentially be protected. Rather, in 1932, a 
plan was developed with the Emergency Relief Commission in Chicago that the city’s finances might be 
guarded against abusers o f  relief funds (LGP, Box 17, Folder 2: ‘Report o f  the Director Scientific Crime 
Detection Laboratory,’ 1932). This plan remained unrealised, but it points to the almost universal 
applications imagined for polygraphy as a moral technology.
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The use o f polygraph examinations in private businesses expanded massively in the 1940s and 
1950s, including the spread o f private polygraph businesses. By 1954, the International 
Society for the Detection o f Deception included 150 members.432 Clients o f these firms 
included big department stores, manufacturers, insurance companies, fur companies, jewellery 
supply houses and as in Keeler’s first business use, banks. Most cases concerned 
embezzlements.433
In governmental organisations, polygraph examinations were mainly used in what were 
considered security-sensitive areas. The first big governmental operation was initiated in 1947, 
after Keeler’s business and another polygraph firm Russell Chatham Inc., were called in by 
the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out a preliminary project on the prevention o f the 
theft o f fissionable materials from a nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. On the basis o f 
this project, Russell Chatham Inc. was contracted to carry out polygraph screenings covering 
a range o f 18 000 employees.434 According to Alder, such projects were geared less towards 
the resolution o f cases o f  fraud, but rather sought ‘to enforce a new form o f employee 
behaviour.’435 In polygraph examinations, employees were asked as to whether they had been 
involved with subversive individuals (in post-war America, this would have meant 
communists), whether they had filled out security questionnaires truthfully, whether they had 
talked about their work, had any plans to commit sabotage or to commit security violations.436 
By 1954, it was reported that polygraph examinations had become a regular occurrence at the 
Operations Research Office, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security 
Agency.437
In conjunction with regular screenings o f the workforce, polygraph examinations came to be 
used at the entry-point o f commercial and governmental institutions. Organisations could rely 
on lie detection as a way o f providing a fast and reliable method o f selecting applicants that 
could be trusted:
‘Among other uses, it makes the personnel interview more efficient. An industrialist may want to hire 
tool makers in a hurry. The applicants qualify for skill, but may be saboteurs. The Polygraph will give the 
employer an immediate, accurate check on the applicant’s past record. A  Fifth Columnist need not open 
his mouth. His reflexes will convict him.’438
One o f the first governmental uses that lie detection examinations were put to in screening 
potential employees for their trustworthiness was the examination by Keeler in 1945 o f 
German Prisoners o f War being trained as potential policemen in Rhode Island in post-war
432 Segrave, 2003, p. 57.
433 Ibid, p.58.
434 Ibid, p. 52.
435 Alder, 2002, p. 18.
436 Segrave, 2003, p. 52-53.
437 Ibid, p. 55.
438 McEvoy, 1941, p. 70.
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Germany for potential Nazi tendencies.439 It had also been used at the US State Department 
in ‘miscellaneous morals’ cases, mosdy involving the charge o f homosexuality.440 In 
examinations, potential employees were asked as to possible drug addictions, whether they 
were communists or homosexuals, and vague questions as to whether they had ever done 
anything that they were ashamed of.441 In employment screenings, lie detection 
examinations thus operated as tool o f moral exclusion whereby the ‘integrity’ o f an 
individual was elaborated upon the basis o f a set o f  moral questions. Here, the eligibility o f 
an applicant was determined not on the strength o f his or her qualifications, but on the 
basis o f an assessment o f their individual character, which if  they ‘failed’ the lie detection 
examination was constructed as ‘untrustworthy’ according to categories which were 
conceived o f as morally dangerous — such as homosexuality and communism (considered 
one o f the major threats to the national moral order in cold-war America) — or according to 
alleged transgressions in the applicant’s past which were a sign o f his questionable character 
in the present.
Having presented an overview o f how polygraph examinations came to be used in 
personnel screenings in commercial and governmental organisations, I will now turn to two 
analyses which have been provided regarding their function especially with regard to the 
regular screening o f employees. Alder discusses the spread o f polygraph examinations in 
employment screening in terms o f the regulation o f trust necessitated by the expansion o f 
large-scale bureaucratic organisations in the market economy and the national-security state. 
While in the 19th century, people still engaged in social relations through face-to-face 
interactions and thus interpreted the trustworthiness o f people through the skill o f  reading 
their appearances, in large-scale organisations social relations were increasingly 
anonymous.442 Lie detection examinations thus can be seen as one o f  a number o f new 
techniques designed to regulate social relations in an organisational setting marked by 
impersonality and efficiency. Drawing on the work o f institutional historians, Alder argues 
that lie detection examinations provided a means o f regulating trust in hierarchical 
organisations, which had been formed to reduce the cost o f information in risky market 
relations. In using lie detection examinations, managers had no longer to depend on 
‘sentimental avowals that passed for sincerity in Victorian times’443 and the idea o f loyalty to 
the firm. Rather, the use o f lie detection examinations was a technique for ensuring that
439 Alder, 2007, p. 202-204.
440 Segrave, 2003, p. 56; Alder, 2007, p. 222-228.
441 Segrave, 2003, p. 55.
442 Alder, 2007, p. 163-164.
443 Alder, 2002, p. 19.
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employees knew that the knowledge which was generated in and passed through these 
organisations was kept as a property o f that organisation.444
While Alder’s discussion regarding the function o f the polygraph examination in regulating 
trust makes sense in terms o f an analysis o f reorganisation o f interpersonal relationships 
resulting from institutional change in modern capitalism, it does not fully capture how lie 
detection came to function as a disciplinary technique. Thus his discussion might be expanded 
in conjunction with the broadly Foucauldian perspective taken by F. Allan Hanson. As 
became clear in the above discussion, lie detection worked as a disciplinary technique for 
controlling the behaviour o f employees. Lie detection could not only be used to ‘reform’ 
individuals who had committed minor thefts in commercial organisations. On a broader level, 
the mere institution o f regular polygraph screenings in organisations, which implied that 
transgressions would be known, worked as a disciplinary technique in directing the behaviour 
o f employees in terms o f organisational interests. In the book Testing testing, which discusses 
the ubiquity o f a battery o f psychological and psychiatric tests as mechanisms not only to 
constitute the individual as a person but also to subject that person to surveillance and 
domination in modern society,445 Hanson discusses this disciplining feature o f polygraph 
screenings in terms o f Foucault’s notion o f  disciplinary power. He argues that the lie 
detection examination constitutes the ultimate tool o f surveillance as it provides a way of 
monitoring employees’ self-awareness — ‘an awareness not only o f overt deeds but also o f 
intentions, desires, impulses and other “inner” phenomena [,..]’446 — and a means o f 
controlling their behaviour and deriving information on it. In this context, he argues that the 
lie detection examination can be compared to the power mechanism to which the prisoner is 
subjected in the panopticon. The spatial organisation o f the panopticon institutes a certain 
form o f visibility whereby the prisoner can in principle be permanently observed in his cell by 
the guard in the central watch tower. Conversely, the observer in the watch tower remains 
hidden from view so that the prisoner can never know whether he is in fact being observed 
or not. The institution o f a permanent visibility makes for an ‘automatic functioning o f 
power’ — ‘the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its 
action.’447 As a result o f the organisation o f space which divides along the lines o f a 
permanent visibility and invisibility, ‘inmates should be caught up in a power situation o f 
which they are themselves the bearers.’448 The regular screening o f employees in polygraph 
examinations may have a similar effect on their behaviour. However, instead o f being
444 Ibid, p. 19.
445 Hanson, 1993, p. 3.
446 Ibid, p. 116.
447 Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 201.
448 Ibid, p. 201.
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organised along the lines o f visibility, I suggest, the lie detection examination operates 
according to a logic o f temporal displacement. That is to say, it seeks to direct the behaviour o f 
individuals through the awareness that their transgressions might be known in the future.
In constituting a power mechanism that is continuous in its effects, lie detection is also 
marked by its efficient^ . Hanson compares the use o f lie detection examinations with the 
institution o f the $5 day by the Ford Corporation as part o f which employees were rewarded 
with an increased wage for ‘proper living.’ This, however, necessitated the institution o f a 
‘Sociology Department’ with up to 100 investigators who would pay visits to employees to 
check whether they were leading their private lives in an appropriate manner. By contrast, 
polygraph examinations provided a cheap and fast way o f checking on the appropriateness o f 
employee behaviour and controlling it through the threat that any transgressions would be 
known.449 Thus the lie detection examination corresponds to disciplinary power in terms o f 
how it renders the subject party to his continual surveillance. In doing so, it implements the 
second major characteristic which marks the ‘disciplinary mechanism:’ it operates as ‘a 
functional mechanism’ which enhances ‘the exercise o f power by making it lighter, more 
rapid, more effective, [...].’45°
It seems to be the efficiency o f this mechanism which has sustained the use o f lie detection 
examinations in commercial organisations and government institutions. For, while this 
mechanism has been subjected to continual criticism and contestation, it has maintained itself 
and even prospered. Although persistent criticism seems to have lead to a provisional success 
o f the critics o f lie detection in the institution o f the Employment Polygraph Protection Act 
(EPPA) in 1988, which provided that polygraph examinations could only be carried out in 
criminal investigations and in security-sensitive fields o f employment,451 polygraphy has 
continued to expand. Intriguingly, this expansion has been accompanied by a cyclical process 
o f government investigations into its use in its various government institutions. Such 
investigations are framed not only in terms o f the contestation o f its scientificity, but also in 
terms of the protection o f the rights o f the individual and the motivation o f the workforce. 
These investigations in turn result in the temporary curbing or modification o f its application
449 Hanson, 1993, p. 116-117.
450 Foucauk, 1975/1991, p. 209.
451 For the legal provisions o f  the act, cf. Federation o f  American Scientists. “Tide 29 United States Code 
Chapter 22 Employee Polygraph Protection Act.” http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/eppa.html 
(23/2/2007). Further analysis is needed as regards the shifting o f  regular polygraph screenings more 
exclusively to governmental including law enforcement and national security institutions. Drawing on his 
institutional analysis, Alder interprets this shift in terms o f  the re-organisation o f  modern firms along more 
flexible and horizontal lines ‘where “knowledge workers” operate almost like subcontractors’ (Alder, 2007, p. 
256). In this new model o f  management enforced ‘loyalty’ by means o f  polygraph examinations has become 
outdated. A further examination would elaborate on the changing operating mechanisms o f  commercial and 
governmental institutions with regard to the protection o f  information and the direction o f  employees in 
harbouring it, i.e. it would investigate different conceptions o f  institutional secrecy.
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in agencies. This period is then followed by a swift increase in its use, justified on the basis o f 
internal or external events such as the identification of security leaks or (most recendy) 
terrorist threats, leading on to the next government investigation — and so on.
The first intervention in the spreading government use o f the polygraph occurred in 1963, 
when a congressional subcommittee was formed to ascertain the use o f polygraph 
examinations in government institutions. In 1964, hearings were held by the so-called Moss 
committee to determine whether and to what extent polygraphy should be used by 
government agencies. The Moss committee report concluded that: ‘there is no lie detector, 
neither machine nor human.’452 As a result o f the report, which criticised the use o f polygraph 
examinations on the ground o f their lack o f accuracy and the poor training o f polygraph 
operators, the Department o f Defense sharply cut down on polygraph examinations 453 Yet 
this was not to last for long — already in 1983, the next major government investigation was 
underway, carried out by the Office o f Technology Assessment as a result o f President 
Reagan’s order that all government workers in sensitive jobs should be required to take an 
examination in order to root out security leaks, which had been made apparent 454 Finally, in 
2003 the National Academy for Science published yet another report on the scientificity o f 
the use o f the polygraph in security screening following a classified directive which had been 
issued by President Clinton requiring the Department o f Energy to step up its counter­
intelligence programme in order to curtail potential security leaks and which was put into 
action through requiring all employees including contractor employees with access to 
classified information to undergo polygraph examinations as well as a mandatory screening at 
five-year intervals.455
Again, the NAS report pointed to the fact that while polygraphy could detect lying at a level 
above chance, there was little empirical evidence to support the accuracy o f polygraph 
examinations in employment screening.456 It concluded that while there may be some utility in 
using them to increase the chance o f detecting security leaks, alternative methods should be 
given more consideration.457 As result of the report, the Department o f Energy was required 
to revise its regulations regarding the use o f polygraph examinations in security screenings. 
The Department o f  Energy repealed the general screening o f applicants as part o f their
452 Cited in Segrave, 2003, p. 80.
453 Ibid, p. 80.
454 Ibid, p. 137. For an overview o f the report’s findings cf. Saxe, Dougherty and Cross (1985). For a full 
version o f  the report cf. Federation o f  American Scientists. “Scientific Validity o f  Polygraph Testing: A  
Research Review and Evaluation.” http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota/index.html 
(14/02/07).
455 Cf. copy o f  Department o f  Energy publication on ‘Polygraph Examination Regulation’ in the Federal 
Register in 1999, published by Federation o f  American Scientists. “Polygraph Examination Regulation.” 
http://www.fas.org/ sgp/new s/19 9 9 /0 8 /fr081899.html (22/02/2007).
456 Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence o f  the Polygraph, 2003, p. 3.
457 Ibid, p. 8.
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‘counterintelligence evaluation/ and instead implemented the screening o f employees in 
certain high-risk positions.458 Additionally, it implemented a random screening programme 
which reduced the numbers o f employees tested. While this can be portrayed as the curbing 
o f the use o f lie detection, it works within a mechanism o f increased ‘deterrence/ thus 
keeping within the logic o f all-encompassing surveillance. Thus even though the effectiveness 
o f the mechanism has continually been criticized in actually detecting the transgressions o f 
the employee, its logic o f continual and efficient surveillance seems to have been too 
attractive to relinquish it altogether. Rather, in combination with the continual affirmation o f 
its lack o f accuracy, which always centres on the same figures between 75% and 85%, comes 
the attempt at improving its methods, which as one might already predict, will become the 
basis o f the same assessment in the next round o f government investigations.
Drawing on Alder’s and Hanson’s analyses, I have provided an examination o f how 
polygraphy spreads beyond the confines o f criminal investigation and is turned into a moral 
technology, which comprises an exclusionary as well as an inclusionary, disciplinary function. 
In this, it implements the logic o f disciplinary power, instituting a mechanism of surveillance 
over the individual by means o f directing his behaviour not through continuous intervention, 
but by directing it on the basis o f potential intervention in the future. In this way, polygraphy 
not only comes to implement the logic o f surveillance that defines disciplinary society, but 
does so in an efficient manner — that is to say, a manner which achieves a maximum o f effects 
while requiring a minimum o f resources, or rather by making the individual the resource of 
his own surveillance.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a broader analysis o f the lie detection examination as a technique 
o f knowledge production and intervention. I did so by applying Foucault’s notion o f 
grotesque knowledge, which he develops in his analysis o f the status o f the medico-legal 
expert.
I have argued that, analogously to his evaluation o f the function o f medico-legal knowledge as 
a ‘switch-point’ between psychiatric discourse and jurisprudence, the lie detection 
examination also works as a ‘switch-point’ between psychological knowledge and the 
elaboration o f guilt. In examining its ‘grotesqueness’, I showed how psychological knowledge 
and criminal interrogation became entwined in a circular mechanism which centres on 
modulating the body’s responses in evoking ‘the fear o f detection’ and its simultaneous
458 For an online version o f  the regulations published in the Federal Register in 2006, cf. Federation o f  
American Scientists. “Department o f  Energy 10 CFR Parts 709 and 710 Counterintelligence Evaluation 
Regulations.” http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/fr092906.htm l (22/2/2007).
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measurement. In framing the examination in terms o f the lie, it seeks to bring an absolute 
power to bear on the individual through the absolute threat that what is in his mind will be 
known. In managing the fear o f the subject, the instrument takes on a measuring and a 
performative role in being accorded the status o f lie detector as well as scientific instrument. 
The examiner complements the instrument in constituting a hybrid o f the psychological 
expert and interrogator. The spatial make-up o f the examination which combines the 
characteristics o f the experimental set-up and the interrogation room reinforces the 
construction o f the authority o f the expert/interrogator and the lie/detector instrument over 
the individual. In transforming the expression of fear into a ‘diagnosis’ o f the lie, the lie 
detection examination serves to stitch together psychological knowledge and the elaboration 
o f guilt. The diagnosis o f the lie does not only combine psychological knowledge and criminal 
interrogation, it also serves to mask the inquisitorial aim which defines the lie detection 
examination in seeking to entice the subject into a confession on the basis o f the expert’s 
statement that he has lied. At the very moment at which the subject confesses, however, and 
thus the ensemble o f the expert/interrogator and the lie detector/instrument succeeds in 
having brought an absolute power to bear on the individual, this ensemble is also disqualified. 
As a technique o f knowledge production, whose very structure is built on the inquisitorial aim 
of extracting a confession from the subject by means o f turning his body against himself, it 
cannot free itself from this aim in its attempt at scientific verification. For the confirmation o f 
the subject’s lie only becomes possible through the subject’s avowal o f his guilt, which is 
mediated by the inquisitorial as well as psychological nature o f the lie detection examination. 
Having considered the power/knowledge mechanism which comes to define lie detection, I 
further discussed its role as technique o f  knowledge production and intervention at the 
entrance o f the criminal justice system. I argued that it comes to match the needs o f a system 
that, although reluctantly, still depends to a significant measure on the confession as a form 
o f judicial proof, which the lie detection examination renders in more acceptable, i.e. scientific 
terms. Moreover, it functions as a tool within a system which, on the basis o f its massive 
expansion since the 19th century, came to be organised in terms o f the efficient processing o f 
criminal cases not only within but mainly outside the boundary o f the courts by means o f plea 
bargains and confessions. In meeting this aim, the lie detection examination constitutes a 
hybrid o f an inquisitorial method and the examination, which defines the central technique by 
which the human sciences come to intervene upon the human subject. It also entails faint 
echoes o f torture, which turns the subject’s body against himself in extracting from him a 
statement o f guilt. However, it transforms the epistemology o f pain which marks torture into 
the more benign mechanism o f the epistemology of fear, which seeks to elicit a confession on 
the basis o f the physiological and moral evaluation o f the responses o f the subject’s body. On
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this basis, the subject is not only constituted as guilty on the basis o f his confession, but 
equally, as immoral on the basis o f the abnormality o f his speech. As an efficient mechanism of 
extracting confessions for the regulation o f criminal cases outside o f the court, it is the nature 
o f the lie detection examination as hybrid o f an inquisitorial technique and a psychological 
examination that defines its modem character, at least in the US. For it comes to function as a 
tool in a system which is no longer organised in terms o f assigning a legal punishment on the 
basis o f the judicial process, but caters to its management o f a growing population o f 
‘delinquents.’
While the lie detection examination assumes a central function at the entrance o f the criminal 
justice system as a psychological technique o f eliciting confessions, it spreads beyond it by 
assuming the status o f a moral technology in commercial and governmental institutions. In 
drawing on the analyses o f Alder and Hanson, I showed that the lie detection examination 
moves beyond the criminal justice system being implemented as a moral technology through 
its use in personnel screening. Here, it becomes implemented as a tool in including or 
excluding the potential employee on the basis o f his ‘trustworthiness.’ However, and more 
significandy, it also becomes a disciplinary tool in regular personnel screenings in controlling 
employee behaviour along organisational interests — coming to centre on the control o f 
‘sensitive’ knowledge not to be shared with others.
In discussing its role as disciplinary tool, I presented Alder’s argument which contextualised 
the use o f lie detection examinations in personnel screenings as an expression o f the 
reorganisation o f relationships o f ‘trust’ in terms o f the imperatives o f impersonality and 
efficiency in large scale organisations. However, I argued that this perspective does not 
account for the power mechanism which defines lie detection as a disciplinary tool, and 
sought to extend this perspective through the work o f Hanson. In being used as a tool which 
comes to orient the behaviour o f individuals on the basis o f the fact that their transgressions 
might be known in the future, the polygraph examination works according to the logic o f 
disciplinary power. In a similar vein to how visibility is organised in the panopticon, the lie 
detection examination institutes a system o f surveillance through the threat o f the future 
identification o f transgressions. It is marked by the fact that it is continuous in its effects but 
discontinuous in its application. In this, the lie detection examination corresponds to the 
effectiveness which marks disciplinary power in implementing a structure whereby the 
individuals themselves become the bearers o f the power relationship. It is the apparent 
efficiency o f the lie detection examination in this system which makes it so attractive in the 
regulation o f criminal guilt at the entry o f the criminal justice system and the control o f 
employee behaviour in commercial and governmental institutions and which protects it 
against all efforts at contestation.
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What, then, are we finally to make o f the lie detection examination as hybrid o f an 
inquisitorial technique and psychological examination as well as a disciplinary tool? In a 
broader sense, it becomes one o f the ‘tools’ and ‘methods’ which constitute what Foucault 
calls a ‘political technology o f the body.’ In  modern society, this technology comes to centre 
on the ‘soul’ as target and effect o f a set o f power relations, which constitute the human 
subject as an object o f knowledge and intervention. In Discipline and Punish, which is framed as 
a ‘correlative history o f the modem soul and the power to judge,’ Foucault seeks to show 
how since the 19th century, power and knowledge have intersected to produce the individual 
not only as object o f knowledge but also as site o f intervention by virtue o f that very 
knowledge. It comes to centre on controlling the individual in terms o f his soul, which ‘is 
produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning o f a power that is 
exercised on those punished -  and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and 
corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are 
stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest o f their lives.*459 In  the construction o f the 
‘soul,’ the lie detection examination works directly on the body, taking it as basis for the 
elaboration for what Hacking calls a ‘surrogate o f the soul,’ the construction o f the subject’s 
inner life, o f his thoughts, in terms o f the movements o f the body. This process entails the 
subjection o f the body not only in terms o f the ‘epistemology o f fear’ which is brought to 
bear on it, but also in terms o f the effects which this subjection that is framed in terms o f 
knowledge is supposed to generate: the confession. But the subjected body that is produced 
in the lie detection examination is also a correlate o f the construction o f  the productive body 
— its functioning in commercial and governmental institutions is the result not only o f a direct 
but rather an indirect mechanism, which centres on disciplining the individual in terms o f 
managing his productivity. Here productivity is no longer understood in terms o f managing 
the factory worker’s labour force but increasingly in terms o f controlling the knowledge that 
the employee — in recent years, specifically the law enforcement or government employee — 
harbours in his mind. Thus the lie, formerly the province o f theologians and philosophers 
such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant, has turned from being an object o f 
moral contemplation into an object o f knowledge and intervention that is enlisted in 
managing the productive and the subjected body.
459 Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 29.
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Chapter 7 The Truth Facilitator and the Neuro-Circuitry of 
Deception
In the last chapter I argued that lie detection can be interpreted in terms o f  Foucault’s notion 
o f ‘grotesque knowledge:’ it represents a type o f knowledge which implements an absolute 
power while disqualifying itself as a technique o f knowledge production by virtue o f the fact 
that its verification is dependent upon the subject’s confession. O n the basis o f this analysis, I 
provided an evaluation o f how the polygraph examination has come to operate as a hybrid o f 
an inquisitorial technique and a psychological examination at the entry-point o f the criminal 
jusdce system. Furthermore, from the 1930s, the polygraph examination assumed an 
additional function o f personnel screening in commercial institutions until 1988 and in 
governmental institutions until today. In these institutions, lie detection was constituted as a 
disciplinary technique which directs employees’ behaviour on the basis o f  the threat that their 
transgressions may be known in the future. In this, it comes to operate according to the logic 
of disciplinary power which is marked by its effectiveness in making individuals the bearers o f 
the power relations that are exerted on them.
Taking up where this argument left off, in this final substantive chapter o f  the thesis I will 
consider the most recent development in the spread o f polygraphy. The polygraph 
examination has assumed a new function in the monitoring o f sex offenders and paedophiles 
on parole or probation. As part o f this new function, polygraphy is located within the current 
reconfiguration o f systems o f social control that are geared towards the management and 
containment o f groups o f individuals on the basis o f the assessment o f the ‘risk’ that they 
pose to society. In order to discuss this development, I draw on Rose’s analysis o f the 
operation o f networks o f exclusion in liberal societies. Rose suggests that the classification 
and management o f ‘risky’ individuals engenders the emergence o f a new type o f human 
being: the monstrous individual. I elaborate on how the polygraph examination has come to be 
used as a ‘truth facilitator’ in managing the monstrosity o f the sex offender and the 
paedophile. Operating as a technique o f pre-emptive supervision, it constantly re-asserts and 
contains the monstrosity o f the sex offender in opposition to the free and autonomous 
individual.
Having completed the analysis o f how the polygraph examination as an applied technique 
comes to spread and is reframed in operating according to different mechanisms o f control, 
the second part o f the chapter concerns itself with the re-emergence o f  an interest in the 
detection o f deception in the academic realm in the 1970s. N ot only did this involve the 
taking up o f polygraphy by psychologists and its contestation. Additionally, new ways o f
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capturing deception have evolved, following a shift in experimental psychology from the 
study o f the emotions to the study o f  cognition. I trace the movement from the ‘epistemology of 
fear’ to an ‘epistemology o f recognition’ which engenders, first, the reframing o f bodily 
responses in terms o f the extemalization o f ‘guilty knowledge,’ and second, results in the 
movement o f the lie from the body to the brain. Researchers on guilty knowledge suggest that 
their technique provides a truly scientific means o f detecting deception by rendering 
deception in terms o f the ‘probability o f guilt’ over and against the subjective and unreliable 
methods o f polygraphy. However, polygraphy continues to be the main applied technique of 
detecting deception, while the guilty knowledge test remains confined to the laboratory. In 
drawing a comparison between the latter’s development and the institutionalisation o f early 
polygraphy, I furnish an explanation for this entrapment o f the guilty knowledge test. In 
completing the overview o f the movement o f deception from the body to the brain, I discuss 
recent efforts to light up the ‘neuro-circuitry o f deception,’ which provides the lie with a 
definitive location in the brain. In corresponding fully to the new cognitive paradigm in 
psychology and in turning the detection o f deception into a seemingly automized process o f 
the computation o f the lie, I consider the question whether it will finally fulfil the promise of 
the lie detector as a humane and scientific technique.
7.1 From lie detector to ‘truth facilitator’
As part o f my analysis o f the status o f the lie detection examination as technique o f 
knowledge production and intervention, I discussed how lie detection spread beyond the 
criminal justice system and became instituted as a disciplinary technique. More recently, 
polygraphy has assumed a new and increasingly significant function within the reformulation 
o f the criminal justice system, specifically in conjunction with the notion o f risk that is being 
used in programmes involving the ‘monitoring’ and ‘treatment’ o f sex offenders on parole or 
probation. In the containment o f the sex offender, which has become a focus o f public 
criminal policy and criminal law from the late 1980s,460 the polygraph examination is turning 
into an increasingly widespread tool, having been in use by 16% o f parole and probation 
agencies in the US in 1998.461 Strikingly, this application o f the polygraph examination has not 
remained limited to the US. Beginning in 2001, the UK government, which in 1986 had still 
been opposed to the use o f polygraph examinations in criminal investigations contesting its 
scientific validity,462 had funded pilot studies463 into the use o f polygraph examinations in sex
460 Becker and Murphy, 1998, p 116.
461 English, et a l, 2000, p. 8.
462 The govemement’s posidon was based on a study carried out by the Bridsh Psychological Association 
(Grubin, et al., 2004).
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offender monitoring. By December 2006,464 the UK government was considering the 
implementation o f a monitoring scheme instituting compulsory polygraph screening for sex 
offenders on the basis o f a provision included in the government’s 2005 Management of 
Offenders and Sentencing Bill 465 In the following discussion, I will explore recent shifts towards 
framing social control in terms o f risk and provide an analysis o f how the function o f the 
polygraph examination becomes reformulated in sex-offender monitoring. Its transformation 
into a ‘truth facilitator’ renders it a tool in the intervention upon ‘monstrous individuals,’ 
matching the system’s new logic o f management and containment rather than the reform of 
offenders.
Feeley and Simon have argued that in the period since World War II the criminal justice 
system has become increasingly centred around the notion o f risk.466 Crime is no longer 
conceptualized as a problem to be solved through remedies provided by social reform, but 
rather as a reality to be controlled on the basis o f risk assessment. The techniques o f 
knowledge and control, then, no longer focus on the individualization and normalization o f 
the individual offender in a disciplinary society, but are rather geared towards classifying groups 
o f offenders on the basis o f the risk that they pose to society and identifying measures for 
their management and containment in an increasingly ‘post-disciplinary’ society.467 Control 
measures are here defined on the basis o f conceptions o f ‘actuarial’ justice and derived from 
statistical models, which feed into measures o f regulating deviance.468 However, other 
scholars have suggested that this shift is less straightforward than it seems, that aspects o f  the 
old reformist model coexist with the new risk-based one.469 Drawing on Foucault’s notion o f 
‘governmentality,’ Rose suggests that while shifts in conceiving of, and organizing, control are 
indeed taking place, these should be considered not only in terms o f the criminal justice 
system, but in terms o f how modes o f governing the conduct o f individuals are implemented 
in liberal societies. O n the one hand, these new forms o f control centre on ‘networks o f 
inclusion’ as part o f  which identities o f individuals are constituted through the ‘securitisation 
o f identities,’ which not only makes the increased tracing o f the individual by means o f 
information derived from identity, credit and debit cards and driver’s licenses possible, but
463 The pilot studies were carried out by the National Probation Service under the leadership o f  the forensic 
psychiatrist Don Grubin and funded by the Home Office and the NHS (Grubin and Marsden, 2006; Grubin, et 
a lt 2004). A further pilot study was carried out by Wilcox and Sosnowski (2005).
464 BBC News. “Lie test plan for sex offenders.” 1 /12/2006.
http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1 /h i/ uk_politics/6197458.stm (9/12/2006).
465 House o f  Lords. “Management o f Offenders Sentencing Bill.” 12/1/2005. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldbills/016/2005016.pdf (14/2/2007). Cf. N o. 47-50 
o f  Part 5 Miscellaneous Provisions o f  the Bill. The bill is part o f  a wider reform o f  the British penal system 
which is equally geared towards instituting a risk-assessment based system o f  social control.
466 Feeley and Simon, 1992,457-458.
467 Feeley and Simon (1992); Haggerty and Ericson (1997).
468 Feeley and Simon, 1992, p. 452-454.
469 Garland (1996).
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also serves in the elaboration o f individual’s subjectivities. They form ‘obligatory access 
points’ for individuals in participating in ‘networks o f civility’ which are attached to possible 
sanctions, rewards, etc. which mediate individuals’ choices and thus direct their conduct as 
‘active citizens’ in a free society.470 As part o f the networks o f inclusion, a mode o f governing 
is instituted which is no longer organised around a state-provided system o f control, but 
rather ‘responsibilises’ individuals to constitute their own security in ‘communities o f control,’ 
e.g. forming community watch groups, employing private security companies, constructing 
gated communities etc.471
The management o f the population on the basis o f risk by means o f the analysis o f the 
distribution o f problematic individuals and their placement to ensure an efficient 
functioning o f the population finds its application in networks o f  exclusion. These forms o f 
risk assessment are, however, rarely formulated in actuarial or numericized terms, but are 
rather characterized by a ‘risk gaze’, maintained by an increasingly diversified set o f 
agencies, that is focused on the excluded: the poor, the mental patient, the criminal, etc. As 
part o f the analysis o f the ‘riskyness’ o f individuals, such individuals are assessed as to 
whether they can be included or must be excluded. O n the basis o f this evaluation, sets o f 
measures are defined which, depending on the kind o f risk that individuals pose, are 
focused on controlling them within the community or result in their detainment if they are 
considered too risky for society.472 Those that are included, again, become subject to the 
process o f ‘responsibilisation.’ Programmes are designed for them which are based on 
reframing their problematic nature in ethical and moral terms, centring on their conduct. 
The control mechanism that they apply is intricate, in that the moral rendering o f subjects’ 
problems makes the application o f a set o f psychological techniques possible which are 
framed in terms o f the ‘empowerment’ o f  individuals. They construct the interventions on 
the subject not in terms o f instituting conformity, but rather in terms o f enabling them to 
become ‘autonomous’ free individuals who participate in the ‘empire o f choice.’473 The 
psychologico-ethical elaboration and management o f those to be included is matched by a 
process o f exclusion which considers certain classes o f people to be beyond the moral 
bounds o f society. This involves the definition o f new types o f  human kinds, people that 
are ‘intractably risky — ‘monstrous individuals who either cannot or do not wish to exercise 
the self-control upon conduct necessary in a culture o f freedom.’474 They are defined by the 
fact that their ‘very make up as human beings appears somehow faulty or incomplete and
470 Rose, 2000, p. 325-327.
471 Ibid, p. 327-328.
472 Ibid, p. 331-333.
473 Ibid, p. 334.
474 Ibid, p. 334.
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whose very nature thus seems to place them permanently beyond the limits o f civility and 
its demands on subjectivity.’475
The sex offender, especially the paedophile, are maybe the epitome o f this class o f 
‘monstrous’ individuals, having become, and continuing to be, the focus o f media and 
legislative attention. This is expressed in the extensive news coverage o f heinous sexual 
crimes which centre on the disappearance, abuse and murder o f children. The media 
fascination with these types o f crime and the specific focus o f legislative measures to contain 
them, bear little relationship to the frequency o f their occurrence in relation to other crimes. 
Rather, they are embedded in a ‘culture o f fear’ which is constructed around the threat to 
children’s wellbeing or perceived violence against children.476
In the elaboration o f the sex offender and the paedophile as monstrous individuals, their 
nature becomes defined by their perversity, which is ‘ingrained, compulsive and lifelong.’477 
The ‘sexual predator’ is an individual whose offences are merely an expression o f his 
monstrosity, which is itself framed as a pathology. His definition as an individual who is 
beyond the ethical bounds o f society is accompanied by the construction o f his pathology not 
only in terms o f  his offending behaviour, but in terms o f his moral conduct: he has ‘made 
secrecy and dishonesty a part o f their [his] lifestyle.’478 Being placed beyond the moral bounds 
o f society, sets o f specific measures are applied to him that move him beyond the limits o f 
liberal institutions to which those that exist within the culture o f freedom would normally be 
entitled. He no longer has the right to be subjected to detention only if  convicted o f a crime 
in a court o f law. Rather, once his first conviction and sentence have marked him as a 
monster, he needs to be continually surveilled, assessed, monitored, and treated, upon his 
release back into society. As a human being that poses an absolute risk, pre-emptive measures 
need to be applied, which might include his detention before a crime has been committed in 
order to protect society from the threat that he poses.479
475 Ibid, p. 334.
476 Farkas and Stichman, 2002, p. 256. Further analysis o f  the cultural conditions under which the sex offender 
and the paedophile have become the focus o f  criminal policy at the intersection o f  the media, interest 
groups, psychology and governmental legislatures in liberal societies is needed. As my discussion focuses on 
how the polygraph examination constructs and intervenes upon the sex offender as monstrous individual, 
such an analysis is beyond the scope o f  this thesis. For an insightful analysis o f  discursive changes as part o f  
which the protection o f  children became re-constituted around the figure o f  the sex offender as dangerous 
individual, having formerly centred on both the homosexual and the psychopath, cf. Pratt (1998).
477 English, et al, 2000, p. 21.
478 Ibid, p. 12.
479 These measures have been implemented in specific sex-offending laws, so-called ‘sexually violent predator 
laws’ from the early 1990s which regulate the continual containment and management o f  sex offenders by 
providing for indeterminate confinement, sex offender registration and community notification, and 
chemical castration in addition to regular polygraph examinations. These laws have replaced earlier ‘sexual 
psychopath’ laws which were drawn up from the 1930s that were still framed in terms o f  the rehabilitation o f  
offenders (La Fond, 1998). Legislation providing for mandatory regular polygraph examinations o f  convicted 
sex offenders has been implemented in at least six states at the state-level and has become a requirement in 
local jurisdictions in thirty states (Farkas and Stichmann, 2002, p. 274).
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In managing his pathology, a set o f agencies is constituted around him: ranging from the 
parole officer, the treatment provider, to the ‘post-conviction’ polygraph examiner.480 In 
targeting the nature o f his monstrosity — his compulsion to commit further offences and his 
deceptiveness — the polygraph examination is constructed as the most fitting tool in an equal 
measure to the use o f urinanalysis in the treatment o f the drug offender.481 The polygraph 
examination is used, firsdy, to establish the ‘whole truth’ o f the offender’s sexual offence 
history, to identify his complete pathology. On this basis a treatment plan is elaborated, which 
might include the implementation o f a whole set o f measures geared towards his containment 
ranging from close surveillance measures, electronic monitoring, curfews, to home 
confinement etc.482 These measures are designed to ensure the that the community in which 
he is located is protected from the threat that he poses. Secondly, through recurrent 
polygraph examinations covering past and current behaviour, such measures can be modified, 
stepped up or lead to the revocation o f his parole.483
In requiring the offender’s waiver o f his confidentiality rights, the use o f the polygraph 
examination as confessional technique in the construction o f a full offender history is here 
radicalized by the elicitation o f confessions regarding past crimes resulting in his potential
As regards indeterminate confinement, involuntary civil commitment statutes applied to mentally ill 
persons have been expanded to include sex offenders and paedophiles (for a discussion o f  the expansion 
o f these statutes cf. Cornwell, 1998). As part o f  these statutes individuals can be contained indefinitely if  
they are seen to pose a threat on the basis o f  their ‘mental abnormality’ (a broad term drawn up to 
include not only those who suffer from a classified mental illness but whose behaviour is seen to be 
dangerous) (Farkas and Stichman, 2002, p. 259-260). In the US, all states have been required to 
implement obligatory registers o f  sex offenders and mandatory community notification on the basis o f  
federal legislation passed in 1994 and amended in 1996. This was accompanied by the implementation o f  
the well-known ‘Megan’s Law’ in N ew  Jersey, after the assault and murder o f  the girl Megan Kanka (ibid, 
p. 263). Other states have equally implemented legislation under this name. Megan’s Law served as 
inspiration for the large-scale campaign for ‘Sarah’s Law’ in the UK launched by News of the World in July 
2000 after the assault and murder o f  Sarah Payne (cf. N ew s o f  the World, “for Sarah.” 
http://www.forsarah.com/html/sarahslaw.html. 25 /03 /2007). The registration o f  offenders and the 
notification o f  communities o f  their existence fit within the logic o f  the ‘responsibilisation’ o f  individuals 
in communities o f  control. This measure is intended for people to safeguard against the danger o f  the 
‘monstrous’ individual. It marks the ‘sexual predator’ as individual who, although set within a 
community, cannot adhere to its moral bounds. His mere physical presence therefore is a constant 
danger and he must remain excluded. Simon (1998) provides an analysis o f  how sexual predator laws 
(and their upholding by the US Supreme Court) and ‘Megan’s law’ institute sex offenders as separate 
classes o f  ‘monstrous’ individuals. While Simon’s analysis is valuable with regard to how monstrosity is 
written into the law it fails to account for the central role that is played by psychology in materialising 
this notion. Rather, he argues that psychology has been in crisis having lost its epistemological centre, i.e. 
the individual offender to be rehabilitated (ibid, p. 454). As this analysis shows, psychological techniques 
are crucial in organising systems o f  management and containment. It is for this reason, that Rose’s 
framework which explicitly integrates psychological techniques represents a more useful approach.
For discussions o f  the history o f  sex offender laws, an overview o f  the mental health literature on sex 
offenders, and approaches to sex offender risk assessment and treatment, cf. the special issue in Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law, Vol. 4, N o. 1/2.
480 English, et al., 2000, p. 8.
481 English, 1998, p. 228.
482 English, et a l, 2000, p. 9.
483 Ahlmeyer, et a l, (2000).
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re-insertion into criminal detention.484 Its use also draws on its function as disciplinary tool. 
In subjecting the offender to regular examinations, lie detection seeks to direct his 
behaviour by means o f the threat that any transgressions may be known in the future. 
However, it also transforms this function along the pre-emptive logic o f his management by 
inquiring into patterns o f ‘pre-assaultive behaviors and emotions.’485 Thus the examination 
is no longer only geared towards establishing deeds already committed, but deeds imagined 
or acts considered as transgressions (several o f which would be thought o f as normal or 
minor forms o f misbehaviour) which may now be regarded as warning signs o f the future 
occurrence o f the deed — accessing adult or child Internet pornography, establishing contact 
with children, but also deviant fantasies, (excessive) masturbation, the visiting o f topless 
bars, or “aimless driving” — and which require immediate intervention so as to prevent its 
realisation.486 This new function o f the polygraph examination is expressed by a new 
designation which it is given by its practitioners: it is no longer portrayed as ‘lie detector/ 
but rather as a ‘truth facilitator.’487
The lie detector symboli2es a different form o f how social control and knowledge come to 
intersect in intervening upon the individual. The ‘diagnosis’ o f the lie in the polygraph 
examination seeks to establish the subject’s guilt; it is geared towards the teasing out o f crimes 
committed in the past. Furthermore, as a knowledge technique it does not construct the 
individual as a certain type o f being, but rather seeks to simply apprehend him on the basis o f 
his lie. Being set at the entry-point o f the criminal justice system, it intervenes upon the 
suspect by inserting the criminal into the process o f punishment on the basis o f his 
confession. In being constituted as guilty on the basis o f his confession and immoral on the 
basis o f his lie, the offender remains within the moral order.
By contrast, as a ‘truth facilitator/ the polygraph examination constructs and intervenes upon 
a pathological subject, whose pathology combines his compulsion to commit perverse sexual 
acts with his deceptiveness. By inquiring into the individual’s thoughts and actions, the truth 
facilitator seeks to monitor the danger o f future acts and pre-empt them through the 
modulation o f his treatment. In this sense, the ‘truth facilitator’ encompasses a notion o f 
treatment which does not operate on the basis o f a single crimino-psychological judgment o f
484 Sex offender monitoring programmes are here subject to a tension which is constituted by the underlying 
assumption that successful monitoring o f  sex offender pathology can only be achieved through the complete 
disclosure o f  all criminal acts and the potential thwarting o f  confessions because o f  the danger o f  
prosecution o f  these undisclosed crimes. This is usually negotiated through the granting o f  ‘limited’ or 
‘conditional immunity:’ as long as the offender adheres to the programme and completes it successfully he is 
protected from further convictions (English, et a l, 2000, p.18-21; Hindman and Peters, 2001, p. 12-13). For 
studies on the effect o f polygraph examinations on the disclosure o f  past offences, cf. Ahlmeyer, et al. (2000); 
Emerick and Dutton (1993); Hindman and Peters (2001); English, et al. (2000).
485 English, et al, 2000, p. 9.
486 English, et al, 2000, p. 35-36; Grubin, et al, 2004, p. 215-216.
487 Grubin, et al., 2004, p. 220.
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the subject nor on the basis o f the identification o f his individual character with the aim of his 
normalisation. Rather it works as a method o f continual supervision, which on the basis o f 
recurrent questioning regarding the individual’s thoughts and minor acts o f transgression, 
constandy asserts the sex offender’s monstrosity as well as contains it. The truth facilitator 
carries faint echoes o f reform by seeking to establish a ‘forced level o f  honesty’ upon the 
offender’s deceptive nature that will allow him to comprehend his own deeds.488 But this 
already represents the limit o f  reform: to make the sex offender acknowledge the truth o f  his 
own monstrosity and accept the need for his management outside o f the bounds o f society.
As a result, the polygraph examination now assumes a central role in the networks o f 
exclusion which run through liberal society, and this on the basis o f its novel function as 
‘truth facilitator’ not only in the management and containment o f the ‘m onsters’ existing 
outside the margins o f society. Indeed, it draws on a similar logic to those ‘technologies o f 
freedom’ which seek to responsibilise those who are deemed worthy o f inclusion, by 
applying psychological techniques to a moral elaboration o f their conduct. However, in a 
more sinister fashion, the polygraph examination draws on this mechanism by defining and 
intervening upon the pathology o f the sex offender on the basis o f his conduct - his 
deceptiveness, which becomes the basis for the continual elaboration and containment o f 
his monstrosity. Thus it not only manages and contains, but additionally serves in the 
continual construction and perpetuation o f  the figure o f the monstrous individual as a counter­
figure to the free and responsible individual, justifying more generally the system’s logic o f 
management and containment.
While polygraphy as an applied knowledge production technique has continually spread 
since its inception by the polygraph in 1931, there has been a renewed academic interest in 
it since the 1970s. This has not only involved the taking up o f polygraphy by psycho­
physiologists and its fierce contestation by others. In addition, following a shift in 
experimental psychology from the study o f the emotions to the study o f cognition, this has 
engendered new ways o f capturing deception. In the next three sections I will trace this 
‘cognitive shift’ in the detection o f deception. In this description, I will investigate why one 
o f the techniques within this shift, the so-called guilty knowledge test, remains trapped in 
the laboratory while claiming to have replaced the ‘impressionistic’ methods o f the 
polygraph examiner with a scientific technique o f estimating the probability o f guilt. 
Furthermore, I will explore the question whether the cognitive shift in the detection o f 
deception finally furnishes a scientific and humane detection o f the lie or whether it might 
equally bear the marks o f the grotesque.
488 English, et at., 2000, p. 95.
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7.2 The detection of guilty knowledge
In 1981, the psycho-physiologist David Lykken remarked with regard to polygraphy that ‘after 
50 years o f virtual neglect, there has been recendy a wholesome increase o f  critical discussion o f 
this truth technology and its potential impact upon our society.’489 Indeed, Lykken was to 
become its most outspoken critic within the scientific community. In 1959, Lykken had initiated 
the first academic murmurings o f a critique o f lie detection and o f its basis in what might be 
termed an ‘epistemology of fear,’ and proposed an alternative method. His critique and the 
suggestion o f a different technique were to turn into a full-scale debate among psycho­
physiologists from the late 1970s. For not only had public and academic criticism o f polygraphy 
increased. In the 1970s, a group o f academic psycho-physiologists had taken up polygraphy. 
Convinced o f its scientific potential, they defended the principles o f polygraphy and ventured to 
put lie detection on a scientifically validated footing. In trying to establish authority for their 
respective techniques, psycho-physiologists at the University of Utah — the so-called Utah- 
group — lead by David Raskin, who was to become Lykken’s main academic opponent, and 
Lykken have drawn all measures available to the academic warrior from face-offs in academic 
journals to the sending out o f surveys to members o f psychological associations including the 
Society for Psychophysiological Research, the American Psychological Association, and the 
American Psychology-Law Society. Each has claimed the survey results to be a legitimation o f 
their technique. Additionally, in this battle over constructing their credibility on the basis o f 
opinions o f ‘scientific communities,’ they have in the good manner o f quantitative survey 
deconstruction ventured to undermine each other’s results.490
The basis o f Lykken’s denigration of polygraphy, and the suggestion of a scientific alternative, 
centred on the claim to a new technique o f establishing suspects’ guilt through the detection of 
‘guilty knowledge.’ He and two medical students had carried out experiments using a physiological 
measurement which Keeler had integrated into the polygraph in the late 1930s — galvanic skin 
resistance, or electrodermal response, as it was later called. The set-up of the experiment was the 
same as in those many experiments carried out in early lie detection: it involved a ‘mock crime,’ in 
which the experimental subjects had to either commit a ‘theft’ or a ‘murder’:
‘For the Murder enactment, S [subject] was taken to the second floor o f  the building and required to 
knock on the door o f one o f  the offices. The door was opened by an assistant who, after some 
preliminary conversation, invited S  to play a hand o f  poker, which was thereupon dealt out, the assistant 
getting the better hand. Remarking that S  now owed him a hundred dollars, the assistant then walked
489 Lykken, 1981, p. 37.
49° por thg debate among polygraph operators and proponents o f  the ‘guilty knowledge technique’ cf. 
Kleinmutz and Sucko (1984); Lykken (1974; 1978; 1981; 1998); Podelsney and Raskin (1977; 1978); Raskin 
and Podelsney (1979); Raskin (1982; 1989); Honts (2004); for the discussion o f  the surveys cf. Amato and 
Honts (1994); Ianoco and Lykken (1997); Lykken (1998); Honts (2002).
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over to stand looking out the window. Taking a weapon from his pocket, S  went through the morions o f  
killing the assistant, hid the weapon in a drawer o f  the desk, and left the office.
In the Theft enactment, S  had to idle near the doorway o f  a different office until the occupant, a woman, 
left it to go into the washroom. S  then hurriedly entered and riffled through the desk calendar until he 
found a page on which his own name had been entered. He erased the name and then searched through 
the desk until he found the article (e.g. a watch) which he had been instructed to “steal.” Leaving the 
office, he hid the stolen property in a locker in the hallway.’491
After committing the ‘crime’ subjects were attached to a galvanometer and a list o f  questions 
was read out to them — however, in this first experiment, they were not required to provide 
verbal responses to them. The questions were multiple-choice questions, e.g.
T he murderer hid the weapon in one o f  the drawers o f  a desk. Which drawer was it?
Was it the one
(a) on the left
(b) in front
(c) on the right?’492
In later set-ups, subjects were instructed to answer ‘no’ to each o f the alternatives — thus the 
subject who had ‘committed the crime’ would have had to lie on the location o f the murder 
weapon. Keeler had devised a similar kind o f test in the 1930s, which he called the ‘peak of 
tension test.’ In a jewellery theft case, a list o f different types o f jewels including those that had 
been burgled and a list of different foods including those that had been eaten by the burglar 
were presented to suspects in lists o f questions.493 At the end o f his article, Lykken claimed that 
his new technique — the detection o f ‘guilty knowledge’ -  ‘while less widely applicable,’ was ‘a 
more reasonable, objective, and generally defensible technique’ than lie detection, which 
required ‘unreasonable assumptions o f the consistency o f physiological response patterns.’494 
Considering the similarity o f Keeler’s and Lykken’s approach — what had changed to bring 
about this damning critique o f lie detection as a practice and the suggestion o f  a novel 
technique, the principles o f which had already been used earlier?
Lykken’s approach involved a shift in the object of knowledge. The ‘epistemology o f fear’ 
introduced by lie detection was to be undermined, but not displaced, by a new epistemology, 
which has oriented psycho-physiological research opposed to the use o f polygraphy in the 
detection o f deception since the 1980s — an ‘epistemology of recognition.’ In inaugurating a new 
research programme, Lykken argued that the basic assumption o f a distinct physiological 
pattern associated with lying was not supported by empirical research. N ot only was it difficult 
to establish specific patterns for involuntary bodily responses such as pain, fear and anger, but 
additionally, these responses could vary widely across individuals.495 Rather, the detection o f
491 Lykken, 1959, p. 385.
492 Ibid, p. 386.
493 Keeler, 1938/1939, p. 140.
494 Lykken, 1959, p. 388.
495 Lykken, 1981, p. 56-57.
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guilt might be based on the ‘more reasonable assumption that a guilty person will show some 
involuntary response (e.g. GSR) [galvanic skin resistance] to stimuli related to remembered 
details o f his crime.’496 If  ‘factual details’ o f a crime could be collected which were only known 
to the guilty individual and the investigator, then questions could be designed in such a way that 
these details might be hidden within a number o f possible alternatives. Only the guilty 
individual would recogni2e the factual detail, thus stimulating a greater physiological response, 
whereas to the innocent none of the alternatives would have any significance — he would simply 
respond to the presented stimulus in a normal manner. O f course, this would also entail a 
reduction o f cases. Physiological techniques o f detecting deception would only be possible in 
cases where other individuals were not involved in a crime and, significantly, details o f the crime 
would not have been made public.
The change from an ‘epistemology o f fear’ to an ‘epistemology of recognition’ was set within 
a more general shift in psychology from the study o f the emotions to the study o f cognition 
from the 1950s. As part o f this shift, electrodermal response, part o f a host o f measurements 
that had formerly been translated into emotional processes, was now read in terms o f 
cognitive processes. More specifically, psycho-physiologists framed it in terms o f processes o f 
attention and information processing. The guiding concept within this new understanding o f 
the body’s processes is the so-called ‘orienting response,’ a reaction o f the body to a 
surprising or significant ‘stimulus.’497 Much in the same manner as the understanding o f the 
‘fight-or-flight’ mechanism that had formed the basis o f  polygraphy, it is seen as an 
‘autonomic’ response that cannot be controlled by the body. O n this basis, criminal details are 
framed as significant stimuli, and the body’s reactions as indicators o f a process o f 
‘recognition.’ In this context, the term ‘guilty knowledge test’ might be seen to signify the 
‘objective’ character in the analysis o f cognitive processes set within the new paradigm o f 
psychophysiology, as opposed to the moral imputations o f lie detection based on the 
unreliable and outdated analysis o f the emotions.
The overarching attack on polygraphy’s ‘unreasonable’ and unwarranted assumption that there 
are specific physiological patterns associated to lying, which could be elicited by an expert in the 
examination situation — and thus that the basis o f lie detection is flawed — is part o f the 
boundary-work in which psycho-physiologists engage in constructing their scientific authority 
over and against polygraphy. This boundary-work is framed around the notion o f psychological 
testing and how, by contravening its norms, polygraphy is unable to produce ‘objective’ 
knowledge o f the lie. It combines the juxtaposition o f the ‘subjective’ and ungrounded methods 
applied in polygraphy and the ‘objective’ testing principles o f the guilty knowledge test with a
496 Lykken, 1959, p. 385.
497 Ben-Shakhar and Furedy, 1990, p. 107; Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003, p. 132.
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normative evaluation o f the self-interested practices o f polygraphy versus the assurance of 
justice on the basis o f the disinterested scientific principles o f the guilty knowledge test.
Firstly, the principled critique o f the inadequate training o f polygraph examiners, which we 
have encountered in Larson’s boundary-work before, is put forth by proponents o f the guilty 
knowledge test. In establishing their own scientific authority, they seek to undermine 
polygraphy by pointing towards the general lack o f individuals with advanced academic 
degrees in the behavioural sciences or psychophysiology, who would be capable o f assessing 
the scientific validity o f their methods or indeed to make judgments about the complex 
behaviour that deception represents. I f  anyone, it would only be individuals so qualified that 
could provide such expertise. And since the academic literature shows that lying cannot be 
attributed to specific bodily responses, even those academics working on the scientific 
validation o f polygraphy are misguided in their claims.498
Secondly, the undermination o f polygraphy is framed in terms o f a normative assessment o f 
polygraph operators that is based on the psychological charge o f subjectivity: the examiner 
is portrayed as interested, and (especially as regards police polygraph operators) as motivated 
to obtain confessions.499 Thus their interpretation o f the polygraph chart is guided by their 
preconceptions o f whether the subject appears guilty to them or not. Even if they apply a 
numerical approach to the scoring o f the polygraph charts, assigning numbers is based on a 
qualitative assessment o f the chart. Therefore polygraphy cannot provide fully quantitative 
statements o f deception.500 In this context, even the agreement o f examiners -  so-called 
inter-rater reliability -  gives no assurance o f the validity o f their assessments. Rather, it 
merely points to the fact that they may have received the same training.501 Furthermore, as 
the questions are framed and presented by each individual examiner, they cannot be seen as 
standardised, i.e. as one criterion for producing objective psychological knowledge.
Finally, the so-called control question, designed to distinguish between the fear of the innocent 
and the guilty, does not represent a ‘control’ in the scientific sense.502 As I noted in chapter 5, the 
control question is framed around a minor transgression, which anyone is assumed to have 
committed in one’s life. While it is assumed that the guilty person will be more worried about the 
questions which concern the actual crime, the innocent will fear that a minor transgression might 
implicate him and will thus respond more strongly to the control question. Against this, 
proponents o f the guilty knowledge technique argue that a control in the proper sense is 
formulated around the presence or absence o f a certain behaviour, rather than assumptions
498 Bashore and Rapp, 1993, p. 3.
499 Lykken, 1981, p. 65-67.
500 Ben-Shakhar and Furedy, 1990, p. 11.
501 Lykken, 1981, p. 123.
502 Ben-Shakhar and Furedy, 1990, p. 10-11; Bashore and Rapp, 1993, p. 5.
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about which behaviour is more or less likely to occur in different subjects. Especially, the 
polygraph operator’s interestedness coupled with the questdonability of the control question 
amounts to the danger of ‘false positives’ — of classifying suspects, that are innocent as guilty.503 
Thus polygraphy is portrayed as based ‘on subjective and impressionistic observation,’504 rather 
than objective psychological methods. In all o f this, we find inklings o f Alder’s discretionary 
expert — the combination of scientific critique with a normative judgment regarding the methods 
and motivation o f polygraph practitioners. As its assumptions are misguided, their practitioners’ 
training insufficient, and their methods unfounded and skewed, polygraphy cannot but be a 
knowledge practice which is questionable and which smacks o f manipulation and coercion.
In constructing their technique as scientific in opposition to polygraphy, proponents o f the 
guilty knowledge test, by contrast, contend that their technique matches the criteria o f 
psychological testing, which are not only based on a scientific notion o f ‘control,’ but 
additionally, allow for the exclusion o f  possible mistakes in the detection o f  guilt by statistical 
means. As a result, the examiner is removed from the lie detection examination — the 
detection o f deception no longer depends on his subjective estimations but is rather based on 
objective criteria. As I described it above, the test proceeds by presenting a list o f  stimulus 
words or questions to the subject that are based on ‘factual details’ o f the crime established at 
the crime site. These ‘relevant’ questions are hidden within a number o f possible alternatives. 
While the relevant detail will cause a greater response in the culprit, the innocent subject for 
whom the different words make no difference, will respond in a similar manner to each 
‘stimulus.’ As ‘relevant’ and ‘neutral’ questions are framed in terms o f the presence or absence 
o f bodily recognition, they are presented to correspond to a proper, scientific notion o f 
‘control.’ Additionally, it is argued that the test can be matched to the recognised principle o f 
psychometric testing whereby the reliability o f a test is increased, the more questions are 
asked. Thus the higher the number o f  collected crime details transformed into questions, and 
the higher the number of alternatives presented, the better ‘detection efficiency.’ This is in 
turn combined with a statistical analysis o f  the responses o f the body. In this analysis, a 
probabilistic so-called ‘decision rule’ is applied, that is to say, an individual’s record is counted 
as guilty only if a certain percentage o f  responses to the relevant items have been shown to 
indicate ‘recognition’ o f the relevant item.505 This allows for the calculation o f the probability 
that an innocent person would falsely be classified as guilty.
Here, the guilty knowledge test is portrayed as a test which allows for a failsafe estimation of the 
guilt o f the subject, which independently o f an examiner’s judgment and simply depending on the
503 Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003, p. 132.
504 Bashore and Rapp, 1993, p. 3.
505 Ben-Shakhar and Elaad (2003); Ben-Shakhar and Furedy (1990); Lykken (1998).
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number of questions and the stringency o f the applied decision rule, makes possible the exclusion 
o f faulty conclusions, of ‘false positives/506 by which ‘[a]s is well known, lives of innocent people 
have been damaged, perhaps, unalterably [.. .].’507 The problem o f ‘false positives’ is here enlisted 
as a special rhetorical resource in the boundary-work of proponents o f the guilty knowledge test. 
It serves in its legitimation as a valid psychological technique o f the detection of deception in the 
debate over the validity of polygraphy in two ways. First, by arguing that on the basis of its 
methods false positives can be controlled, it is rendered as a scientific technique that conforms to 
the main paradigm of how science currently constructs claims to valid knowledge: probability. 
Second, this argument is connected to a normative claim. It represents it as knowledge technique 
which takes special care that miscarriages o f justice be prevented by contrast to polygraphy, which 
on the basis of its methods almost negligently accepts this danger.
By reformulating bodily responses as measurements o f ‘autonomic responses’ representing the 
cognitive process o f recognition, the guilty knowledge test is wrested from the epistemology of 
fear which defines the polygraph examination and its questionable methods. Rather, by centring 
on the process of cognition, it is conceived as a process which (equally to the notion o f fear in 
the polygraph examination) cannot be controlled, but which in opposition to the polygraph 
examination, is represented as a necessary process beyond subjective inducement or 
manipulation. In this respect, it is legitimated as an objective technique on the basis o f the 
argument that no normative assumptions are made about the subject’s bodily responses such as 
guilt feelings, fear, etc. Inferences are only made regarding a subject’s knowledge o f details o f a 
crime. This is further assured by the construction o f questions which attain their ‘objectivity’ by 
virtue o f the fact that they represent ‘factual details’ that are lodged in the suspect’s mind, rather 
than variously phrased and possibly suggestive questions about possible past transgressions and 
the commission o f a crime. Thus while centring on the same bodily measurement as the 
polygraph, on the basis o f its practitioners’ boundary-work, the guilty knowledge test is 
constructed as a clean and scientific procedure based on statistical procedures in which all the 
problems of polygraphic methods have been contained.
And yet it seems that the guilty knowledge test requires an equally complex translation 
mechanism as the polygraph examination. The attribution o f guilty knowledge centres on the 
notion o f a specific relationship between body and mind which is framed in terms o f 
information processing. It is assumed that, if presented with a certain ‘stimulus’ that surprises 
or that is ‘significant’ in some way, the body’s autonomic system will necessarily produce a 
response — an ‘orienting response.’ In the detection o f guilty knowledge, this response is 
framed in terms o f recognition o f the details o f the crime lodged in the subject’s mind that
506 Gronau, Ben-Shakhar and Cohen, 2005, p. 147.
507 Bashore and Rapp, 1993, p. 4.
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can be teased out through the body. This is done by means o f the formulation o f questions 
on the basis o f the ‘factual details’ o f the crime. Interestingly the construction o f ‘factual 
details,’ and their calling forth o f necessary responses, had already been problematised with 
regard to the word-association test in the early 20th century by the one o f the main experts in 
American evidence law, John Wigmore among other critics. He pointed to the ‘fallacy o f 
fixing beforehand as criteria o f guilt the reaction-words which the magistrate supposes to 
belong to the crime.’508 Additionally, he criticised the assumption ‘that there are any uniform 
associations with certain so-called “key-words” which are valid for every individual’s 
experience.’509 This connects to the more general problematic, battled over so fiercely by 
proponents and opponents o f polygraphy, as regards the specific lie response. In an equal 
measure as it is ventured in the case o f polygraphy that subjects ‘autonomic’ responses vary 
so widely so as to make it difficult to classify them as stemming from particular emotions, the 
‘orienting response’ indicating recognition is constructed as a particular class o f physiological 
response occurring in the same manner in all subjects. While the guilty knowledge test prides 
itself in having eliminated the examiner from its testing principles, he has re-appeared, albeit 
in a more inconspicuous fashion. His constructions o f what might constitute unique details o f 
the crime mediate the examination. Additionally, his assumptions regarding the necessity and 
shape o f certain bodily responses equally become built into the statistical routines that 
elaborate the probability of guilt.
While I am not concerned here with an internal critique o f measurement principles and 
physiological responses, the problematisation o f  the guilty knowledge test is intriguing on a 
broader level. The guilty knowledge test may be placed in a similar cycle that its predecessors 
in the detection o f deception have experienced — the construction o f the scientificity o f a 
particular translation mechanism from body to mind in capturing deception which, 
nevertheless, is connected to the indetermincuy o f  this very mechanism. This points to the 
question that I will elaborate on below: whether in the shift from the emotional to the 
cognitive detection o f the lie, we might not equally find the inklings o f grotesque knowledge, 
even if rendered in the fashion o f current notions o f objectivity and probability.
What is intriguing about the guilty knowledge technique in this respect is that, despite the fact 
that it renders itself in terms o f current standards o f the elaboration o f scientific methodology, a 
vast amount o f studies having been carried out in the last three decades,510 it has mostly
508 Wigmore, 1909, p. 430 [my emphasis]. Wigmore’s article was a retort to Hugo Munsterberg’s criticism o f  the 
lack o f  application o f  psychological methods by the legal profession. The article was framed as a law case in 
which Wigmore set out to prove that legal psychological methods had not advanced sufficiently enough to 
be integrated in legal proceedings.
509 Ibid, p. 430 [my emphasis].
510 For reviews o f  studies in the field cf. Ben-Shakhar and Furedy (1990); Ben-Shakhar and Elaad (2003); Elaad
(1998); Ansley (1992); Vrij (2000); MacLaren (2000).
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remained locked within the confines of the experimental laboratory.511 Lykken continually 
promotes the use of the technique in criminal investigation. He envisages an investigation 
process whereby certain investigators are specially trained in the collection o f ‘factual details’ at 
the crime site that can then be passed on to the examiner for constructing questions.512 
However, so far his suggestion has not been taken up by law enforcement agencies. This points 
towards an interesting feature o f how applied knowledge production techniques become 
implemented or fail to take root. Lykken, as well as other proponents o f the guilty knowledge 
technique, have mostly been based at academic institutions. Their legitimation o f the test as 
scientifically valid procedure has been on the basis o f a particular knowledge strategy by which 
psychologists establish claims o f knowledge o f the world: experimental testing in the laboratory. 
The claim that the technique has been tested and validated in the laboratory serves as 
justification that this knowledge can also be applied in the social world.513 By contrast, the 
success o f lie detection to become institutionalised at the entrance o f the criminal justice system 
and beyond may partly be attributed to a quite different knowledge strategy and the placement 
o f its early developers outside o f the experimental laboratory in the institutions involved in 
criminal investigation.
As I showed in chapter 3, there was no strict division between the psychological laboratory and 
the social world. Towards the beginning o f the development o f  techniques o f the detection o f 
deception, academic psychologists used these techniques not only in experiments but also in 
actual cases. While psychological experiments on the detection o f deception continued in 
psychological laboratories into the 1920s and then waned, lie detection moved more and more 
into the realm o f its application. An important figure in this movement was Larson, who as we 
saw, moved the detection o f deception to one of its main institutional settings, the police 
department, and used the technique almost exclusively in actual criminal (or mental) cases. 
Thus, as regards research on lie detection, the social world itself became the laboratory for lie 
detection methods. This was justified by driving a wedge between the psychological laboratory 
and its ability to represent the social world — in this case, the criminal world. While early 
experiments by Marston and Benussi had provided impressive accuracy rates, the replication o f 
their experiments had not lead to equally impressive results.514 In reporting on two laboratory 
experiments, Larson conceded that ‘on being statistically studied, [the results] show that the
5.1 This is supported by the fact that so far only two ‘field studies’ using the guilty knowledge test have been 
published (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003, p. 134). Interestingly, Japan represents an exception to this rule, 
where the guilty knowledge test is widely applied (Gronau, Ben-Shakhar, and Cohen, 2005, p. 147). An 
historical study o f  the different networks and modes o f  the institutionalization o f  detection o f  deception 
practice in Japan in comparison to the United States would be intriguing in this respect.
5.2 Lykken, 1981, p. 254.
513 Ben-Shakhar and Furedy (1990); Lykken (1998).
5,4 Burtt (1921); Landis and Gulette (1925); Landis and Wiley (1926).
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error o f interpretation is so great as to render the test practically useless.’515 However, this did 
not undermine the detection o f deception as a valid technique o f identifying the subject’s lie. 
Rather, ‘a failure o f any type o f deception test in cases o f lying where the deception may be just 
for the purpose of determining whether a test works or not, does not invalidate the same test in 
practical criminal cases in which the subject may experience the deepest possible emotional 
tension.’516 On this basis, Larson constructed ‘experimental’ and ‘criminal deception’ as two 
separate entities. This division not only allowed him to undermine experimental results, but also 
to establish criminal deception as a separate phenomenon in need o f a practical solution, which 
could only be defined in its place o f existence: criminal investigation. Thus early specialists in 
the detection o f deception had quite a different strategy o f legitimating lie detection as an 
applied technique to the approach o f proponents o f the guilty knowledge technique. This 
approach was also marked by a different institutional placement and role o f  the lie detection 
specialist in opposition to the psycho-physiological expert on guilty knowledge.
The efforts at developing lie detection in its setting o f application matched the 
characteristics o f its institutional environment. Lie detection fitted in with the wider police 
reform movement, which sought to professionalize the force as well as to elaborate 
scientific methods o f criminal investigation borrowing from and transforming knowledge 
practices from a range o f disciplines. As I already elaborated upon, this also involved the 
development o f new specialized roles within the police department and in criminal 
investigation, including among others not only lie detection specialists but fingerprint 
examiners or ballistics experts. In  developing inside and at the interstices o f the institution 
o f the police department, lie detection could thereby enlist this wider movement and root 
itself in an institutional base to the aims and epistemological organization o f which its 
knowledge practices corresponded, and which was open in the development o f the 
integration o f  new practices. As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, this did not take the route that 
Larson envisaged for lie detection, but was rather made possible by Keeler’s development 
and commercialization of the instrument. While Larson had moved lie detection to the 
social world, he was working within, and attempted to draw his scientific authority from, 
the frame o f the academically trained expert with divergent epistemological stakes: in his 
conception the lie detection examination was connected to a deeper understanding o f the 
criminal suspect’s personality. His campaign for the clinical team approach matched this 
aspiration. Yet the epistemological stakes and organization o f scientific criminal 
investigation as they evolved in the police professionalization movement were more direct, 
centring on the quick and simple apprehension o f the criminal within a burgeoning criminal
515 Larson and Haney, 1932, p. 1054.
5,6 Larson, 1923, p. 448.
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justice system. It was in this regard that Keeler’s version o f lie detection matched the needs 
and professional roles that were developed in criminal investigation. In a similar vein to the 
fingerprint examiner, the polygraph operator more closely corresponded to the figure o f a 
specialized technician. Following the model o f  quick processing o f cases, his interest was 
not in the offender as an individual, but rather in his apprehension.
Lykken’s and other’s move towards the implementation o f the guilty knowledge test 
constitutes a call o f the reorganization o f settled investigation structures and the 
epistemologies that go with it from a separate institutional environment. This would not 
only necessitate the change o f the investigation process by training investigators in the 
definition o f salient details o f the crime site, but it would also reduce the scope o f 
examinations by being solely applicable in crimes in which only the culprit would know the 
details o f the crime. The practicality o f lie detection examinations, which can be applied in 
all cases, is thus not easily overcome. In this case, the argument that the scientific validity o f 
the guilty knowledge test — as found in experimental research - surpasses the one o f the 
polygraph examination does not find institutional support in police investigation. In line 
with the sociology o f science and technology, this suggests that the integration and 
development o f knowledge practices does not follow a clear-cut route o f progressive 
scientific development and application. Rather, the taking up and integration o f knowledge 
practices is bound to the specific circumstances o f its emergence, and to how well its 
practitioners can settle in and enlist networks in their institutionalization.
7.3 “Ughting up ” the Ue in the Brain
While Lykken’s ‘innovation’ has not been able to set a mark in lie detection practices as they are 
currently carried out in criminal investigation, the move towards an ‘epistemology of 
recognition’ is significant insofar as it provides the starting point for moving the detection of 
deception from the body to the brain within the broader development o f cognitive psychology. 
As I explained above, this has involved a shift in the understanding o f measurements formerly 
understood as denoting emotional processes. Lykken uses one o f the measurements which also 
form part o f the polygraph: galvanic skin resistance, or as it is now called, electrodermal 
response. However, his interpretation o f what this measurement indicates has shifted: rather 
than being understood as an expression o f the fight-or-flight mechanism of the body, it is 
understood as an equally ‘autonomic,’ i.e. uncontrollable, reaction o f the body which is framed 
in cognitive terms. Lykken’s guilty-knowledge-technique has become the basis for the elaboration 
o f the detection o f deception around another measurement, which seeks to study the brain’s 
responses by means o f tracing the electrical changes o f the brain — electroencephalography.
184
The study o f electrical changes o f the brain was initiated by the neuro-psychiatrist Hans Berger 
in 1929, who proceeded by connecting electrodes to the scalp o f the subject’s brain and 
recording the electrical changes on a graph.517 As with other physiological measurements, the 
waves represented on the graph had been the basis o f constructing the subject’s inner life, 
ranging from the ‘epileptic,’ the study of personality, to the study o f cognitive processes518 — as 
in the case o f the detection o f deception. While until roughly the 1950s, research centred on 
analyzing the wave forms in terms of their frequency, as computers became available in the 
1960s the most minute electrical fluctuations o f the brain — measured in microvolts — could be 
filtered out using a complex translation system.519 These minor fluctuations — termed Event- 
Related Potentials (ERPs) — have become the basis o f making inferences about mental 
processes. The detection o f deception is constructed on the basis of one specific ERP, the so- 
called P300, a positive peak occurring 300 milliseconds after the subject is presented with a 
surprising or significant ‘stimulus.’520 As in Lykken’s use o f the technique, this peak is 
interpreted in terms o f information processing, which the subject cannot control and thus will 
be larger when the subject is confronted with details of the crime, which he cannot but 
recognize. While it builds on and elaborates the guilty-knowledge-technique, it equally sets itself 
o ff from it.521 It establishes its authority by means o f boundary-work that frames it as a one- 
and-for-all solution to the debate over the interpretation o f bodily responses raging between 
academic psycho-physiologists supporting polygraphy or the guilty knowledge test. By 
eschewing this question, the EEG  is not only dissociated from the questionable methods o f 
polygraphy, but also constructs itself as providing a better alternative to the guilty knowledge 
test by drawing on more advanced methods o f measurement. This measurement is portrayed as 
superior to Lykken’s method in that it does not involve the attribution o f cognitive processes, 
but directly taps into the brain.522 In this context, the question o f the processes o f the body is 
no longer at issue, as the ERP allows for the revelation o f the ‘neurocircuitry o f deception.’523 
And yet another technique has been developed, which ventures to finally be able to capture the lie 
for good: not only representing it as a sign, but finally giving it a name and location. In this, it draws 
on what is currently considered to be the most advanced measuring technique at the intersection
5,7 Cf. Borck (2005) for a history o f  how Berger constructed the EEG; the phenomenon o f  brain electrical 
activity had been found earlier in 1875 by the English surgeon Caton (Rosier, 2005, p. 96).
518 Hugdahl, 1995, p. 254-255.
5,9 Rosier, 2005, p 101-108. The electrical signal is measured by the electroencephalograph. This signal is then 
run through a series o f  amplifiers, which magnify minimal signals. Once they have been passed through the 
amplifiers the signal is transferred to an A /D  board in a computer which converts the analogue signal into 
its digital correspondent. Then the signal is displayed on a computer screen (Hugdahl, 1995, p. 15).
520 Another ERP, the N400 has been suggested as potential indicator o f  deception — it is thought to be evoked, 
when information is presented that is perceived as incorrect. Cf. Boaz, el al (1991).
521 The first studies using the ERP in the detection o f  deception were carried out by Rosenfeld, et al. in 1987, 
and then Farwell and Donchin in 1991 (Rosenfeld, et al., 1987; Farwell and Donchin, 1991).
522 Rosenfeld, et al., 1987, p. 125; Bashore and Rapp, 1993, p. 7.
523 Kozel, Padgett and George, 2004, p. 852.
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of the new cognitive psychology and the neurosciences: functional magnetic resonance imaging or 
fMRI. Its principles having been developed in physics, in the 1940s and 1950s it was translated 
into the emerging neurosdences from the 1970s, spreading from the 1980s when the first 
commerdal instruments became available.524 In pladng the individual in a strong magnetic field 
which generates magnetic pulses, the oxygen level in the blood flow in the brain is traced and 
translated into visual representations denoting brain activity at a particular moment in time in 
different parts of the brain.525 As a result, the method seeks to ‘provide a “landscape” of the brain 
by “lighting up” areas of increased neuronal activity.’526 Thus externalising the lie, researchers 
attempt to map the lie’s different locales on the basis o f an experimental set-up in which subjects 
are e.g. instructed to lie and tell the truth about which card they have picked from a set o f cards, 
intriguingly mirroring the polygrapher’s card test, deny a task they have carried out, money they 
have hidden, etc. The lie becomes apparent on the basis of:
‘increased activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and left premotor,
motor and anterior parietal cortex /527
among other locales.528 In this, we find a shifting in the understanding o f  the lie as it is 
captured on the basis o f ‘cognitive’ processes: instead o f being framed in terms o f 
recognition, it is now conceptualised in terms o f areas o f the brain that are thought to be 
connected to ‘response inhibition.’529
We can see here again the combination o f a normative and physiological evaluation which we 
encountered in chapter 3, and which is reminiscent o f the word-association test in which the 
lie was connected to the subject having to overcome the necessary ‘truthful’ representations 
lodged in his mind. In a similar vein, truthful responses are conceptualised as natural response 
o f the subject, whereas the lie is conceptualised in terms o f a cognitive digression. This 
technique makes a promise that the ERP cannot fulfil because o f the way in which its 
translation mechanism is framed around the guilty knowledge test. In focusing on the 
‘orienting responses’ o f the body, capturing deception remains limited to rendering it in terms 
o f the ‘recognition’ o f ‘significant’ stimuli. As a result, it remains constrained to cases in which 
only particular subjects would be ‘in the know’ and thus be able to lie regarding a certain fact.
524 Buxton, 2002, p. ix.
525 The signal o f  the fMRI is described as BOLD phenomenon (blood oxygenation level dependent contrast). 
Sequences o f  radiofrequency pulses are used to create an MR image. They excite and refocus the protons that 
are aligned in a magnetic field. Each pulse sequence has its own characteristics for generating a particular MR 
image (Hugdahl, 1995,324-325).
526 Ibid, p. 309.
527 Langleben, et al., 2002, p. 727.
528 Kozel, Padgett and George, 2004, p. 855.
529 Spence, et al., 2001, p. 2849; Langleben, et al., 2002, p. 727; Langleben, et al., 2005, p. 262; additionally, the 
regions o f  the brain associated to ‘working memory’ and ‘theory o f  mind’ are conceptualized as being part o f  
the ‘neurocircuitry o f  deception.’
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By contrast, in capturing the lie in terms o f processes understood to point towards ‘response 
inhibition,’ etc. in particular areas o f the brain, the lie ‘itself can be made apparent.
These new set-ups for capturing deception on the basis o f the processes o f the brain in terms of 
‘event-related potentials’ or the ‘lighting’ up o f areas in the brain are framed in terms o f an even 
greater attempt to control the experimental situation by virtue o f the removal o f the ‘human 
element’ from it and the construction o f the detection o f deception in terms of its computation. 
In these detection o f deception experiments, the examiner seems to have disappeared 
completely. He no longer asks questions, he is not even present in the room; he no longer even 
seems to interpret the physiological responses of the brain. The detection o f deception appears 
to become an automated process as part o f which the subject is connected to the instrument or 
placed in the MRI scanner and the ‘stimuli’ in the form of words or pictures o f cards are flashed 
before him on a video screen in precisely calculated time intervals. The subject no longer utters 
the lie, but ‘executes’ it by the mere press o f button, indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ which is connected 
to a computer.530 The activities of his brain are translated into visual representations on the 
basis of complex mechanisms whereby the data generated by the instruments is amplified, 
digitised, averaged and displayed on the computer screen in the case of the ERP and the data 
transformed from functional into visual data, normalised, corrected for image distortion, and 
equally displayed on a screen in the case o f the MRI. In distinguishing ‘truth’ from ‘lie,’ this data 
is analysed on the basis o f complex statistical computations.531 In the same manner as the guilty 
knowledge test as used by Lykken, these computations involve, at least in the case o f the ERP, 
the application o f a decision rule, whereby an individual is only to be counted as deceptive, if 
more pronounced ERP’s have been evoked in a particular percentage o f the stimuli relevant to 
the ‘crime.’532 As in Lykken’s guilty knowledge test, this is taken as failsafe method o f ensuring 
that the innocent will not be counted as guilty.
On this basis, then, the ‘cognitive turn’ in techniques o f detecting deception seems to finally 
mark a ‘scientific’ road to capturing the lie. N o longer founded on the normative attribution 
o f guilt or fear to bodily processes, which do not allow for the distinction o f the guilty from 
the fearful subject and are based on the impressionistic methods o f  the polygraph examiner, 
they provide a clean and scientific way o f capturing deception as cognitive process on the
530 Allen and Ianoco, 1997, p. 236; Farwell and Donchin, 1991, p. 534; Miller and Rosenfeld, 2003, p. 16; 
Langleben, et a l, 2005, p. 263; Kozel, Padgett, and George, 2004, p. 853; Spence, et al., 2001, p. 2849-2850.
531 For a description o f  the transformation o f  data and methods o f  analysis using the ERP, cf. Allen and Ianoco, 
1997, p. 236-238; Farwell and Donchin, 1991, 535-538; Miller and Rosenfeld, 2003, p. 16-24. For the same 
description using fMRI cf. Langleben, et a l, 2005, p. 263-267; Kozel, Padgett, and George, 2004, p. 853; 
Spence, et a l, 2001, p. 2849-2850.
532 This process o f  analysis is somewhat more complex, as tests which draw on the ERP are elaborated on the 
basis o f  the so-called ‘oddball-paradigm.’ This set-up integrates an additional control, presenting a number o f  
stimuli to subjects before the actual test in order to compare different responses to ‘recognised’ stimuli among 
the innocent and the guilty. The ‘oddball paradigm’ was applied from the very first experiments using ERPs 
(Rosenfeld, et al., 1987).
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basis o f first, the bodily responses, formerly used in polygraphy, and more recendy, the 
physiological responses o f the brain. In elaborating a procedure which mirrors most closely 
the model o f psychological testing, it is no longer dependent upon the subjective questioning 
o f the polygraph examiner. Rather, the examiner has been removed from the procedure and 
has instead been replaced by the ‘objective’ elaboration o f stimuli. The qualitative 
interpretation o f the polygraph record has been exchanged by the use o f statistical methods in 
the estimation o f guilt. In techniques o f detecting deception using measurements o f the brain, 
it seems like we have reached the stage o f ultimate scientific control — the experimenter, no 
longer even present in the experimental set-up has become completely reliant on the 
translation mechanisms o f the machine and the statistical computation o f the lie.
7.4 ‘Lie, my friends’
Will we finally find the promise of the ‘lie detector’ fulfilled in the cognitive turn in the detection 
o f deception? These new techniques seem to work as scientific mechanisms — an ensemble of 
machine and statistical routine -  which can detect the lie by themselves. A mechanism, which 
through its scientificity assures that miscarriages o f justice be prevented and provides a humane 
way of detecting the lie in opposition to the impressionistic polygraph examiner.
And yet we may wonder how these techniques may fare when translated from the laboratory 
into the social world. For now, cognitive models of the detection o f deception using the ERP 
have only been applied in one criminal case.533 Yet because the detection o f deception using the 
ERP is equally built on the guilty knowledge technique, which restricts its use to cases where 
only the suspect and the investigator know about the crime, it is likely to find only limited 
application. The big promise remains the detection of the lie on the basis o f ‘lighting’ up the 
‘neurocircuitry’ o f the brain by means o f functional magnetic resonance imaging. Perhaps 
ironically, this most advanced technique o f capturing the lie fails for now, as it is currently only 
able to construct ‘significant’ patterns on the group level. But what would happen if, finally, a 
statistical routine were found which would allow us to identify the individual’s lie? Will we know 
whether the subject lied? I would like to suggest that even if the detection o f the lie in the 
individual’s brain should become possible, it will still bear the marks o f grotesque knowledge 
once it has been translated into criminal investigation.
The mechanisms o f translation which define the detection of deception in the case o f  methods 
using brain measurements and statistical analyses for the computation o f the lie, are based on the
533 The researcher Farwell used an ERP-derived system in the Harrington v. Iowa case. Farwell is an interesting figure. 
He might be seen to represent a new version o f  Keeler in the field o f  the ERP-related detection o f  deception. He 
has patented and is seeking to commercialise his own system and intriguingly refers to his technique as brain 
fingerprinting’ (Farwell and Smith, 2001). While his research has been funded by the CIA, federal agencies have 
shown little interest in its implementation (United States General Accounting Office, 2001).
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same attempts at turning deception into an entity that can be captured that have been made since 
the beginning of the 20th century — whatever the site o f  the lie may have been. The detection of 
deception draws on a notion of the subject, which having been elaborated in early psychology, 
still defines its foundation: that the subject is carved up according to voluntary and involuntary 
processes. Each new paradigm and each new experimental set-up that emerges along 
psychology’s trajectory which identifies and interprets these involuntary mechanisms of the 
subject as indicating a particular mental process, is framed in terms o f pointing towards the 
subject’s lie - whether it is to be made visible on the subject’s body or within his brain. All o f these 
mechanisms are marked by their indeterminacy.
Each o f these mechanisms is based on the externalization o f deception on the basis o f the 
assumption that through the framing of ‘stimuli’ in a particular way, blood pressure 
measurements can be translated into the subject’s fear o f detection; which in turn, indicates the 
subject’s lie, that galvanic skin response and event-related potentials can be translated into an 
orienting response; which in turn, points to the subject’s recognition (and in a round-about way 
to his deception), that the blood-volume changes in the brain can be translated into processes 
of ‘response inhibition’; which in turn, and yet again, signifies the subject’s lie. Yet the 
confirmation that the subject’s lie has been detected can only be confirmed by the subject himself. 
This relates to what is ultimately the aim o f the endeavours o f detecting deception. As an 
applied technique, these endeavours are in the first instance geared towards the elaboration o f 
the subject’s guilt, which is rendered in terms o f the ‘diagnosis’ or the ‘computation’ o f his lie. 
In this, they seek to implement a translation mechanism, which on the basis o f framing a 
criminal interrogation in terms o f psychological ‘stimuli’ seeks to modulate the body’s or the 
brain’s responses in such a way that the subject is ultimately turned against himself.
In the translation mechanism centring on cognitive processes, the ensemble o f instrument 
and the examiner take on an analogous role to the polygraph operator and the polygraph. The 
instrument is enlisted, in the same manner as in the polygraph examination, being accorded a 
dual performative and measuring function in modulating the responses o f the body. The use 
o f the following preamble in a lie detection experiment using fMRI measurements already 
points to this status o f the instrument in the examination: ‘participants were told that they 
would be able to keep the $20 [that they were given at the beginning o f the examination] if 
they succeeded in concealing the identity o f their card from a “computer” that would 
administer the GKT and analyze their brain activity during the MRI session.’534 This preamble 
is framed in such a way so as to ‘model’ the criminal subject’s ‘motivation’ to deceive on the 
basis o f  the monetary reward offered. The portrayal o f the instrument as a ‘computer’ which
534 Langleben, et at., 2002, p. 730.
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detects the lie mirrors the polygraph examiner’s enlistment o f the instrument. This enlistment 
in the experiment is geared towards finding ways o f increasing ‘detection efficiency.’ 
Translated into criminal investigation, this type o f preamble is likely to be employed as well. 
As in the polygraph examination, it cuts out the complex translation mechanism which is 
required in the translation o f bodily responses to the lie. As in the polygraph examination, it 
entails the threat o f an absolute power — the reading o f the subject’s mind. Has the examiner 
disappeared in this translation mechanism? Seemingly so. He may no longer to be found in 
the interrogation room. Equally, he may seem more inconspicuous in the construction and 
presentation o f the ‘stimuli’ that are framed according to the psychological logic o f testing, 
and may appear more scientific in his presentation o f the results o f the examination in terms 
o f the probability o f guilt. Yet he is to be found in the statistical routines that are applied in 
making the lie apparent: his assumptions regarding the necessary processes o f the brain 
mediate the statistical construction o f the conditions under which the brain’s responses are to 
be counted as deceptive. Additionally, his assumptions as to how stimuli may be framed so as to 
strike the subject’s body form a central part o f the examination. In this, he will still take on the 
dual role o f the psychological expert/interrogator who constructs his authority by means o f 
enlisting the instrument and who, although no longer present in the interrogation room, 
subjects the suspect to a criminal interrogation, which is framed in terms o f a psychological 
procedure in modulating the responses o f the brain. As part o f this framing, he brings the 
pressure o f the representative o f science and social control to bear upon the subject.
While in the experiment, the estimation o f the probability o f deception can be confirmed by a 
disinterested experimental subject, what are we to make o f the computation o f the probability 
o f the lie if it were to count in the elaboration o f the guilt o f a particular individual charged with 
a crime? Would not the process itself require that the results be presented to the subject and 
he be asked as to his opinion regarding them? Might this presentation o f results to the subject 
not only be significant for the subject but rather to the researcher as well in seeking to 
legitimate the applicability o f his method not only in the laboratory but also in the social 
world? And in order to justify itself as an applied technique, might not the validation o f the 
technique in the criminal setting depend on the subject’s affirmation o f his lie -  his confession? 
We may conclude that the structure o f the examination, that is elaborated in terms o f the 
modelling of the interrogation o f a ‘criminal’ in the laboratory, constitutes a stitching together 
o f criminal interrogation and psychological discourse which mirrors the logic o f the polygraph 
examination. The lie functions as a switch-point between the subject’s responses and the 
elaboration o f guilt, by seeking to turn the subject’s body — in the form o f the lighting up o f the 
brain — against himself in eliciting a confession. Might we not consider this as a form o f 
disqualification o f the expert who on the basis o f his machine and complex statistical routines
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elaborates the probability of guilt only to find himself bound up with the most uncomfortable 
o f proofs? It seems that in depending on the same mechanism, the ensemble o f the modern- 
day neuro-scientific expert/interrogator and the lie detector/fMRI scanner that ‘light up’ the 
‘neuro-circuitry o f deception’ equally fit into the category o f the grotesque. Drawing on the 
same performative and measuring logic o f the lie detection examination, it seeks to ‘maximise 
the effects o f power’ through the threat that the lie will be known. Yet at the moment at which 
it succeeds it also disqualifies itself, for its verification depends on the subject’s admission o f the 
lie, which, in the social world, means his confession — as a result o f which the mere signification 
o f the lie is forever to remain undecided.
Thus to recall my critique o f Alder in chapters 5 and 6, the critique of lie detection cannot 
proceed on the level o f the practitioners who developed it. Rather, die construction o f an 
historical critique on the basis o f ‘the sort o f lie detection’ which developed in the US based on 
Keeler’s development o f polygraphy misses its target. The historical critique o f lie detection 
must proceed on the level o f how it is framed as a knowledge practice itself — on the way in 
which power and knowledge become entangled in it. As I have tried to show, the attempts at 
capturing deception within the new paradigm o f cognitive psychology elaborated on the basis 
of the current notion o f psychological testing and a probabilistic conception o f science, 
ultimately rely on the same grotesque mechanism which defines the polygraph examination. 
The historical critique o f lie detection must therefore return to the constitution o f the human 
sciences — and how they have developed, as Hacking has called it, a ‘surrogate o f the human 
soul.’ It must examine how the construction o f this soul is intimately connected to the subject’s 
control. Will the endeavours into capturing the lie continue? Surely, they will — as long as our 
inner life is defined on the basis o f our bodies, the attempts to turn the lie into an entity that 
can be measured, recorded, made visible, will continue. In light o f the voracity o f the human 
sciences to finally be able to capture the lie in order to protect society from its criminals, 
monsters, terrorists, to mend or break marriages on public television, we might thus — having 
started this thesis with one o f the great humanists — end its substantive part with a saying of 
another albeit more ironically inclined one:
“A Lie is a vice only when it does harm, it is a very great virtue when it does good. So, be more virtuous 
than ever. You must lie like a devil, not timidly, not for a while, but boldly, and persistendy .. .  Lie, my 
friends, lie, 1 shall repay you when I get the chance.”535
535 Voltaire, (1736/1954), p. 286-287.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
Having travelled from the first attempts at teasing out deception - reducing its ‘hundred 
thousand shapes’ and ‘undefined limits’ by materialising its truth on the body’s script as ‘the 
reverse o f what the liar said’ to its most recent instantiations in which the lie is lit up as 
magnetic signal in the brain by the press o f a button, in concluding this thesis I will revisit the 
main arguments that I have made along the way. I will especially elaborate on their 
significance in two respects: the directions that they point to and contributions that they 
entail in terms o f historical studies in the sociology o f science and technology. Finally, I will 
suggest that this study might provide a starting point for a field, which up to this point, has 
remained under-explored in sociology: the sociology o f the lie.
This thesis set out to provide a contribution to historical studies in the sociology o f science 
and technology and the history o f the human sciences by studying lie detection as a 
knowledge practice, which has remained contested but has nevertheless successfully settled 
and even spread. In this it applied an opposite logic to the one currently most prominent in 
the sociology o f science and technology: to demonstrate that the ‘hardest’ o f scientific facts 
and technological objects are in fact the result o f  social (as well as technical) negotiations. In 
going about this, this thesis was inspired by two approaches. O n a broader level it was 
inspired by the Foucauldian tenet, shared by most historians o f the human sciences, that the 
history o f the human sciences — in this specific case psychology — is intimately linked with 
modern systems o f social control. In taking up Foucault’s argument that modem society is 
marked by a benign ‘political technology o f the body,’ which constructs and intervenes upon 
the subject by means o f the creation o f the ‘modern soul’ this thesis studied lie detection as 
one o f the ‘bits’ and ‘pieces’ o f this technology: as a technique which intervenes on the 
subject by means o f  constructing what goes on his mind on the basis o f his bodily 
movements. From this followed that this thesis sought to account for lie detection as a 
technique o f knowledge production and intervention, i.e to study the linking o f power and 
knowledge with regard to the social and material processes o f the examination and with 
regard to the effects it comes to exert within its specific contexts o f  application in systems o f 
social control.
However, in accounting for the special status that lie detection has had as a knowledge 
technique which has remained contested and has been generally excluded from the courts, on 
the concrete level o f the study o f  the development o f lie detection, this thesis drew on 
methodological tools and premises developed in the sociology o f science and technology. A 
serious and sustained sociological analysis o f the specificity o f lie detection as knowledge
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practice required that no position was taken on its status in light o f its contestation but rather 
that its development within its different contexts o f application and exclusion be analysed. 
Thus, I drew on one central methodological tenet o f the sociology o f scientific knowledge: 
the symmetry o f knowledge, i.e. the premise that the same type o f analysis should be applied 
to all types o f knowledge regardless o f whether they are currendy held to be true or false. This 
methodological tenet was supplemented by the use and extension o f the notion o f boundary- 
work originally put forth by Gieryn. The notion o f boundary-work focuses the analysis o f 
knowledge practices on the varied resources that are used in distinguishing science from non­
science and thus allows for an analysis o f how those disdncdons are elaborated in the first 
place. This guards against evaluating knowledge in terms o f what are currendy thought to be 
accepted standards o f scientific knowledge. In using the notion o f boundary-work I showed 
that it could be extended to examine the resources used by non-scientific institutions (the 
courts) in including or excluding certain types o f knowledge (lie detection). Additionally, I 
drew on it to analyse the rhetorical resources employed by lie detection practitioners in 
contesting polygraphy: Larson, in seeking to implement a clinical team approach and, more 
recendy, proponents o f the guilty knowledge test in seeking to institute an ‘epistemology o f 
recognition’ in the detection o f deception.
By combining a Foucauldian motivation and seeking to account in detail for how lie detection 
developed as a knowledge practice, this thesis was then able to provide insights into the 
development o f lie detection as technique o f knowledge production and intervention on three 
interrelated levels: the development o f lie detection as knowledge practice, the
power/knowledge mechanism o f  the lie detection examination, and the functions that 
polygraphy takes on in systems o f social control.
8.1 Lie Detection as Knowledge Practice
In the description o f the development o f lie detection as a knowledge practice, I traced the 
movements, which deception has undergone in being framed as an object o f  knowledge 
within psychological practice and discourse. I showed how the simple lie emerged as a 
measurable entity on the body’s script in early psychological discourse on the basis o f a two­
fold reconfiguration. As part o f the first reconfiguration, deception moved from the 
measurement o f the deviant processes o f the mind in overcoming its necessary, i.e. truthful 
representations to those of the viscera o f the body becoming associated with the emotions o f 
fear. In the second reconfiguration, deception itself was reframed in being reduced to its bare 
minimum - a simple falsification. As part o f these reconfigurations, the detection o f deception 
became set within the distinction drawn in early psychology between emotion -  associated
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with uncontrollable bodily processes — and cognition — as controllable by the subject. It was 
in this period that the psychological basis and the interactional set-up o f the ‘epistemology o f 
fear’ was established. It entailed the materialisation o f the link between fear and deception 
through the distinction between the internal ‘truthful’ movements o f the body and the 
external deceptive appearance o f the subject. O n this basis the lie was rendered into a 
psychological condition that could be read on the body’s script by means o f a physiological 
and normative evaluation, whereby the ‘truth’ o f the subject’s lie was constructed in terms o f 
the ‘abnormal’ functionings o f the body. I showed how in its recent development, the 
detection o f deception has equally been informed by broader developments within 
psychological discourse in following its move from the study o f emotion to the study o f 
cognition. As part o f this move, the detection o f deception was re-organised around the 
notion o f ‘guilty knowledge,’ which, first, reinterpreted the bodily measurements that 
formerly used to denote the subject’s fear, in terms o f  information processing seeking to 
implement an ‘epistemology o f recognition.’ Based on the same distinction o f the 
uncontrollable and controllable functions o f the body that had emerged in early psychology, it 
implemented a translation mechanism whereby the culprit’s bodily reactions are framed as 
‘orienting response,’ denoting his knowledge o f  ‘factual details’ o f the crime, which he cannot 
but recognise and therefore point to his guilt. Second, more recently, the detection o f  
deception has completed the move towards a cognitive conception o f deception, by utilising 
brain measurements. On the one hand, the bodily measurement o f the guilty knowledge test 
has been replaced by so-called event-related potentials denoting minute electrical fluctuations 
in the brain. O n the other hand, on the basis o f functional brain analyses the simple lie has 
found a name and location that is lit up by means o f fMRI in the brain. Here the normative 
and physiological distinction between the normal^truthful responses o f the body as opposed 
to the abnormal=deceptive ones are interpreted in terms o f ‘response inhibition,’ whereby the 
lie becomes associated to cognitive digression requiring the overcoming o f the brain’s 
‘truthful state.’
This analysis, on the one hand, demonstrated the continuity in the attempts at framing 
deception in terms o f the ‘uncontrollable’ physiological processes o f the subject and 
interpreting them in terms o f a normative evaluation whereby ‘normal’ processes correspond 
to truthfulness, and ‘abnormal’ ones to deception, and, in turn, guilt. In this, the detection of 
deception has been set within the broader epistemological framework that defines 
psychological practice ranging from psychoanalysis to experimental psychology to this day. 
This framework operates on the notion that the ‘truth’ o f  the subject’s inner life is to be 
found in those processes which are beyond his control — the movements o f his body or, as, 
for example in psychoanalysis, his slips o f the tongue. They are to be interpreted as symptoms
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o f an underlying condition repressed by the subject, which reveal his ‘true’ nature and open 
up a space for the application o f remedies, whether this be therapy or punishment. O n the 
other hand, my analysis showed that ‘deception’ is not a straightforward entity but rather has 
been refashioned following different conceptions of where the ‘truth’ o f the subject’s inner 
state can be captured on the basis o f broader shifts within psychological discourse. The 
examination o f the psychological underpinnings which accompanied the emergence and 
development o f the lie as object o f knowledge was combined with the study o f the context in 
which lie detection developed as a concrete knowledge practice.
While early lie detection was carried out by academically trained psychologists, who did 
experiments but also applied their knowledge in individual cases following the notion that 
psychological knowledge could and should be applied in curing society o f its ills, the 
development o f lie detection as a separate practice involved its movement to law enforcement 
agencies — the police department and crime laboratories from the 1920s — as part o f the 
police professionalisation movement seeking to implement ‘scientific methods o f criminal 
investigation.’ In analysing this period in terms o f lie detection as a knowledge practice, I 
placed a particular focus on the development o f the instrument(s) — the ‘lie detector’ and the 
‘polygraph’ — and the reframing o f lie detection as it moved from the academic realm to the 
realm of criminal investigation. This was by contrast to the history o f  the lie detector 
provided by Bunn, which conflated the history o f both instruments. As a result his analysis 
reified lie detection as a ‘popular science’ rather than examining its development as a practice. 
In disentangling the lie detector and the polygraph, and focussing on the institutional 
specificities o f the structure o f knowledge practices as lie detection moved across realms, this 
thesis was able to account for the ways in which external representations o f  the ‘lie detector’ 
fed back into lie detection practices. Secondly, it allowed for a symmetrical analysis o f 
changing models o f expertise involved in the development o f lie detection, which provided an 
explanation for the disappearance o f Larson’s model o f lie detection and the success o f 
polygraphy in establishing itself as separate discipline (over and against Alder’s normative 
history o f polygraphy). Thirdly, it furnished the basis for an historically contextualised 
understanding o f the maintenance o f polygraphy as only applied technique in the detection o f 
deception and the failure o f the ‘guilty knowledge test’ to move from the laboratory into the 
social world.
As regards the role o f the instrument, I re-interpreted Bunn’s history o f the lie detector to 
analyse the role that the media representation o f the ‘lie detector’ as machine with 
superhuman powers that could detect the lie by itself took on in the practices o f lie detection 
specialists. I thus followed the rationale o f scholars in science communication working against 
an hierarchical view o f science by accounting for the various ways in which the construction
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o f scientific knowledge moves ‘upstream* and ‘downstream.’ Although lie detection specialists 
benefited from the media attention in terms o f the promotion o f scientific methods of 
criminal investigation, they equally denied that there was such a thing as a lie detector as this 
threatened their status as experts. For, if there was a machine that could detect lies by itself, 
no expert was needed for its operation. They claimed that the actual ‘lie detector’ was the 
trained expert who rendered a diagnosis o f the lie on the basis o f the interpretation o f the 
instrument’s charts. At the same time the notion o f the ‘lie detector’ fed back into their 
practices in lie detection examinations. In the examination, they equally portrayed the 
instrument as a machine that could detect lies by itself. On this basis the instrument assumed 
an uncertain ontological status, which resulted in its dual role in the examination — it took on 
a performative role in modulating the body’s responses as ‘lie detector’ as well as a measuring 
role as physiological instrument. My thesis thus showed how ‘downstream’ representations o f 
knowledge practices can feed back into and inform those practices in complex ways. N ot only 
did the notion o f the ‘lie detector’ come to play an important role in the construction o f the 
examination itself. It also informed the organisation o f early polygraphy as expertise. Once 
Keeler had the polygraph produced as integrated instrument, he made its sale subject to his 
approval. He employed this strategy to ensure that its commercialisation would not result in 
the polygraph being sold as a lie detector to be used by anyone, but rather to guard its status 
as scientific instrument earmarked for the evolving figure o f the polygraph operator as 
professional expert in lie detection.
As regards the development o f the polygraph and the establishment o f polygraphy as separate 
discipline, I showed how the development and commercialisation o f the polygraph by Keeler 
mediated the institutionalisation of lie detection as a separate practice in criminal 
investigation. Its setting within criminal investigation was initiated by Larson, who 
represented a transitional figure in the development o f lie detection. He implemented the 
final set-up o f the examination and took lie detection to its field o f application. At the same 
time he remained rooted in an academically oriented approach to lie detection, which in 
conjunction with the detection o f the lie sought to develop a deeper understanding o f the 
criminal’s personality. In the movement to the police department, lie detection, however, 
came to mirror the structure o f knowledge practices and epistemological aims as they were 
elaborated in the implementation o f ‘scientific methods o f criminal investigation.’ Matching 
the more immediate epistemological goal o f criminal investigation to simply apprehend the 
offender on the basis o f material traces o f his crime, the lie detection examination came to 
centre on capturing the offender on the basis o f  the simple lie. In a corresponding fashion the 
notion o f ‘scientific expertise’ elaborated in criminal investigation centred on the application 
of a particular technique. The polygraph operator, just like the fingerprint examiner and the
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ballistics expert, became not an academically trained expert but rather represented a 
technician versed in a specialised technique, which he had been trained in through 
apprenticeship rather than university studies. The development o f the polygraph facilitated 
the reframing o f lie detection around this notion o f expertise. While it was legitimised as 
scientific instrument that would contribute to medical and psychological knowledge more 
generally, it was designed and marketed by Keeler as instrument for the use in lie detection. 
The integration o f measurements in one portable ‘black box’ meant that detailed expertise in 
the assemblage o f measurements in lie detection, which would traditionally have been the 
province o f the psychologist, was no longer required. Instead the polygraph could simply be 
used by an individual trained in its application.
By contrast to Alder, who, as I showed, drew on a Mertonian view which analyses scientific 
practice in terms o f the norms elaborated in the generation o f ‘objective knowledge/ leaving 
scientific knowledge per se untouched, the analysis o f shifting models o f expertise in lie 
detection provided an explanation for why Larson’s version o f lie detection disappeared. In 
opposition to Alder’s normative account which took Larson’s seemingly more acceptable 
psychological practices as a measure against which to evaluate Keeler’s and the current status 
of polygraphy more generally, I showed that the success o f polygraphy to establish itself in 
criminal investigation could not be conceptualised as due to the overtaking o f the rogue 
commercialisation o f polygraphy. Rather, Larson’s model, being rooted in a deeper 
understanding o f the personality o f the offender and an academic notion o f expertise, did not 
correspond to the technical notion o f ‘scientific expertise’ and the immediate aim of 
apprehending the offender which came to orient the endeavours o f the fingerprint examiner, 
the ballistics experts and the polygraph operator.
In comparing the early development o f lie detection leading to the establishment of polygraphy 
and the (currently) failed implementation o f the guilty knowledge test, I showed on a broader 
level that there is no straightforward trajectory as to how knowledge practices travel in between 
the scientific realm and the social world. Rather, their taking up is dependent on the specific 
historical context in which they emerge and, more fundamentally, how the relationship between 
knowledge and the social world is constructed, legitimised and reconfigured. In the context o f 
the detection o f deception the differing development o f polygraphy and the guilty knowledge 
test was due to the divergent institutional placement and context o f lie detection experts within 
and outside criminal investigation. Additionally, it depended on the employment o f different 
knowledge strategies in the legitimation o f their technique. This centred on the abolition o f the 
link to the laboratory in the case o f polygraphy and affirming it as a main source o f authority in 
the case o f the guilty knowledge test.
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Methods o f  lie detection emerged as part o f early experimental psychological discourse which 
did not draw a clear-cut distinction between the laboratory and the social world. This made it 
possible for Larson to subsequendy completely sever the link by turning the social world itself 
into the laboratory and moving lie detection into its area o f application. As lie detection 
became set within and at the interstices o f the police professionalization movement, which 
elaborated new specialised functions integrating and borrowing from various scientific 
techniques, it came to match the institutional aims and structure o f knowledge practices in its 
area o f application (although not intended by Larson) as I elaborated on above.
By contrast, the institutional development and legitimisation o f the guilty knowledge test has 
developed in a different manner. Its proponents legitimise the applicability o f the guilty 
knowledge test on the basis o f how current-day psychology claims knowledge o f the social 
world: laboratory testing. The testing and validation in the laboratory is used to justify its 
applicability in the social world. Proponents o f the guilty knowledge test are mostly psycho- 
physiologists working at academic institutions and have no established links within criminal 
investigation. In drawing a clear distinction between the construction and legitimisation o f the 
technique by the laboratory psychologist and its subsequent application by investigators in the 
social world, its integration would take on the form o f a hierarchical dissemination in which 
psychologists would attain superiority as regards the structuring o f investigation practices. By 
contrast, in developing at the interstices o f the police professionalization movement, 
polygraphy could be integrated more ‘organically7 -  polygraphy was applied as well as further 
developed by its practitioners. Additionally, in contradistinction to the period in which 
polygraphy emerged, the guilty-knowledge test would require the re-organization o f  settled 
investigation structures that were just emerging when lie detection was integrated into 
criminal investigation. Finally, the practicality of the lie detection examination in providing a 
knowledge technique that can be used for the testing o f all suspects as opposed to only those, 
where the suspect is the only person familiar with the details o f the crime, provides little 
reason for investigators to succumb to the psycho-physiologist and thus has made for the 
technique remaining locked in the laboratory.
This thesis not only accounted for the processes by which lie detection instituted itself in the 
social world, but also provided an analysis o f how its status and location within it was 
mediated by processes o f exclusion by other institutions — the courts. Drawing mainly on 
Golan’s analysis o f the Frye ruling which formed the basis o f the continued exclusion o f lie 
detection as judicial evidence, I showed that lie detection evidence was rejected not because 
of its scientific questionability but because o f its potential power in influencing the ‘credulous 
jury’ and, more significantly, undermining the structure o f the judicial system. The admission 
o f lie detection evidence, which provided a direct statement o f the guilt o f the individual
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entailed the threat o f replacing the jury’s role in passing judgment on the defendant. In 
counter-acting this threat to the organisation o f the judicial process, the court elaborated the 
‘general acceptance rule’ implementing a community-oriented notion o f science and providing 
the courts with wide interpretive leeway as to which kind o f knowledge was to be seen as 
generally accepted in a ‘relevant’ scientific community and thus to be allowed to cross the 
courts’ institutional boundaries. My discussion thus entailed an extension o f Gieryn’s notion 
o f boundary-work, which focuses on how scientists construct boundaries between science 
and non-science, by examining how a non-scientific institution — the court — implemented a 
particular notion o f science, which allowed it to maintain and defend its mode o f constructing 
judicial truth. As regards the further development o f lie detection, we saw that its rejection 
from courts was not complete, for the kind o f proof that it could furnish — the confession — 
was still an important if uncomfortable proof in court. Even more, as regards lie detection as 
technique o f knowledge production and intervention, the setting o f the polygraph as 
confessional technique at the entrance o f the criminal justice system fit quite well into the 
functioning of the US criminal justice system, which has become focused on the efficient 
processing o f cases and negotiates judicial truth mainly outside o f the court.
With respect to broader directions that this study o f the history o f lie detection as knowledge 
practice points to in the sociology o f science and technology, I indicated in the introduction, that 
given the proliferation o f ‘expert’ knowledges, science studies have developed an increased 
interest in studying the ways in which scientific knowledge is constructed and translated into 
other domains such as courts of law or policy processes.536 In relation to the use of scientific 
evidence in the context o f criminal law, I detailed the general lack o f studies in this field. 
Additionally, the studies that exist, have focused on the negotiation of scientific expert 
knowledge inside the court-room mostly focussing on those techniques which have been 
constructed as unquestionable — fingerprinting and DNA evidence. In this context, this thesis 
has provided a contribution to how lie detection as expert knowledge, which has been excluded 
from the courts, nevertheless successfully operates in criminal investigation at the entrance o f the 
criminal justice system. This has not only meant that it has given an insight into how the courts 
mediate the construction of scientific knowledge by means o f implementing boundaries 
regarding which types o f knowledge are allowed to pass through them. Additionally, it points to 
the necessity of studying more closely how ‘expert knowledges’ are constructed and legitimised 
outside the courts’ boundaries. This might provide further insights into how conceptions o f 
scientific expertise might differ between the courts and criminal investigation and would allow 
for an examination of how one is translated into the other in moving from criminal investigation 
to the courts. Conversely, it may provide sociological accounts for why such translation
536 Collins and Evans (2002); Edmond (2004);Jasanoff (1990; 1995).
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processes fail and whether, in a round-about way, these failures might constitute successes as in 
the case o f lie detection, which thrives at the entrance o f the criminal justice system.
As regards studies o f forms o f ‘expertise’ in the sociology o f science and technology on a 
broader level, my thesis has provided an analysis o f how one form o f expert knowledge 
develops and settles in the social world. By studying the changing models o f expertise 
associated to early lie detection and polygraphy, I showed how knowledge practices are re­
configured in moving from one realm to another and become shaped by differing 
institutional epistemologies. Set within these institutions, they may prosper as ‘scientific’ 
expertise which otherwise remains contested and is subject to processes o f  exclusion. In this, 
I additionally showed that as regards applied knowledge techniques, the translation o f expert 
knowledges from what is conventionally considered the academic realm into its area o f 
application is not a straightforward process but is configured within a particular historical 
context and depends on how the relationship between knowledge and the social world is 
framed. In this, the history o f lie detection constitutes an especially interesting case in that the 
seemingly outdated and contested ‘epistemology o f fear’ until this day has remained the only 
technique to root itself in the social world, while the more recent ‘epistemology of 
recognition,’ which constructs its authority on conventional markers o f scientific authority 
such as academic credentials and adherence to current standards o f academic practice, has 
remained locked in the laboratory. As a result, this study has not only accounted for the 
variable ways in which knowledge practices are organised across different realms as they 
move between institutional locations in the social world, such as the courts and criminal 
investigation, and what is considered more conventionally as the scientific realm. Rather, it 
has made possible a sociological examination o f how those boundaries are constructed in 
relation to each other, in the first place, rather than presupposing them.
8.2 Grotesque Knowledge and Symmetry
The examination o f the power/knowledge mechanism that defines the lie detection 
examination followed from my critical engagement with Alder’s history o f polygraphy. 
Having problematised Alder’s analysis on the level o f his Mertonian conception o f knowledge 
practices and provided a symmetrical assessment o f the different models o f expertise that 
Larson’s and Keeler’s technique entailed, I elaborated on the impossibility o f evaluating lie 
detection on the basis o f a knowledge-oriented versus a power-oriented approach. I showed 
that lie detection is marked by the fact that the aim and the only verification o f lie detection — 
the confession — could not be disentangled, which not only rendered a judgment o f the 
psychologist’s versus the polygraph operator’s technique futile but additionally did not
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account for this special feature o f the lie detection examination. Rather, an assessment o f the 
lie detection examination needed to focus on the way in which knowledge and power become 
linked in this technique. I applied Foucault’s notion o f the grotesque, defined as a power 
mechanism in which the ‘maximization o f effects o f power’ — in this case the confession — 
‘are accompanied by the disqualification o f the one who produces them.’537 
The lie detection examination depends on a circular mechanism which links the ‘truthful’ 
responses o f the uncontrollable emotional body with the lie through the ‘fear o f detection.’ 
The lie plays a special role in the management o f the subject’s fear in entailing the threat o f an 
absolute power in overcoming the subject’s mind. The modulation o f the body’s responses is 
mediated by the ensemble o f the instrument/lie detector and the expert/interrogator. In the 
management o f fear the performative function o f the former as instrument with superhuman 
powers that can read the subject’s mind by itself and its measuring function become 
inextricably linked. With the respect to the latter, the examiner becomes a hybrid drawing on 
the hierarchical position o f the psychological expert elaborated at the end o f the 19th century 
while simultaneously exerting the normative power o f the representative o f social control. 
The spatial elaboration of the set-up o f the examination in combining a quasi-experimental 
setting and the modern interrogation room equally implements an air o f intimidation turning 
the subject into an object o f knowledge as well as subjection and augmenting the impersonal 
authority o f the ensemble o f the instrument/examiner. On this basis the circular mechanism 
o f the management o f fear and its measurement is maintained in which its persuasive and its 
measuring functions cannot be disentangled. Rather, it expresses the stitching together of 
psychological knowledge and the elaboration o f guilt which extracts knowledge by means o f 
turning body against itself in seeking to elicit a confession. Since the verification o f the 
examination depends on the confession, which constitutes its simultaneous aim, the moment 
at which the lie detection examination succeeds in instituting its effect, it is disqualified or at 
least becomes questionable.
I extended this analysis to current attempts at replacing the ‘epistemology of fear’ in polygraphy 
by means o f novel attempts at lighting up the lie in the brain, arguing that they equally bear the 
marks o f the grotesque. The guilty knowledge test and lie detection by means o f brain imaging 
techniques legitimise their scientific authority over and against polygraphy by contending that 
they have done away with its unreasonable epistemology and the impressionistic methods of the 
polygraph examiner. Instead they have elaborated an objective procedure that corresponds to 
standards o f psychological testing, which removes the influence o f the examiner and provides 
failsafe statistical estimations of the probability o f guilt. By contrast, I demonstrated that these 
methods which aim to fulfil the promise that the lie detector once made, are marked by the same
537 Foucault, 2003, p. 34.
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indeterminacy that has characterised methods o f detecting deception since the inception of 
psychology in constructing the subject on the basis of the distinction drawn between his 
controllable and uncontrollable processes. They all depend on a similar translation mechanism, 
which seeks to evoke and interpret a physiological measurement as ‘fear,’ as an ‘orienting 
response,’ or as ‘response inhibition’ which in turn is taken to point to the subject’s deception, 
which, again, in turn, is taken as evidence o f guilt. As regards the most promising development at 
lighting up the lie in the brain by means o f fMRI, it is marked by the same stitching together o f 
psychological knowledge and the elaboration o f guilt as the polygraph examination, albeit in a 
changed manner. The instrument is enlisted in the same way as machine that can detect what is 
going on in this subject’s mind. While the examiner has disappeared from the examination room, 
he is still present in manipulating the instrument, in framing the questions and in the construction 
o f statistical routines that mark out the brain’s patterns as deceptive or truthful. One might even 
argue that his virtual absence and the framing o f the examination in terms o f technical 
procedures -  the pressing o f buttons to indicate ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ and the complex translation o f data 
into the visualisation o f the brain’s functions even increase the impersonal authority exerted on 
the subject. In the same manner as in the polygraph examination, the moment at which the 
ensemble of the lie detector/fMRI and the neuro-psychologist/interrogator succeed in exerting 
their effect, they are disqualified for if applied in the social world, the aim and verification of the 
lighting up of the lie in the brain would still depend on the confession.
The analysis of the lie detection examination in terms o f ‘grotesque knowledge’ might at first 
glance appear to contradict the principle o f a symmetrical analysis o f knowledge whose 
significance I stressed in the methodology chapter. It seemingly entails a valuation o f the lie 
detection examination as a knowledge practice by pointing towards the indeterminacy o f its 
translation mechanism and its continual disqualification. However, I would venture that while 
my analysis o f the lie detection examination constitutes a form of historical critique, it does not 
run counter to the principle o f symmetry. A distinction needs to be drawn between an 
evaluation o f knowledge based on what seem to be acceptable standards o f knowledge as Alder 
did and the analysis o f the way in which knowledge and power come to intersect in knowledge 
practices. The former necessarily involves a hierarchical view o f science. In my analysis, I have 
not presupposed a standard o f knowledge against which to assess polygraphy and recent 
methods in the cognitive detection o f deception. Rather, I have provided an in-depth account 
o f the social and material relationships which constitute the lie detection examination as 
technique o f knowledge production and intervention that is marked by the entanglement of 
psychological knowledge and interrogation.
By using the term ‘indeterminacy’ I have sought to throw up the complex translation 
mechanism, which defines the lie detection examination in moving from the mechanical
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translation o f an inner bodily movement onto graph paper to not only the diagnosis o f  a 
particular social act but the framing o f guilt in terms o f this act, thus moving in between the 
construction o f scientific and judicial truth. As an applied technique it is its location in 
between the two that also mediates its disqualification since the translation mechanism in the 
lie detection examination cannot be contained within itself. Rather, both with regard to the 
individual case in which the verification can only be provided by the ‘object’ o f knowledge 
itself but also with regard to broader attempts at verification by means o f using ‘solved,’ that 
is adjudicated cases, it has to break its own, and seek its affirmation in a different ‘order’ o f 
truth — the subjective truth o f the individual entailing the danger o f false confessions and 
judicial truth marked by the jeopardy o f false judgments.
This thesis does not seek to make recommendations as to the legitimacy o f  lie detection as a 
knowledge practice overall and whether current attempts at lighting up the lie in the brain 
should or should not be pursued. Interpreting the manner in which I have used the category o f 
the grotesque in this way, would be to misunderstand its analytical purpose. Rather, in throwing 
up the continuities in the way in which lie detection is constructed, I have proceeded in the 
manner o f a critique, which seeks to problematise current knowledge techniques in light o f their 
historical constitution. I have tried to show that the indeterminacy in the translations and their 
disqualification are common to techniques o f lie detection for they draw on a particular notion 
o f the subject in psychology which remains prevalent to this day. The decision as to whether 
this notion o f the subject should be maintained or, rather, whether in the case o f lie detection, it 
can finally be brought to fruition, does not rest with the sociologist. What rests with the 
sociologist o f science and technology is to provide an understanding o f the historicity o f these 
constructions and to convey the curiosity that the continuing attempts at capturing the lie entail 
— which also means throwing up the possibility o f their being otherwise.
8.3 Polygraphy as Tool in the Political Technology of the Body’ and Historiography in the Sociology of 
Science and Technology
How are we to evaluate historically, the different functions that the polygraph examination 
comes to attain in shifting systems of social control? The polygraph examination has been 
marked by its very malleability in following these shifts. It is at once reminiscent o f the old 
system o f torture as a confessional technique at the entrance o f  the criminal justice system, 
combining an inquisitorial logic and the main structure by which knowledge has constructed 
and intervened upon the subject with the emergence o f what Foucault calls disciplinary 
society in the 19th century — the examination; it has spread beyond the criminal justice system 
as disciplinary technique, which directs employee’s behaviour; lastly it has implemented a
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technique o f pre-emptive control as ‘truth facilitator’ in the management and containment of 
classes o f ‘risky’ individuals.
Having sprung from early psychological and criminological discourse it has left behind the aim 
of understanding the criminal’s personality and the application o f an individualised treatment to 
him. As confessional technique, which formed its first and most extensive function, the 
polygraph examination came to operate in the 1930s, as the system of reform was nearing its 
submersion in a logic which has become more and more geared towards the management and 
containment o f a delinquent population, less to be treated but more to be controlled in the 
period since WWII.538 In the latter part o f Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that the 
implementation o f the treatment and rehabilitation o f offenders that has accompanied the 
emergence o f the penal system since the 19th century has had one central effect: the continual 
maintenance and reproduction o f a delinquent population set apart from the rest o f society.539 
Additionally, in his analysis o f the ‘carceral’ society, he points to the continuity o f the 
mechanism o f the prison across society which is instituted on the basis o f graded disciplinary 
techniques.540 Foucault’s analysis o f the carceral society has been the basis o f analyses which 
identify a new phase o f social control which is defined by a radicalisation o f surveillance and a 
shift towards increased control. These interpretations extend his analysis by arguing that 
disciplinary mechanisms do not disappear but are reconfigured by losing their functional 
specificity and by penetrating more deeply into the social body. This is accompanied by the 
diversification o f classical sites o f confinement such as the prison that is supplemented by 
varied measures o f detention and supervision within society. In combination with increased 
technological possibilities of social surveillance they institute the seamless control o f individuals 
in what have been termed ‘post-disciplinary societies’ or ‘societies o f control.’541 Following the 
logic o f increased surveillance and control, the aim o f reform of the individual is increasingly 
framed in terms o f the management and containment of different groups o f delinquents.
As I argued in the last chapter, it is the anachronistic nature o f the polygraph examination, 
which combines the inquisitorial aim of torture by intervening on the body with the benign 
mechanism o f the examination at the entrance o f the criminal justice system that fits into this 
recent logic o f control. It relinquishes the aim o f  understanding the individual offender’s 
personality and applying a treatment to him, but rather centres on the simple apprehension of 
any individual on the basis o f his lie. The extraction o f confessions, which not only renders this 
most uncomfortable o f proofs in terms o f a scientific technique, but also contributes to the 
quick negotiation o f punishment outside o f  court that has become prevalent in the US, allows
538 Simon and Feeley, 1992, p. 457-458.
539 Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 276-277.
540 Ibid, p. 301-303.
541 Campbell (2004); Deleuze (1995).
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for the efficient insertion and management o f delinquents in the criminal justice system. This 
system is no longer interested in the establishment of guilt for a specific offense to which a 
precise punishment can be assigned, and less and less in the individualisation and treatment of 
the offender. Rather, this system is oriented towards the supervision and control o f the 
delinquent population through different measures ranging from imprisonment, variable 
containment, to probation and parole. Here, we find another reason for Larson’s failure to 
implement the clinical team approach. N ot only did it not match the epistemological 
organisation o f criminal investigation, which was and is geared towards the simple 
apprehension o f the offender on the basis o f specialised technical expertise. Furthermore, 
Larson’s approach was set within a model o f knowledge production and intervention which 
centred on the individualisation and treatment of the offender, that has, if not fully, been 
displaced by a new one. By contrast, it is precisely because the polygraph examination has lost 
its depth as ‘technology o f  subjective truth,’ that has secured its continued success at the 
entrance o f the criminal justice system.
As disciplinary technique, the polygraph examination also matches the increased grip of 
surveillance and control. While the polygraph examination still operates according to the logic 
o f disciplinary power when it assumes the function o f moral technology from the 1930s, but 
especially the 1940s onwards, it has lost two o f the central characteristics, which mark the role 
o f the examination as knowledge production technique in disciplinary society: 
individualisation and normalisation. In disciplinary society, the examination operates as tool 
which classifies and hierarchises, which accords the individual ‘his own individuality, and in 
which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the ‘marks’ that 
characterise him and make him a ‘case.’542 It is on the basis o f these ‘gaps’ that his grade of 
abnormality is determined and measures o f his individualised treatment are defined. The 
polygraph examination abandons this feature o f  the examination and instead operates as tool 
o f behavioural supervision and direction o f all employees within commercial and, later more 
exclusively, government institutions -  whether this be through the regular screening o f the 
entire staff or the random screening o f a certain percentage o f employees, which reduces the 
numbers examined, yet seeks to implement the same effect. As ‘truth facilitator’ the role o f 
the examination is equally not to distinguish between the grades o f psychopathic propensity 
o f an individual but rather to re-inscribe into the sex offender as member o f the class of 
monstrous individuals, his irremediable pathology, which needs to be continually controlled. 
While it equally works as disciplinary technique, which directs the offender’s behaviour on the 
basis that transgressions might be known in the future, it also radicalises this function by 
working as tool o f pre-emptive supervision. In inquiring into illicit thoughts or acts o f minor
542 Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 192.
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transgression, which it takes as warnings signs o f  future deeds, to be controlled in the present, 
it most completely matches the new logic o f social control which is geared towards the 
management o f individuals on the basis o f  an assessment o f their ‘riskyness.’
Yet, while the polygraph examination is thus an example o f how psychological techniques 
come to operate in a system o f social control that has become oriented towards the 
management and containment o f ‘risky individuals’ and the radicalisation o f surveillance in 
disciplinary mechanisms, its success also points to the fact that this shift is not 
straightforward and does not follow a single logic or trajectory.
Authors who write about new systems o f social control frequently set this shift within the 
emergence o f new technologies and knowledge practices. Such analyses, for example, focus 
on the development o f the computer, on the basis o f which the generation o f expansive data 
bases with different sets o f information regarding individuals has become possible ranging 
from health data, banking information, consumer patterns, to criminal records. The potential 
linking o f these sets o f information across data bases makes for broader opportunities o f 
surveillance and the management o f conduct across society. As we saw in my discussion o f 
Rose’s networks o f inclusion and exclusion, the intricacy in the way in which computer- 
supported technologies weave themselves through the social body, lies in the fact that they do 
not only constitute a mechanism of top-down surveillance and straightforward control. 
Rather, although they may be used in this respect, their inescapability is also characterised by 
the way in which they operate as diversified mechanism in the constitution o f individuals — in 
the ‘securitisation o f identities.’ The holding o f bank and consumer accounts, credit cards, 
health passes, driver’s licenses, etc. are different points o f passage through which individuals 
must pass in order to act as citizens licensed to participate in a liberal society. In this the logic 
o f surveillance and control lies in the fact that in order to maintain their citizenship, 
individuals must continually prove their credentials in order to enter new ‘circuits o f 
civility.’543 Additionally, writers on new systems of control often focus on a new ‘biopolitics’ 
engendered by the rise o f the life sciences and biomedicine, whereby individuals are 
increasingly constructed on the basis o f their somatic constitution by means o f an analysis o f 
their genetic code, and intervened upon on the basis o f their biological functioning.544 The 
connection o f computer technologies and the ‘somatisation’ o f individuals makes for the 
operation o f ‘post-disciplinary’ systems on the basis o f ‘bio-surveillance modalities’545 — 
ranging from the institution o f DNA-databases for criminal identification to the management 
o f the conduct o f the individual in terms o f his genetic ‘risks.’
543 Rose, 2000, 325-327.
544 Lyon and Zureik (1996); Lyon (2001); Rose (2007); Novas and Rose (2000).
545 Campbell, 2004, p. 79.
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However, the history o f the polygraph examination shows, how knowledge production 
mechanisms, which now seem outdated, nevertheless become part and parcel o f changing 
systems o f social control. In polygraphy, the principles of the examination have not changed 
since the 1930s, nor have the assumptions drawn from early psychological discourse that the 
lie can be teased out on the basis o f the distinction between the emotional body ruled by its 
evolutionary birthright and the deceptive subject. It is thus, that the ‘political technology of 
the body,’ used by Foucault to denote the way in which the emergence o f the human sciences 
and the penal system have come to create a ‘modem soul’ as new mode o f intervention upon 
the body, still holds sway. As one o f the ‘bits’ and ‘pieces’ o f this technology, the different 
functions o f the polygraph examination combine mechanisms which range across the old 
system o f torture and set themselves within the new system o f control in acting upon the 
subjected body o f the criminal and the sex offender as well as the productive body o f the 
commercial and, now more exclusively, the government employee. What unites them is that 
they intervene on the individual by means o f constructing the subject’s inner life on the basis 
o f the movements o f his body. This intervention is framed in terms o f a knowledge that 
combines a physiological interpretation o f what goes on his mind with a normative evaluation 
o f his conduct by rendering the lie as an ‘abnormal’ pattern on the body’s ‘truthful’ script. 
This way of conceiving and taking control o f the human subject’s mind shapes psychology to 
this day. If  anything it has tightened its grip, as we have seen with regard to modelling the 
mind on the basis o f the brain’s functioning.
In moving across the three levels o f the development of lie detection as a knowledge practice, 
the constitution o f the power/knowledge mechanism of the lie detection examination, and 
the functions o f polygraphy as technique o f knowledge production and intervention, this 
thesis has shown, that detailed historical analyses o f the social and material relationships 
which serve in the constitution o f techniques o f knowledge production can usefully be 
combined with the study o f  broader questions o f how psychological techniques are enlisted in 
and shape systems o f social control. Foucauldian analyses o f systems o f  social control and 
social studies o f science have so far remained somewhat separate fields, although they follow 
similar aims in seeking to demonstrate that scientific developments do not follow an 
independent and progressive trajectory but are the result o f (historically) complex social and 
material processes. By studying these processes they both problematise the fixed authority o f 
scientific truth and instead reveal how ‘truth’ — o f the subject, the scientific artefact, or the 
technological object — is variably constructed. This study suggests that by bringing 
Foucauldian analyses and the sociology o f science and technology together they can both 
enrich each other. The former is provided with methodological tools, which allow for fine­
grained analyses o f how scientific techniques and technological objects are elaborated. This
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can make for an analysis o f  the specificity o f how these techniques and objects operate within 
knowledge-based systems o f  control. As a result, the analysis o f shifts within these systems 
might gain in subdety as well as reflexivity in conceptualising these shifts. The latter could be 
sensitised further to a perspective from which to provide contributions to broader questions 
o f how our historical being is constituted in the co-constitution o f various scientific and 
technological developments and processes o f social ordering.
Historical studies in the sociology o f science and technology, especially actor-network-theory, in 
the past, frequently have taken the shape o f developmental accounts, i.e. tracing the processes 
which make objects stable or which account for the failure o f objects to stabilize — i.e. to 
describe the constitution o f technological objects or scientific facts.546 This developmental 
historicity was elaborated in opposition to the philosophy o f science. It has been important in 
debunking notions o f the independent nature o f scientific knowledge and aimed at bringing 
about a positive change in the way in which we think about science, technology and society. In 
these studies, history thus becomes a vehicle through which a different notion o f science and 
technology can be demonstrated. However, the sociological historiography of the sciences is 
not limited to the examination o f scientific facts or technological objects in terms o f their 
development. Additionally, they may contribute in a more extended fashion to studying how we 
are constituted and intervened upon as subjects. It is in this regard that this thesis has aimed to 
make a contribution: to provide a history o f the development o f lie detection as well as 
elaborate an understanding o f the way in which psychological techniques have come to 
construct us as individuals whose mind can be overcome, whose monstrosity can be 
manifested, whose behaviour can be controlled. If  elaborated further, this study, in following 
Foucault, would attempt to move towards a more detailed consideration o f the limits within 
and against which our historical being and the constitution o f ourselves as objects o f knowledge 
is defined. It is with the aim of identifying these limits that I suggest broader directions in the 
study o f the social phenomenon which has provided the background of this thesis -  the lie.
8.4 Preliminary Directions for an Historical Sociology of the Lie
In learned discourse before the turn o f the 19th century, the lie was the province o f the moral 
philosopher and the theologian — the lie seemingly was an object o f moral contemplation. By 
contrast, the emergence o f the human sciences, especially psychology, from the late 19th century
546 Latour (1988; 1996); Pickering (1984; 1995); Bijker (1995). My argument does not suggest that the sociology 
o f science and technology has not contributed to the study o f  how selves are constructed. Indeed there are 
insightful studies, especially within the A N T tradition, which focus on how selves are variously produced as 
part o f  sodo-technical practices. For example, cf. Berg and Mol (1998). However these studies do not take 
an historical perspective.
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onwards, initiates a new discourse on the lie. As part o f this discourse, the lie has been turned 
from an object of moral contemplation to an object of knowledge and, as we have seen with 
regard to lie detection, an object o f intervention. However, outside the human sciences, modern 
philosophy has continued to claim privileged status with regard to the evaluation o f the lie, 
which has informed recent sociological work. Philosophical discussions o f the lie frame the lie 
as an inherently problematic act. They centre on the definition of the lie as normatively loaded 
speech-act (mainly in the philosophy of language) and on elaborations on the question o f what 
constitutes the moral reprehensibility o f the lie (moral philosophy). These discussions are 
constructed in terms o f the continuity o f a philosophical and theological ‘canon’ on the lie 
which usually reaches as far back as Augustine. As might be the case with most ‘canons of 
thought’ the works that are considered part o f it are taken as the most fundamental expositions 
on questions o f lying and are seen to operate within a lineage o f thought (from Augustine,547 
through Thomas Aquinas548 to Kant549). Different thinkers’ works are taken as points o f 
reference upon which an ‘improved’ conception o f the lie is elaborated. In the philosophy of 
language this means a more precise classification of the lie as a certain type of speech 
phenomenon, whereas in moral philosophy this means increased precision in identifying moral 
principles for its evaluation. Correspondingly, the lie in this discourse is seen as a uniform 
concept which is defined by taking recourse to a stable and a-historical moral subject. In these 
discussions, the moral subject is conceptualised as conscious, rationally thinking being who 
should use his reason for the good and for the pursuit o f ‘truth.’ In turn, the lie is frequently 
seen as violating reason and free will — the intellect turning against morality and ‘truth’ in order 
to pursue its own interests. In elaborating on the reprehensibility o f the lie as a moral act, 
philosophy then seeks to ground it in more general and equally a-historical notions o f free will, 
reason, truth, truthfulness and falsehood, and the nature o f good and evil.550 Thus, in discussing 
the foundations for the evaluation o f the lie, authors do not ask whether what appears to be a
547 Augustine wrote two texts on the lie — On Lying (De mendacio, ca. 395) and Against lying  (Contra Mendacio, ca. 
420), cf. St. Augustine (1952a; 1952b).
548 Thomas Aquinas’ treatment o f  the lie is contained in his Summa Theologiae (written between 1266 and 1273). 
Cf. Thomas Aquinas (2006).
549 Kant’s central statement on the lie is ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie Because o f  Philanthropic Concerns’ in A  
Grounding to a Metaphysics of Morals written in 1785 (Kant, 1785/1993).
550 Dietz provides four categories o f  arguments regarding the inadmissibility o f  the lie in contemporary moral 
philosophy and the philosophy o f  language. The first is the ‘domino theory o f  the lie’ which holds that once 
one has lied successfully, one will be encouraged to lie on other occasions (Dietz, 2000, p.2-3). The second 
argument portrays lying as an abuse o f  language. In this view the central communicative purpose o f  language 
is undermined by lying in that it violates the fundamental conditions o f  its use (to convey truthfully one’s 
thoughts, opinions, etc.) (ibid, p. 4-5). The third argument treats the lie as an ‘attack on freedom’. This 
perspective condemns all kinds o f  deceptive action in general as it violates the duty to respect each other’s 
freedom (ibid, p. 6). The fourth and final argument concerns the ‘unity o f  the soul’ and is employed by 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. This argument focuses on the self, in that lying is 
conceptualised in terms o f  a denial o f one’s own self, (ibid, p. 6). For moral philosophical discussions o f  the 
lie cf. Adler (1997); Bok (1978); Baruzzi (1992); Koorsgard (1986); Margolis (1963); Nyberg (1993); Schwarz 
(1970). For discussions that are more oriented towards the definition o f  the lie and language, cf. Chisholm 
and Feehan (1977); Simpson (1992); Reboul (1994); Falkenberg (1982); Weinrich (1966).
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continuous moral problematic o f the lie is not in fact subject to changes, in which the terms o f 
reference would shift so as to transform the search for a universal definition and estimation of 
the lie into the examination of multiple, historically variable practices which, in turn, might 
destabilise current notions o f the moral subject and the associated concepts o f reason, truth, 
truthfulness and falsehood, and good and evil.551
While sociology has tried to give flesh to the lying subject, it has been unsuccessful in fully 
distancing itself from the philosophical approach to the lie. Instead it has replaced the 
elaboration o f abstract moral principles with the evaluation o f different moral contexts. 
Moreover, the sociology o f the lie is an understudied field. Barnes’ study A  Pack of Ues 
represents the only explicit, sustained sociological engagement to date that takes lying as an 
integral part o f social life.552 In his study, Barnes draws on a uniform philosophical definition 
o f the lie. According to Barnes, a lie is ‘a statement intended to deceive a dupe about the state 
o f the world, including the intentions and attitudes o f the liar.’553 The term ‘intending to 
deceive’ is qualified as: ‘intending to cause a dupe to adopt an understanding o f the state o f the 
world and/ or o f the mind o f the liar that the liar believes to be false.’554 In  this conception o f 
the lie, the mendacity o f  a subject’s statement is distinguished from the simple falsehood of 
that statement by means o f a recourse to the intentionality of the subject. Someone who is 
mistaken about the general state o f affairs, may not be intending to lie — he may be 
completely truthful in conveying a falsehood. Similarly, a person who lies may convey 
something true, mistakenly believing that he is conveying something false — although he states 
the truth, he or she is still trying to intentionally mislead a person. Thus, while truth and 
falsehood are thought to belong to the realm o f ontology and epistemology, truthfulness and 
mendacity ‘belong to the moral domain o f intention.’555 On the basis o f this definition, Barnes 
considers ways o f classifying the lie: depending on the intentions o f the deceiver, lies can be 
‘malicious’ or ‘benevolent.’ He then provides an overview of how lying is valued in different 
social domains, in which lying is either expected to happen frequendy and other domains in 
which lying is more heavily sanctioned. For example, warfare and politics are prime areas in
551 Arguments within moral philosophy are more diverse than they may appear in this brief description. For 
example, Nyberg (1993) argues that deception constitutes healthy and socially necessary behaviour and 
investigates instances in which deception may be connected to morally desirable results. However, his work 
is also connected to a moral evaluation o f  deception. There is also a Nietzschean line o f  argumentation in 
philosophy which maintains that ‘truth’ is a ruse to make the meaninglessness o f  reality more bearable. Rue 
(1994) is an example o f  this line o f  thought.
552 Recendy an ethnomethodological study on the lie in everyday life was published, cf. Strauss (2006). Another 
area which studies the lie as a social phenomenon in terms o f  ‘interpersonal deception theory’ is social 
psychology/communication studies. Interestingly, this field grounds its normative conception o f  deception 
partly in physiology, attesting to the translation o f  the conception o f  the lie elaborated in lie detection back 
into psychological thought, cf. Buller and Burgoon, (1996a; 1996b); DePaulo, Ansfield and Bell (1996).
553 Barnes, 1994, p. 11 [my emphasis]. Barnes follows and slighdy adapts Bok’s (1978) definition.
554 Ibid, p. 11 [my emphasis].
555 Ibid, p. 12.
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which lying is presumed to occur on a regular basis.556 There are also so-called ‘ambiguous 
domains’ such as advertising in which the interpretation o f ‘untrue messages’ as lies varies 
according to the roles and expectations o f different social actors, and may be sanctioned or 
condoned accordingly.557 Barnes’ broad overview o f the contextual evaluation o f lying in 
social life largely amounts to a debunking o f debates in moral philosophy which seek to 
ground the moral reprehensibility o f lying in universally applicable principles. However, his 
study has a serious drawback. A contextual analysis o f lying will lend itself to becoming a 
treatment o f  lying in terms o f its social or moral evaluation and come to centre on an 
explanation o f the social domains in which it takes place, for example how much they are 
characterised by trust or mistrust. As a result, we lose sight o f the lie as a social phenomenon 
per se. Additionally, by adopting a uniform philosophical definition o f the lie, a stable 
(modern) notion o f the subject is maintained, which cements a particular relationship 
between intentionality, truth, truthfulness and falsehood, and the morally problematic nature 
o f the lie.
How to eschew a contextual analysis o f lying that is based on a stable definition o f the lie and 
the subject? Taking the three central dimensions o f the definition o f the lie — intentionality (and 
associated philosophical concepts such as consciousness and free will), questions o f truth, truthfulness and 
falsehood, and the normativity o f the lie — one might investigate the variable relationships that 
they assume. This means problematising how they are configured in a specific historical 
location, rather than presupposing a stable relationship between them. We might explore the 
lie detection examination in criminal investigation as a potential example for such a 
problematisation.
As regards the first set o f concepts — intentionality, consciousness, free m il — in lie detection we 
have encountered a certain elaboration o f the relationship between the functions o f the mind 
and the body which centres on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary processes. 
The lie is constructed in terms o f a struggle o f these two processes whereby the ‘baser’ 
processes o f the body, the so-called fight-and-flight system o f the Autonomic Nervous 
System, turns against the ‘deceptive consciousness’ thus giving it away. This fight-and-flight 
system is characterised by two emotions: fear and anger. The distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary processes is supplemented by a distinction between the ‘internal,’ i.e. truthful, 
and ‘external,’ i.e. deceptive functionings, o f the body. Whereas the external appearance of 
the body is subject to the mind’s deceptive control, the internal mechanisms o f the body rage 
freely - ‘externalising’ them by means o f  physiological instruments allows to make this false 
appearance visible. Thus, instead o f speaking o f a possible notion o f intentionality here, it
556 Ibid, p. 20-35.
557 Ibid, p. 36-53.
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needs to be replaced by a particular configuration o f the interaction between mind and body 
that is assumed in early psychological discourse.
The second set o f concepts — truth, truthfulness, falsehood, is closely entwined with the first. The 
physiological conception of the lie used in lie detection posits particular physiological states 
which, in combination with the utterances o f a person, suggest that he or she is speaking the 
truth or lying. In the development o f the detection o f deception, strict rules become 
elaborated as to the form in which truth or falsehood can be uttered — from the elaboration 
o f a narrative to the eventual simple negation o f a state o f affairs by means o f ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answers. Correspondingly, we found different representations o f ‘truth’ and ‘lie’ in the 
development o f lie detection — while both took the shape o f distinct generalisable curves in 
William Moulton Marston’s research in 1914, truth and lie are distinguished on the basis of 
constancy and variability from John Larson’s research in 1923 onwards. The interpretation of 
a statement as truth or lie is based on the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
physiological reactions, which are elaborated on the basis o f how the human sciences 
construct the human subject as knowable object.
This takes us to the third dimension — the normativity of the lie. The physiological and normative 
evaluation o f the lie as ‘abnormal’ was further extended in that truth and falsehood were 
equivocated to guilt and innocence, respectively. But this relationship is not an intrinsic one, 
as may be suggested in moral philosophy. The abstract moral subject is replaced by the 
criminal suspect whose utterances are taken to indicate his guilt or his innocence depending 
on the ‘normality’^  ‘truthfulness’ or ‘abnormality’ = ‘mendacity’ o f his bodily reactions. The 
resolution for the guilty subject — the confession, results in both mental and physiological 
relief — the body returns to its ‘normal’ functioning while the sinner expects the penance for 
his crime. The lie here becomes a site o f intervention which is connected to specific 
normative effects that are induced by a certain technology o f knowledge production — lie 
detection and the wider sphere o f crime detection within which it is located.
This reframing o f the dimensions o f  intentionality, truth, truthfulness and falsehood, and 
normativity in terms o f their historical configuration in the lie detection examination in 
criminal investigation, demonstrates how the lie may be approached from a perspective which 
does not presuppose a certain conception o f the subject nor a uniform definition o f the lie. 
By contrast it provides an alternative approach in taking the three central dimensions as 
heuristics on the basis o f which to investigate current elaborations o f the lie in relation to an 
historically constituted subject. Early psychological discourse on the lie put to work a 
particular conception o f the subject — as I have outlined, as one o f the bits and pieces o f the 
political technology of the body,’ it constructed the subject as ‘psyche,’ ‘personality,’ or
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‘consciousness’ on the basis o f his bodily movements.558 This was translated into lie detection 
by means o f constructing the ‘truth’ o f what goes on in the subject’s mind through the split o f 
voluntary and involuntary processes o f the body, by framing the lie as a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answer 
and refashioning its morality around the notion o f abnormal functionings o f the body.
This particular configuration points to the necessity o f abandoning uniform conceptions o f 
the lie in Western philosophy, which, although in a more contextualised fashion, have 
dominated what litde sociological thought there is on lying. An alternative form to studying 
the lie sociologically means to study it as an historical practice, to analyse how it is framed, 
where and by whom it is used and deployed, and how its normativity is constructed. Such 
studies would be supported by an historiographical premise set out by Foucault in ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History.’ In opposing Paul Ree’s treatment of the history o f morality as a linear 
movement, Foucault develops his notion o f genealogy which
must record the singularity o f  events outside o f  any monotonous finality: it must seek them in the most 
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history — in sentiments, lover, conscience, 
instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve o f  their 
evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy 
must define even those instances where they are absent, the moment when they remain unrealized (Plato, 
at Syracuse, did not become Mohammed).
As a result,
genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze o f  the philosopher might 
compare to the molelike perspective o f  the scholar, on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical 
deployment o f  ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.559
Apart from providing an analysis o f the emergence and development o f lie detection, this 
study might be seen as a starting point in this respect. If  it has not provided a genealogy o f 
the lie, by focusing on a shift which has turned it from an object o f moral contemplation to 
an object o f knowledge and intervention, it has at least enabled a reflection on how current 
thought proceeds with regard to lying and to problematise the ‘monotonous finality’ o f 
approaches to the lie in philosophy and sociology. Thus in returning one last time to 
Montaigne, whom I cited at the beginning o f this thesis and who complained about the lie’s 
one ‘hundred thousand shapes and undefined limits,’ studies o f the lie as an historically 
variable practice could provide a fruitful starting point for a nascent historical sociology o f the 
lie. However, sociologists would not proceed in the manner o f good Pythagorean 
philosophers, who, if  they cannot control its hundred thousand shapes, will at least make its 
concept appear as ‘definite and finite’ entity. Rather, as I have hopefully been able to show, 
they would release the lie and the truth that is spoken about it — whether as seeming object of
558 Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 29-30.
559 Foucault, 1977, p. 139-140.
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moral contemplation or scientific investigation — into the multiplicity o f its historical 
constructions.
As regards further possible contributions that may be provided on the basis o f this thesis, 
there are two directions in which it might be taken. First, as I indicated in the methodology 
chapter, this study could be complemented by a broader comparative study o f the 
development o f the ‘sciences o f credibility’ at the intersection o f criminal justice systems in 
the US and Europe. This would trace the divergent developments as regards the integration 
o f  psychology in the rendering o f subjective truth in judicial processes. As I outlined, while 
legal and applied psychology had common roots in the early 20th century in both geographical 
locations, in Europe research on the physiological detection o f deception soon stagnated, 
while a focus was placed on witness psychology. Witness psychology centred on the 
evaluation o f whether a mtnesi statement could be seen to be credible based on the 
assessment o f the ‘objective’ capacity o f his mind to represent past events on the basis o f 
studies o f memory and perception. By contrast, witness psychology made little headway in the 
US, where the construction o f credibility came to focus on the evaluation o f the ‘subjective’ 
truthfulness o f the suspect on the basis o f the movements o f the body. Moreover, since the 
1960s, methods o f detecting deception have been developed within the ‘psychology of 
testimony’ in Europe, which focus on the analysis o f the verbal content o f the subject by 
means o f quantitative content analysis. A comparative analysis would trace these divergent 
developments by examining how ‘subjective truth’ is problematised and its knowability 
elaborated at the intersection o f  legal psychology and judicial systems. This would involve 
studying the three dimensions o f intentionality, truth, truthfulness and falsehood, and 
normativity, by means o f examining how the ‘truth-speaking’ subject is constructed on the 
basis o f where subjective truth is located -  in memory, the body, or in speech — and how 
these constructions intersect with the framing o f judicial truth and the ‘psycho-legal’ subject 
in the accusatorial system o f the US versus the inquisitorial system in continental Europe. 
Secondly, the study o f the transformation o f the lie from an object o f  moral contemplation to 
an object o f knowledge might be broadened through the study o f the construction o f 
deceptive human types in the history o f psychology. This would include an examination o f 
writings in early psychology which elaborate classifications o f lies and human types o f liars, 
ranging from the ‘occasional,’ the ‘habitual,’ to the figure o f the ‘pathological liar’, the person 
suffering from so-called ‘pseudologiaphantastica,’560 As is typical in psychological discourse, these 
types are framed in terms o f ascending grades o f abnormality. While the occasional liar is 
conceptualised as ‘bad’ liar in the sense that he is not well-practiced in lying and is fully 
conscious o f his transgression in achieving a certain end, the pathology o f the pathological liar
560 A good example o f this is Duprat (1903).
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is precisely constituted by the fact that his lying does not follow an apparent motive, it 
represents ‘a falsification disproportionate to any discernible end in view.’561 The mental 
processes o f the pathological liar are likened to the ones found in the poet or author o f 
fiction who expresses an urge for self-expression and views the creation o f fictional stories as 
an end in itself.562 However, those processes are radicalised in that the pathological liar can no 
longer distinguish between ‘truth’ and ‘fiction.’ Rather, the desire for self-expression is 
connected to a ‘deep-set egocentrism,’563 which is expressed in the disregard for others and 
the ‘social antagonism’ that the pathological liar’s fabrications causes.
The historical study o f ‘deceptive types’ would place a focus on the ‘rationality’ o f the lie in 
exploring how the three dimensions o f intentionality/consciousness, truth, truthfulness and 
falsehood, and the normativity o f the lie are configured around a certain relationship between 
rational, means-end related action and the boundary between reality and fiction, that marks 
the ‘occasional liar’ as transgressing moral bounds but in a ‘normal’ manner, while 
constituting the pathological liar as ‘abnormal’ in acting irrationally by disregarding what is 
real and what is not. Such a study could tie in with the analysis o f the sex offender as 
monstrous individual, by analysing the transformations, that the elaboration o f  ‘abnormal’ 
human types in terms o f their deceptiveness have undergone from the emergence o f the 
pathological liar, whose ‘condition’ was originally associated with hysteria and epilepsy to the 
definition o f the sex offender in terms o f his ‘dishonest lifestyle.’
On a final, more speculative and future-directed note, a genealogical study o f  the lie might be 
conceived, which would give the moral concept o f the lie in modem philosophy a history in 
terms o f its problematisationy that is by studying how and why the lie has become a problem.564 
Forrester has suggested that the importance given to the utterance o f ‘truth’ in Western 
society might have its origins in the public pronouncement o f faith and martyrdom that is 
rooted in evangelism.565 Such a study might therefore reach as far back as early Christianity. In 
this process it might trace the history o f the modern conception o f the lie and its web of 
relationships in Thomas Aquinas’ and Augustine’s biblical exegeses as well as Kant’s critical 
philosophy among others. However, this would mean examining them not in terms o f their 
continuity but in terms o f the different historical interventions they represent within systems 
o f thought and practice.566
561 Healy, 1929, p. 729.
562 Healy and Healy, 1915, p. 20-21.
563 Ibid, p. 250.
564 Foucault, 2001, p. 171.
565 Forrester, 1997, p. 8.
566 In this respect, Zagorin’s study on practices o f  religious dissimulation in early modern Europe might provide 
directions for such a study. It provides an examination o f  how religious dissimulation was justified by groups 
subject to religious persecution on the basis o f  early church fathers’ biblical exegesis, cf. Zagorin (2000).
215
9. Appendix A: Overview of Archival Material
Northwestern University Archives
At Northwestern University, I surveyed part o f  the Archives’ holdings on the Scientific Crime 
Detection Laboratory in 2002. The Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory was founded in 1929 
and affiliated with NWU’s School o f Law. The SCDL was sold to the Chicago Police 
Department by Northwestern University in 1938 due to financial pressures. The SCDL 
included a psychology department which was run by Leonarde Keeler. I was told by one o f the 
archivists that Leonarde Keeler removed most o f the case files when he was let go by the SCDL 
— this was confirmed by correspondence I found on the disappearance o f Keeler’s files.567 
The Archives hold a general file on the SCDL which contains newspaper clippings, course 
materials, and the ‘Outline o f Scientific Crime Investigation’ published by the SCDL, etc. The 
remaining sources on the SCDL are contained within individuals’ papers who dealt with the 
SCDL in an official capacity:
Walter D ill Scott Papers
Walter Dill Scott, a well-known psychology professor, served as president o f NWU during 
the period o f the affiliation o f the SCDL with NWU. I surveyed box 35 o f the papers which 
include material relating to the setting up, maintenance, and financial upkeep concerning the 
SCDL in the period from 1930 until 1938.
John Henry Wigmore Pipers
John Henry Wigmore served as dean o f the Northwestern University School o f Law and his 
papers include correspondence on organisational matters relating to the SCDL. I surveyed 
boxes 103 and 104, which relate to the organisational activities o f the Scientific Crime 
Detection Laboratory.
Wigmore was an important figure in the development o f legal rules o f evidence — he wrote a 
ten-volume work codifying different types and rules o f evidence. ‘The Wigmore’ was one o f 
the most important reference sources for lawyers when it came to rules o f evidence and 
updated editions were produced on a regular basis.
Peon Green Papers
Leon Green succeeded Wigmore as dean o f the School o f Law. Again, most o f the surveyed 
sources relate to organisational matters concerning the SCDL. I consulted boxes 17 and 18 of
567 Fred Inbau wrote a letter to Leon Green that Katherine Keeler, Leonarde Keeler’s wife, had removed ‘all 
polygraph or “lie detector” records’ among other items’ (LGP, Box 17, Folder 12: letter to Leon Green by 
Fred Inbau, 20/7/1938).
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the papers which contain reports o f the activities o f the SCDL including weekly and monthly 
reports by Leonarde Keeler for the period from 1932 until 1938.
Fred Inbau Papers
I surveyed 17 boxes which form part o f the collection. Fred Inbau was a member o f the 
School o f Law faculty and a member o f the SCDL during its affiliation with NWU. Inbau 
worked with Keeler at the SCDL and is another well-known figure in the development o f lie 
detection. When the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory was sold to the Chicago Police 
Department in 1938, he assumed the position o f the Director o f the Laboratory before 
establishing himself as professor o f law at Northwestern University. Inbau was one o f  the 
most outspoken opponents o f the curbing o f police powers in criminal interrogation, 
campaigning against the institution o f the so-called Miranda ruling implemented in 1966, 
which requires police officers to inform arrestees o f their rights. In  addition to his legal career 
he maintained and avid interested in lie detection throughout his life publishing widely on the 
topic. The papers mainly contain material relating to his publication activities on lie detection 
and legal evidence and his campaign against the Miranda ruling.
Except for some o f the sources contained in the Leon Green Papers and most o f the sources 
in the Fred Inbau Papers, the other collections described above relate to the institutional 
history o f the SCDL, i.e. the setting up, the maintenance, the continuing financial difficulties 
and eventual sale o f the laboratory.
Bancroft Library, University o f  California at Berkeley
At the Bancroft Library I surveyed the papers o f three individuals — August Vollmer, John 
Larson and Leonarde Keeler as part o f two archival visits in 2002 and 2005. In the 1920s the 
first polygraph experiments were carried out by John Larson, Leonarde Keeler and others at 
the Berkeley Police Department, then headed by August Vollmer, one o f  the main figures in 
the police professionalisation movement in the first third o f the 20th century.
August Vollmer Papers B A N C  M SS C-B 403
Vollmer was head o f the Berkeley Police Departm ent from 1905 until 1931 and later taught 
police administration at the University o f California at Berkeley. He taught at the University 
o f Chicago from 1929 until 1931. Vollmer was considered to be one o f the pioneers in 
developing the ‘m odern’ police force, i.e. a college-educated professional police force 
trained in methods o f ‘scientific’ crime investigation. As chief o f  the Berkeley Police 
Department he oversaw John Larson’s first experiments into lie detection and was
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considered a lifelong mentor by Leonarde Keeler who worked under Larson at the Berkeley 
Police Department.
In total the collection comprises 46 boxes, 7 cartons, 3 volumes and 2 oversize folders.
Most o f the sources I surveyed either related to background information on the social 
networks surrounding lie detection (the SCDL, the relationship between Larson and Keeler), 
or were newspaper clippings on the polygraph or papers or speeches given by Vollmer on 
police professionalism that referred to the polygraph in one way or another.
John Larson Papers B A N C  M SS 78/160
John Larson was one o f the main figures in the development o f lie detection, developing the 
final set-up o f the lie detection examination and moving lie detection more closely into 
criminal investigation. Larson joined the Berkeley Police Department in 1920, moving to the 
Institute for Juvenile Research in Chicago in 1923. Larson worked for four years as 
Experimental Psychologist at the Institute for Juvenile Research and in the Illinois 
Department o f Criminology in Chicago. In this period he received his medical degree, 
establishing himself as psychiatrist for the rest o f his career.
I surveyed 6 out o f the 10 cartons which made up the papers in 2002, which at that point had 
not been properly catalogued. When I finished reviewing the collection in 2005, the collection 
had been catalogued and re-arranged into 6 cartons and 3 boxes. Unfortunately the 3 boxes 
containing Larson’s correspondence were still in processing when I visited the archive and were 
therefore inaccessible. A fair proportion of the papers consist o f different kinds of polygraph 
read-outs which mostly did not include any interpretation o f the charts. Additionally, the papers 
contained newspaper clippings, various materials relating to lie detection including brochures by 
instrument manufacturers, articles relating to lie detection and psychology, articles and drafts o f 
papers published or given by Larson, as well as drafts o f material for a second o f his monograph 
Lying and Its Detection,568 originally published in 1932. These drafts have been most useful in 
reconstructing the conflict between Larson and Keeler.
Leonarde Keeler Papers B A N C  M SS 76/40 c
Next to Larson, Leonarde Keeler was considered one o f the most influential figures in the 
development o f the polygraph. Keeler developed and patented the polygraph. He was 
instrumental in the development o f polygraphy as independent profession through the 
commercialisation o f the instrument and polygraph operator training as well as developing 
the application o f polygraphy in personnel screening. He enjoyed a certain degree o f 
popularity in the media and was one o f the first polygraphers to set up his own independent 
polygraph business and training institution. Keeler carried out his first experiments on lie
568 Larson (1932).
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detection at the police department in Berkeley in the early 1920s, moving to the Institute for 
Juvenile Research in Chicago in 1928 and joining the SCDL in Chicago in 1929. After having 
been let go by the SCDL after its sale in 1938 he set up his own polygraph business Keeler Inc.
I surveyed 2 cartons out o f the 3 cartons, 1 box, and 1 oversize volume which make up the 
collection in 2002 and completed the survey in 2005. The cartons contain a fair amount o f 
biographical material (membership in societies, clubs, etc.), articles by Keeler and others on 
lie detection, criminal investigation and law enforcement, newspaper articles on Keeler, 
addresses and speeches by Keeler, drawings o f early polygraphs, correspondence relating to 
the patenting and commercialisation o f the polygraph, as well as correspondence on issues 
regarding the polygraph, criminal cases, and his relationship with Marston and Larson. 
Especially his correspondence with August Vollmer, whom he considered a life-long mentor 
gives insight into his activities at the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory and the conflict 
which developed between him and Larson.
Charles Keeler Papers B A N C  M SS 93/122 c
Charles Keeler, Leonarde Keeler’s father, was a well-known local poet in Berkeley. The 
collection consists o f 12 boxes and 14 cartons. The collection o f his papers includes 
correspondence, writings, diaries, notes, and clippings. I surveyed Box 7, which contains his 
correspondence with Leonarde Keeler.
Berkeley Police Department Records B A N C  M SS 721227c
The Records consist o f 49 boxes and 15 cartons and cover the period from 1909 until 1932, 
when August Vollmer was head o f  the department. They mainly consist o f Vollmer’s 
correspondence with law enforcement officers, city officials, private, governmental and 
professional associations, and contains budget data as well as some speeches. As my focus 
was not on the institutional history o f the department, I only surveyed boxes 10 and 11
which contain the correspondence with individuals involved in the development o f lie
detection, i.e. John Larson, William M oulton Marston, and Leonarde Keeler.
Leonarde Keeler Collection at the Dr. William J. Yankee Library, Department o f  
Defence Polygraph Institute, Fort Jackson, SC
The collection was donated to the Department o f  Defence Polygraph Institute by Leonard 
Harrelson who took over Keeler’s business when Keeler died rather young in 1949. It 
consists o f 43 boxes, 2 drawers with folders, 5 binders as well as a box with material on a 
murder case, which the department uses as introductory material on the history o f 
polygraphy. The collection does not contain the case files that went missing from the SCDL
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nor files o f Leonarde Keeler’s own cases after he had opened his own business. There are 
some scattered case materials and a collection o f scripts o f the radio programme ‘Hidden 
Truth’ that was broadcast between 1950 and 1952 and which was based on Keeler’s most 
prominent cases. The collection consists o f material relating to the SCDL, information on 
instruments, Keeler’s correspondence, material relating to the training o f polygraph operators, 
a collection o f reprints of articles on various (mosdy physiological) subjects, Keeler’s notes on 
several ardcles and bibliographies drawn up by him, a notebook containing notes and 
drawings on experiments Keeler carried out using the polygraph in Berkeley in 1925, a 
research paper on physiological reactions o f mental padents using the polygraph, polygraph 
brochures, a survey o f police departments on the use o f the polygraph carried out by Keeler, 
and 3 boxes containing drafts by Keeler’s sister, Eloise Keeler, for her biography o f Keeler. 
The Lie Detector Man,569 The collection additionally contains material on Keeler’s involvement 
in questioning German prisoners o f war after World War II.
569 Keeler (1983).
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